

AFRICA IN GLOBAL POLITICS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

A Pan-African Perspective



OLAYIWOLA ABEGUNRIN





SHOUT
SHARE **IT**

Africa in Global Politics in the Twenty-First Century

ALSO BY OLAYIWOLA ABEGUNRIN

Nigeria in Global Politics: Twentieth Century and Beyond: Essays in Honor of Professor Olajide Aluko (Co-editor with Olusoji Akomolafe), 2006

Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966–1999, 2003

The Political Economy of South-South Cooperation: Towards A New International Economic Order (Co-editor with Franklin Vivekananda), 1998

Nigeria and the Struggle for the Liberation of Zimbabwe: A Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making of an Emerging Nation, 1992

Economic Dependence and Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: SADCC and South Africa in Confrontation, 1990

United States Foreign Policy Towards Southern Africa: Andrew Young and Beyond (Co-author with H.E. Newsum), 1987


African Development: The OAU/ECA Lagos Plan of Action and Beyond (Co-editor with Ralph I. Onwuka and D. N. Ghista), 1985

AFRICA IN GLOBAL POLITICS IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

A PAN-AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE

OLAYIWOLA ABEGUNRIN

palgrave
macmillan



AFRICA IN GLOBAL POLITICS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Copyright © Olayiwola Abegunrin, 2009.

All rights reserved.

First published in 2009 by

PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®

in the United States—a division of St. Martin's Press LLC,

175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN: 978-0-230-61890-9

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Abegunrin, Olayiwola.

Africa in global politics in the twenty-first century : a pan African perspective / Olayiwola Abegunrin.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-230-61890-9

1. Africa, Sub-Saharan—Foreign relations—1960– 2. Africa, Sub-Saharan—Politics and government—1960– 3. Africa, Sub-Saharan—Social conditions—1960– 4. Nigeria—Foreign relations—1960– 5. Nigeria—Politics and government—1960– 6. Nigeria—Social conditions—1960– 7. South Africa—Foreign relations—1994– 8. South Africa—Politics and government—1994– 9. South Africa—Social conditions—1994– 10. World politics—21st century. I. Title.

DT30.5.A247 2009

327.67—dc22

2009000632

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.

First edition: October 2009

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed in the United States of America.

Dedicated to
Professor Sulayman S. Nyang
My teacher, mentor, friend
And to all those who have dedicated their lives to achieving
stability, unity, peace, and security in Africa

This page intentionally left blank

Contents

<i>List of Tables</i>	ix
<i>Preface</i>	xi
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xv
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xvii
Introduction	1
1 Nigeria and the Struggle for the Liberation of South Africa	5
2 Nigeria and South Africa in the Global Forum	29
3 Post-Apartheid South Africa: New Challenges and Dilemmas	45
4 Southern African Development Community and the New South Africa	69
5 Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts in Africa	83
6 Peace, Security, and Human Survival in Africa	113
7 From Organization of African Unity to African Union	141
8 New Partnership for Africa's Development: Politics of Dependence	173
9 Pan-Africanism and Unity: A Wake-up Call to Africans	191
<i>Notes</i>	203
<i>Selected Bibliography</i>	239
<i>Index</i>	251

This page intentionally left blank

Tables

5.1	Major ethnic conflicts in Africa, 1967–2007	106
6.1	The top ten U.S. sources of oil as of 2005	118
6.2	African oil production by country, 1993–2003	122

This page intentionally left blank

Preface

This book brings together my work in the course of twenty-eight years of teaching, reflections, and research on Nigeria, South Africa, and Africa at various academic institutions in Africa, Europe, and the United States. As such, this book reflects successive stages of my evolving thinking about Nigeria, South Africa, and Africa's international relations. As the title suggests, the common thread that binds the chapters in this book together are challenges confronting Africa, opportunities for Africa, and the changes that are needed, viewed, as major issues facing Africans in the twenty-first century. In other words, the theme of the essential political, socioeconomic, and cultural unity of Africa, as eloquently advocated by Kwame Nkrumah undergirds these essays. The essays in this book show that six centuries of unequal and asymmetrical relations between Africa and Europe characterized by domination and exploitation through the successive historical processes of slavery, commercialism, imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, and globalization have left Africa *undeveloped, marginalized*, and still politically, economically, and culturally dependent on the Western powers as never seen before in our historical relations with the West. At the same time, African governments have not been able to devise any strategy of their own for solving (solution of their own for) the multitudes of their problems. The analysis in this book is supported by a detailed study of Nigeria's efforts to liberate South Africa from the white apartheid rule, and Nigeria–South Africa relations; Nigeria's efforts at strengthening the Economic Community of the West African States by initiating the Economic Community of the West African States Observer Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), while South Africa, in its post apartheid era, energized the regional integration of the Southern Africa subregion and the transformation of the former Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to Southern African Development Community (SADC). The analysis also deals with ethnicity and ethnic conflicts, and approaches to find solutions to ethnic conflicts and civil wars in the continent.

Another motivation for this book is my concern about the African perspective of the numerous economic, political, and security problems plaguing the continent, especially at a period when the world has entered a new Millennium (twenty-first century). The end of the Cold War is witnessing the emergence of global ethnicity and ethnic conflicts, refugee crisis, U.S.

proposed AFRICOM, and the rising of the deadly disease of HIV/AIDS pandemic, with Africa becoming the victim of this killer disease.

Chapter 1 examines Nigeria's contributions toward the liberation of South Africa, and Nigeria-South Africa relations since the end of apartheid in 1994. The first section deals with the shared colonial heritage of the two countries, followed by an analysis of the apartheid system in South Africa, and Nigeria's determined abhorrence to the racist philosophy. Nigeria's diplomatic offensive against the apartheid policy is followed by an examination of Nigeria's support for the African liberation movements in Southern Africa as well as Nigeria's post-apartheid policy; and relations with the new democratic South Africa. The last section of the chapter critically examines the future relations and global challenges confronting Nigeria and South Africa. Chapter 2 treats the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa after the end of apartheid, and the beginning of rivalry for the leadership of the African continent between Nigeria and South Africa. This chapter shows that the issue of a permanent seat for Africa in the United Nations Security Council, which is of much interest by the Africans, has particularly caught the imagination of the proponents of Nigeria-South Africa rivalry.

Chapter 3 deals with the post apartheid South Africa, and challenges and dilemmas facing the new South Africa under African majority rule. This chapter shows that the leadership of Nelson Mandela helped brought South Africa out of its political misery transforming it in a matter of few years from a pariah state to a legitimate, enviable actor in African continent and within the international system. Chapter 4 focuses on Southern African Development Community and the New South Africa. This chapter traces its historical foundation from the 1980, Lusaka Declaration of Southern African Development Coordination Conference to its transformation to Southern African Development Community on August 17, 1992, with a Declaration and Treaty establishing SADC which replaced, the former SADCC. The entry of a democratic, non-racial South Africa into SADC has given a major boost to efforts already underway to promote regional cooperation and integration in Southern Africa. It has also enlarged the overall size of the regional market and created new opportunities for cooperation in many areas.

Chapter 5 implicitly shows that the nation-states in Africa have massively failed to find solution to their ethnic conflicts. Despite the heady optimism of the 1960s, nowhere have hothouse methods of ethnic conflicts resolution actually succeeded. Nigeria is used as a case study of ethnicity and ethnic conflict in Africa. Somewhat like an opportunistic virus, ethnicity has found niches in stubborn reality of Africa. Chapter 6 deals with Nigeria's, South Africa's, and Africa's capabilities and potential in the

areas of energy and natural resources supply to the global communities in the twenty-first century. In addition, it examines peace, security, and human survival from African perspectives. It was argued in this chapter that peace, security, and human survival depend not only on weapons, or military balance, but also on international cooperation to ensure a sustainable peaceful environment, sustainable development, and prosperity based on equitably shared resources.

Chapter 7 examines the relative effectiveness and weaknesses of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) since its inception and transformation to African Union in July 2002. With a critical analysis of the influence of Nigeria, South Africa, and Libya in its transformation to African Union in 2002, and its problems, and prospects in the twenty-first century. Chapter 8 is on New Partnership for Africa's Development, and prospects of development in Africa. It is observed that NEPAD's biggest danger is that it could collapse due to lack of resources/funds of its own. Unless it secures direct foreign investments and fair trade policy from the external sources, it could become just another pointless product of vanity. This chapter argued that ultimate solution to Africa's deep-seated but not insurmountable problems lies in the development of the continent's natural and human resources by its own people. And that African leaders must wake up and work for cooperation and economic integration of Africa and should realize that only an African initiative with genuine commitment and ready to police themselves can ensure stability, good governance, accountability, and authentic development.

The final chapter aptly entitled, "Pan-Africanism and Unity" is "a Wake-up Call to Africans." It contains suggestions for the survival and unity of Africa entails the revival, and implementation of Kwame Nkrumah's original Pan-African Projects of the 1960s as updated by Edem Kodjo's impassioned plea of a great hope in the future of Africa Tomorrow. Emphasizing a rationalized Pan-Africanism, and unity for survival, and Alpha Oumar Konare's advocate of a Pan-African Union are solidly based on both history and present realities of the twenty-first century. Such strategy also requires awareness by Africans wherever we are, of the role we can, and should play in Africa and the world to make it better for all. Such a new approach is what Africa needs to work for today, what other countries and international institutions can help foster, and what Africa Tomorrow is all about.

This page intentionally left blank

Acknowledgments

The publication of a book is a convenient time to acknowledge publicly the debt incurred in the course of its writing. I welcome this opportunity, knowing fully that such debts can never be repaid, but only reciprocated.

In the course of my academic career in three continents, I am indebted to a number of people, without whose assistance, this book would not have been possible. I am very grateful to all the people who have assisted me in writing this book. First and foremost among them is my mentor, teacher, and friend Professor Sulayman Sheih Nyang, to whom this book is dedicated. Professor Nyang has been the pillar for my academic growth from my student days at Howard University. He is a steadfast friend, without, his gentle advice, suggestions, and constant prodding this book will not have been written. Professor Sulayman Nyang is a scholar I dignify because he has dignity and integrity. I have gained much from intellectual interaction with such scholars and friends as Professors Charles Pryor T.N. Igboeli, Kwadwo Pobbi-Asamani, Julius Okolo, Olajide Aluko, J. Ayodele Langley, Ralph I. Onwuka, Emeka Nwokedi, and Robert Mundt (all of whom have passed away, may their souls rest in perfect peace). Those who have contributed to shape my perspectives on African politics and international relations, and I benefited greatly from include: Charles Pryor, who was the first to encourage me to study international relations, T.N. Igboeli, Kwadwo Pobbi-Asamani, Julius Okolo, Sulayman S. Nyang, J. Ayodele Langley, Luis B. Serapiao, Bereket Selassie, and Ronald Walters. My sincere gratitude to Professor Adeoye Akinsanya of Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria, Bayo Oyeade of Tennessee State University, Nashville, and Sabella Abidde of Howard University both of them read the entire manuscript and gave very useful, constructive criticism and valuable suggestions. Many thanks to my graduate assistants Shameka Nicole Cathey for proofreading and Sarian Samura for printing of the entire manuscript, and Lisa Brown, for providing some research materials, and Soji Akomolafe, Norfolk States University, Virginia who read a part of the manuscript, I am also grateful to Dr. Christiana Okechukwu of Montgomery College for reading and editing part of the draft of the

manuscript and gave valuable suggestions. My gratitude to former Nigerian Ambassador to the United States Dr. George Obiozor (2003–2007), and his Political Attache, Dr. Umunna Orjiako for his advice and suggestions, especially on the chapter on Nigeria and the liberation of South Africa and foreign aid to Africa. I thank the South African Information Marketing Officer to the United States Juan A. Henriquez and Mr. Pahukeni Titus, First Secretary, Embassy of Republic of Namibia in Washington, DC. I extend my gratitude to my sons Olayiwola, Jr., for compiling data on the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and the Constitutive Act of the African Union and Oladimeji for searching for maps on the Web intended for but ultimately not used on the cover for this book. I thank all my graduate students in the graduate courses, that I teach in the Department of Political Science at Howard University: *Africa in World Politics; Problems in African Politics; Government and Politics of Southern Africa, and Seminar in Political Economy*. I am particularly grateful to Lionel Isaacs for providing me with very useful information on African National Congress and the civil society in South Africa, and also to Maria Nghidinwa who provided me with very useful information on Namibian trade. I thank Salam Sudan Foundation (SSF) for making my trip to Sudan and Darfur possible to see things for my self with my own eyes. I am very grateful to the editor-in-chief of *Journal of the Third World Spectrum* for permission to use my article on “Post-apartheid South Africa: An Analysis on Regional Perspectives,” from *Journal of the Third World Spectrum*, volume 6, no. 2, fall 1999. I am very grateful to Drs. Babalola Cole, Michael Nwanze, Mae King, Daryl Harris, Lorenzo Morris, Ms. Javenia Lilly, Ms. Saphronia Drake, and Ms. Taylor, all of Department of Political Science, Howard University, and Professor Vincent Thompson of Connecticut College, New London, Connecticut.

The convention of acknowledgment places last a gratitude, which in the sincerity of my mind comes first—that is to my immediate family. To my wife, Funmilola Emiola Atoke, my best friend, and companion, she has been an indispensable fountain of inspiration and a source of indefatigable support. As my best friend and life partner, her unwavering love and support are wellsprings of my life. My love to my children, for their continued and remarkable understanding of my academic life (profession), during my constant absence from home while writing this book. However, I am solely responsible for any error of fact, omission, and interpretation.

Olayiwola Abegunrin, Ph.D.
New Carrollton, Maryland
December 2008

Abbreviations

AAMS	Associated African and Malagasy States
AAP	African Action Plan
AAPC	All African People's Conference
AAPSO	Afro-Asian People Solidarity Organization
ACCORD	African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ACDHRS	African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies
ACP	African Caribbean and Pacific Group
ADB	African Development Bank
AEC	African Economic Community
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AFRC	Armed Forces Ruling Council
AFRICOM	African Command Center
AG	Action Group
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
AHSG	African Head of State and Governments
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ALCC	African Liberation Coordination Committee
ALF	Africa Leadership Forum
ANC	African National Congress (of South Africa)
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, and United States
AOPIG	African Oil Policy Initiative Group
APC	African People's Congress
APEC	Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation
APEF	Asian Pacific Economic Forum
ASAS	Association of Southern African States
AU	African Union (formerly Organization of African Unity)
AWCPD	African Women's Committee on Peace and Development
AZAPO	Azanian People's Organization
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation

BCEAO	Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Ouest Africaine
BCM	Black Consciousness Movement
BEECOM	Black Economic Empowerment Commission
BP	British Petroleum Company
BSA	British South African Company
CA	Cooperation on Africa
CAN	Christian Association of Nigeria
CAP	Common Agricultural Exports
CARICOM	Caribbean Economic Community
CBN	Central Bank of Nigeria
CD	Campaign for Democracy
CEAO	Communaute Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (Economic Community of West Africa)
CEAPL	Economic Community of the Great Lake
CFA	Communaute' Financiere Africaine
CIA	U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
CIAS	Conference of Independent African States
CLO	Civil Liberty Organization
CMP	Concert of Medium Powers
CNC	Chevron Nigeria Corporation
CODESA	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CONSAS	Constellation of Southern African States
CORE	Congress of Racial Equality
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Union
CPP	Convention People's Party
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSSDCA	Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa
DFI	Direct Foreign Investments
DMO	Debt Management Office
EAC	East Africa Community
ECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
ECGD	Export Credits Guarantee Department (British)
ECOMOG	Economic Community of the West African States Observer Monitoring Group
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Observer Group
ECOSOCC	Economic, Social and Cultural Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECU	European Currency Unit
EDF	European Development Fund
EEC	European Economic Community

EDB	European Development Bank
EFCC	Economic Financial Crimes Commission
EMCAP	Economic Management Capacity Building Program
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
ESCOM	Electricity Supply Commission of South Africa
ESKOM	Electricity Supply Commission of South Africa
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
FAS	Femmes Africa Solidarite
FAWE	Federation of African Women in Education
FBI	(U.S.) Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCD	Forum for Community Development
FCS	Foreign Service Commerce
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FIFA	Federation International Football Association
FMG	Federal Military Government
FNLA	Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution
GNP	Gross National Product
GRAE	Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile
GSM	Global System Mobile Communication
GSP	Generalized System Preferences
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HRVIC	Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission
IASPS	Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies
ICPC	Independence Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offense Commission
IFI	International Finance Institutions
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IGO	Inter-Government Organization
ILO	International Labor Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ING	Interim National Government
ISDSC	Inter-State Defense and Security Committee
JACC	Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee
JMC	Joint Monitoring Commission
LURD	Liberian United Reconciliation for Democracy

MAGHREB	Permanent Consultative Committee of the Maghreb (North African Consultative Committee/NACC)
MAP	Millennium Action Plan
MCA	Millennium Challenge Account
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MOSOP	Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MSF	Medecins sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders)
MTN	Mobile Telecommunications Network
NAACP	National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples
NADECO	National Democratic Alliance
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Area
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCNC	National Council of Nigerian Citizens
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NEPA	National Electric Power Authority
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NEPU	Northern Element Progressive Union
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIC	Newly Industrializing Countries
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NIIA	Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
NIPSS	National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies
NIS	Newly Independent States
NLC	Nigerian Labor Congress
NMA	Nigerian Medical Association
NNA	Nigerian National Alliance
NNDP	Nigerian National Democratic Party
NNOC	Nigerian National Oil Corporation
NNPC	Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
NP	National Party of South Africa
NPC	Northern People's Congress
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPN	National Party of Nigeria
NSF	Namibian Solidarity Fund
NTF	National Trust Fund
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Obafemi Awolowo University-(Ile-Ife, Nigeria)
OAU	Organization of African Unity (now African Union)
OIC	Organization of Islamic Council

OECD	Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PAC	Pan-African Congress of South Africa
PAFMECA	Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa
PAFMECSA	Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern Africa
PAIGC	Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde
PDP	People's Democratic Party
PHCN	Power Holding Company of Nigeria
PNDC	Provisional National Defense Council
PRC	Provisional Ruling Council
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Program
RENAMO	Mozambique National Resistance Movement
REPA	Regional Economic Partnership Agreement
RTZ	Rio Tinto Zinc
SACP	South African Communist Party
SACU	Southern African Custom Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SADF	South African Defense Forces
SADR	Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic
SAFCOL	South African Forest Corporation
SANDF	South African National Defense Force
SANNC	South African Native National Congress (later ANC)
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programs
SARF	Southern African Relief Fund
SAYROC	South Africa Youth Revolutionary Council
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SEATO	South East Asian Treaty Organization
SFBC	Swiss Federal Banking Commission
SMC	Supreme Military Council
SPA	Strategic Partnership with Africa
SWAPO	South West African People's Organization
TAC	Technical Aid Corps
TEC	Transitional Executive Council
UANC	United African National Council

UDEAC	Central African Customs and Economic Union (Union Douaniere et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale)
UDF	United Democratic Front
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UMBC	United Middle Belt Congress
UMEOA	West African Economic and Monetary Union
UNAIDS	United Nations AIDS
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIA	Universal Negro Improvement Association
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNO	United Nations Organization
UPA	United Party of Angola
UPGA	United Progressive Grand Alliance
UPN	Unity Party of Nigeria
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WACH	West African Clearing House
WAEMU	West African Economic Monetary Union
WB	World Bank
WILDAF	Women in Law and Development in Africa
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZANLA	Zimbabwean African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwean African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwean African People's Union
ZIPRA	Zimbabwean Independence People's Revolutionary Army
ZUPO	Zimbabwe United Peoples Organization

Introduction

For too long in our history, Africa has spoken through the voices of others. Now, what I have called an African Personality in international affairs will have a chance of making its proper impact and will let the world know it through the voices of Africa's own sons.

—Kwame Nkrumah¹

Economic globalization began with the circumnavigation of the Cape of Good Hope by Vasco da Gama toward the end of the fifteen century (1487–1497).² That circumnavigation opened the prospect of trade, and economic relations among the three continents of the ancient world—Africa, Asia and Europe. Shortly after that time the Americas were added as sources of raw materials, precious metals, and subsequently cash crops.

South Africa became in time a magnet for demographic globalization, people from other continents found their way to Africa either willingly or by force in search of new opportunities. Thus, economic globalization was the emergence of a global network of interlocking factors of production, and the growth of economic interdependence across the globe.

Africa is of growing international importance. By the end of the first decade of this twenty-first century, for instance, Africa South of the Sahara is likely to become as important a source of United States' energy imports as the Middle East. China, India, Europe, and others are competing with each other, and with the United States for access to oil, natural gas and other natural resources from Africa. The world's major powers are also becoming more active in seeking investments, winning contracts, and building political support in the continent. Africa is also one of the battlegrounds in the fight against terrorism. Osama bin Laden based his operations in Sudan before setting up a base in Afghanistan. Terrorists struck United States embassies in Africa years before the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. Radical and fundamentalist African Muslims³ are actively recruited for terrorist operations in Afghanistan, and the Middle East, including Iraq.⁴ Mass killings in the Darfur region of

Sudan, war in the Great Lakes Region and the persistence of conflict in the continent challenge the world's will to spotlight, prevent, and stop atrocities. Africa is also the epicenter of the world's most serious health epidemic, HIV/AIDS.

Africa has a land mass second only to Asia, and a 12 percent share of the world's population (a share that will grow rapidly in the twenty-first century); yet it accounts for a mere 3 percent of world trade. According to a report by Adebayo Adedeji former Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the underlying causes of Africa's social and economic crisis lie within the very structure of the African economy. First, too many African countries depend on too few export items, most of which are minerals and agricultural commodities. Second, it is a structure that obliges Africa to keep producing commodities it does not need because its people consume very little of such commodities while it depends on other people for the production of its own needs. "It is a structure of dependency rather than self-reliance... It is a structure that is more import-export oriented rather than production-oriented."⁵ Once, net exporters of food, African countries now have difficulty feeding their own citizens to the extent that about one-third of Africa's population now rely wholly or in part on imported food. Whereas Africa in 1980 had a 6 percent share of world trade, by 2002 this had dropped to just 3 percent despite Africa having 12 percent of the world's population. It has been argued that an added 1 percent share of global trade would earn Africans \$70 billion more in exports trade each year.

Africa has been shaped in so many dramatic ways by events in Nigeria and South Africa since the early 1990s. Those events have taken a more dramatic form by significant transformations in both countries. South Africa's attainment of majority rule in 1994, coupled with Nigeria's successful transition to a democratic civilian rule in 1999 have refocused attention on the important roles and implications of these two regional powers both in Africa as well as within the international community. Exactly, what roles would eventually be played by these two countries in fostering growth and development on the continent, while, discernible marks of competition between the two countries, are evident. Whether this competition is healthy for the development, growth and security of their respective regions and the continent remains to be seen.

Nigeria and South Africa have many similarities. First, they are both large countries with large populations. Nigeria is the largest in West Africa, and Africa's most populous country, and the tenth largest worldwide, while South Africa is also the largest in the Southern Africa subregion. Second, both countries boast of having the strongest and most industrialized economies in their respective regions. For instance, while Nigeria

is the driving force of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), South Africa plays a similar role vis-à-vis Southern African Development Community (SADC), and most importantly, South Africa boasts of being indisputably the most industrialized country in Africa.

Third, both countries are among the largest United States trading partners in Africa. In 2000, United States exports to Africa South of Sahara were 78 percent greater than those of the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union, and 86 percent greater than those of Eastern Europe. South Africa and Nigeria alone accounted for about two-thirds of these exports with South Africa accounting for 52 percent while Nigeria accounted for 12 percent. United States exports to South Africa alone were a third greater than all sales to Russia, whose population is more than 3.5 times larger than South Africa's.⁶ Similarly both countries dominate the import market of the continent even more so than the exports. Nigeria alone accounts for about 50 percent of all United States imports from Africa South of Sahara while South Africa takes the second place with 6.5 percent.⁷

Fourth, with all its political instability, Nigeria's exceptionalism includes the deep continuities of indigenous cultures, with the largest population of the Black Race in the world (140 million, the 2006 census). With its many years of white settlers rule, South Africa's exceptionalism has included the rapid pace of Westernization. Nigeria and South Africa are two African countries deep in history, rich in culture, and diverse in demography, and have revealed comparative destinies of the African experience and contrasting visions of the African condition.

Finally, and most importantly, these two countries are indisputable powers in their respective regions in terms of regional security and economy. Their potential to be forces for regional security or regional instability are great and real. The potential for positive (or negative) influence that these two countries have within their respective subregions is illustrated, for example, by Nigeria's leading role in the West African peacekeeping force, ECOWAS Monitoring Observer Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and orderly political transition in Togo, and South Africa's role in promoting political settlements of conflicts in Mozambique, Rwanda, Congo, and Lesotho.

Incidentally, today, some would describe South Africa as the "major force for political stability and economic growth" in its region while the same people may hold Nigeria responsible for promoting/or undermining her own subregion's overall economic, political and security prospects.⁸ Ironically, it was Nigeria, especially from the 1960s to the early 1990s that, occupied with regards to West Africa, and even Southern Africa, the role that people now attribute to South Africa vis-à-vis the Southern African

subregion.⁹ At that period, especially between 1970 and 1980, Nigeria was called the *sixth Frontline State*, a description given by the Western Powers because of Nigeria's dynamic and action-oriented foreign policy in which Africa was the *center-point*, and its total commitment for majority rule in the white settlers dominated Southern African States.¹⁰ Not too long ago, largely because of its apartheid policy, South Africa was regarded in Africa as well as within the international community as a pariah State. Nigeria was very close to being a pariah State under the military regime of General Sani Abacha, especially after the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, an internationally acclaimed environmental activist in November 1995. However, beyond these negative perceptions, both countries still hold the highest expectations for their respective regions and represent at the same time an enormous wealth of potential. Therefore, it seems right, that the task ahead for everyone is and should be to help devise a process whereby this potentiality would be transformed into concrete growth, not only for their individual regions but also for the continent as a whole.

Chapter 1

Nigeria and the Struggle for the Liberation of South Africa

On the question of colonialism and racial discrimination, I am afraid that we in Nigeria will never compromise.

—Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa¹

Introduction

Since Nigeria's independence in 1960, Africa has been the centerpiece of its foreign policy. In terms of policy, this involved the total liberation of Africa from colonial domination, racial discrimination, and apartheid system.² Colonization remained longer in Southern Africa than in any part of the continent. The white settler regime in South Africa was the last white rule regime to surrender power to an African majority government in the continent.³ Nigeria's overall policy toward South Africa was derived strictly from its firm and total commitment to achieve accelerated decolonization and to uphold the dignity of the black race. This moral commitment manifests itself in Nigeria's persistent support for the oppressed black people in Southern Africa in general and South Africa in particular. Since its independence in 1960, Nigerian government and its people have demonstrated their concern over the violation of human rights and denigration of the black's dignity by the minority white regimes in Southern Africa. The first practical demonstration of this was the sympathy generated by the Sharpeville massacre of March 1960. This eventually led to

the vigorous pressures mounted by the Nigerian public on Balewa's government to condemn, unequivocally the inhuman, racist, and despicable action of the apartheid South African regime.⁴ As a result, Nigeria was in the forefront in the clamor for intensification of embargoes, boycotts, and economic sanctions against apartheid South Africa. This action was continued until apartheid system was finally dismantled and non-racist democratic government was elected in April 1994.⁵

This chapter examines Nigeria's efforts and contributions toward the liberation of South Africa, and Nigeria-South Africa relations since independence. The first section deals with the shared colonial heritage of the two countries followed by an analysis of the apartheid system in South Africa and Nigeria's determined abhorrence to the racist philosophy. Nigeria's diplomatic offensive against the apartheid policy is followed by an examination of Nigeria's support for the African liberation movements in Southern Africa, as well as Nigeria's post-apartheid policy and relations with the new democratic South Africa. The last section of this chapter critically examines the future relations and global challenges confronting Nigeria and South Africa.

Shared Political and Economic Heritage

Both Nigeria and South Africa share certain fundamental commonalities in terms of their colonial heritage, and post colonial political and economic history. Prominent among these commonalities are the effects of British colonial policies in the two countries before the attainment of independence. With respect to Nigeria, colonization and the scramble for influence in Africa by European powers led to a forced unification of the separate and different cultural, historical and social empires and kingdoms, and formation of nation states for economic interests, and convenience of colonial administration.⁶ Before unifications, Europeans have established their interests along the South West coasts of Africa as far back as the fifteenth century when Portuguese explorers began sailing down there in search of an alternative sea routes to India, and the Far East Asia.⁷ Consequently, European influence in the areas progressively grew, culminating in the colonization, and decolonization of Africa. The desire to establish and boost trade, and later, slave trade motivated the Europeans colonizers. In order to continue the slave trade that reached its peak between sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, it was necessary for the Europeans to establish forts along the African coasts. However, at the end of the slave trade, European interests shifted to trade and commerce in such items as gold, diamond,

copper, palm products, cocoa, coffee, and cotton. Therefore, it became expedient to establish coastal settlements. Hence, the annexation of some coastal towns in Africa, including Freetown 1803, Cape Coast 1821, and Lagos 1861 became inevitable.⁸

The political entity called Nigeria began to evolve in 1861 following the forced annexation of Lagos by the British. Consequently, Lagos became a crown colony in 1861. While this was going on, George Goldie, a British Merchant, came to the Guinea Coast in 1878, specifically present day Niger Delta. He obtained a Royal Charter from the British Crown in 1886, and established the Royal Niger Company, which later became known as United Africa Company (UAC).⁹ In 1886, the Royal Niger Company entered into a series of forced agreements with the African local chiefs inhabiting the Niger Territories. The area was subsequently declared a British Protectorate in 1887, following which the company signed a number of treaties with the Emirs of Sokoto and Gwandu. All these treaties were used to support British claim to Northern Nigeria. However, the British did not take full control of the Northern Territories until 1900, when their flag was finally hoisted at Lokoja in the Middle-Belt of Nigeria. Up to this point, there were many spirited efforts by the Nigerian people to resist British occupation of their territory. However, the British were armed with sophisticated weapons which were used to fight and defeat the indigenous people who were mostly farmers, cattle herders, artisans, and who were bereft of any knowledge of western military logistics and tactics.¹⁰

Frederick Lugard, a Captain in the British Army who worked for the Royal Niger Company from 1898 to 1900 in the Niger Territories (which included the present Northern Nigeria), negotiated a series of treaties with traditional rulers in the areas. In his previous assignments with the British government in 1889, "he absorbed the Royal Niger Company Constabulary and other paramilitary units in the British West African Frontier Force and formed the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) based in Jebba."¹¹ In 1900, the British government took over the Royal Niger Company, and appointed Frederick Lugard as the first British High Commissioner of the Niger Territories (Nigeria) 1900 to 1906. As the British High Commissioner, he brought the various parts of the Northern emirates under one Administration called Northern Protectorate. The two governments in the South, the Southern Protectorate, and the Colony of Lagos, were merged in 1906 under one Administration and designated the Colony and Southern Protectorate.¹²

Although Lugard was appointed the British High Commissioner of the Northern and Southern Protectorates in 1900, technically, between 1900 and 1912, the two territories were autonomous entities, responsible separately to the Colonial Office in London. Therefore, the Northern and

Southern Protectorates were ruled separately until the amalgamation on January 1, 1914.¹³ Thus, Nigeria became a united political entity with a federal structure firmly put in place by the British colonial administrators in 1914 and eventually became independent in 1960. However, the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates was not without its attendant problems, including the structural imbalance between the North and the South, which made it impossible for the South to control political power at the center for many years (1960–1999). This political imbalance and other colonial policies created conflicts and instability which pervade the polity up to today in Nigeria.¹⁴

South Africa shares some of Nigeria's historical European (British) connections in its political and economic development. Both South Africa and Nigeria are countries which were created by amalgamating two previously distinct territorial entities. In the case of South Africa, the amalgamation consisted of the Afrikaner (Boer) controlled Republics of Transvaal, the Orange Free State, and the Afrikaans of the Cape and Natal. Essentially, South Africa is the product of European rivalry, especially the British unification efforts which were finally consummated in 1910 when the Union of South Africa came into being, four years before the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria. Thus, like Nigeria, South Africa is made up of different peoples with different traditions, history, and cultures, whose unification was the direct result of European economic interests.

Before the European colonization of the Cape in 1652, South Africa had been occupied by three major African ethnic groups, namely, the Bantu, the San, and the Khoi-Khoi. The arrival of the employees of the Dutch East Indian Company at the Cape on April 6, 1652 led by Jan Van Riebeeck¹⁵ marked the beginning of contact between the indigenous African population and the Europeans. The primary aim of the Directors of the Company in sending Riebeeck to occupy the Cape (Table Bay) was to promote Dutch economic interests. Modern South Africa was settled as a by-product of the enterprise of the Dutch merchants:

The colony was to serve a specific and limited role as a link between the Netherlands and their eastern empire centered on Batavia, Java. They had no intention of creating anything more than a small fortified base, where the annual fleets bound to and from Batavia could rendezvous, take in fresh water, fruit, vegetables and grain, and land their sick for recuperation.¹⁶

According to Leonard Thompson, one very unique situation of South Africa as a colony was that, initially, the Dutch East Indian Company did not envisage the use of slave labor in their Cape settlement. However,

Van Riebeeck was soon requesting permission to follow the example of the company's settlement at Batavia and elsewhere in Asia:

The die was cast in 1658, when the company imported one shipload of slaves from the Republic of Benin; Nigeria's neighboring country to the west, and another shipload of slaves from Angola, whom it had captured from the Portuguese. After that, there was no looking back. The company, the Dutch government, and the free Dutch (Boers or farmers) community in the Cape colony all became dependent on slave labor. The Cape had become a slave holding society.¹⁷

The holding of slaves by the Boers created a master-servant relationship between blacks and whites. Consequently, racial discrimination became the bedrock of all interactions. The whites made no pretence of their hostility toward the rightful and legal owners of the land as they outlawed any mixing between blacks and whites. Condoning a mixture of races was regarded as "a disgrace to the Dutch and the so-called Christian nations."¹⁸

Just like the way the British government gave imperial power to George Goldie's Royal Niger Company in Nigeria, in 1899, the British government empowered a commercial company, the British South African Company (BSAC). The company was dominated by Cecil Rhodes, the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony to run it as a chartered company. At this period of the British Empire in Southern Africa, Cecil Rhodes was the most powerful man in the diamond and gold-mining industries. Because of the failure of Cecil Rhodes's attempted coup known as the Jameson Raid, a classic piece of naive misadventure, the British government assumed direct responsibility and took over South Africa as a crown colony in 1895. The British colonial pressures and policy of domination over the Boers culminated in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902.¹⁹

With the African loyalty and support to the British Crown, Britain eventually defeated the Boers in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902. As a result the British annexed all the four Boers' provincial republics (Cape Province, Natal Province, Orange Free State Province, and Transvaal Province) as British colonies; but did not use its victory to modify the racial structure of South African society. On the contrary, the war ended in a treaty that guaranteed that African people would not participate in parliamentary elections in the new colonies when the colonies were given representative institutions. In 1907, the British honored that agreement with the Boers and sold out the Black people in South Africa, when finally, the Cape Colony, Natal, the Transvaal, and the Orange Free State joined to form the Union of South Africa, with full independence for the *whites only* in 1910.²⁰

Under the Union government, the Republic firmly established a master-servant relationship between the blacks and whites. This was the situation until 1948 when the racist National Party led by Daniel Malan came to power, and instituted apartheid, namely, the complete separation of races.²¹ The institutionalization of apartheid laid the foundation of a legally segregated society in South Africa. The National Party set up a Special Committee to produce a comprehensive policy document on the philosophy of the minority in government. The Committee submitted a Report that the Africans were not entitled to political and equal social rights with the whites, and that a process of separate development should be encouraged. As a result, several discriminatory laws which laid the foundations for the Bantustan policy were enacted by the white racist regime to disenfranchise the non-whites in South Africa, mostly Africans. The apartheid regime's intention was to create Bantustans (Black States), the so-called Homelands which would be the exclusive preserves of the Africans.²² It was intended that since the Europeans and the Africans were not on the same developmental levels, it was thought and felt that a collective development would not be in the "national interest." The discriminatory laws promulgated between 1948 and 1958 following the institutionalization of apartheid best illustrated this strategy. These included the Group Areas Act, which provides for total residential segregation between the different races. This empowered the white government "to mark off areas for residence, occupation and trade by the different races and to move each race into its own area by force if necessary."²³ In addition, the Population Registration Act was introduced, with a rigid system of race classification, so much so that every person could be put into a water tight compartment; the Native Law Amendment Act which restricted African movements to white areas in which they were not resident or employed up to seventy-two hours without a permit; and the Prohibition of Mixed Marriage Act and the Immorality Amendment Act that prohibited marriages of different races.²⁴

Through these obnoxious and other repressive laws that were subsequently enacted, the African majority in South Africa were subjected to all manners of indignities and denied their fundamental human and civil rights. Black South Africans were also denied equal access to social services and economic resources. Although the Africans constituted about 75 percent of the entire population, they were allocated only 13 percent of the land and only 19 percent of the total national income while the whites that constituted 16 percent of the total population had access to 87 percent of the land, and 75 percent of the total national income.²⁵

The Homelands policy initiated by the apartheid regime generated frustration and resentment from the African population. The Bantu

Self-Government Act of 1959 stratified the land area allocated to Africans into ten Homelands, and Africans, regardless of domicile, experience, or desire, were made to belong to any of the ten Homelands. Brian Lapping observed that "a majority of the 11 million Bantu (Black Africans) in the Union would presumably go on living in *white* South Africa, and their labor was indispensable. Like Italians working as miners outside Italy, they will have no political rights outside their homelands; their position will be that of honorable guests."²⁶ According to Richard Gibson "the sinister purpose of apartheid was to remove from the African population even the dignity of their African nationhood, dividing them by tribal origin and labeling them Bantu."²⁷ South Africans outside the homelands were closely monitored and controlled by white police force. They were required to carry pass at all times, failing which they were summarily arrested and severely punished.²⁸

The Bantu Education Act, Bantu Authorities Act, and Native Labor (Settlement of disputes) Act were passed in 1955, but the most repressive and bitterly opposed of these laws was the Bantu Education Act. This Act was fundamental to central government control with a view to making education the handmaid of apartheid by training Africans only for inferior roles in South African society. Opposition to carriage of pass by the Africans led to a massive demonstration organized by the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) on March 21, 1960. This led to the shooting of several unarmed civilians at Sharpeville in Transvaal Province, claiming the lives of sixty-nine Africans and including several women and children were wounded.²⁹ This incidence further aroused African consciousness and for the first time exposed the atrocities of apartheid policy to the outside world.

The African National Congress (ANC) started "as a reformist elite led association for the betterment of African economic, social and political conditions within a non-violent legal framework."³⁰ However, it spontaneously turned to violence after all channels of peaceful protests were barred by the apartheid regime. Several members and leaders of the liberation movements, the ANC and PAC, including Nelson Mandela and his comrades, were jailed while political movements organized to protect and defend their rights were severely crushed. This notwithstanding, the liberation movements continued their violent protest underground and launched guerilla warfare on the apartheid government in 1960. They were overwhelmingly supported by the international community including Nigeria. Nigeria launched vigorous diplomatic campaign against the apartheid regime since 1960 until the institutionalized racial discriminatory policy was completely dismantled and a non-racial democratic system was established in 1994.

Nigeria's Policy Toward the Apartheid Regime

Nigeria's relations with South Africa predated the country's independence. However, before independence in 1960, Nigeria had no definitive policy on South Africa, and played no visible role in the international struggle against apartheid regime in South Africa. As a British colony, the colonial administration in Nigeria accommodated apartheid and endorsed white minority regime rule. As a colonial state, Nigeria could not criticize South Africa's white regime. As the country's independence was approaching, efforts began to be directed toward sensitizing Nigerians on the evil of apartheid and the need for the country to take appropriate actions against the white minority rule in South Africa. On April 5, 1960, a Private Member Bill was presented at the Federal Parliament urging the Federal Government to take appropriate measures to ban the importation of South African goods into Nigeria.³¹ The Bill was unanimously passed by the House of Representatives. In a similar manner, the Nigerian press echoed the sentiments of the Nigerian government and people against apartheid policy.

Following Nigeria's independence and subsequent membership of the United Nations, Nigeria occupied a central role in the decolonization of Africa, especially the struggle against racist apartheid regime in South Africa. Initially Nigeria adopted a conservative and conciliatory approach to the racial issue in Southern Africa. For instance, Prime Minister Balewa rejected bluntly many proposals for Nigeria to support revolutionary actions against the apartheid system, but rather preferred a conciliatory approach to the apartheid issue. However, as the South Africa debacle produced deeper emotions in Nigeria, the Federal Government rejected the apartheid racist policy, contending that the estrangement of the black people, it observed, was due to South Africa's official policy of apartheid, which curtails their freedom of association and movement.

Nigeria, with its enormous black population, size, and resources, considered itself as having a manifest role and unique responsibility toward other black peoples all over the world, and particularly in Africa in reclaiming black dignity and respect. Consequently, Nigeria's Foreign Minister, Jaja Wachuku, pointed out that:

Nigeria, as the country with the largest concentration of black peoples anywhere in the world, owes a duty to all the black people of the earth to do everything possible to eradicate the humiliation of the black man anywhere in the world. Whether Nigeria likes it or not, it is its duty; it is part of Nigeria's destiny; if Nigeria does not do this then it has failed in its mission.³²

At the UN General Assembly, Nigeria, vehemently demonstrated forcefully its opposition against apartheid system in South Africa. Following the March 21, 1960 Sharpeville massacre, Nigeria spearheaded the UN in the international campaign against apartheid and racial discrimination in South Africa. Nigeria received a wide global support for the designation of apartheid as a heinous crime against humanity. As a strategy of accelerating the momentum of its campaign against the white minority regime, Nigeria also canvassed for the imposition of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa.

In an Address to the Special Political Committee of the UN General Assembly in 1961, Nigeria's Foreign Minister reiterated the country's position on the issue of decolonization and racial discrimination, and said, "The independence of African states will be meaningless, if in other parts of African continent black men did not have freedom. The independence movement in Africa as a whole would be a failure if blackmen everywhere in the world continued to be oppressed and be judged not by their capabilities but by the color of their skins."³³

In order to further display its aversion to apartheid policy, Nigeria called on the United Nations Security Council to expel South Africa from the United Nations. Addressing the Federal Parliament on his mission to the UN in November 1961, the Foreign Minister had this to say:

It was at our suggestion at the United Nations that the Security Council applied the provisions of Article 6 of the United Nations Charter, which says that when a member continues to disobey or infringe the Charter of the Organization, then the possibility of such member's expulsion must be considered under Article 6 of the Charter. We in conjunction with other African States, brought this resolution to the political committee and it was passed. Now we want the Security Council to consider the possibility of expelling South Africa from the United Nations under Article 6.³⁴

Although the move to expel South Africa from the UN failed in 1961, it constituted a serious challenge and warning to the apartheid regime. In addition, it boosted Nigeria's image as a frontline state in the liberation struggle in Africa.

The advent of the military on the Nigerian political scene did not diminish the momentum of the country's distaste for racism and apartheid. Indeed, Nigeria was more determined in its opposition to South Africa's apartheid system when the first military administration under Major-General J.T.U. Aguiyi Ironsi in July 1966 denied the use of Nigerian airspace and seaport facilities to South Africa's white regime.³⁵ During the Nigerian Civil War of 1967–1970, it became clear that the apartheid

regime in South Africa aided the secessionist Biafra in its struggle for the dismemberment of Nigeria. The Biafran leader, Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, in a desperate attempt to sustain his ambition to secede made it clear that he would collude “even with the devil itself (South Africa), if that proved to be the only option left to ensure the survival of Biafra.”³⁶ Consequently, Biafra received military, logistic and propaganda support from South Africa apartheid regime. This further enraged the Nigerian military government to the extent that after the civil war, the government resolved to continue intensifying its struggle against apartheid South Africa. To demonstrate its anti-apartheid policy, the Nigerian Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon, on the Seventh Anniversary of the OAU declared, “We shall never relent on our endeavor to proscribe South Africa as an unfit member of the international community as long as it continues to practice racism.”³⁷ Speaking at the Ministerial Conference of the OAU in June 1971, Nigeria’s External Affairs Minister, Okoi Arikpo, emphasized that: “Nigeria will oppose to the last drop of its blood that the OAU as an Organization...should enter into a dialogue with South Africa.”³⁸ While addressing the summit of the OAU Heads of State in June 1971, General Gowon reiterated the same position. According to him, Africa had two choices to make as regards the South African issue: either direct appeasement of the racist regime or outright confrontation with it. However, he emphasized that “Nigeria will never be a party to the first alternative. We reject any appeasement or accommodation with South Africa as inconsistent with the principles of our Charter.”³⁹ Nigeria’s total commitment toward the eradication of apartheid earned the country the Chairmanship of the United Nations Anti-Apartheid Committee in 1970, a position, which Nigeria held until apartheid was eradicated in 1994. This position provided Nigeria the unique opportunity to air its views more forcefully on the evils of apartheid, and as well offered the country a strategic position from which to launch vehement global campaign to stir up international moral indignation against apartheid.⁴⁰

From its independence in 1960 until the collapse of apartheid, Nigeria consistently maintained a hard-line posture against the racist system. Following the successful transition and attainment of majority rule in May 1994, Nigeria terminated its anti-apartheid policy and began to craft a post-apartheid policy that was to be mutually beneficial to both countries.

Nigeria’s Diplomatic Offensive against Apartheid

Nigeria continuously and persistently supported the dismantling of apartheid and establishment of democratic majority rule in South Africa.

Nigeria's policy toward Pretoria has always been that only majority rule based on free and fair exercise of

universal suffrage by the people in a non-racial and non-fragmented South Africa can lead to a just and lasting solution of the explosive situation prevailing in that country.⁴¹

Three basic strategies have been employed in implementing this policy, namely

- (1) supporting the imposition of direct economic and political sanctions,
- (2) appealing to Western powers to support the sanctions resolutions, including encouraging hostile global opinion against continued imperialist rule and isolating the white apartheid regime from the international community; and (3) offer of material and moral support to liberation movements in South Africa.⁴²

Economic and Political Sanctions

The Sharpeville massacre of March 1960 provided a storm of anger and combative reactions in Nigeria, Africa and the world at large. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, then Leader of the Opposition in the Federal House of Representatives urged the Federal Government to take immediate action against South Africa's business interests in Nigeria in response to the sadism and barbarism displayed by the white apartheid regime against black people. Not surprisingly, the Western Nigeria House of Assembly unanimously passed a Resolution urging the Federal Government to invoke appropriate sanctions against the white minority government in South Africa. Consequently, series of rallies and political demonstrations were effectively organized all over the country by opposition political parties, trade unions, youth organizations, and other interest groups including churches to denounce the Sharpeville killings. The reactions generated a flurry of actions nationwide, including the expulsion of the South African Dutch Reform Church from Nigeria. A Private Member Bill was passed in the Federal House of Representatives urging the federal government to immediately ban the importation of South African goods into Nigeria, the termination of the appointment of South Africans in the Nigerian Public Service as well as contracts awarded to South African Companies.⁴³

More than any other issue, championing continental opposition to apartheid and white minority rule in Southern Africa was one issue in which Nigeria demonstrated unquestionable leadership in its African

policy. According to former Nigerian Foreign Minister, Major-General Joseph Garba, because anti-apartheid commitment was an article of faith of every Nigerian Government, it was no surprise that:

No foreign policy issue has more preoccupied Nigerian governments since our independence in 1960. Nigeria has made friends with countries with whom it has nothing in common; it has conversely made enemies of erstwhile friends...all on account of their attitude towards the Southern African question. We have formulated economic policies that have sometimes been detrimental to our own development because of our commitment to the eradication of apartheid.⁴⁴

Appeal and Propaganda War

Until the fall of apartheid, various administrations in Nigeria since independence tried vigorously to publicize the evils of apartheid, racism, and discriminations at different international fora and platforms.⁴⁵ Both the electronic and print media were used to propagate the inhumane nature of apartheid. The Federal Government not only encouraged the formation of anti-apartheid organizations in the country. Notable among these was the National Committee on the Dissemination of Information on the Evils of apartheid. It also succeeded at various international conferences to mobilize global opinions and support against the apartheid regime in South Africa.

Nigeria's activist role in the international campaign against apartheid attained an admirable global recognition in 1977 when the United Nations General Assembly proposed holding a World Conference for Action against Apartheid, either at the UN Headquarters in New York City or "in a country that was irrevocably committed to the eradication of the heinous crime against humanity."⁴⁶ With popular acclamation, Nigeria was chosen to host the Conference. It was the largest global gathering on apartheid, and Nigeria once again reemphasized its strong opposition to the apartheid system. The Conference was held in Lagos in August 1977. In his opening speech Nigeria's Head of State, General Obasanjo stressed that there could be no compromise whatsoever with apartheid and sounded a note of warning that "Nigeria's actions to dismantle it would include using economic leverage against governments and companies doing business in South Africa."⁴⁷ To continue to publicize the evils of apartheid globally, Nigeria hosted an International Conference on the Legal Status of the Apartheid Regime in Lagos in August 1984.

Propaganda and diplomatic isolation of the apartheid regime were perhaps the most consistent weapons in Nigeria's opposition to apartheid. The Federal Government made efforts to expel South Africa from the International Labor Organization, Olympic Games, and International Atomic Energy Agency.⁴⁸ It was in the area of sporting events that notable successes were recorded. Nigeria organized and led the boycotts of the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, Germany, and strenuously campaigned and led several other African States to withdraw from the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal, Canada and the 1978 Commonwealth Games in Edmonton, Alberta.⁴⁹ In December 1978, Nigeria made it clear that it would boycott all international sporting events in which any country having sporting links with apartheid South Africa was represented. Therefore, the country's boycott of the Commonwealth Games was no surprise because New Zealand, which had clandestine sporting links with South Africa, was allowed to participate.⁵⁰ At the Commonwealth Heads of Government and State Summit in London in 1977, Nigeria dramatized its displeasure toward the racist policy in South Africa as it succeeded in pressurizing the Conference to adopt the Gleneagles Agreement under which all Commonwealth Governments were mandated to actively discourage sporting links with apartheid South Africa.⁵¹ The intransigence of the apartheid regime coupled with the economic and strategic interests of the Western powers encouraged Nigeria's sustained efforts toward condemning the Western collaborators of racism oppression, and apartheid in South Africa. For instance, a Report published by the Commonwealth clearly revealed that apartheid South Africa was strengthened in its pursuit of the inhumane policy through direct or indirect economic and financial cooperation with Japan and the Western powers. Specifically, the Report claimed that: 400 British and United States corporations had investments of over \$600 million in South Africa, representing over 12 percent of total investment in that country. It added, "While Japan had annual trade turn over with South Africa of \$360 million. Additionally, the white South Africa regime was receiving a lot of military aid from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, particularly, U.S., Britain, France, and Germany."⁵²

The Nigerian Government strongly condemned the despicable action of apartheid to arouse the conscience of those countries that continuously assisted in the sustenance of the apartheid system in South Africa:

Because it feared that we can not hope to win the race against time in Southern Africa as long as South Africa could count on the shelter and protection of their friends who afford them the Political, economic and military collaboration aimed at truncating the growth of independent Africa.⁵³

Moral and Material Support for the South African Liberation Movements

Since the establishment of the Special Fund of the OAU for the "Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa," known as the African Liberation Coordination Committee, in 1964, Nigeria contributed enormously to this Fund. The country not only substantially increased its contributions to the Fund since 1970. It also provided direct financial, materials, military, and moral support to the Nationalist Liberation (both the ANC and PAC) Movements in South Africa,⁵⁴ even though it deplored the performance of the ANC and PAC, as well as their inability to unite and form a united front against the racist regime. Consequently, in 1977 the Federal Government decided to accord recognition to the South African Youth Revolutionary Council (SAYRCO), led by Khotso Seatholo, because it was believed that only such a youthful organization could threaten and overthrow the apartheid government.⁵⁵ Some of the members of SAYRCO participated in the Soweto uprising of June 1976.⁵⁶ In addition, the SAYRCO enjoyed widespread support from Nigerian government and people, which provided them tremendous assistance in form of military aid and scholarship awards. All the SAYRCO members were given free education in Nigerian higher institutions.

In December 1976, the Federal Military Government set up the Southern Africa Relief Fund (SARF). The Fund was designed, to "be used to alleviate the plight of the victims of the apartheid oppression in Southern Africa, and to promote their education and general welfare."⁵⁷ The Obasanjo Military Administration (1976–1979) contributed \$37 million to the Fund. General Obasanjo as Head of State made a personal donation of \$3,000, while each member of his cabinet contributed \$1,500, and Nigerian civil servants and Public Officers made voluntary donations of two percent of a month's salary. Appeals for donations were launched all over the Federation. As a result, the first group of 86 Southern African students arrived in Nigeria to start their education which had been disrupted by the Soweto riots of June 1976.⁵⁸ It should be noted that besides the Soweto students, President Thabo Mbeki (South African President 1999–2009) was a guest of the Nigerian government from 1977 until 1984 when he moved to the ANC Headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia.⁵⁹

The existence of white supremacist regimes in Southern Africa was a fundamental factor that had shaped Nigerian foreign policy. Since independence, and until the fall of apartheid, Nigeria consistently extended its solidarity and support for the liberation movements in all the Southern African countries. In order to confront the white racist regimes in Southern

Africa (in Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa), it evolved different strategies, especially, to the apartheid government in South Africa. According to Olajide Aluko:

Nigeria has since independence taken a number of measures against the Southern Africa, especially in spearheading their exclusion from most UN conferences and agencies, in the field of propaganda against the white regime, and in the provision of material, moral, financial and diplomatic support to all the liberation movements in the Sub-region. Moreover, Nigeria has for years been putting pressure on South Africa's Western economic partners to end their oil, financial and military ties with Pretoria.⁶⁰

Ibrahim Gambari, the former Nigerian Permanent Representative to the United Nations reiterated that in spite of the United States' diabolical policy of constructive engagement and the "non-aggression" accords signed by racist South Africa and some Frontline States (a political grouping of the independent African states that were neighboring States of the white minority settler ruled states in Southern Africa)⁶¹ whose economies the apartheid regime had been constantly devastating, "Nigeria would continue to maintain its support for the liberation movements through a combination of the following strategies:"⁶² (1) making substantial financial and other material contributions to the ANC and SWAPO and to a much lesser extent to PAC, some of the Frontline States to assist them in consolidating their national economies and their military capabilities (2) encouraging the ANC to rethink a new strategy of operations within South Africa itself. Although this would be possible only at greater risks than before, the ANC should be emboldened by the desperation of the racist regime and increased support from Nigeria and other African States; (3) increasing consultations with Eastern Bloc countries with a view to improving their assistance to the liberation movements; (4) identifying and working actively with influential groups such as religious organizations and anti-apartheid groups to increase world attention directed at the evils of apartheid; and (5) obtaining international support for the Frontline States through the Non-Aligned Movement, the United Nations, and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) so as to strengthen their economies and reduce their dependence on South Africa.

Nigeria developed a special relationship with the ANC beginning in 1960. This relationship was forged when the ANC's revolutionary struggle against the white minority regime started in full swing following the Sharpeville massacre of 69 unarmed black civilians in March 1960.⁶³ This massacre unleashed bitterness and revolt by the ANC leading to the proscription of the organization and the PAC in 1962. The ANC subsequently launched a full-scale liberation war on the apartheid regime in the

mid- 1970s. Nigeria was approached for humanitarian assistance, which it gladly provided. At the height of the war of liberation against the racist South African regime in the 1970s, Nigeria was providing \$5 million subvention annually to ANC and PAC, excluding special financial allocations for the OAU Liberation Committee and other expenses borne by the National Committee against Apartheid (NACAP) and the Southern African Relief Fund established in 1976.⁶⁴

Nigeria's unflinching support for the liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe, had a domino effect on the liberation struggle in South Africa. As the Pan Africanist Congress leader, Robert Sobekwu, once observed, "Nigeria's support for the liberation struggle in Angola, and Mozambique had encouraged the blacks in South Africa to fight for the total liberation of their country, from white dominance."⁶⁵ Consequently, in the spirit of its decolonization policy, Nigeria embarked on intensive and continuous efforts to convince both the ANC and PAC on the necessity to form a united front in order to confront their common enemy, the apartheid government in South Africa.

When the last apartheid President, Frederick F. de Klerk, started his reform process in 1989,⁶⁶ Nigeria put tremendous pressure on him to ensure that the process was irreversibly completed. At the verge of apartheid's collapse, Nigeria was instrumental in the release of the ANC leaders including Nelson Mandela in its position as a Frontline State, and the Chairman of the United Nations Committee Against Apartheid. To show his gratitude Nigeria was one of the first few countries that Nelson Mandela visited after his release from prison on February 12, 1990.⁶⁷ Nigeria's solidarity and commitment to the South African Liberation Movements was unwavering throughout the struggles for liberation. The same position was consistently and systemically maintained by different Nigerian administrations, until the apartheid system was finally dismantled in 1994. With all-race democratic election of 1994 South Africa attained a non-racial democratic government under the leadership of President Mandela. He was described as the "Last twentieth century hero and a truly inspirational figure with unequalled international stature, and moral authority."⁶⁸

Nigeria's Post-Apartheid Policy

During the dark days of the apartheid system in South Africa, Nigeria was one of the most consistent and irresistible antagonists of the racist regime. Irrespective of the government in power since independence, the country consistently remained the vanguard of the struggle against the unspeakable

white apartheid policy until it was finally dismantled. Removal of apartheid and installation of African majority rule in May 1994 was thus a major breakthrough in Nigeria's articulated post-apartheid independence foreign policy objectives. This provided a unique opportunity for the country to eliminate its anti-apartheid policy and establish a full rapport and mutual respect for the new South Africa. A practical demonstration of this was the immediate opening of a Consulate in Johannesburg to forge closer relations with democratic new South Africa. The establishment of a full diplomatic relations and an Embassy in Pretoria followed this. Thereafter, the two countries resumed economic relations and sporting events.

In March 1995, the former military Head of State, Olusegun Obasanjo (later President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999–2007) and his former deputy, Major-General Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, and many others, both military and civilians, were arrested and accused of plotting a coup d'état against the Abacha military regime. They were tried by a Special Military Tribunal, and both Obasanjo and Yar'Adua were sentenced to death. President Mandela was one of the world leaders who pleaded on their behalf which led to the commutation of the sentences to life imprisonment and fifteen years imprisonment for Yar'Adua and Obasanjo respectively.⁶⁹ However, the relatively cordial relations between the two countries changed dramatically in November 1995 when the worst human rights record of the Abacha military administration in Nigeria undercut the strategic foundations of Nigeria–South Africa relations. The Ogoni Crisis resulted in the execution of the human right activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists on November 10, 1995. The execution strained the ensuing bilateral relations and poisoned the Commonwealth's perception of General Abacha's regime because this execution was carried out on the opening day of the Commonwealth Summit in Auckland, New Zealand. The Abacha action not only led to the declaration of the Nigeria delegates to the Commonwealth Summit as *persona non-grata* but also resulted in the suspension of the country from the Commonwealth as a result of a Resolution tabled by President Mandela.⁷⁰

It should be noted that right from his ascension to the Presidency of a democratic South Africa, Nelson Mandela had been deeply involved in and highly critical of the seemingly endless political turmoil in Nigeria. This, coupled with the high level of human rights abuse by the military regime of General Abacha, was a major area of conflict between the two countries. Thus, Nigeria–South Africa relations were strained during this period, 1995–1998. However, as the cold relations between these two countries thawed, General Abacha suddenly died on June 8, 1998.⁷¹ His successor, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, showed a generally more conciliatory approach and was able to remove the discordant relationship between the

two countries. He improved on the country's poor human rights records by releasing many of the political prisoners, including General Obasanjo, and implemented a remarkably swift and generally successful transition to civil rule program that eventually terminated military dictatorship in Nigeria. This was followed by a democratic election that ushered in a civilian government on May 29, 1999.⁷²

The end of military dictatorship in Nigeria and the installation of a civilian rule provided the Nigerian leadership the opportunity to start the process of redeeming the image of the country and adapting the country's foreign policy to a new international reality. In a similar fashion, the abolition of apartheid and the emergence on the global scene of a new South Africa as a non-racial democratic State committed to democratic reform gave it acceptance globally. These two events effectively terminated the seemingly chilly relations between the two countries and led to their working together to reinvigorate their bilateral relations. This was based on the general realization of the importance of the two countries as strategic partners in Africa, and in global affairs.

Thus, the latter part of the 1990s saw a unique period in Nigeria–South Africa relations. Nigeria's democratization process that started in 1998 following General Abacha's death, and South Africa's second non-racial democratic elections in June 1999, ushered in a peculiar era of bilateral dealings between the two countries. This phase came to a successful conclusion with the inauguration of civilian democratic regimes in both countries. Obasanjo became the President of Nigeria on May 29, 1999, and Thabo Mbeki was elected as the second democratic President of South Africa in June 1999. Thus, the end of the decade marked its uniqueness of the dictatorship in Nigeria and the racist apartheid system in South Africa, and for a new era of Nigeria–South Africa relations from the end of the twentieth to twenty-first century.

From 1999, Nigeria–South Africa relations entered a new era characterized by a succession of many positive developments. One landmark event in this regard was the signing in October 1999 of the document establishing a joint Bi-National Commission by Nigeria and South Africa. The Commission is designed to promote and cement economic ties between the two countries. It covers whole areas of the economy, including agriculture, commerce, energy, mining and solid minerals, labor, aviation, and telecommunications. Its overall objective is to actualize strategic and mutually beneficial relations between the two countries. Since the establishment of the Commission, a numbers of achievements were recorded particularly in the economic and other spheres of human endeavors. For instance, the Nigeria–South Africa agreement on agriculture was signed in September 2000 in Pretoria by the Minister of State for Agriculture

and Rural Development, Chris Agbobu, and his South African counterpart, Dirk Du Toit.⁷³ Under the Bi-National Commission Agreement many South African Companies see Nigeria as a giant African market in Africa and started investing massively in the country. South African Oil Corporation (SASOL) and Chevron Nigeria Corporation (CNC), for instance, started a \$500 million gas project in Nigeria in 2000. Mobile Telecommunications Network (MTN) was part of the bidding process for the Global System Mobile Communication (GSM) license, while South African Electricity Supply Commission (ESKOM) collaborated with Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) formerly Nigerian Electric Power Authority (NEPA) in order to activate, stabilize and maximize electric power supply in Nigeria.⁷⁴ All these developments have ultimately proved to be a significant watershed for bilateral relations between Nigeria and South Africa in the new millennium.

The New Millennium and Global Challenges Facing Nigeria and South Africa

The emergent global system and unfolding globalization poses concrete challenges to all countries and all regions of the world. However, Nigeria's post-apartheid policy and relations with the New South Africa must be reoriented to changing global realities. We are now living in an interdependent world in which the old paradigms that consistently governed interstate and multilateral relations are gradually and systematically being dismantled and new approaches are emerging with the new global economy. Therefore, Nigeria and South Africa are confronted by this onerous task of motivating the rest of Africa to tackle African problems in a concerted action. Nigeria and South Africa, as the two giants of Africa, are uniquely positioned within the continent to respond to global challenges that are unfolding for the continent in the new century. The new challenges include response to Structural Adjustment Programs; reform of the international financial institutions; developments within the United Nations system, management of the pervasive African conflicts; the solution to Africa's debt crisis; and the HIV/AIDS pandemic ravaging the continent.⁷⁵ The impacts of liberation and structural adjustment program include high unemployment rate, increasing poverty, high inflation, weakened balance of trade, de-industrialization, and increased vulnerability of financial sector and civil conflicts. There is the need for Nigeria and South Africa to compare experiences and promote concerted subregional and regional responses to these problems. Such responses should include policy actions by the African Development Bank, increased trade and investment, as well

as economic and technological cooperation between the two countries, and for the rest of African countries to benefit.⁷⁶

Nigeria and South Africa should also encourage other African countries to demand a reform of the World Trade Organization and international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. For instance, it has been estimated that the collapse of commodity trade cost Africa a colossal sum of \$34 billion in terms of trade losses in 1996 alone; and that Africa has been losing about \$3 billion annually since 1997 with the functioning of the World Trade Organization (WTO).⁷⁷ Therefore, it is imperative for Nigeria and South Africa to mobilize other African states in a concerted approach to solve the problem in a fundamental sense. Four major developments within the United Nations system pose challenges for Nigeria and South Africa, namely: (1) its democratization; (2) a seat for Africa in the United Nations' Security Council; (3) the growing marginalization of the Developing Countries' interests, especially the Developing World debts; and (4) the UN Peace-keeping operations in Africa.⁷⁸ On the issue of democratization, the two countries should mobilize the emerging African Union to coordinate efforts with Asian and Latin American countries and press for the democratization of the UN system from its current domination by the developed countries, especially, the five Security Council members.

The marginalization of the Developing Countries' interests in the Economic and Social Council (UNECOSOC) of United Nations, United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) and International Labor Organization (ILO) constitutes another crucial issue that has been raised in a coordinated manner by the developing countries, the Non-Aligned Movement and Group-77 leaders pressing for a systematic review by the United Nations. Also Nigeria and South Africa are on the forefront of the demand for UN peace-keeping force in the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Darfur region in the Western Sudan.⁷⁹

The pervasive African conflicts and the need to resolve them present a real challenge to Nigeria and South Africa as the two major powers in the continent. Both countries as the regional powers have huge stakes in maintaining peace and security in their volatile subregions, and in Africa as a whole. Both countries share strategic stakes in conflict resolution, management, and prevention in Africa. Under the mutual leadership of Nigeria and South Africa, both the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) respectively, can learn from each other's experiences, and serve as models for other subregional organizations in Africa and in developing countries

as a whole. For instance, in the end, cooperation between subregional organizations could form the nucleus of a Nigeria–South Africa initiative for conflict resolution in Africa.⁸⁰

The former Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa have been leading the African Union and the developing countries by pressing for debt cancellation and forgiveness from their Western creditors, the IMF, and the World Bank. However, it has been an Achilles heels, and uphill task to persuade Western leaders and international financial institutions to cancel the debts which was estimated to be about \$2 trillion, however, some of it were forgiven at the Gleneagles Summit of G8 in July 2005. These debts constitute the most difficult obstacle to the survival, recovery and development of the developing countries, especially the African countries.⁸¹ Similarly, the two countries, along with Algeria's President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal in July 2001, launched an African Initiative known as The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).⁸² This initiative commits African leaders to eradicate poverty, and calls for a new partnership between Africa, industrialized countries and organizations, grouped within the Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA). Each of Africa's five subregions is expected to identify projects in the eight priority sectors of the NEPAD, namely good governance, infrastructure, education, health care, agriculture, new information technologies/communication, energy, and market access.⁸³ In addition, Presidents Obasanjo of Nigeria and Mbeki of South Africa were very instrumental in transformation of the Organization of African Unity to African Union.

A former South African Ambassador to Nigeria, George Nene, pointed out that Nigeria and South Africa are viable partners in the development of Africa in view of the enormous potentials of the two countries. He succinctly stated his views thus:

We believe that there is a lot the two countries can do in the field of economy and trade, which will be of spill-over effect to other African countries. Nigeria being the biggest market in Africa with abundant human and natural resources has a lot to offer South Africa, with its advanced technology and the expertise will prove to be very needy to some of the projects in Nigeria.⁸⁴

Conclusion

Nigeria's external behavior has hinged on Afro-centric policy rooted in the struggle against colonialism, imperialism, racial oppression and apartheid system in Africa generally, and Southern Africa in particular.

Nigeria's unwavering commitment particularly toward the total decolonization and liberation of Southern Africa has been variously exhibited in all international fora. Successive administrations in the country have consistently reaffirmed and heightened that commitment. This has been clearly demonstrated by the various diplomatic offensives launched against the white minority regime in South Africa in different international fora, and particularly at the African Union, the Commonwealth, Non-Aligned Movement, and the United Nations. Nigeria's continuous vigorous and intensive offensives were designed to evoke public and international attention, and shape world opinion on the evils of apartheid and the need to resolve the problem of self-determination in the former white minority ruled Southern African countries including South Africa.⁸⁵

Nigeria's anti-apartheid policies were informed by the inhuman and unjust apartheid policy, and its criminal acts against the black majority population of South Africa. Nigeria strongly believed that it had a unique responsibility to all of African states under colonial rule. However, apartheid was considered as repugnant, not only to its articulated foreign policy objectives, but also to the conscience of mankind in general.

The country saw apartheid as a violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as a negation of the principles, and purposes of the United Nations' Charter.

Therefore, Nigeria's diplomatic objective toward the former racist South African regime had been geared toward confronting and repudiating the apartheid regime with a view to changing and eradicating this inhuman system. The country's resistance to white minority rule in South Africa was consistently maintained from independence till 1994 when the apartheid system was finally transformed to a non-racial democratic system. Nelson Mandela, as the first black President, led the non-racial democratic government under majority rule. Thus, since 1994, concerted efforts were made to forge closer relations between Nigeria and South Africa. The two countries have evolved a strategic partnership that has culminated in the establishment of a Bi-National Commission, which covers a range of cooperation. The agreement has been yielding fruitful and substantial results since 1999. For instance South African investments are visibly thriving everywhere in Nigeria, particularly in the areas of aviation, banking, telecommunication, electricity, sports, water resources, and agricultural industries. Similarly, Nigeria's petroleum has been flowing regularly into South Africa on a daily basis. As from early 2001, Nigeria has increased the supply of its crude oil to South Africa from an initial of 55,000 barrels to 120,000 barrels per day.⁸⁶ Thus, Nigeria and South Africa have firmly established very unique, mutual, and strong relationship.

Therefore, it can be said that the much strained relations that existed during the obnoxious apartheid regime in South Africa and repressive military dictatorship in Nigeria that prevented the two giants of Africa from realizing their full economic potentials have been eliminated. Nigeria and South Africa have always been economically strong and richly endowed in two of the major strategic minerals/resources. Nigeria with its petroleum is the sixth producer in the world, and South Africa with its gold is the leading producer in the world. These two countries were very strategically important to the world in the twentieth century, and will continue to be in the twenty-first century. Since the end of the South African institutionalized racism in 1994, and Nigeria's triumph over protracted military dictatorship in 1999, these two major African powers have been consolidating their strategic and economic partnership for the development of their respective subregions and for Africa as a whole in this twenty-first century.

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 2

Nigeria and South Africa in the Global Forum

In unity, we lost nothing, but our economic chains; indeed, in unity we gain many things, including economic independence, and the welfare of our entire peoples. However, in division, we would lose many things, and gain nothing but neo-colonialism, permanent economic bondage; and mutually destructive hostilities among ourselves. Let us therefore remain united; and let us do so resolutely, faithfully, and unflinchingly.

—Chief Obafemi Awolowo¹

Introduction

The end of apartheid saw the end of the implacable hostility between successive Nigerian governments and the minority regime in South Africa. Many saw this as the beginning of a rivalry for the leadership of the African continent between Nigeria and a free South Africa. One headline in a Nigerian newspaper in 1994 screamed “Nigeria Loses Clout to South Africa.”² The article went on to state that the crisis in Nigeria had shifted the respect of the international community from Nigeria to South Africa. The issue of permanent seat for Africa in the United Nations Security Council, which is of much interest by the Africans, has particularly caught the imagination of the proponents of Nigeria–South Africa rivalry. The many years of political crises and military rule in Nigeria provided an opportunity for comparisons of the “*transition programmes*” of the two countries, with Nigeria come out worse off.

Nigeria Loses Clout to South Africa

The collapse of apartheid and the entry of South Africa on the international scene as a major power in Africa brought changes and challenges that seriously affected Nigeria's policy and position in the African continent. With apartheid gone and the entire African continent liberated from the last vestiges of colonialism, the only major issue that gave coherence to Nigeria's policies had been removed. Even the African Union (AU) formerly the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was a major vehicle of Nigeria's African policy until the mid-1990s, seemed to have lost its relevance, at least temporarily. In the process of charting a new African policy in post-apartheid South Africa, it was inevitable that Nigeria would at some point confront the new South Africa as a rival for continental leadership.³ It did not take too long for the rivalry to start. The Abacha military government started the twin struggle between the two giants beginning in 1995.

The opportunity came in 1995 as South Africa attempted to play a leading role in the resolution of the Nigerian crisis in 1995. General Abacha's violation of human rights of the Nigerian peoples, the killing of the nine Ogoni leaders, the detention of thousands of political prisoners without trials, and the assassinations of political opponents intensified the crisis. Initially, General Abacha seemed ready to accept South Africa's intervention, which unlike that attempted by the Western powers, was based on dialogue and mutual respect. President Mandela's emissaries to General Abacha, first, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and later the former South African Vice President (later became president 1999–2009) Thabo Mbeki, received assurances of leniency for the detained political activists, while the attempts of others had failed.⁴ However, at that stage, strain could be observed in the relations between the two countries due to South Africa's open-door policy toward the opponents of the Abacha regime, especially the Nigerian pro-democracy groups. Relations deteriorated to their lowest point after the executions of the nine Ogoni leaders on November 10, 1995. President Mandela considered the executions a personal blow since he had received assurances from General Abacha that the nine Ogoni civil rights activists would not be executed. Mandela's decision to become the African arm of the international opposition to General Abacha while other African leaders remained silent and muted their reactions to the executions led to accusations by General Abacha that: "South Africa was a stooge of Western Powers, and Mandela was not a true African nationalist." In response, Mandela described the Abacha regime as "an illegitimate, barbaric, arrogant military dictatorship, which has murdered activists using a kangaroo court and false evidence."⁵ Nigeria withdrew from the 1996

African Cup of the Nations, hosted by South Africa. The excuse was that South African authorities had refused to guarantee the safety and security of the Nigerian delegation. Steps were initiated to restore normal relations between the two countries, but things were not as they had been before the November 1995 executions of the nine Ogoni activists. Relations remained cool until General Abacha's death in June 1998.

Nigeria has been eclipsed by post-apartheid South Africa as the regional power and the champion of Africa. With a larger and more diversified economic base than Nigeria, South Africa has attracted significant interest from international investors and negotiated for special assistance from the European Union under the African, Caribbean, and Pacific cooperation agreement, and also with the regional membership of the Lome Convention. South Africa is also the most likely nation in Africa to reach the status of a newly industrializing country (NIC) because of its diversified economic base. Furthermore, the Southern African Development Community and the Southern African Custom Union (SACU) appear to be better regional economic organizations for South Africa than the Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS) is for Nigeria. For example, South Africa has better developed economic infrastructure, in addition to research and development programs that stimulate industrial productivity. That South Africa is a regional power in Africa was *de facto* internationally recognized even before apartheid was abolished. South Africa's prestige within the international arena was further enhanced by the charisma of its former and first black President, Nelson Mandela. His political legacy lingers on, while his successor, President Thabo Mbeki, has indeed built around this legacy his popularity and strong leadership ability, at home, in Africa, and internationally.⁶ The voice championing African issues is now South Africa, rather than Nigeria. During the period of 1990 to 1999, when South Africa began gaining prestige and acceptance in the international community, Nigeria lost prestige and became a pariah State because of a succession of corrupt military dictatorships. What Nigeria lost, South Africa gained. Paradoxically, Nigeria's military regimes suppressed at home the rights and freedoms they championed for other African countries.⁷

Many South Africans at the beginning of an African Renaissance, initiated by President Mbeki, see the emergence of a non-racial democratic South Africa from the ruins of apartheid. Since the end of apartheid, South Africa has become a diplomatic power house and a democratic role model not only for African countries but for many other countries outside Africa. Most especially is the larger than life image of the first African President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, who has been described by some as the greatest hero and moral authority of the twentieth century. In the words

of his official biographer, Anthony Sampson, "He has become a universal hero at the end of the twentieth century."⁸ Whether South Africa will indeed become a beacon for the rest of the continent depends largely on developments in the country over the many years period after the retirement of President Mandela. After more than three centuries (1652–1994), which witnessed one of the most brutal and damaging racist political system in modern times, South Africa is not yet a normal and stable society. While the transition period presided over by Nelson Mandela was surprisingly peaceful and promising, the period of transformation away from what is still a white privilege society is bound to be more difficult and controversial. The danger is that the fallout of any serious conflict in South Africa could certainly affect the Southern African subregion and the entire continent of Africa.

The Western powers look more favorably at South Africa than Nigeria since the first all-races democratic election that elected Nelson Mandela as the first black President of South Africa in 1994. The profusion of Nigeria's domestic problems has relegated its African policy and its foreign policy as a whole to the back burner. No longer able to lure friends with promises of loans, grants, or access to its markets, Nigeria saw its influence and image in international circles diminished during the last fifteen years of military rule, from 1983 to 1999. One Western diplomat described Nigeria as "probably the country that has the least popular following in the world at large."⁹ Many Africans saw Nigeria as the empty vessel that made the most noise. For example, shortly after Major-General Muhammadu Buhari's regime was overthrown by General Ibrahim Babangida in 1985, *West Africa* described the general image of Nigeria held by many Africans thus:

For over a decade Nigeria has been synonymous with greed, corruption, coups, insensitivity, wastefulness, misdirection and financial insanity. Nigerians have been credited with more money than brains, more chaos than sense. . . . Nigerians are seen as noisy, arrogant, and brash.¹⁰

Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has often taken the lead in Africa and pursuing policies commensurate with its perceived stature. During the 1970s, a clear policy focus, matched by some economic power, signaled its important stake in the African continent. Nigeria's policy initiatives outside the continent were also respected. In this sense, Nigeria gained status in the international community, which at times translated into real influence.¹¹

As noted above, Nigeria, once a respected nation abroad and an important player in international affairs, especially African affairs, suddenly became a pariah under the military regimes of Generals Babangida and

Abacha. President Obasanjo on May 29, 1999, pledged in his inaugural speech to change this state of affairs and pursue a dynamic foreign policy aimed at developing friendly relations with all nations and playing a constructive role in the United Nations, the AU, the Commonwealth, and other international bodies. According to him, Nigeria will continue to honor all its existing international and bilateral agreements.¹² Since the civilian administration under President Obasanjo took over in May 1999, it has shown its determination to restore Nigeria to the position it had previously enjoyed in the international community.

United Nations Reform and Africa's Quest for Permanent Seat in an Enlarged Security Council

There is an increasing demand for a reform of the Security Council of the United Nations for the following reasons:

1. The increased membership of the United Nations from fifty-one in 1945 to 192 as of 2006;
2. The need to ensure transparency, efficiency, and accountability in the Council's working methods;
3. The use or abuse of the veto power by the permanent members; and
4. The prevailing international climate of relative peace.

Since its inception in 1945, the Security Council has undergone a modification in its membership only once in 1965 when the original membership of eleven was increased to fifteen (made up of five permanent and ten non-permanent members). The present mood for reform can therefore be better served if expansion takes place in both categories of membership on a non-discriminatory basis and as spelt out in the Charter of the organization. In addition, the will of the international community as a whole should not continue to be undermined by that of the minority who presently exercise the veto power in matters that bear on the maintenance of international peace and security in which all member states have vested interests.

However, in 1979, the delegation of India raised the issue of Security Council reform in the General Assembly. As a result, the question of equitable representation and an increase in the membership of the Security Council has come to be addressed by the General Assembly. Consequently, at its Forty-Ninth Session, the General Assembly formally established a Working Group under the Chairmanship of the President of the Assembly to address the issue.¹³ The Working Group has continued its work since then.

When the United Nations was formed in 1945, out of the fifty-one original members, only four were African countries: Liberia, Egypt, Ethiopia, and South Africa. Even as African membership of the UN increased in the 1960s as a result of independence, the continent has remained under represented in the Security Council. At the moment, Africa has to contend with only three rotating non-permanent seats in the Security Council. Against this backdrop, the issue of Africa's representation in the Security Council, particularly in the category of permanent membership, has come not only to the UN but has become a compelling preoccupation of the AU, formerly the OAU.

In September 1994 the AU adopted a common position on this issue. It stated *inter alia*,

Without prejudice to the fact that it should have a proportionate number of non-permanent seats with all the privileges attached thereto, as long as the institution of permanent membership remains in force. The permanent seats allocated to Africa will be assigned to countries based on a collective decision made by Africans themselves in accordance with, a system of rotation. The rotation will be determined through a set of criteria of the African Union currently in force and other elements which might subsequently improve those criteria.¹⁴

At the Harare Summit in June 1997, the African Union charged the African Group at the United Nations to come up with the modalities for carrying out Africa's position on this issue. Within the African Group there are some considerable difficulties in getting agreed modalities for the implementation of the rotation principle. It is strongly felt by some African states that rotating permanent seat is a contradiction and is in fact an extension of non-permanent status. Some are of the opinion that Africa should not consign itself to an inferior status by advocating permanent regional rotating seats, especially, if other regions manage to come up with specific countries to occupy new permanent seats in a reformed and expanded United Nations Security Council. The new five permanent members being proposed are India, Brazil, Japan, Germany, and Nigeria or South Africa for Africa.¹⁵

Although in the forefront of the call for an expansion of the membership of the Security Council, Nigeria did not formally announce its interest in serving the international community as a permanent member until 1992. Since that time, it has reiterated its interest on a number of occasions to serve in this position. Having served with distinction for three terms as a non-permanent member of the Security Council (1966–1967; 1978–1979, and 1994–1995), Nigeria's claim to permanent membership of the Council cannot be discounted. Among many other contributions, Nigeria

vigorously articulated and consistently defended Africa's concerns and interests at the United Nations—especially on questions of decolonization and the struggles against former white minority regimes in Southern Africa. Nigeria held the chairmanship of the United Nations Committee against Apartheid from the 1970s until apartheid was abolished in 1994.¹⁶ In addition, Nigeria has been the leading African nation in the United Nations peace-keeping operations around the world. Since its independence in 1960, Nigerian troops have participated in sixteen UN peace-keeping and peace-observer missions ranging from the Congo in the very early years of its independence in 1960, in Tanzania in 1964,¹⁷ in Lebanon, Cyprus, Sinai, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and to the peace-keeping in the Balkans. As from 2005, Nigerian peace-keeping, both civilians and military were serving in the Darfur Region of the Western Sudan. Over 200,000 Nigerian troops have served in one UN peace-keeping operations or another since 1960.¹⁸ And it should be noted that a Nigerian—General Martin Agwai is the Commander of the Hybrid Peace-Keeping Force of the African Union and the United Nations in a bid to end the Darfur crisis of the western Sudan. Also the United Nations Secretary—General Ban Ki-moon has appointed a Nigerian, Lt.-General Chikadibia Obiakor as his Military Adviser for United Nations' Global Peace-keeping Operations.

One very important question is whether Nigeria should assume, as some Nigerian analysts have advocated, the continental role in Africa in the twenty-first century and serve as big brother, just as the United States has assumed the superpower role in the Western hemisphere. As attractive as this option may seem, it is going to be very difficult, because Nigeria has neither the stability nor the image for such a role. However, by virtue of its economic power (resources), diplomatic experience, and manpower Nigeria is qualified to occupy the African seat in the UN Security Council. With all of its resources, Nigeria is a poor country because most of its peoples are not benefiting from the wealth of the country, and only about 5 percent of its peoples are benefiting from its resources. Nevertheless, the current reality of the situation is that Nigerians are suffering in the midst of plenty. Any attempt by Nigeria to claim such a position undoubtedly would be strongly resisted and resented by other African countries, especially by South Africa. Before the eradication of apartheid in South Africa, this role for Nigeria was possible and might have been very easy, but now it is not going to be easy. Multiracial, democratic South Africa has the most powerful and well-equipped military, a strong infrastructure, and a strong and diversified economy, as well as a stable government, and Nigeria's leadership role would be resented. Predictably, the rivalry between Nigeria and South Africa has already begun. Both countries wish to represent Africa as permanent members in the proposed expanded UN Security Council, but

there is space for only one African nation. South Africans are convinced that their country is the most qualified candidate for the United Nations Security Council position. They point out that South Africa is politically matured by citing the peaceful transition, from apartheid to a democratic rule and the orderly transfer of power from Nelson Mandela to Thabo Mbeki in June 1999.¹⁹ In addition, South Africa has been able to hold two peaceful, free, fair, and credible democratic elections after the 1994 first election (1999 and 2004 elections).²⁰ These are impressive credentials indicative of a new African state that is fully capable of representing Africa with honor and respect in the world body. Africans would have reason to be proud of their representation in the Security Council.

Conversely, Nigeria's domestic history since 1966 is tarnished with recurring military dictatorships, incessant religious conflicts, corruption, and human rights abuses, especially, between 1985 and 1998. For instance, Nigeria has not been able to hold any free, fair, and peaceful elections since independence election of 1959, and the only one that was free, fair, and credible held in 1993 was annulled by the Babangida military regime.²¹ Nevertheless, political leaders, intellectuals, and the majority of Nigerians and non-Nigerians have disagreed, arguing that:

Over the years Nigeria has earned the right to be the voice of Africa. Despite its chequered internal record, its performance on behalf of African causes have been impeccable. This has been done at immense national self-sacrifice. If we seek to demonize Nigeria for its domestic misdeeds, it is only fair that we glorify her for external performance. And, even if we went by number distribution, Nigeria would still prevail, five of every ten Africans are Nigerians. In Nigeria's view, South Africa is a novice in world affairs and needs time to mature past apartheid politics.²²

In a characteristic manner, Africa has been unable to produce a compromise candidate for the proposed expanded permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council. If this opportunity is frittered away, Africans will remain the only race without representation in the most powerful organ of the United Nations, with the attendant negative implications. Since the world body was established in 1945, it has served as a widely accepted platform for international relations, diplomacy, and arbitration. Specifically, the Security Council that takes final decisions on war and related matters and has become a forum where awesome military credentials are used as weapons for negotiations and supremacy. Also, the veto power held by its five permanent members—United States, China, France, Britain, and Russia, confers on them rare privileges whose misuse can have serious global consequences. Over the years, this status quo has

provided the basis for apprehension, inferiority, and agitation among the non-veto members of the organization.

The current reforms at the UN are aimed at correcting that imbalance to foster a better sense of belonging in the world community. The Cold War period (1945–1990) between the United States and the former Soviet Union (now Russia Federation), promoted the polarization of nations of the world along ideological lines, which in turn hampered global peace, trust, and cooperation. In the new world order of the twenty-first century, there is the need for a repositioned United Nations to move closer to racial equality. This is why Africa must not be sidelined, as a new thinking sweeps through the United Nations. From centuries of slavery, through direct colonialism, and now to economic imperialism and neocolonialism, Africa has remained the butt of all other races of the world.

It is very sad now that an occasion has presented itself to move the continent up in the global family; Africa is once again in contention with itself for the one Security Council slot. In addition, to Nigeria and South Africa, Egypt, Kenya, Senegal, Libya, and the Gambia are also very much interested to occupy the same seat.²³ The seven African countries contending for this seat do not seem to appreciate the gravity of the situation that this is an opportunity that Africa must not lose. The Africans must understand that majority of the five permanent Security Council members prefer the existing structure and composition of the influential position they hold in the Security Council. The failure of the African nations to forge a common front would only justify an excuse for their position that the elite club of veto-wielders should not be expanded. The Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Olu Adeniji, made this point when he said: "The quest for a candidate has hit a brick wall. The battle is now between aspirants to that seat and members not willing to admit new entrants. . . . And for the five permanent members, the disagreement among the contenders is sweet music."²⁴ At this stage, the African Union should get its act together and be united, focused, and undaunted in the pursuit of its interests. Africa must show that it has come of age, and that it is prepared to be realistic in its choice of which African country should assume the critical responsibilities at the world's center stage.

Nigeria, South Africa, and African Union

Various suggestions have been presented on the UN Security Council Seat by both Africans and non-Africans. Bade Onimode has proposed that Nigeria and South Africa should amicably agree on one of them bidding for the African seat in the Security Council.²⁵ Joy Ogwu advocated

for a common voice as well as committed pragmatism and rationalism on it in the larger interest of Africa, to support one candidate.²⁶ Onimode proposed that one should concede the seat for the other in a mutually agreed manner, while Joy Ogwu counseled for the larger interest of Africa to which the two countries (Nigeria and South Africa), have a great stake to defend. Jide Owoeye advocated for a tripartite cooperation in filling the proposed African seat and submitted that:

Now that the African seat in the United Nations Security Council is up for grabs, South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt are perhaps the only credible regional powers that could aspire to the seat. While South Africa has better logistics than the other two, the political will for such role by Nigeria and the prestige Egypt has attained holding the United Nations Secretary-Generalship could be combined to produce a rotational control of this much exalted but demanding position.²⁷

According to the Chinese Ambassador to Nigeria, Wang Yonqiu, "Given the seriousness of Nigeria for this seat, China, the world's most populous nation and one of the five current permanent members of the U.N. Security Council believes that Nigeria, with her vast geographical spread and records of good neighborliness in Africa is eminently qualified for the United Nations Security Council Seat."²⁸

Emphasizing the Chinese' strong support of Nigeria to occupy the seat, during his visit to Nigeria, in October 2004, the Chairman of Chinese National Peoples' Congress, Wu Bangguo said,

As an important country, Nigeria, in pursuit of the policy of good neighborliness and friendship, takes an active part in regional and international affairs. It also supports stability of the African continent, especially the West African sub-region and promoting the process of regional economic cooperation and integration. China backs Nigeria for the UN Security Council seat.²⁹

In addition, Nigeria's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Aminu Wali emphasized that:

Considering Nigeria's records on peace and security in Africa and around the world. I believe that Nigeria ought to have the seat if there is only one, but I found out that other African countries thought differently. I also found out that if you have influence and power; you have to contend with a lot of opposition.³⁰

These are some of the dynamics that characterize relations between Nigeria and South Africa. In essence, the best Nigeria can do under the present

circumstances is to try to make the African Union more efficient. With deft diplomacy, Nigeria can ensure that a two-third majority of AU member states can pass a resolution that has moral authority and is binding on all member states on African issues. To this end, Nigeria should encourage the African Union to adopt some ethics, not necessarily those of Western democratic societies, but ones that place a premium on human life, human dignity, the rule of law and good governance, freedom of expression, and African family values. As the largest and most populous black nation in the AU and in the world, and as the largest contributor to the AU's regular budget, Nigeria has an immense part to play in accomplishing this task. It is against this background that the civilian administration, which had adopted reform policies at home had contributed military, financial, and material resources to the civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo, and Sudan, materials, and advice to other crises areas in Africa, especially the Darfur Region of the Western Sudan and Somalia in order to help them achieve peaceful settlements.³¹

It is hoped that Nigeria with its leaders, and with its past records as a very strong, and committed Pan-African nation, is in a better position to make the African Union of the twenty-first century adopt some meaningful and ethical policies. These are necessary, especially on issues of human rights, with the consequence that any breach of these positions would ideally result in the suspension of the violating country's membership in the organization. This would serve as a deterrent to the irresponsible use and misuse of power against the civil society in the member states. Despite the OAU's checkered history since its inception in 1963, no single member state has been suspended from it until the AU was formed, and Madagascar was the first member state of the AU, when it was suspended from 2002 to 2003.³² Morocco voluntarily pulled out in 1984 over the admission of the Western Sahara to the African Union. Therefore, the fear of possible suspension or expulsion may have a salutary effect on the style of governance in most of the African countries.

It has been argued that if the African Union adopted this kind of position, it would be interfering in the internal affairs of member states. This argument cannot stand the test of times in the New World Order for the following reasons. First, at the Africa-Europe Summit held in Cairo, Egypt in April 2000, both President Obasanjo and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the member states agreed and very strongly stated that:

Positive intervention is today an indispensable obligation of all members of the international community, and human rights should no longer be considered an internal affair. There can be no turning back from the principle that human rights are sacred, regardless of frontiers. Non-interference in

internal affairs is no longer tenable as an excuse for folding our hands and allowing innocent men, women and children to be consumed by barbarism, tyranny or whatever violent means of expressions of evil nature.³³

Second, there is nothing in the African Union's Charter that specifically prevents it from interfering in the internal affairs of member states when a member state's security is threatened. Article 4 (h) of the AU's Constitutive Act, 2000, reiterates that "the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity."³⁴ Third, the African Union has intervened in many cases in African conflicts in the past, such as the Nigerian Civil war of 1967–1970, the Angolan Civil War 1975–2003, the Chadian conflict 1977–1989, the Liberian Civil War of 1989–1997, Sierra Leonean conflict 1991–2001, and the civil war in Sudan (1983–1984). Fourth, the organization needs to grow if it is not to decline and become irrelevant, and in the process of growth it will have to modify some of its original principles in the light of the global circumstances of the twenty-first century.

In addition, if all the member states are united and speak with one voice, there is no reason why, under the African Union umbrella, they cannot declare an African version of the Monroe Doctrine.³⁵ It is humiliating that non-African states (foreign states) mediate most of the inter- and intra-state conflicts in Africa.³⁶ Indeed, the economic and military weaknesses and lack of unity of Nigeria and South Africa as the leading powers in the continent, and all African countries make this inevitable. Yet one can argue that if the majority of African Union member states were to take a united stand on an issue, it would be very difficult and even embarrassing for any non-African power to ignore their opinion. Nigeria and South Africa can play a major role in bringing about this unity. First, by ensuring political stability, economic and social well being of their peoples at home. Second, by reaffirming their total support for an efficient, and effective African Union and its Charter. In essence, Nigeria and South Africa as the leading powers in Africa should adopt a consistent and forward-looking, serious, committed and responsible policy in regard to the African Union, and their respective regional organizations—ECOWAS and SADC.

At the annual meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund of September 2003, held in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Nigeria and South Africa were elected as permanent representatives of the Anglophone Bloc of the African continent into the Finance Committee of the IMF and the Development Committee of the World Bank.³⁷ This is an unprecedented honor accorded these two African countries in recognition of their active role and economic importance on the continent and the world.

Africa's Capacity for Peace-keeping and Security in the Continent

A threat to peace anywhere in the world should be considered as a threat to peace everywhere. This is the essence of the principle of collective security. As far as 1963, at the inception of the Organization of African Unity, President Nkrumah of Ghana advocated for the establishment of an *African High Command*, and emphasized the importance of African security. Thus, in order to protect the economic structure, political stability, and security of African continent, African leaders should adopt "a unified defense strategy, based on an African Military High Command, unified economy, and a unified foreign policy and diplomacy."³⁸

Among West African nations, Nigeria stands tall as the *super power* of the subregion. Socioeconomic tranquility and desired political stability of West African countries rest solely on Nigeria's effective leadership. Nigeria's meaningful and effective contributions to internal political order and peace in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ivory Coast in terms of manpower, economic resources, and military materials cannot be overemphasized. When Togo outrageously violated its succession constitutional order after the death of President Gnassingbe Eyadema in 2005, Nigeria stood firm as a regional leader in West Africa. President Obasanjo, as the then Chairman of the African Union advised the Togolese very strongly to "retrace their steps to the position of the constitution, to hold free, fair and transparent elections."³⁹ Consequently, Nigeria effectively invoked the ECOWAS economic sanctions with the support of the African Union, the European Union, and the United States, to make Togo comply accordingly.⁴⁰

Renewed efforts have been made within and even outside the continent to help deal with the issues of peace-keeping and security in Africa. The most important of all the continent-wide efforts was the establishment in 1993 of the Central Organ of the African Union (AU) mechanism for the Prevention, Management, and Resolution of conflicts. This Central Organ has been replaced by the Peace and Security Council, equivalent to the Security Council of the United Nations. It is the desire of the African Union that subregional efforts within Africa should complement this central mechanism. Most importantly, with the initiative and leadership of Nigeria, West African countries under ECOWAS umbrella have demonstrated through the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Observer Group (ECOMOG),⁴¹ the necessity and importance of subregional security organization. ECOMOG was set up initially to contain the Liberian civil war and restore peace to that country. The ECOMOG as a military arm of ECOWAS was a successful effort, and furthermore, created the climate that enabled democratic elections to

take place in Liberia in July 1997. This formally ended the conflict in that country in which 150,000 people were killed. It is on record that Nigeria lost over 200 soldiers while over 1,000 of Nigerian military personnel were wounded and the country spent over \$3 billion to finance ECOMOG's operation in Liberia.⁴²

From the Liberian civil war experience with Nigeria's leadership of the ECOMOG forces, it has evolved the *Monrovia Doctrine*, legitimizing intervention in West Africa by Nigerian led troops. We began to witness the birth and development of *Pax Nigeriana*, meaning the right of Nigeria to pacify any unruly neighbors. Thus, Nigeria may have started something of long term duration, in the West Africa subregion which began in Monrovia, Liberia in 1992. It has since also been implemented in Sierra Leone leading to the settlement of its civil war. Consequently, Nigeria has become the *big brother* (Super power) of West Africa.

The Economic Community of the West African States has maintained peace-keeping operations in West Africa since 1992. One can surely say that ECOWAS rivals the United Nations in effective peace-keeping under difficult circumstances, making it a world leader in that field. With the ECOMOG record of achievements in Liberia and its success in bringing peace to Sierra Leone, the West African subregion thus has an effective proven peace-keeping record. In recognition of ECOMOG's success the meeting of Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministers of ECOWAS member states held in Cote d'Ivoire, on March 11 and 12, 1998. The meeting recommended that experts from member states should work with the Executive Secretariat of the United Nations to prepare a mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution and for peace-keeping in accordance with the directives contained in the Final Communiqué issued at the end of the Fourth Extraordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government in Lome, Togo.⁴³

Consequently, West African Defense Ministers in their meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, in June 2004, agreed to create a 6,500 member multi-national force to respond to "crisis and threats to peace in the war ravaged region."⁴⁴ The core of this force will be 1,500 highly trained and well equipped rapid response troops and 3,500 backups. The remaining 1,500 soldiers will form a reserve force. In recognition of ECOMOG successes, Ali Mazrui has pointed out that:

Pan-Africanism of military integration is likely to be led by West Africa, with the precedent set by ECOMOG under the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In spite of the difficulties and inconclusiveness of ECOMOG's attempted rescue operation in Liberia, the effort has been a major pioneering enterprise in the history of Pax Africana.⁴⁵

Also the Carter Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution in Atlanta, Georgia, U.S.A. has acclaimed ECOMOG as the most successful regional security model ever established in the developing world. In economic integration, ECOWAS' performance has been dismal when compared to the successful performance of ECOMOG collective security model.

In the Southern Africa subregion Southern African Development Community (SADC) as a regional economic community has demonstrated similar determination and capability to succeed but not in the area of military security such as ECOMOG in the West African subregion. However, all these are efforts that emphasize the need for Africa to take its destiny into its own hands in the areas of peace and security without letting the Security Council of the United Nations off the hook in terms of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Most significantly, since the establishment of the AU Central Mechanism for Prevention, Management, and Resolution of Conflicts, there has been a sudden proliferation of initiatives from various countries outside Africa aimed at enhancing Africa's capacity for peace support operations. Since 1995, the AU and African leaders have pronounced themselves on the initiatives that have been launched by various non-African countries aimed at enhancing Africa's capacity in this regard. While noting the goodwill of the sponsors of these various initiatives, the AU has always felt that the control of these initiatives should rest with Africans themselves. At the Seventh Ordinary Session of the Central Mechanism for Prevention, Management and Conflicts Resolution held at Ministerial level in November 1997, the Central Organ emphasized the necessity for Member States of the AU to determine the parameters for the implementation of any initiative aimed at enhancing Africa's capacity in the area of peace support operations bearing in mind the need to preserve the unity and cohesion of the continent in this critical era. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union also underscored the need for inclusiveness in the implementation of any initiative to enable all AU member states willing and able to participate in such initiatives to do so.

Conclusion

Some of the non-African initiatives tend to perpetuate the division of the continent into Anglophone and Francophone peace-keepers. This will clearly weaken the continent's collective resolve at tackling issues of common concern and may result in a repartitioning of Africa into foreign

spheres of influence and interests, which are incompatible with the objectives of the African Union. Africans believe that any initiatives that claim to support Africa's efforts at peace-keeping operations must also be implemented within the ambit of the existing AU mechanism. Such initiatives must also be transparent, inclusive, and above all, respond to the collective consensus of African leaders, its peoples, and organization. It is important to note that already members of the African Group at the United Nations strive to promote closer cooperation in the area of peace-keeping between regional organizations and the UN. Their views were accommodated in the final report and recommendations of the United Nations Special Committee on Peace-keeping operations under the chairmanship of Nigeria.⁴⁶

The former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has advocated that "New permanent or long term members should be added to the UN Security Council, whose current membership reflects the reality of 1945, not of (today) the twenty-first century."⁴⁷ There is no alternative to a reorganization and reform of the United Nations particularly, its Security Council. This is very necessary in order to ensure its congruent adjustment and adaptation to not only the far-reaching changes in the new international system in which it has to operate, but also the imperative of improving the political legitimacy of its decisions, the effectiveness and efficiency of the whole organization. "It is in the context of the Security Council reform which entails, among other things, the expansion of the membership, including permanent membership of the Council that an opportunity exists for African continent to a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council."⁴⁸ More than 25 percent of the UN members in the General Assembly are African countries.⁴⁹ Therefore Africa deserves and should occupy one of the proposed permanent five Security Council seats.

Chapter 3

Post-Apartheid South Africa: New Challenges and Dilemmas

During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African peoples. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal, which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.

—Nelson Mandela¹

Introduction

South Africa's transition from apartheid to majority rule has been greeted both domestically and internationally with enormous enthusiasm. Here, in the midst of the mounting conflict, and confusion of the post-Cold War, is an undeniably good news story. And triumph of peaceful negotiations, and democracy over violence and many years of white racist authoritarianism in South Africa.² President Mandela said:

The election of April 1994 did not set us free—but we did achieve the freedom to be free. There are new dilemmas in our new democracy, and real problems which our institutions and the media face. There are responsibilities and new challenges. Nevertheless, few would now dispute our newly won right to debate and argue about our response to those challenges. This is one of our country's real achievements. It is another personal delight for me today to watch how the divisions of the past are giving way to the beginning of a new South African sense of belonging, shared by all³

A few years ago many observers predicted that, “there will be a bloodbath in South Africa and that the whites will never give up power.” And yet, it happened. Why? While in Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda and other countries, people have torn themselves apart, the South African story was indeed a breath of fresh air. Perhaps this was nothing short of a political miracle. What then is responsible for this South African miracle? There are many answers to this question, but the most important one is the leadership of Nelson Mandela. Despite his imprisonment on Robben Island for twenty-seven years, he did not allow his emotions to cloud his political judgment. Instead, he forgave his captors and in so doing successfully brought South Africa out of its political misery transforming it in a matter of few years from a pariah state to a legitimate, enviable actor within the international system. He applied his teachings of morality and humane democracy to his many years of difficult situations. His behavior has won him praise around the world. All these have helped to produce a government, led by this same man, Nelson Mandela, described as the “*last twentieth century hero*” a truly inspirational figure with unequalled international stature, and moral authority. At his inauguration as the first African President of the Republic of South Africa, he said:

The time for the healing of the wounds has come. The moment to bridge the shams that divide us have come. The time to build is upon us as we enter into a covenant that we shall build the society in which all South Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk tall, without any fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable right to human dignity—a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world. We are humbled and elevated by the honour and privilege that you, the people of South Africa, have bestowed on us, as the first president of a united, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist government. We must, therefore, act together as a united people, for national reconciliation, for nation building, for the birth of a new world. Let there be justice for all. Let there be peace for all. Let freedom reign. God bless Africa.⁴

These statements from Mandela have provided a source of optimism on a continent that for many decades has been habitually described as being “in crisis.”⁵ Nelson Rlihlahla Mandela will without question go down in history as one of the best-known and best-loved public figures of the twentieth century. As he had come to personify the heroic struggle against the evils of apartheid, he also symbolizes the qualities of forgiveness and reconciliation in the new nation of South Africa. His personal example as well as his political vision gave him exceptional stature among his fellow South Africans—irrespective of race and color, and in the entire world—to whom he became a veritable icon. Indeed, many countries were encouraged

by this new development including the United States government which under the Clinton administration launched a Mission to present South Africa to the Americans as the door of hope for the rest of the continent.⁶

Despite more than a decade of piecemeal sanctions, economic stagnation, and crisis South Africa retains the most powerful, industrialized, and diversified economy in Africa. During the apartheid phase of South African history, most African states, and international organizations attempted, with varying but often high degrees of resolve, to isolate South Africa, and minimize their economic interaction with the then apartheid state.⁷ Nevertheless, historical linkages, and the continuing strength of South African political and capital interests ensured the persistence of significant economic interchange, regardless of political obstacles.

As South Africans work out their post-apartheid future, and as the old political, and economic barriers with the rest of the continent crumble, there are increasing social, political, and economic interactions between the hobbled Leviathan of South Africa and its continental neighbors. What repercussions will follow from this process? To what extent will it enhance prospects for political and economic development in the rest of the continent? And to what extent may it further constrain them? Who will be the main agents and beneficiaries of this expansion of South African–African interchange, and who will be its casualties? And what security consequences will result? This chapter explores these questions within three expanding concentric circles: the new South Africa itself, South Africa's interactive relationships with its neighboring states, and its role in Africa as a whole.

Post-Apartheid Reconstruction and Development

Any attempt to re-make South Africa, and to promote development as well as growth in a manner, which begins to address the historical injustices, and grossly inequitable life chances, which are the legacies of the past, is handicapped from the outset by the impact of prolonged economic decline. South Africa's economic performance has slowly improved since the historic first democratic elections of April 1994. Growth estimates of 3.3 percent for 1998 remain short of the 4 percent required to make any inroads into South Africa's acute unemployment problem. This is so, despite Nelson Mandela's remarkably successful efforts to gain the confidence of the South Africans and international business communities for the four years he was the President. In the meantime, the traditional mainstay of the South African economy, gold, experienced a crisis marked by sharply worsening production figures, and falling prices. With these considerations in mind, the South African government launched an ambitious new macro-economic

strategy for "Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR)" in June 1996. This strategy was aimed at achieving average annual growth rate of 4.2 percent between 1996 and 2000, but reached 6.1 percent in 2000. The government of National Unity under President Mandela, and later President Thabo Mbeki were able to achieve these targets and engineered a reversal of South Africa's relative economic decline. However, the process proved to be a long and difficult one.⁸ It will make it all the more challenging to generate the resources and the political will to finance South Africa's ambitious Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP).⁹

The RDP has been the centerpiece of the government policy agenda. Among other things, it embodies the government's justice agenda. Those were policies, and programs, which were designed to reduce historic inequalities and provide a better life for the previously disenfranchised black majority. It provides the political assurance that, along with fiscal responsibility, economic restructuring, and growth, the ANC government is committed to real change for the poor black majority. This is its primary base of electoral support. Yet, the RDP and its associated programs will place an enormous strain on South Africa's limited human and financial capacity. To cite just one important example, the former Health Minister, Nkosazana Zuma's¹⁰ widely praised National Health Insurance Program. This program unveiled in mid-1995 and designed to provide free primary health care to all who needed it by 2005, faced a financial shortfall of R3.39 billion. More broadly, the RDP process as a whole has come under increasing criticism for its preoccupation with bureaucratic structures and limited progress in meeting concrete targets. This would explain in part its transfer to the Ministry of Finance in 1996 in controversial circumstances. At the same time, the RDP White Paper, which was designed to set out plans for implementation, has been criticized by progressive academics as a "very significant compromise to the neoliberal economic policy preferences of the old regime."¹¹

Thus, the government presided over an economy that was growing in positive terms. Though this has been the case particularly in its first years in office, the ANC government failed to achieve growth levels that are high enough to cut down the army of unemployment. It was estimated that over 30 percent of South Africans who are fit to work do not have jobs.¹² In fact, many South Africans have continued to lose their jobs as previously protected firms are being forced to reshape their operations to face international competition. Firm shutdowns have also been orchestrated, in part, by perceptions that South Africa's new labor regime will make it difficult for companies to fire workers. These concerns have also been cited as the reasons for slow levels of foreign direct investments. These are because most of the new labor laws designed to eradicate workplace discriminations, and

protect labor rights have only recently been implemented. Therefore, it is a little premature to say what their effect is on employment trends.

The ANC government has emphasized that, though the country has experienced jobless growth, Pretoria's industry support measures have helped save jobs, in South Africa, and in the neighboring states. Be that as it may, the unemployed in South Africa went into the election of April 2004, with inquiring minds about when they will be rescued from joblessness. Policy makers' constraints insuring interventionist policies as the scourge of unemployment have been worsened by the new global trading rules which are highly skeptical of State intervention in the economy.

However, 1998 was the most difficult year for South Africa's multiracial government. The global financial markets crisis, which spread from Asia through all emerging markets, threatened the trend of globalization, which had hitherto been thought of as unstoppable. While many Asian governments were forced to introduce foreign exchange controls, Pretoria's authorities stayed the course, choosing to keep the economy open and playing by the global rules. As a result, South Africans had to contend with higher interest rates to defend, the Rand (South African currency). These punitively high rates plunged the country into a recession in 1998. The economy grew by 3.2 percent in 1996, 1.7 percent in 1997, and only 0.1 percent in 1998 and this followed a 2.0 percent in 1999.¹³

Economic policy and performance are crucially linked in shaping international and local confidence in the unfolding South African story. Globalization is not a favored phenomenon in the developing world, given the concern of poor nations that they are competing on an uneven playing field where the rules for the global economy are made by the rich and powerful for their advantage. South Africa is a special case in the divide separating developed and developing countries. The South African economy, unlike the Nigerian economy has distinct features of both developed and developing nations. On balance, however, South Africa is a developing country beset by many of the challenges to economic and social well being faced by many poor nations, like Nigeria.

As far as economic policy is concerned, it is a basic tenet of the South African government that the country is an inextricable part of the global economy and that it should seek optimum utilization of that linkage for the sake of economic growth and development. According to Trevor Manuel, the South Africa Finance Minister, "South Africa's response has been to seek a partnership with the global economy and, in particular with the wealthy nations of the world and its multilateral institutions: a partnership built on trust, respect and, above all a commitment to succeed."¹⁴ The Minister further pointed out that South African economy has shown impressive resilience in the midst of the global slowdown of the early

twenty-first century. The economy grew by 3.4 percent in 2000, which was less than 6.1 percent expected, while declining to 2.2 percent in 2001, "underpinned by a moderate recovery of investment and a strong export performance in the first half of 2001." Growth for 2002 was 2.2 percent, 3.3 percent in 2003, 3.5 percent in 2004, and 4 percent in 2005. Trevor Manuel pointed out that "in first World terms, these growth figures are respectable taking into account that the advanced economies are expected to grow by 0.6 percent in the year 2003."¹⁵

However, unlike in Asia, the South African government can take comfort from the fact that its economic troubles had nothing to do with a flawed banking system, where cronyism between industry and bank converged. The country's vulnerability to the external shocks in part derives from the low rates of domestic savings, its inability to attract sustained inflows of direct foreign investments, the high ratio of short-term foreign debt to foreign exchange reserves, and falling commodity prices.

Things may have been tough on the growth and job front, however, the ANC government went to the elections of April 2004 with the encouraging results and rising confidence in its economic management ability. It has managed to keep inflation levels in single digit figures. In February 1999, inflation dipped marginally to 8.6 percent from the January figures of 8.9 percent, maintaining the single-digit trend. In April 1999, the Ministry of Finance unveiled a new set of data on government finances. These statistics showed that the budget deficit stood at 3.3 percent in 1998/1999 compared with an earlier figure of 3.7 percent. This was particularly good news, occurring in a difficult year when the economy went into recession. This good news was attributed to better revenues, as a result of improved tax collection. Collection of taxes is one of the economic achievements that the ANC government has recorded. The importance of this should not be underestimated as the improvement is taking place in a society where apartheid has almost eroded tax morality. Withholding of service payments was one of the tools used by the majority in pressing home their demands for an end to apartheid.¹⁶

However, in terms of South Africa's development needs, unemployment and poverty of crisis proportions in the past years, growth has fallen below the goals set out in the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy that drives the government's macroeconomic policy. The GEAR strategy envisages a "high road" growth and development option that targets economic growth at 6 percent and the creation of 400,000 new jobs annually but this has not been realized. According to President Thabo Mbeki

the adoption of GEAR by our organization and government caused the ongoing controversy within the broad democratic movement. The GEAR strategy to finance our development with our own resources rather than

depend on borrowed money was denounced as neo-liberal and a betrayal of the revolution to the so-called Washington consensus. The left (meaning the opposition) wanted us further to increase the debt burden that we inherited from the apartheid system on the basis of the principle live now, pay later. It wanted us to follow the example of Zimbabwe, which since its independence in 1980 financed its social and economic development on the basis of a large budget deficit, financed by unsustainable domestic and foreign borrowings. Rather, we took the opposite route to get out of debt, so that our national savings is directed at social and economic up-liftment [*sic*] which Zimbabwe financed with borrowed money, but we have chosen to finance with our own resources.¹⁷

Mbeki strengthens his case for the efficacy of economic orthodoxy in delivering tangible benefits in line with government policy objectives. These objectives showed that prudent financial management resulted in lower interest costs that led to the release of R10 billion in additional financial resources for spending on social services over the next three years. President Mbeki was in essence addressing his ideological opponents within the ANC alliance as well as the broader black political constituency where he knows there is support for President Mugabe's hard-line approach to landownership and perceived Western interference in the politics of Zimbabwe. Specifically, a market economy and prudent fiscal governance are the proven pillars of sound economics if South Africa is to achieve its growth and development goals. Implicit in Mbeki's reasoning is that South Africa is part of a global economy that brings with it policy imperatives to which the country must adhere if it seeks to derive optimum benefit in the form of investor confidence and global trading opportunities.¹⁸

Though foreigners continue to invest in South Africa, the bulk of the money has gone into corporate takeovers, and mergers. This in part, explains why growth and investments have done little to reduce unemployment. While the privatization program has been one of the strong attractions for foreign investors, its sluggish pace, in response to resistance from labor unions, has denied the country of millions' worth of direct foreign investments. For example, the country is unable to secure a strategic or core investor in the State's owned, South African Forest Corporation (SAFCOL), although the government has sold 20 percent stake in South African Airlines to a Swiss owned Corporation.¹⁹

The ANC has proved wrong the critics who claimed it would nationalize the major "commanding heights" of the economy. Banks, and mines are still privately owned, but the government controls the mineral rights. The State has sold off a number of radio stations; licensed new broadcasters; and partially privatized its telecommunications, and sold off a small airline. Unlike its predecessors, who presided over an isolated economy under a segregated

society, the ANC government, basking in the glory of international goodwill, relaxed restrictions that prevented South Africans from investing abroad. Not only are foreigners free to take their money in and out; and a number of South Africa's corporate giants are free to move their primary listings offshore. Mining giants such as the Anglo-American Corporation and Life insurer, Old Mutual, are set to follow South African Breweries in seeking a primary listing in London. This is by far the most eloquent sign of the growing confidence of ANC government in their economic management skills.

Since 1994, the extraordinary leadership qualities of President Mandela have been the greatest contributory factor to the mood of reconciliation that has prevailed. Thus, since 1994, much has been achieved in the country. The government has begun to deal significantly with rooting out poverty and inequality. The Constitution protects South Africans from abuse and discrimination of the past under the apartheid system. The ANC's policies have provided 750,000 more families with their own houses on land that belongs to them. Over 4 million people, who never had running water or electricity, today have access to both. Everyday, five million children in schools across the country are enrolled in a government-feeding program. The building and renovation of over 10,000 more classrooms means that the government is educating 1.5 million more school children as part of its implementation of a non-racial educational system. More than 30,000 schools have been integrated as well as all the universities and other institutions of higher learning, and the literacy rate of fifteen- to twenty-four-year-olds has been raised to 95 percent.²⁰ Over 500 new clinics have provided access to health care to millions of South Africans who were excluded in the past under the apartheid system. "More than 543,000 acres of lands have been transferred to 68,000 households among nonwhite South Africans."²¹ And very few doubt that President Mbeki's suitability to manage this process, and lead South Africa into the new and better future.

The South African Economy

The economy has become more open to competition and there is a clear willingness to integrate with the global economy. Import tariffs have fallen to around 11 percent by 2000 on a trade weighted basis while trade restrictions and incentive programs that sustained the inward-oriented economy have been scrapped. Despite the huge problems of unemployment, low investment and faltering growth, the ANC government has won respect both at home and abroad for its economic management, and still facing more challenges.²² A sound national economy is the only durable basis for security, and political stability. But democracy is in turn a prerequisite for

economic development, and the country has laid the foundation to build upon President Mandela's administration.

Obviously, the political stakes around the RDP are very high. Notwithstanding the fact that the RDP itself enjoins the, "democratic government to negotiate with neighboring countries to forge an equitable and mutually beneficial program of increasing cooperation, coordination and integration, it seems likely to absorb a great deal of time, energy, and resources for essential domestic purposes, with relatively little leftover for the region and continent."²³ Progressive politicians and analysts in the new South Africa periodically point out the country's historic culpability for much of the hardship which currently besets the region. They note that a strong case can be made for South African public resources to help fuel a regional recovery.

According to a research study conducted by the University of the Western Cape, together with the Chronic Poverty Research Centre,²⁴ black households are getting poorer in post-apartheid South Africa. Majority of poor Africans/blacks do not regard their living standards as having improved substantially since the end of apartheid. In spite of the gains made since the end of apartheid, poverty and economic inequality along racial lines have increased while more than a quarter of all households still remain trapped in long-term poverty. As the study puts it:

Since the end of apartheid in 1994, the South African government has achieved political stability, improved social services and brought about steady national economic growth. At the same time, poverty and economic inequality along racial lines have increased. Incomes in black households fell by 19 percent between 1995 and 2000, while white incomes rose by 15 percent. Meanwhile, the poorest third of black households are falling into long-term destitution, even in urban centers.²⁵

In South Africa, access to paid employment is the most important factor in the poverty status of households. This is partly because colonial land grabbing under apartheid destroyed productive rural economies in order to create a cheap black labor force. However, the Report notes that over the past decade employers have chosen capital intensive rather than labor-intensive routes to competitiveness through increased mechanizations. As a result, unemployment had doubled in 10 years to over 30 percent. The study noted (1) that 76 percent of households lived below the poverty line, R352 per adult per month, just an increase of 15 percent since 1996, (2) that the main breadwinner of almost a third of households had lost a job in the previous year; (3) that 52 percent of households had no income from wages; and 67 percent of wage earners remained below the poverty line,²⁶ and (4) that an individual's ability to find paid work was not greatly influenced by their level of education because the jobs are not there.

The study added that “the main causes of death in black townships were avoidable effects of poverty, communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis which accounted for 39 percent while trauma assaults accounted for 29 percent of deaths. However, the most troublesome obstacles, to escaping from poverty are the lack of access to basic economic resources like land.”²⁷ More important, prices of staple foods such as maize were now set on world markets, which meant poor households are directly affected by international currency changes and global trade liberalization.

One very important issue which the ANC government has not addressed is the land issue. The Land question was left untouched even by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, whereas it should have been factored into the equation. One needs only to look at what has been happening in South Africa’s neighbor, Zimbabwe to realize that the land issue is a very delicate and sensitive issue that is going to become an explosive issue sooner or later in the new South Africa, if the government does not address this issue.

South Africa in Southern Africa: Partnership or Hegemonism?

What precisely has changed in regional relations since the end of apartheid and South African elections of 1994? What are the benefits and where are the dangers? Undoubtedly, the region as a whole has benefited from the cessation of interstate hostilities between South Africa and its neighbors. Also, from apartheid South Africa’s destructive campaign of destabilization at the height of white minority regime power.²⁸ While the bonds of regional interdependence ensured that a variety of more or less open economic and political links were maintained throughout the apartheid era, the dawn of a new era of legitimate communications and cooperation create more and better opportunities for a range of novel bilateral, and multilateral initiatives in the region. To use a medical analogy, by excising the cancer of apartheid, the various parts of the regional body are able, for the first time, to begin to function normally. What forms will this unprecedented normality take?

Regional Security

The strategic environment in Southern Africa has changed dramatically since the end of apartheid, the demise of the Cold War, and the subsequent resolution of many major national conflicts. These circumstances create the

potential for new and more collaborative means of dealing with the instability that continues to plague the Southern Africa subregion. Over the past three decades, especially between 1960 and 1990, Pretoria's regional policy was predicated on adversarial relations with most of its neighbors. At a conceptual level former officers of the South African Defense Forces (SADF) believed that "state do not have allies, they only have interests."²⁹

Some of the most dramatic changes have taken place in the security sphere. In a situation replete with ironies, whereas the *old South African security establishment* was the major source of regional insecurity, the new security establishment is engaged in a variety of cooperative exercises to combat regional insecurity. For instance, under the terms of a bilateral crime combating agreement code-named, *Operation Rachel* South African police specialists have destroyed mortars, rocket-launchers, hand-grenades, and landmines in an operation against illegal weapons with their Mozambican counterparts. Similar agreements and operations have been initiated with other neighboring countries. More broadly, the new South African National Defense Force (SANDF) has played a leading role in the planning for a new regional security arrangement called the Association of Southern African States (ASAS),³⁰ substantially modeled after its old adversaries, the Frontline States. It is anticipated that the functions of this new, relatively informal, and unbureaucratic, security mechanism will include the provision of intelligence support for preventive diplomacy. Initiatives in the case of pending or actual conflicts within the region, planning for combined regional operations and establishment of security arrangements between states on specific issues, such as countering weapons smuggling. Indeed, given the relatively promising development of regional security links, Laurie Nathan among other scholars, has argued that, "in building regional cooperation a focus on security should precede economic integration."³¹

In light of its economic and military power, its history of regional aggression, South Africa has a special responsibility to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in Southern Africa. Given South Africa's overwhelming military superiority in the subcontinent, and in Africa as a whole, and absence of a conventional threat, a process of substantial disarmament is required. This would encourage a broader process of disarmament in Southern Africa as a whole, and release resources for socioeconomic development. The armed services of the new South Africa should adopt a defensive doctrine and posture in order to heighten military confidence and stability in the region. South Africa should abide by international law, which governs the peaceful settlement of interstate conflict, and prohibits the threat or use of force. The new SANDF could play the following roles in the region at the request of its neighbors: (1) Assist

in distributing disaster relief; (2) Controlling cross-border trafficking in arms; (3) Defusing minefields; (4) Assisting with military training; and (5) Helping to maintain equipment and weaponry. Most important, South Africa should pursue mutually beneficial relations with neighboring states, especially in the economic sphere. The country's political, and strategic interests will be best served in the long term by interacting with its neighboring states in such a way that they are strengthened, and not undermined.³²

In an era of globalization, countries are becoming increasingly interdependent because common problems transcend national boundaries as never before. States can no longer protect their citizens through unilateral military means. They have interest in joint survival and should begin to organize their security policies in cooperation with each other. Mozambique's independence in 1974 expanded the geographical and political boundaries of decolonization in Southern Africa, affording African states the opportunity to build a framework of collaboration that sought to resolve regional conflicts. Thus, "the diplomatic efforts that ensued as a result of this collaboration subsequently gave birth to the Frontline States alliance construed and designed as an entity distinct from the larger African continental organization."³³ The Frontline States responded to South African policy of destabilization by establishing the Inter-State Committee on Security and Defense, a body of senior military officers, and defense ministry officials. As one observer puts it "The committee was a relative success. In addition, to fending off South Africa regular meetings, information sharing and coordinated action over the past 20 years have inter alia helped built a high level of trust among the participating armed forces."³⁴ A collective approach to security is very necessary in the post-apartheid era. Despite the fact that there is little prospect of external aggression against individual states or the region as a whole many of the domestic threats to states are shared problems that may eventually impact negatively on the stability of the region as a whole. The fact that the Southern Africa subregion is volatile and its national and regional institutions are weak could very 'conveniently' spark cross-border tensions. This problem is further compounded by the fact that, the political cohesion of the Frontline States was based mostly on their common indignation for and opposition to apartheid white minority rule and its attendant odious segregationist policies. Now, with the advent of a democratic government in South Africa, the bonds of regional solidarity may begin to show cracks in the seam or even eventually melt away. Potential problem areas for interstate disputes include but are not limited to refugee management, trade, foreign investment, natural resources, and territorial claims. Common security arrangements would have many advantages. These could provide a basis for early warning of

potential crises; sharing of information, and resources; joint problem solving; adopting measures to build military confidence and stability; negotiating security agreements and treaties; and resolving interstate conflicts through peaceful means.

Democracy and Human Rights

A second important regional effect of the South African transition is that, through the power of its example; a new regional norm of democracy and human rights has been established, and strongly promoted. Usually in the past the persistence of apartheid allowed the Southern African Development Community (SADC)³⁵ member states to escape critical scrutiny of their own democratic shortcomings. Indeed, it also justified certain important derogation from democratic norms in light of the security threat posed to their respective governments by the former apartheid regime. Today, the advent of a freely elected South African government featuring strong constitutional safeguards for human rights has created strong pressures on these governments to accelerate their own reform process. This is not to suggest that the trend toward democratic parties and civil liberties is irreversible in the new South Africa. Nor is it to suggest that the new regional norm of democracy and human rights is irresistible by neighboring governments determined to retain their political control. However, so long as the South African state and society continue to move in this direction, the pressures on regional governments to do likewise will continue to mount. The promising process of political reform and democratization in Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia need to be understood in relation to the process of change in South Africa.³⁶ In addition, South African policy makers continue to assert that a cornerstone of their new foreign policy will be the promotion of a culture of human rights in Southern Africa and beyond, though precisely, how this is to be done remains unclear.³⁷

Continuity and Change in Regional Political Economy

At the level of the political economy, pockets of the region, in both spatial and class terms are beginning to benefit from increased South African interest and investment. One assessment has asserted that whereas South

Africa has kept a low political profile in relation to its neighbors, and the African continent as a whole in the year since its first all-race democratic elections in April 1994. Available figures have shown many of South African business activities are all over Africa. Much of South Africa's renewed economic interest in the region and the continent is based on the pursuit of new markets for trade rather than opportunities for longer-term investment, particularly in Southern African subregion, some substantial new investment projects are coming on line. For example, the powerful electricity corporation, the Electricity Supply Commission of South Africa (ESCOM) is developing power grids in Angola, Lesotho, and Mozambique, with plans to integrate them into South Africa's power network. South Africa is providing 15 percent of the Zimbabwean electricity supplies. The mining giant—Anglo-American Corporation—in conjunction with other South African organizations, has entered into a turnkey supply agreement to rehabilitate Maamba Collieries in Zambia. South African hotel companies are making new investments in Southern Africa and beyond; and various South African mining, transportation and energy firms are either considering or undertaking major projects in the extraordinarily difficult but potentially lucrative market of Democratic Republic of Congo.³⁸

Perhaps most remarkable is the advent of what has been described as another "*Great Trek*," a process formalized in mid-1995 by an agreement between the South African government, Angola, Mozambique, and Democratic Republic of Congo for the settling of hundreds of mainly Afrikaans-speaking farmers (white farmers) on the agricultural land in those countries. It was expected that other countries including Namibia, Tanzania, and Zambia, would also welcome South Africa's new trekkers.³⁹ Fear concerning the effects of land redistribution, illegal immigration and loss of protection for agricultural goods, among other things, have persuaded numerous white South African farmers to seek greener pastures in the more fertile and less regulated rural areas of their increasingly prostrate neighbors. In some respects, this process builds upon the reemergence of large-scale, corporate-owned plantation agriculture, notably in Mozambique.⁴⁰

What do these emerging linkages imply for development prospects in post-apartheid South Africa? At one level, South African firms and farmers are providing much needed investment, technology, and employment. There can be no doubt that some individuals and groups in neighboring countries will benefit materially, in some cases very significantly economically from renewed South African interest in its neighbors. However, at another level, in the absence of effective institutional frameworks, and regulatory safeguards, both nationally and regionally, these various projects will significantly exacerbate disparities and promote private networks of patron-clientelism. They are likely, in other words, to reinforce and accelerate the emergence of regional *growth poles* and *backwater*, in both

spatial and class terms. At the risk of sounding anachronistic in this era of marketization and privatization, it can be anticipated that this trend will not mitigate, and will exacerbate human insecurity throughout the region. Those inside the charmed circles of growth and development will take steps to protect themselves, their families and their property from the immoderation outside, while those outside will resort to various illicit *modes of accumulation* such as theft, drugs, wildlife poaching and trade, guns etc. Moreover, should the state structures of the region continue to experience declines in effectiveness and legitimacy, this process will continue to be marked by increasing resort to private "protection rackets—both legitimate and illegitimate."⁴¹

After all, South African corporations such as Anglo-American Corporation have had longstanding holdings and investments throughout the region, while white settlers have maintained their presence in areas as remote as Botswana's far Western Ghanzi District. South African investments and promotion of tourism in Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, for example, in some respects simply resurrect pre-independence patterns. From this perspective, it was the relatively brief period when apartheid and majority rule coincided, from the mid-1960s to the end of the 1980s, which is historically aberrant, and given the maintenance of South African trade and investment links with the region throughout this period.

Notwithstanding the acceleration of regional interpenetration and concurrent human insecurity, what is occurring in some respects is simply the *normalization* of historical regional economic patterns and trends that have always been particularly beneficial to South Africa. It is not surprising, therefore, that South African interests, both private and governmental, have been somewhat lackadaisical in their attitude toward the reform and renegotiations of regional trading and investment arrangements.

Framework for Regional Cooperation: SADC in Transition

Although Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established in 1980 as a regional organization, its primary purpose was first and foremost the promotion of political isolation of white minority ruled South Africa.⁴² With the demise of apartheid, the political justification for SADC's original objectives had been eliminated, and more rational trade patterns emerged. Member-States have more freedom to act in their own interests regarding South Africa, basing economic decisions on economic rather than political considerations. As a result, South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, and perhaps Mozambique could develop

into a closely knit economic zone. A similar relationship already exists or is evolving within the context of the Southern African Customs Union comprising South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland whose members trade freely among themselves and share a common pool of customs receipts.⁴³ The more likely prospect, however, is that SADC will eventually evolve into a regional bloc or common market along the lines of the European Economic Community (EEC) now European Union (EU).

While government's credentials in economic management were not big issues in the 2004 election, the ANC government has been facing many challenges after the 2004 elections, including inability to provide jobs to the army of unemployed South Africans, estimated to be about 40 percent among black South Africans.⁴⁴ Another dilemma is that the government is also under pressure to privatize public enterprises, and find appropriate incentives, including lower corporate taxes to investors who would utilize labor-intensive technologies.

With the devastating civil war in Angola resolved, the way is clear for the daunting task of developing the significant economic potential of the SADC member-nations. In the post-apartheid era, a large part of the goods and services required for the reconstruction in the region will be procured in South Africa, thereby giving a boost to South Africa's construction and manufacturing industries.

South Africa in Africa

The struggle against apartheid was profoundly Pan-African in character. No issue united African governments and peoples like the struggle against white minority rule. Indeed, Nigeria's material resources and financial support during the struggles against apartheid cannot be underestimated as Nigeria was the largest contributor among African nations to these struggles.⁴⁵ While member states of the African Union (AU) struggled with internecine conflicts and ineffectiveness, they were powerfully welded together by their common opposition to apartheid South Africa. African caucuses and organizations found their firmest common ground in lobbying for sanctions against white minority rule regime at the United Nations, Commonwealth and other international fora. While much of this opposition was rhetorical in character, a significant number of African countries maintained more or less open economic and political links with apartheid South Africa, such as Malawi, Cote D'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (the former Zaire under President Mobutu Sese Seko), and others committed scarce resources to the struggle. These included South Africa's,

neighboring States, Tanzania, Zambia, Nigeria, and Libya. The latter countries' contributions to the struggle include hosting refugees including leaders of the ANC, and other liberation movements, often in large numbers, as well as providing material assistance to the struggle.

As a result of this long standing commitment and the bonds of solidarity forged with the ANC, there was not unreasonable expectation among African states. As a group, the ANC-dominated government of National Unity was expected to give material support and enlightened political leadership in increasingly crisis-ridden Pan-African Organizations such as the African Union and the African Development Bank (ADB). Moreover, it was also reasonable to expect that those states, which had been unwavering in their solidarity and had made the largest sacrifices, would be rewarded by the new South Africa, while those which had cooperated tacitly or otherwise with the apartheid state could anticipate a cool and difficult relationship.

Post-apartheid South Africa's political leadership for a number of reasons was reticent about taking on a significant leadership role in a crisis-ridden Continent, and providing tangible political or material rewards to the ANC's allies. Systematically, the end of apartheid coincided with what has been described as a tectonic shift at the level of the world order, which had the effect of shaking the ANC and others loose from its traditional normative and solidarist anchors. Economically, South Africa's own intimidating needs and challenges have meant that it does not have much resources to devote to the continent's problems, principally because its top priority has been to develop and exploit trade and investment opportunities which can help it reestablish economic growth and generate employment for its jobless masses. More so when better short-term economic opportunities have tended to be located in such states, as Kenya, and Cote D'Ivoire, which at best were lukewarm in their support for the anti-apartheid struggle while strong supporters such as Tanzania and Zambia have rather less economic leverage. Finally, the process of negotiation and compromise on which South African transition rests, had meant a significant watering down of the ANC's core influence and more radical alignments and priorities, notwithstanding the 1996, precipitated withdrawal of the F.W. de Klerk led National Party from the Unity government.⁴⁶

Preventing Conflicts, Building and Keeping Peace

This does not mean that South Africa will entirely eschew a leadership role in the continent's political and security affairs and organizations. To some

extent, the cautiousness with which the new leadership, including Nelson Mandela, approached continental conflicts reflects an admirable degree of modesty concerning the need to understand Africa's problems thoroughly and have a clear policy approach before adopting any position. Indeed, South Africa's retreat from activism in response to General Abacha's Nigeria was partly indicative of its inexperience in African diplomacy.⁴⁷ Similarly, South Africa's officials have been rightly chary of usurping the leadership of continental mediation processes already underway; and thus, appearing to seek a position of dominance, that would trigger political alarm bells in several African States. On some issues, however, such as economic development, regional peace-keeping, and the development of the AU's Conflict Prevention and Peace Management Resolution Mechanism adopted at its 1993 Summit, South Africa moved toward a more active leadership role in Africa.⁴⁸ For example, President Mbeki's initiative of African Renaissance and his role in formation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development.⁴⁹

Ironically, and worrisome, the initiative in these areas once again rests primarily with the South Africa–African defense establishment, as it has with the emergent of ASAS. There is a strange circularity to South Africa's emergence as a leader in addressing issues of continental insecurity and armed violence which it has itself helped to foment through arms trading and the covert activities of its apartheid regime.⁵⁰ Despite these tensions, however, it makes sense that the new South Africa should use its relatively strong military-security technology and capabilities to aid in continental conflict prevention, peace-keeping and peace-building efforts.⁵¹

Even more troublesome is the question of whether and how South Africa should contribute to the promotion of a culture of human rights, and the strengthening of democratic norms and procedures on the continent. It is here that Mandela's vaunted moral authority and the country's own powerful example would seem to give it a distinct comparative advantage. Moreover, notwithstanding the continent's traditional firm adherence to the norm of non-intervention in the internal affairs of member-states as embodied in the OAU Charter, there has been no greater or more successful derogation from that norm in the interests of fundamental human rights than the case of South Africa. Hence, once again, the political beneficiaries of that derogation, i.e. the ANC and South Africa's black majority, would appear to be in a strong position to extend and consolidate this process of normative change. Yet the issue is an extraordinarily sensitive one, not least for an organization like the ANC and a society that has, at long last, finally gained control of their state.

While official South Africa moves gingerly toward a more prominent role in Africa's political and security affairs; the most immediate impact

of change in South Africa on the continent's security equation has come from the private sector, especially profit-seeking ex-South African Defense Forces (SADF) mercenaries. According to one source, South African white mercenaries in Africa are now thought to number in the thousands. Battle-hardened veterans of guerrilla warfare in Southern Africa employed by the Pretoria-based firm, Executive Outcomes, successfully helped turn the tide of war in Angola from the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to their former enemies in the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), thereby facilitating the peace process in Angola.⁵² As state capacity declines in many parts of the continent and disorder spreads, the prominence of such *private armies* is likely to continue to increase. South Africans especially soldiers of the former apartheid era are likely to be prominent among them, because of their experience in counter guerrilla warfare,⁵³ given their activities in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone and in the Equatorial Guinea.⁵⁴

For instance, on August 25, 2004 Mark Thatcher, the son of Margaret Thatcher, former British Prime Minister, was arrested in Cape Town, and charged for contravening two provisions of South Africa's Foreign Military Assistance Act, banning South African residents from taking part in any foreign military activity. The charges related to possible funding and logistical assistance in relation to an attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea organized by Simon Mann.⁵⁵ Also involved were twenty former South African white soldiers arrested in Malabo, capital of Equatorial Guinea, and charged with attempting to assassinate a Head of State, illegal possession of arms and explosives, terrorism, treason and endangering the public. Those arrested in Malabo included a white South African arms dealer, Nick du Toit, who told the trial court that "his co-accused in Malabo were never told what they were being recruited for."⁵⁶ All the alleged coup plotters were said to be hoping to exploit the Equatorial Guinea's massive oil reserves after overthrowing President Teodoro Obiang, and installing their own leader, Severo Moto, who was in exile in Spain. United States and Britain were implicated in the abortive coup by the testimony of Johann Smith, a former commander in South African Special Forces. He testified that he knew about the coup from two of his former military colleagues who were recruited to overthrow Obiang by Nick du Toit; "Johann Smith sent two separate, highly detailed reports of the planned coup in December 2003 and January 2004 to two senior officers in British intelligence and to a senior colleague of Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. Defense Secretary."⁵⁷ According to Anthony Barnett and Martin Bright, Johann Smith was reported to have said:

I considered it my duty to warn the authorities in the U.S. and England because some of their nationals might be killed. I submitted a report in

December 2003 of what I had discovered to Michael Westphal of the Pentagon. I expected the U.S. government to take steps to warn Equatorial Guinea or to stop the coup. This was also my expectation as regards the British government which I warned through two SIS (Secret Intelligence Service, MI6) people I knew, and to whom I sent the report by Email, also in December 2003 to their personal email addresses. After preparing and sending my December report I received further information... and put this in a second report which I sent by email to the same people as the first one; Michel Westphal of the U.S. and British SIS contacts. There was no response from British or U.S. authorities to the warnings. The only thing that happened was that the U.S. authorities froze the Equatorial Guinea money with the Riggs Bank in U.S.A.⁵⁸

Michael Westphal was one of Donald Rumsfeld's most trusted lieutenants. The former marine officer was the United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in charge of special operations and combating terrorism and was previously responsible for African affairs.⁵⁹

Trade and Investment Issues

More conventional South African traders and investors are also having an increased impact on the continent. Both trade, and more slowly but still significantly, investment between South Africa and other parts of the continent are growing. With respect to trade, South African exports to African countries increased almost 50 percent in two years to a total of almost US\$2.8 billion in 1998 while imports tripled over the same period from US\$220 million to US\$664 million.⁶⁰ This placed Africa as a whole fifth among South Africa's trading partners, behind Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan, though continental markets have always been disproportionately important as purchasers of South African manufactures. While the main criterion governing increasing interaction appears to have been whether African countries offer viable markets for South African goods, and thus short term opportunities for trade, there has also been a range of new investments in the continent beyond Southern Africa. Predictably, many of these have been in the mining sector, but others have occurred in tourism, banking, transportation, and brewing.⁶¹ South African Breweries (SAB) has joined the big league. In May 2002, South African Breweries signed a letter of agreement and bought Miller Brewing of the USA for \$5.6 billion, making SAB the number two beer colossus of the world.⁶²

In terms of trade and investments, South Africa (a nation of 45 million people) is a big investor in Africa. Since the mid-1990s, South Africa has become one of the largest investors in Africa.⁶³ By the beginning of 2002,

South African businesses were running Cameroon's railroads and were scheduled to run those of Malagasy Republic. South African businesses were managing power plants in Mali and Zambia, and brewing local beers in Mozambique and Ghana. South African businesses are also the leading providers of Global System Mobile (GSM)⁶⁴ in Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Uganda and many other African countries. South African companies are also operating banks and supermarkets in Tanzania, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Kenya.⁶⁵

It would be a mistake to overestimate the significance of these developments; however, because they are spread over a whole continent, their impact is significantly limited. Moreover, most African countries have relatively little to trade with South Africa. Thus, small, debt-distressed economies like those of Kenya, Tanzania, Guinea and Sao Tome are likely to experience increasingly adverse balance of trade with South Africa, particularly within the context of IMF-mandated liberalization conditionalities, that is, if (at all) and when they attract the attention of South African traders and investors. Therefore, where significant investments do occur, they do create and reinforce patterns of winners and losers, in a context where price of losing may be high indeed. In sum, as with the Southern African subregion, the effects of South Africa's increasing commercial interchange with the rest of the continent are likely to be highly uneven. They are likely, therefore, to increase tensions and insecurity within and between African countries, though the extent to which they alter current trends on the continent is likely to be limited.⁶⁶

It should be added that the *normalization* of South Africa's relations with the continent has opened the door to an increase in a range of illicit forms of exchange. As the continent's formal sectors decay, various forms of buccaneer capitalism flourish, creating new loci of political and economic power. Given this rather chaotic and unpromising set of prospects, it is hardly surprising that some powerful interests in South Africa advocate focusing the country's attention on extra-continental markets and alliances. Yet, should South Africa attempt to take these measures, the continent's myriad problems, which range from environmental decay, drought, arms trading, disease and food insecurity will only worsen. Inevitably, they will spill over into the South African society, economy, and politics. How, then, might a more cooperative and helpful future be constructed?

Building a More Cooperative Future in Africa

In the post-apartheid era, the slow process of normalizing South African relations with the international community and the difficult but thus far

successful birth of a more democratic and non-racial order in South Africa itself have also created a range of new openings and opportunities for positive cooperation and transnational community building. Where do these opportunities lie, and how can they be encouraged? In fact, there is a wide range of issue areas in which cooperation is not only possible, but in many cases desirable. For some of them, promising beginnings have been made. Some of these have already been noted, for example, bilateral agreements to deal with small arms trading.⁶⁷ Among other key areas in which cooperation is both possible and strongly desirable are health, particularly in light of the alarming spread of HIV/AIDS throughout the region; the environment, notably with regards to scarce water resources and shared watershed ecosystem; energy resources; tourism; communications; agricultural research and food security; and labor.⁶⁸

Such sectoral cooperative efforts should be encouraged to proceed as far and as fast as possible. More and less extensive programs of regional coordination should indeed encourage coexisting without being forced to conform to some regional grand design. At the same time, however, political efforts should be made to establish linkages and synergies between these programs, so that they spill over into more extensive forms of regional cooperation. And also, for the developing countries of Africa trade and investment issues are *high politics* and are likely to generate a high degree of interstate competition and conflict. Hence, the long-term goal of a more fully fledged economic community should not be neglected. Regional efforts should be concentrated in the first instance on other areas in which positive outcomes will be more readily achieved.

The promotion of effective regional cooperation and community-building will rest on the efforts of wide range of interests and actors, developing and promoting a regional consciousness rooted in concrete and immediately relevant achievements. These interests and actors will include corporations, universities, and research institutes, trade unions, environment, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), women organizations, and cultural groups along with state-based organizations. While this approach may appear idealistic and will indeed require a long-term vision in the face of uncertainty and setbacks, it would appear to be the only alternative to a future of mounting human insecurity and continued continental marginalization.⁶⁹

Conclusion

For many South Africans, there has been a revolution without change. Since the end of apartheid many black South Africans have assumed top

leadership roles in governments and some businesses.⁷⁰ However, these new leaders have been reluctant to bring about any dramatic economic transformation that would broaden opportunities for the poor. This is one of the very crucial issues that needs and must be addressed seriously by the Mbeki ANC led administration in the new South Africa. While President Mandela regarded by South Africans almost as a saint, and considered above blame for his government's failure to deliver on all its promises, however Mbeki was not given such a leeway.

South Africa's effort to confront and expose its dark past has been one of the triumphs of the Mandela Presidency. On Coming to power in South Africa, Nelson Mandela did not fire a single white bureaucrat or soldier, not because he thought that they (white) had been kind to the black Africans. He correctly saw the strategy as the way to prevent an Afrikaner (white) rebellion and conflict. Thus, it is remarkable that South Africa has not boiled over into open warfare, given the deep fault lines that continue to rend the society. However, the absence of war should not be mistaken for complete reconciliation, which may simply be too much to ask at this early juncture. *Reconciliation* implies a sense of reciprocity and mutual acknowledgment of wrongdoing between former antagonists that does not exist in South Africa. *Peaceful coexistence* more accurately describes the fragile post-apartheid truce. Such coexistence cannot be taken for granted. The peace that has reigned in South Africa took root under the persistent prodding of President Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the two leaders who made forgiveness a matter of patriotic duty.⁷¹ As those moral beacons pass from the scene, old animosities may yet resurface, particularly in places where little change has occurred. One of the members of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has categorically put it this way: "It is not good enough telling people to reconcile when they are still as poor and disadvantaged as they have been (under apartheid) in the past."⁷²

The most deadly issue confronting South Africa today is the HIV-AIDS epidemics.⁷³ HIV-AIDS has devastated significant parts of the population. The 1990s witnessed the political healing of South Africa as Nelson Mandela was released from prison, the African National Congress was legalized, the local Communist Party tolerated, and political apartheid dismantled. The racial pathologies of South Africa were healing at about the same time as the physical health of South Africa was worsening. Political apartheid was making its exit by the front door as HIV-AIDS was making its entry into South Africa from the back door.

Obviously, the challenges before South Africa, its neighbors and the continent as a whole are daunting. The needs for timely and well-targeted international support are wide-ranging and extensive. There is much that the international community can do to support a successful transition in

South Africa and beyond, even within the parameters of reduced resources. Several injunctions apply to these efforts. First, in South Africa itself, international assistance must embody both short and long-term dimensions. For the South African transition to succeed popular support must be consolidated through the success, for example, of housing and school feeding programs associated with the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP). At the same time, policy within and toward South Africa must support much longer term and larger-scale projects in health care, education, energy, environmental, and others.

Second, in focusing on the importance of a successful transition in South Africa, external governments, NGOs, and private sector organizations must not lose sight of the rest of the region and the continent as a whole. They must support those groups and institutions championing a regional and transnational vision, and provide assistance to concrete regional initiatives.

Finally, it needs to be recognized that the process of South African, regional, and continental reconstruction and development will be a long-term and politically difficult one. It is not one which can be successfully achieved within straightjacket economic and political conditions. All of those factors suggest one final way in which the emergence of the new South Africa may be beneficial to the development and security prospects of the continent. Given the high stakes and profile of the South African transition and the country's relatively robust capabilities and resources, South African policy makers should be accorded a degree of flexibility, and space in the medium term at least, which most of their African counterparts from other African countries no longer enjoy. South Africa could become to Africa what Japan has been to the Pacific Basin, the dynamo that energizes and drives those economically underdeveloped countries to become economically viable. Therefore, by aligning themselves with the New South Africa in regional and continental initiatives, other African countries can regain a degree of autonomy and independence in the establishment of their own priorities and democratic processes.

Chapter 4

Southern African Development Community and the New South Africa

The ultimate objective is to achieve economic liberation and to reduce our economic dependence on the Republic of South Africa . . . through regional and coordinated efforts. It is not our objective to plot against anybody or any country, but on the contrary to lay the foundation for the development of a new economic order in Southern Africa, and forge a united community wherein will lie our strength of survival in the future. I am convinced that with the collective will and determination with which we have struggled for political freedom we can succeed in our struggle for economic liberation.

—President of the Republic of Botswana, Seretse Khama¹

Introduction

The countries that now make up Southern African Development Community (SADC) have been linked historically in a number of ways. Although the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mauritius, Seychelles and, Tanzania to some extent are less closely associated with the core grouping,² Economically, the original development of this group was largely centered on the exploitation of gold and diamond fields of South Africa, and to lesser extent, the copper mines in Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia), as well as agricultural products in South Africa and Zimbabwe. Labor was recruited from most of the current SADC member states to serve these areas of economic concentration while trade and transport links radiated outward. Six of the fourteen SADC States are land-locked. The ports of

Beira, Lobito, Benguela, Durban, Cape Town, and Maputo have served the landlocked countries as well as the great industrial and mining Center of the Witwatersrand in South Africa.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC),³ formerly known as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), was born out of the experiences of close cooperation among the governments and peoples of Southern Africa. During the 1960s, the struggle for political independence in the region gained momentum, and strong bonds of solidarity grew out of a sense of common purpose and collective action against colonialism and racism. The countries of Southern Africa, however, ultimately achieved political independence against a backdrop of mass poverty, economic backwardness, and the ever-present threat of powerful and hostile white minority ruled neighbors, particularly South Africa and Zimbabwe.⁴

First, the need to work together, rather than individually, became increasingly apparent to the leaders of Southern Africa as a precondition for political survival, economic development, and social advancement. They began to seek out areas of mutual interest, first through bilateral cooperation, and later through the Front-line States grouping.⁵ The Front-line States became the vehicle through which the region could coordinate its efforts, resources, and strategies to support national liberation movements, and at the same time, resist the aggression of apartheid South Africa.

Second, the roots of SADCC are a little bit remote, though President Mugabe of Zimbabwe has traced its root to the Pan-African Freedom Movement of Eastern, Central, and Southern Africa of 1958 to 1964, and the Conference of East and Central African States of 1966 to 1974.⁶ However, the immediate impetus for its emergence can be traced to the prospects of independence for Zimbabwe, in particular, and the war of national liberation in Southern Africa of the 1970s, in general. As rightly stated by Douglas Anglin, "Zimbabwe is the hub of the transportation network north of the River Limpopo and the key to the success of any serious endeavor to promote economic liberation from South Africa and collective self-reliance."⁷

Third, the idea of regional economic cooperation, that is, the pooling of economic resources on a regional basis in Southern Africa dated back to July 3, 1974. At that time, former President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia proposed the, "establishment of a transcontinental belt of independent and economically powerful nations from Dar-es-Salaam and Maputo, on the Indian Ocean, to Luanda, on the Atlantic coast."⁸ Thus, since 1974, several economic discussions and meetings were attended by the Foreign and Economic Ministers as well as Heads of Government and State of the Front-line States. Of importance was the May 1979, Foreign Ministers

meeting of the Front-line States held in Gaborone, Botswana, to discuss economic cooperation, where it was agreed to convene an International Conference in Arusha, Tanzania, with donor governments and international development institutions.

The meeting held in July 1979, in Arusha, Tanzania, and attended by representatives of government and international agencies from many parts of the world to discuss regional cooperation in Southern Africa in turn led to the landmark Lusaka Summit on April 1, 1980. The then nine majority-ruled countries of Southern Africa met and declared their commitment "to pursue policies aimed at economic liberation and integrated development of our national economies."⁹ The Summit not only adopted the Lusaka Declaration entitled "Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation" as well as a Program of Action covering such areas as Food and Agriculture, Industry, Manpower Development and Energy. It also identified transport and communications as the priority for regional cooperation. Gaborone, the capital of Botswana, was chosen as the permanent headquarters of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference with an initial staff of eight, a Zimbabwean, Arthur Blumeris, the former Zimbabwean Ambassador to Belgium was appointed the first Executive Secretary, and Head of the SADCC Secretariat in July 1982.¹⁰

The Lusaka Declaration is a remarkable policy statement reflecting the ever-evolving African strategy of achieving total liberation of Southern Africa, building upon the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969 and the 1975 Dar-es-salaam Declaration. The April 1, 1980, Lusaka Declaration not only clearly reflected the growing concern of black Southern African countries over the continuing economic domination of apartheid South Africa. It was also in recognition of the need for devising a collective economic strategy to lessen the economic dependence of the SADC States on apartheid South Africa. Thus, the Lusaka Declaration noted that "future development must aim at the reduction of economic dependence not only on the Republic of South Africa, but also on any single external state or group of states."¹¹

The Southern African Development Community fits neatly within the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and AU policy of encouraging regional economic groupings as the basis for an eventual African Economic Community and Continental Unity. Former President Kaunda of Zambia put the SADC in a proper historical and continental perspective when he said:

The journey to SADCC started many years ago. The founding fathers of the OAU/AU expressed our aspirations when they adopted the Charter of the Organization.... The SADCC is an expression of Africa's deliberate and planned effort in forging links which not only have political objectives

but also economic and social meaning, . . . African unity must be given economic substance out of which the social-cultural fabric will grow so strong that our continent will no longer be vulnerable.¹²

From Coordination Conference to Community

Much has been achieved through the old SADCC, primarily in the areas of transport and communications, energy, and agricultural research. The greatest achievement of the SADCC, however, has been the establishment of a firm foundation for regional integration in Southern Africa. In addition, it has fostered confidence among member states and a spirit of regional solidarity that goes beyond governments to ordinary people in various spheres of lives.

Namibia was an observer member when SADCC was formed in 1980. But immediately it became independent in March 1990, it automatically and formally became a member of the organization. South Africa joined in August 1994, after its all-race democratic election with the ANC-led government of National Unity. The Indian Ocean Island of Mauritius joined in 1995,¹³ while Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire) and the Indian Ocean Island of Seychelles were formally admitted into the SADC at the September Summit of 1997.¹⁴ Southern African Development Community Member states increased to fourteen while Uganda has applied for membership.¹⁵

By the late 1980s, it had become apparent to SADCC policy makers that the organization needed to strengthen its position as well as its development efforts. The challenges presented by the profound socioeconomic changes taking place in the region, the continent, and globally necessitated a review of the Organization's mandate and priorities. SADCC had existed as a *de facto* international organization without a treaty or a legally binding instrument. This was consistent with its Founding Fathers' pragmatic approach which sought to demonstrate practical benefits of regional cooperation without placing heavy demands on the member states at the early stage. Thus, the emphasis was on coordination of discrete projects on the sectors coordinated by the members on regional programs.

Therefore, the 1989 Summit of Heads of State and Government, in Harare, Zimbabwe, decided that SADCC should be formalized to "give it an appropriate legal status taking into account the need to replace the Memorandum of Understanding with an Agreement, Charter or Treaty."¹⁶ Thus, after four years of preparatory work and consultations, a strong consensus evolved indicating that member states wanted the mandate and

mission of SADCC to focus on concerted efforts toward deeper regional cooperation beyond mere coordination of development projects to equitable integration of their economies. Whereas the old SADCC sought to coordinate economies of member States, the new SADC on the other hand seeks to integrate them into a single whole.¹⁷ After the independence of Namibia in March 1990, it was decided to formalize the structure and extend its mandate. This process was given even greater impetus after the release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990 from prison. The ANC and all other nationalist organizations in South Africa were unbanned, and many political prisoners were released. From subsequent negotiations which began between the ANC leaders, and the apartheid regime led by President F.W. de Klerk, it became evident that South Africa would soon be democratized.¹⁸ These developments came at a time of a sea of change in African politics, precipitated largely by the end of the Cold War and a “*second wave*”¹⁹ of democratization. On August 17, 1992, the Southern African Heads of State and Government met in Windhoek, Namibia, and signed a Declaration and Treaty establishing Southern African Development Community (SADC), which replaced the former Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).²⁰

SADC Treaty and Its Significance

New member States may be allowed to join by a unanimous decision of the SADC Summit and upon acceding to the SADC Treaty. Until the 1992 Treaty signed in Windhoek, Namibia, membership in SADC was confined within the Southern African subregion. This was one of the reasons why the Democratic Republic of Congo under former President Mobutu Seseko was refused membership of the organization in 1980.²¹ The SADC Treaty signed in August 1992, and ratified in September 1993, is a legally binding and all-encompassing framework by which countries of the region shall coordinate, harmonize, and rationalize their policies and strategies for sustainable development in all areas of human endeavor. Thus, the Treaty commits member States to fundamental principles of the following:

- (a) Sovereign equality of member States;
- (b) Solidarity, peace and security;
- (c) Human rights, democracy, and rule of law;
- (d) Equity, balance and mutual benefit.

Member States are therefore expected to demonstrate their commitment to act in accordance with these principles as set out in Article 4 of the

Treaty.²² This Treaty is very significant because it directly affects the lives of individual citizens as it assumed the force of national laws upon ratification by the member States in September 1993. The Treaty also commits SADC and the governments of Member States to fully involve the people of the region, and NGOs in the process of regional integration. In addition, the Treaty provides for protocols which set out the principles and procedures under which member States will conduct their cooperation in specific areas. To demonstrate its sincerity of purpose and action, the Treaty provides for the imposition of sanctions against member States that: (a) Persistently fail, without good reasons, to fulfill obligations assumed under the Treaty, (b) Implement policies which undermine the principles and objectives of SADC; (c) Are in arrears for more than one year in the payment of contributions to SADC for reasons other than those caused by natural calamity or exceptional circumstances that gravely affect their economies, and have not secured the dispensation of the Summit.²³ Such sanctions, as imposed, shall be determined by the Summit on a case-by-case basis. Member-states of the SADC agreed that underdevelopment, exploitation, deprivation, and backwardness in Southern Africa will only be overcome through concerted regional economic cooperation and integration.²⁴

SADC and the New South Africa

On August 3, 1994, the South African cabinet under the government of National Unity (GNU) decided to apply for SADC membership, and on the August 29, 1994, at the SADC Summit held in Gaborone, Botswana South Africa acceded to the SADC Treaty.²⁵ Thus, South Africa officially and formally became a SADC member-state. The ANC government's vision for the Southern African subregion is one of the highest possible degrees of economic cooperation, mutual assistance where necessary and joint planning consistent with socioeconomic, environmental, and political realities. South Africa strives to achieve regional economic development by using SADC structure, and organization of which provide valuable opportunities for developing and executing South Africa's foreign policy objectives within Southern Africa.

The aim of the SADC is to provide for regional peace and security, sector cooperation and an integrated regional economy. As a regional institution it has laid the foundation on which regional planning and development in Southern Africa could be pursued. As an organization, SADC has much legitimacy and has built a sense of regionalism

among its member governments. Within the SADC context, integrated development of the region as a whole is a priority. Despite the vast disparities in the levels of development and structural features of the fourteen SADC member states, all could potentially benefit significantly from regional integration and cooperation. For instance, South Africa has the best and well-developed telecommunication system in Africa. Paradoxically, before 1994, all of SADC countries depend solely on Europe to route all their air telecommunications and satellite links to the outside world. With South Africa's membership of SADC, its member states can take this advantage and route their air telecommunications and satellite links directly to anywhere in the world through South Africa. This will be more economical and less expensive than routing their telecommunications through Europe.

The promotion of economic growth and development is of paramount importance as the economies of African countries are underdeveloped, and interdependent. Understandably, South Africa's participation in SADC for many reasons is more heavily weighed toward Reconstruction and Development Programs (RDP).²⁶ The RDP has been the centerpiece of the agenda of the ANC government. Among other things, it embodies the government's programs which were designed to promote justice and reduce historic inequalities, and provide a better life for previously disenfranchised black majority in South Africa. It also provides political assurance, along with fiscal responsibility, economic restructuring, and growth. The implementation of the RDP should therefore also be seen within a broader context. As a result of its advanced financing and banking institutions; and its many natural resources with well developed infrastructures, and a large market, it comes as no surprise that South Africa was assigned the financial and investment Sector of the SADC as its special area of responsibility.

Trade and Investment

SADC spent much of its first ten years of existence (1980–1990) trying to survive grave acts of destabilization initiated by the apartheid regime in South Africa which saw it as a challenge to its political project of continuing white minority rule.²⁷ However, the democratically elected government in South Africa from April 1994 opened up the prospect of a synthesis of the existing and deep seated forms of actual economic integration. This is being harmonized with the institutional political organization form for regional cooperation of Southern African Development Community. South Africa's membership of

SADC offers a whole new range of prospects, not for South Africa alone, but for the region as a whole. Once again, this is not without problems, not the least of which is the vast disparity that exists between the sizes of the South African economy, especially when compared to that of its neighbors. In addition, the long period of South Africa's isolation from the rest of Africa, possible resentments felt by other states about the threat of being overwhelmed. The dismantling of apartheid and establishment of democratic rule opened endless possibilities as longer-term benefits can now be reaped by all the citizens of Southern Africa.

What other alternatives exist in the face of globalization? Individually, the countries of Southern Africa are weak and lack a competitive edge. First, by cooperating with each other, it will be possible to create a more viable economic base. Second, there is the possibility of harnessing the dynamics of capital accumulation of South Africa to give an added dynamic to economic development throughout the subregion, such as harnessing finance, investment, and technological know-how. Moreover, this can be translated into mutually beneficial package deals between the countries in the subregion.

One of the most positive new expressions of this impetus is the Maputo corridor linking Gauteng and Mpumalanga provinces, the South Africa's industrial heartlands with Maputo province in Mozambique. These corridors as a concept offer the opportunity of diminishing the importance of the existing political demarcations, and divisions, and emphasizing the mutuality of benefits that can be realized from SADC. Their aim is to use the transport spine to facilitate accelerated trade, industry, development, the spread of knowledge and a better cultural understanding. Improving the infrastructure is often central to this process. Clearly, such initiatives require care and sensitive handling with respect to the mutuality of benefits, minimizing possible negative environmental and social costs. Yet the potential benefits are great because these corridors will play an ever-greater role within the globalized economy and will also greatly facilitate regional markets in Southern Africa subregion. The Maputo corridor has the advantage of building on what already exists. Its potential benefits include economies of scale, reducing distribution costs and time savings, vertical integration of upstream and downstream production of primary and secondary sectors, improving access to suppliers, tourism and market access more generally. Above all, the corridor impetus should encourage industry and trade in the SADC member states. Thus, the South African President, Thabo Mbeki pushed for a SADC Free Trade Area Agreement which was ratified by the member states in 2000. Since the ratification of this agreement trade and regional cooperation in Southern Africa had increased.²⁸

SADC Interstate Defense and Security

Politically, the SADC member-states have quite distinct histories and cultures, although these converged to some extent during the 1970s and 1980s through the struggle against white minority rule in the region. With the exception of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mauritius, and Seychelles, the SADC member-states may be grouped into three broad categories. First are the former British High Commission territories and colonies of Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia, Malawi, and Tanzania, all of which achieved *flag* (bloodless) independence from Britain in the 1960s. And, with the exception of Botswana this group was characterized in varying degrees by one-party/rule, although, the early 1990 democratic wave that swept many parts of the globe following the end of the Cold War led to a multiparty system in many of these countries too. Second are the former Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola which achieved independence under a Marxist regime after the fall of General Antonio Spínola in Portugal in 1974. These two countries endured brutal counterrevolutionary civil wars, which eventually led to negotiated political settlements in the 1990s. With the capture, and death of Jonas Savimbi in February 2002, after 27 years of civil war, the conflict in Angola finally ended.²⁹ The third group, consists of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, where white minorities held on to power and following protracted political and military struggles led by national liberation movements.³⁰ Finally, there were negotiated settlements leading to the establishment of democratic governments.

South Africa forms the hub of this web of interdependence, and it has dominated the region's politics and security, which have been profoundly affected by the conflicts over apartheid.³¹ As the African independence movement swept through Africa, and white minority rule came under increasing pressure, successive South African white leaders, notably Daniel Malan, Hendrick Verwoerd, John Vorster, and Pieter W. Botha, promoted the concept of regional economic and political cooperation in Southern Africa on the basis of white apartheid South African leadership. These proposals for a "Southern African constellation of states" was linked to attempts to develop a formal South African defense alliance with the Western powers, based on the argument that white-ruled South Africa was a bulwark against communism. But Africans rejected these proposals, and South Africa was excluded from the AU and expelled from the Commonwealth, and became increasingly isolated not only in Africa but also from the world community.³² However, Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia, and Swaziland remained closely linked to South Africa through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), created in 1910.³³

In 1956, South African Defense Minister C.F. Erasmus proposed to the United States and Western European leaders by urging them for the creation of a NATO-style defense pact for Southern Africa to be known as South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO).³⁴ SATO pact was to include United States, Western Europe, plus Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. Erasmus was very persistent advocating for this proposal throughout the 1950s by pointing out that:

The alliance of nationalism and communism, of which India, the Arabs under Nasser and the Soviet Union were regarded as the Principals, was seen subverting the Western position all over the East, including Africa. The only way in which the West could save itself, physically and spiritually, was in its coming together in a politico-military alliance underpinned by Christian ideology.³⁵

This idea of SATO Pact was revived by the United States during the Angolan conflict of 1976–1977, under the Ford-Kissinger policy toward Africa.³⁶ South Africa's last attempt to achieve regional cooperation on the basis of its hegemony was Pieter W. Botha's effort in 1979 to set up a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) premised on the expectation that Zimbabwe would become independent under a government sympathetic to apartheid South Africa. Instead, Zimbabwe became a leading force behind the establishment of the SADC immediately after its independence in 1980.³⁷

When the Front-line States was formed in 1974, it included a military coordinating structure, known as the Inter-State Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC). The functions of which had expanded over time to include coordination of training and intelligence, but not joint control of operations. In a subsequent agreement, the 1993, SADC Framework and Strategy for Building, the Community argued for the adoption of a "new approach to security," which reflects integrated, multifaceted approaches adopted through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). These new approaches were reflected at the 1991, AU Summit in Kampala which declared that "there is a link between security, stability, development and cooperation in Africa."³⁸ The SADC framework not only emphasized the non-military dimensions of security; it also linked democratization and development to security. It called for a reduction in military expenditure, and force levels as well as the adoption of non-offensive defense doctrines.³⁹

With the end of the Cold War and the negotiated settlement in South Africa in 1994, one major challenge faced by the SADC was, and continues to be, that of building and consolidating a security community in

Southern Africa.⁴⁰ Happily, SADC leaders recognize the need to work on a concept of security different from the one that prevailed in the region during the apartheid era. Moreover, there is an increasing realization within the SADC States that in order to succeed, in stabling an effective security structure in Southern Africa, countries in the region will need to collaborate closely.

The strategic environment in Southern Africa has changed dramatically since 1990, with the demise of the Cold War, the subsequent resolution of many major national conflicts and the ending of white minority rule in South Africa. These circumstances created the potential for new and more collaborative means of dealing with the instability that continues to plague the Southern Africa subcontinent. Between 1970 and 1990, Pretoria's regional policy was predicated on adversarial relations with all of its neighbors. This was both a consequence of apartheid, and the product of a Cold War perspective on the relationship between states. At a conceptual level, the leadership of apartheid South Africa including the military believed that "the international system is based on the law of the jungle and that states do not have allies, they only have interests."⁴¹

Much has changed in Southern Africa, especially since the 1994, non-racial democratic elections that brought the ANC to power. Mozambique's sixteen-year civil war (1978–1994) has ended, and the Chissano government in Mozambique has embraced a free-market economy and democratic election that has become a model for the developing countries. Also the Angolan civil war (1975–2002) has ended. In South Africa itself, the former black guerrilla fighters have been integrated with the South African army.⁴² A very good example of the SADC cooperation was the February 2000, Mozambican flood that claimed the lives of thousands of Mozambicans and entailed loss of millions of United States dollars in property with white South African soldiers rescuing the flood devastated Mozambique.⁴³

In a situation replete with ironies whereas as the old South African security establishments both military and police, were the major source of regional insecurity in the 1970s and 1980s. The new security establishment in South Africa is engaged in a variety of cooperative exercises to combat regional insecurity. Post-apartheid South Africa and its neighbors are suffering the worrying pangs of freedom. South Africa and its neighbors are teeming with illegal and unlicensed weapons of all types. Drug trafficking is a problem, heroin from Asia, and cocaine from Latin American move through South African cities to Europe and the United States. Large quantities of locally grown marijuana, also leaves Southern Africa for the same destinations.⁴⁴ Therefore, South Africa has become distribution center. The security situation in Southern Africa is further complicated by the

abundance of arms and competition among drug traffickers and underworld syndicates. This has led to an escalation in violent crime, especially carjacking and bank robberies.⁴⁵ In addition, the economies of the region are growing too slowly. For example, South Africa's per capital Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by about only 2 percent in 1999,⁴⁶ 3.5 percent in 2004, and 4 percent in 2005,⁴⁷ and other countries in the region are not doing much better. For instance, to combat these problems, a bilateral crime combating organization was formed by SADC member-states, code-named "Operation Rachel." With the formation of this organization, South African police specialists have destroyed mortars, rocket launchers, hand-grenades, and landmines since starting an operation against illegal weapons with their Mozambican counterparts. Indeed, given the relatively promising development of regional security links, it could be argued that in building regional cooperation, a focus on security should precede rather than follow economic integration. Nevertheless, economic, political stability and peace are catalysts to security and development.

Conclusion

The entry of a democratic, non-racial South Africa into SADC has given a major boost to efforts already underway to promote regional cooperation and integration in Southern Africa. It has also greatly enlarged the overall size of the regional market and created new opportunities for cooperation in many areas. The comparative advantage which Southern Africa's minerals sector enjoys will moreover facilitate the formation of new regional oriented, mineral based industrialization strategy. Additionally, new opportunities will arise in areas such as investment coordination at the regional level. These may include an unhindered flow of capital, labor, and technological resources to productive activities in the region as well as a further consolidation of the regional market and mobilization of financial resources for natural and human resources development in the whole region.

However, South Africa's admission into SADC will not of itself, automatically resolve the problems created by the acute imbalances, inequities and patterns of domination and dependency that characterize existing regional relations. Southern Africa Development Community has, since its inception, seen these as barriers to balanced growth and development in the subcontinent. The current dominance of the South African economy over the rest of the regional economy is both undesirable, and unacceptable even with the new South Africa as a SADC member. Originally, it was

precisely to redress this economic imbalance, among other reasons, that SADC was established.⁴⁸

To achieve its full significance, the admission of a democratic South Africa into SADC will reinforce ongoing processes aimed at restructuring existing unbalanced relations, and creating a new framework for a mutually beneficial, equitable, and interdependent regional order in Southern Africa. The ANC-led government in South Africa has expressed its commitment to work together with the rest of the region to create a new pattern of regional relations along these lines. Southern Africa Development Community envisages that a negotiating process aimed at reconstructing regional relations along new lines should involve full and frank exchanges both about existing interactions and possible new relations in various sectors. The principle of mutual benefit means that all partners, including the stronger South Africa, should legitimately expect to benefit materially, and economically, from the new arrangement that emerges in the region. All member states should realize that the principle of equity does imply a willingness to recognize the inequalities that characterize a number of existing relations and the need to act together to place these relations on a new footing. The principle of interdependence implies recognition by all partners that the fate of the entire region is interlinked and that growth and development throughout the region is in the best interest of all the SADC member states. In the short term, the future of SADC is not bright as long as the civil war in parts of the region and in the Democratic Republic of Congo is not resolved, and political instability in Zimbabwe continues.⁴⁹ Over the long term, with a stable and strong democratic government in South Africa, and with the end of civil conflicts in the region, and political stability in the entire subcontinent, there is a bright future for Southern African Development Community.

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 5

Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts in Africa

Civil wars and civil strifes are but violent reactions to the pervasive lack of democracy, the denial of human rights, the complete disregard of the sovereignty of the people, the lack of empowerment, and accountability and generally bad governance.

—Adebayo Adedeji¹

Introduction

International relations at the beginning of the new millennium are punctuated, by ethnic conflicts. Whether they emerge in Central or West Africa, Southeastern Europe or South Asia, ethnic fault lines have often led to nationalist mobilization at home and with external third party interventions. More often than not, international organizations such as African Union (AU) or United Nations Organization (UNO) cannot effectively interpose themselves so as to prevent escalation of ethnic conflicts.

The conflicts in Africa are fuelled by a combination of national and international forces. At the national level conflicts are propelled by the decay of government structures and the lapses of State and non-State actors into criminal activities. Public officials, rebel groups, and underground gangs all conspire to engage in criminal activities. The global dimension of the problem is provided by rogue states and crime syndicate networks of illegal trade of arms, drugs, and trafficking of illegal goods across international borders.²

Nations endowed with high commodities are particularly vulnerable to the warfare that is financed by the exchange of the natural resources for arms, drugs, and money. Sierra Leone's diamonds, Liberia's timber, the Republic of Congo's diamonds, gold, and other minerals have been the mainstay of the conflicts in these parts of Africa, and similarly in other parts of the continent. These resources in those countries, have so underwritten that many went as far as saying that if the nations were resource poor, there would be no wars. Race is not a major issue in Africa with the exception of Southern Africa. In apartheid South Africa, the white minority ruled until 1994 when an all race democratic election was held and Mandela was elected as president. Zimbabwe (former Rhodesia) existed, under the white minority rule, and Angola, and Mozambique under the Portuguese colonial rule. Without any doubt ethnicity is very serious major factor of conflicts in African continent.

Ethnicity and Ethnic Identity

Ethnicity is conceived as a social phenomenon associated with some forms of interaction between the largest possible cultural-linguistic communal groups within political societies, such as nation-states. Ethnicity arise when relations between ethnic groups are competitive rather than cooperative. It is characterized by cultural prejudice, ancient animosities, and is a product of age-long socioeconomic and political discrimination. Underlying these characteristics are feelings of pride in the in-group (ethnocentrism), a common consciousness and identity of the group, and the exclusiveness of its members. Therefore, it is a phenomenon linked directly or indirectly to forms of affiliation and identification built around ties of real or putative kinship. As Okwudiba Nnoli puts it that "ethnic groups, whose interaction may generate ethnicity are social formations distinguished by the communal character of their boundaries. The relevant communal factor may be culture, language or both."³ In Nigeria, as in many African countries, language has clearly been the most pervasive and crucial variable.

Potentially, ethnicity embodies both positive and negative elements. It involves an appreciation of one's own social roots in the community and cultural group without necessarily disparaging other groups. As a reference phenomenon, it provides a material and emotional support network for individuals in society that has increasingly become more complex, bureaucratized, impersonal, and alienating. It also fosters a sense of belonging as part of an intermediate level of social relations between the individual and society. Thus, ethnicity may serve as an adaptive mechanism that enables

the individual to adjust successfully to the increasing alienation of mass societies. It enables the individual to overcome the socioeconomic insecurity as a consequence of divisive competition in market-oriented societies. Ethnicity binds individuals together, gives them internal cohesion, and encourages them to provide for each other's security, promote sense of identity, and therefore their sense of direction and unity. In addition, it offers a personal solution to the generic problems of exploitation and oppression.

More significant, ethnicity makes it problematic for social harmony in multicultural societies. For instance, under conditions of intense socioeconomic competition ethnicity is associated with conflict and violence. Thus, it embodies passionate, symbolic, and apprehensive aspects that promote not only direct and potentially violent conflict but also intense conflict as a consequence of competition among members of ethnic groups for socioeconomic advantages. By investing group entitlement with comparative worth and legitimacy, it encourages the ethnic in-group to be willing to incur costs to maximize beneficial inter-group differentials in resource competition.⁴

The Emergency of Ethnicity

The existence of ethnicity the world over suggests that it is not the result of some or any primitive heritage peculiar to any group of people, or the consequence of the precolonial pattern of conflict between members of different ethnic groups. It is a social phenomenon involving relations among individuals and is influenced by several factors which include the memories by individuals of interactions between groups. Consequently, ethnicity is often referred to as primordial ethnicity. It is homogeneous by occupational, political, and other identities and is focused essentially on blood ties, the accompanying emotional bonds, and the consciousness of the historical pattern of association with other groups. For example, in Kenya, the traditional enemies of the Kikuyu in precolonial periods were the Massai. Therefore, ethnicity arising from relations between members of the two groups would be classified as primordial ethnicity. The same holds true for Hausa-Fulani relations in the then Northern Nigeria.

However, there is ample evidence to show that patterns of ethnicity have not only changed over time; boundaries of ethnic groups also have tended to change. Some groups may also wish to conceal their ethnic identity or submerge it under other ethnic identities. For instance, in precolonial Kenya there was no enmity between the Luo and Kikuyu until era of

the struggle for independence. Immediately after the Nigerian civil war members of the Igbo ethnic group in the Delta region (Rivers State) of Nigeria, fearing reprisals at the hands of a state machinery that was rife with anti-Igbo sentiment, denied their Igbo ethnic identity, and assumed Ijaw or Ikwerre identities as manifested by some of them (Igbo) changing their names in their communities.⁵

However, as social formations, ethnic groups are not necessarily homogenous entities. Minor linguistic and cultural differences sometimes exist within the group, forming the basis for the delineation of subethnic systems. For example, the Shona ethnic group in Zimbabwe is split into various subethnic identities such as the Karanga, Zezuru, Manyika, Korekore, Rozwi, and Ndu, which compete for political power and patronage as fiercely as the Shona and Ndebele ethnic groups. A similar situation exists with respect to the Ndebele-speaking group: Ndebele, Kalanga, and Tonga.⁶ In addition, Kenya's interethnic conflicts are not as straightforward as they sometimes appear. Not only is the predominantly Kikuyu Central Province divided into three rival districts of Muranga, Nyeri, and Kiambu, but clan and generational differences remain as ever.⁷ Such clan differences in Somalia have wreaked havoc and destruction on the state and people of that country. Botswana is made up of five major ethnic groups: the Tswana, Kalanga, Bayei, Ndebele, and Herero. By far the largest of these groups is Tswana. It is composed of strong, well-organized, subethnic formations: the Bamangwato, Bakwana, Bangwaketse, Batawana, Bakgatla, Bamelete, Barolong, and Batlokwa.⁸ Imperial states or colonial powers inevitably magnify these structural and cultural differences and segregations of rulers and ruled, and they are typically administered through systems of multiple dominations.⁹

With ethnic conflicts, nation building in the typically diverse circumstances of the former-colonies was inevitably a difficult task. The new leaders, often heading or leading interethnic nationalist coalitions, committed themselves with enthusiasm and dedication. In 1849, Klemens Von Metternich¹⁰ observed that Italy is a geographical expression, and later, after the formal achievement of Italian unification in 1860, Massimo d'Azeglio¹¹ offered the famous phrase, "We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians, for at the time of unification a mere 10 percent of the population spoke Italian, and regional differences remained profound."¹² Similarly, Chief Obafemi Awolowo in 1947 noted in respect of Nigeria that

Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no *Nigerians* in the same sense as there are Welsh or French. The word Nigeria is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not. On top of all this, the

country is made up of a large number of small, un-integrated tribal and clannish unit, who live in political isolation from one another. The Yoruba, for instance, belong to the same racial stock. But they are divided into a number of tribes and clans, each of which claims and strives to be independent of the other.¹³

Nigeria's internal diversity and problems this posed to nation building were no doubt of a uniquely daunting order, but virtually all of the new states faced comparable obstacles. Moreover, all lacked the domestic equivalents of Piedmont or Prussia to force the pace of national integration. Rupert Emerson observed in 1963 that: "The prime condition for the building of nations is that they have an opportunity to age in the wood, and it is precisely this which the African peoples have been denied."¹⁴ If European nation-states had commonly been able to age in the wood, the African states, at their period of independence enjoyed no such comparable advantage. The African states were underdeveloped, economically, politically, and socially, and usually poor in skilled indigenous personnel, and reliant on state administrative structures that have proved inadequate for the tasks to which they were put by the imperial powers. Thus, in contrast to much of Western Europe, where franchise extension had been gradual, most African states (Angola and Mozambique are notable exceptions) were endowed with fully fledged democratic institutions at the time of independence. The extent and pace of preparation for self-government by the different colonial powers varies. On the whole, the British did better; the French did well, the Belgians did little, and then only in the last few years of their rule while the Portuguese did nothing, effectively abandoning their African colonies to their own fates in a precipitate withdrawal.¹⁵

Colonialism, Ethnicity, and Ethnic Conflicts in Africa

An influential trend in scholarly writing on Africa locates the origin of ethnicity in the colonial period. Jean-Francois Bayart asserts that "the precipitation of ethnic identities becomes incomprehensible if it divorced from colonial rule."¹⁶ Leroy Vail, in *The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa* has put it succinctly: "ethnicity is not a natural cultural residue but a consciously crafted ideological creation."¹⁷ His model of ethnogenesis involves the combined efforts of three categories: intellectuals or culture brokers, who might be European missionaries, social anthropologists, historians, or local intellectuals; local administrative officials; and ordinary

people, looking for firm cultural moorings in a time of rapid social change. Missionaries brought the Western education, and often orthography of the vernacular languages. Anthropologists produced monographs on the peoples they studied, and African administrative intermediaries gained a stake in the so-called tribal power in a context in which the colonial administrators assumed that Africans were naturally tribal people. The convergence of these three processes created a new intellectual thinking for educated Africans in the form of a sense of identity that derived from "an automatic, ascriptive cultural unity."¹⁸ It gave the ordinary people not only a sense of comfort in situations in which they interacted with people from different ethnic groups, but also a sense of control:

Men came to think of themselves as belonging to particular ethnic group... not because being a member of the group made them feel good, but also because the ethnic apparatus of the rural area. The chiefs, traditional courts, petty bourgeois intellectuals and the systematized traditional values of the tribe as embodied in the ethnic ideology-all worked to preserve the very substantial interests which these men had in their home areas. Without ethnicity... the migrants would have been less able to exercise the control that was necessary for them to assure the continuation of their positions in rural societies.¹⁹

Vail's model has the merit of taking the discussion of ethnicity beyond the increasingly sterile debate between primordialists and instrumentalists by showing that the insights of both perspectives can be incorporated into what Crawford Young calls a constructivist approach.²⁰ Nevertheless, this model however useful leaves certain issues unexplained. For example, it cannot readily account for the different ideological choices made by individuals who apparently underwent similar experiences. In late nineteenth century Natal Province in South Africa, for instance, the educated petty bourgeois class of African tended to despise traditionalism. And as educated, Christian people, they wanted equal status with the colonialists. In their belief, that could be achieved only by putting maximum social distance between themselves and their tribal kin for whom they generally expressed distaste.²¹ In the Eastern Cape Province, called the cradle of African nationalism because of the educational institutions that created a rising elite, the situation was similar. The products of institutions such as Lovedale and Fort Hare University College did not embrace narrow or subnational ethnicities but, progressively, the wider concept of African nationalism. However, the major vehicle of Kikuyu political agitation in Kenya was the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) founded in 1924, with Jomo Kenyatta as a leading member. Only later, after the Kenya Central

Association had been banned did its leaders support the Kenya African National Union (KANU) founded in 1944, an organization claiming to advance the rights of all Africans in Kenya.²²

Obviously, colonial rule did have much to do with the making of ethnicities in Africa. It is very clear that precolonial societies were not completely isolated from one another. Thus,

there were trading relationships and alliances could be formed in warfare generally speaking, as the common processes of fission and fusion, conquest, domination and absorption suggest, boundaries were more fluid and permeable than a static notion of a primordial ethnicity might suggest.²³

In several cases, the contribution of colonial rule to ethnic conflict was direct. The Igbo of Nigeria and the Kikuyu of Kenya are cases of indigenous societies that lacked overarching political structures. A sense of wider Igbo or Kikuyu commonalities could only occur with the momentum created by colonial rule. Even more remarkable are those cases where ethnicities have arisen out of mistaken imputations, a classic case being the Ngala of Democratic Republic of Congo. No such people existed by normal ethnographic criteria but the name was used by European traders and explorers to describe riverine people in the Upper Congo area, thus, "the label swiftly became a generic term utilized by Europeans to describe the Africans who were recruited from this area for the service of the state and who clustered around the mission and state outposts."²⁴ A potential parallel, but a different kind, might be the case of the colored people in South Africa (categorized as mixed-race numbering some 4 million). Historically, the colored people have been a residual category in the scheme of racial classification. They were neither white nor African. They could not be identified with a racial group; nor were they culturally similar although a great majority spoke Afrikaans (the language of the Boers). Many colored people rejected that designation. In the 1970s the more radically minded opted to be identified with other nonwhite groups and following the trend established by the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa, identified themselves along with Africans and Indians, as blacks. Many colored people, however, rejected the designation, implying thereby that their affinities lay more with whites than with Africans. With the end of apartheid regime, the colored people found themselves a pivotal voting grouping in the Western Cape Province where 60 percent, at least, voted for the National Party. Although it is too soon to reach firm conclusions, there have been some signs of a new sense of a colored identity. At present it is limited to essentially fringe groups. If there is such a thing as a mainstream of colored political thinking (itself a highly debatable contention),

the tendency is to assimilate to a widened notion of Afrikaner identity, a tendency that is welcomed by National Party politicians eager to consolidate a support-base, but deplored by right-wing Afrikaners whose concept of identity remains racially circumscribed.²⁵

It is no doubt true enough as an indictment of colonial rule that it did too little to create a firmer base for a durable territorial nationalism. In Nigeria, the North and South was deliberately kept in relative mutual isolation as that there was little or no chance of a sense of one Nigeria or Nigeria-wide identity emerging until after the Civil War, 1967–1970.²⁶ In the Sudan, another scene of intractable violent conflict, the Arab North and the black South were separately administered with the three southern provinces enjoying a special status of servitude while the Arab North dominates. While Islamic religion predominates in the North, some 25 percent of the Southerners are Christians and in the negotiations that led to independence in 1956 the British dealt separately with the northerners who, in the view of the southerners, persuaded the colonial power to renege on its commitment to protect the special status of the South. The consequence has been persistent civil war since independence, and one of the longest civil wars in Africa, from 1983 to 2004.²⁷ However, the war between the North and the South of the country ended with the peace agreement signed in January 2005. But the war shifted to the Darfur region in the West.²⁸ The Sudanese persistent civil war, with its worsening human condition and the massacre in the Darfur region of the Western Sudan has been described by the former United States Secretary of State Colin Powell, as *genocide* committed in Darfur by the Government in Khartoum.²⁹

In other African states where violent ethnic conflict has been endemic, similar charges of colonial culpability can be made. In Burundi and Rwanda, for example, Belgian colonial officials disturbed the delicate balance on which Tutsi-Hutu relationships rested. According to Rene Lemarchand's account, they (Belgians) read into Burundi's traditional structure, the far more rigid system of stratification prevailing in Rwanda. By withholding traditional Hutu claims to a limited degree of power within the Tutsi monarchical system, "the colonial state significantly altered existing patterns of political recruitment to the advantage of the Tutsi, and ensured that the fragile balance between cohesion and conflict was tipped in the direction of conflict."³⁰ Nevertheless, Lemarchand denies that the roots of the Tutsi-Hutu conflict lie in the precolonial past and asserts that the trigger was the competition unleashed by electoral processes after independence.³¹ Regarding Uganda, the special status accorded to Buganda and the application of indirect rule to other kingdoms in that country may be said to have complicated the search for a sense of identity and unity in Uganda. An overwhelming majority of Bagandans boycotted the

preindependence elections of 1962 and continued to assert their special status until 1966 when Prime Minister Milton Obote forcibly terminated it, and Edward Mutesa fled into exile in London. No doubt the Buganda sense of identity was the Kabaka of Buganda sharpened by the colonial experience, which involved sharp clashes with the British. As pointed out by D.A. Low, "at bottom there was a profound concern for the integrity of self-generating capabilities of Baganda society, and a deep anxiety lest these should be in any way frustrated."³²

It is very important to note that colonial rule rested on the distinctions and particularisms of colonial territories. Thus, proponents of nationalism were regarded with dislike and contempt as dangerous upstarts by the colonial rulers. In most of the African states, nationwide parties with deep roots could not be established because of the colonial policy of divide and rule. Unlike the Indian Congress Party whose roots go back into nineteenth-century India, no single African party that assumed power at independence was established before 1945. Ironically, one important exception was South Africa's African National Congress (ANC), which was formed in 1912, but did not assume political power until 1994. Despite lengthy periods in the doldrums (such as the 1920s and 1930s) and a long period of proscription from 1960 to 1990, the ANC managed to retain a presence and to build up legitimacy as the leading nationalist liberation movement/party in South Africa. Thus, the long and hard struggle against white supremacy at least gave South Africa a greater sense of unity among the African states than elsewhere in the continent, where relatively speaking, the struggle against colonial rule was much easier (with the exceptions of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe)³³ and of far shorter duration. As a result these may serve it well as it grapples with the intractable problems of governing so turbulent a society as South Africa.³⁴

African leaders avoid federation, minority rights, and other techniques that sought to place limits on the power of ruling parties. In Nigeria, federation was inevitable not because no Nigeria-wide nationalist movement had developed before independence, but essentially because each of the three regionally and ethnically based political parties—the Action Group (AG), National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), and Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC), wanted a system that would protect it against domination by the others. In Kenya, a constitution (Majimbo) with some federal features was agreed at the negotiations leading to early independence in 1963 under the KANU. However, the regional leaders who feared KANU domination which meant Luo-Kikuyu domination succumbed easily to KANU's wooing, and very shortly a unitary system was in place.³⁵ Federation was almost universally condemned as a neocolonial trick, a device to ensure that richer regions remained rich, providing a toehold for

potential secessionist movements, and more temperately, an expensive and complex form of government that the poor and soft states of Africa could not afford. For instance, in South Africa, the ANC entered the negotiating process with National Party in 1991 with a preconceived bias against federation that embodied these negative views. To reach a settlement, it had to back down somewhat from this position. There is little doubt that its centralist attitudes remain strongly entrenched. Nearly equally and uniformly the new leadership denounced tribalism or ethnicity as an evil to be combated. Namibia's independence Constitution of 1989 goes so far as to assert that ethnicity is a scourge and pathology and stipulates that the parliament and the cabinet must guard vigilantly against its emergence.³⁶ Mozambique's government declared in 1975, that a radical break must be made with tradition, which in its view was associated with colonialism. "Even the constitution provides for the elimination of colonial and traditional structures."³⁷

However, among the first wave of independent states in Africa, the one-party state came to be seen as the most effective way of promoting national unity. Tanzania is a good example under President Julius Nyerere, 1963–1985. In practice, it was also a neat way of eliminating opposition, but the rationalizations invoked rested on loftier claim that opposition parties were divisive, being based (as indeed they commonly were) on ethnic or regional support. That every state had its Katanga became part of the learning experience of African politics and prompted the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) insistence that the boundaries of states created by colonial people at the Berlin conference of the partition of Africa of 1884–1885 (arbitrary though they were) should remain unchanged. The paranoia about possible secessionist movements remained; in due course Katanga could be added Biafra, Eritrea, and Southern Sudan and other claimants may follow.³⁸

As the evidence shows, ethnicity has been manipulated as a political weapon in most of the conflicts in Africa. Thus, the ethnic party or association can readily be assimilated into the concept of an interest group. Efforts have been made to demonstrate, for example, that Afrikaner ethnicity has been no more than a class alliance using the banner of the *volk* to mask the interests of the Afrikaner elites (petty bourgeoisie) in South Africa. Such arguments, however, fail to give appropriate weight to the significance of the emotional intensity or affection that accompanies and, indeed, undergirds ethnicity. So strong is this phenomenon that it can push ethnic mobilization in directions that run directly counter to what might reasonably be considered its interests.

Few African states have been able to cope with ethnicity in ways that have proved compatible with democracy. Of the few that have done so

are Botswana and Mauritius. They have had the enormous advantage of high economic growth rates for sustained periods of time. In most of the rest of Africa, serious economic contraction and harsh structural adjustment programs have exacerbated ethnic conflicts, often by worsening the regional imbalances that fuel ethnic tensions. Mauritius, however, has the advantage of being a small island with a vigorous tradition of civil society.

Mauritius politicians, over the years, have managed to turn this potentially explosive diversity into a political strength. Out of this poly-ethnic plethora, they wove a political spoil system which has ensured that each ethnic group has an established stake in the system. This has resulted in the emergence of rules of the political game whose legitimacy and legality is accepted by all the dominant forces on the island.³⁹

Botswana's advantage lies principally in its largely homogeneous Tswana population. Among the Tswana, however, the Ngwato dominate. In more than forty years of independence, it has never had a change of government, and it has been ruled by one dominant political party, and with this the signs of political (sclerosis) conflict are apparent. Recent reports, especially in the early 1990s, suggest some disturbance of ethnic calm among the Ngwaketse, a subethnic group, who have been up in arms since the government suspended their paramount chief in 1994 for "failing to cooperate with the authorities."⁴⁰ This serves as a reminder that the internal solidarity of ethnic groups should never be assumed. It may appear that in Namibia and Zimbabwe respectively, for example, Ovambo and Shona domination of the ruling parties will ensure continuing control. It may, but it also may not.

Although conflicts between ethnic groups are often caused as a result of ancient rivalries, and animosities, most ethnic conflicts are very complex and have very little to do with ancient hatreds. For instance, when a group's identity is based mainly on adversarial relationships, on the basis of *us* versus *them*, conflict is almost inevitable. The adversarial approach influences members of different groups to expect only the worst from each other, to put the worst interpretation on each other's statements and behavior, and to strongly distrust each other. The more one group focuses on how different it is from the other, the more likely it is not to see how much the groups have in common.

This refusal to see obvious similarities helps to strengthen ethnic boundaries and the group's view of itself as pure and uncomplicated by outside influences. Ethnic conflict is often caused by deliberate action by ethnic group leaders to preserve and reinforce group identity. Conflict helps to strengthen the boundaries between the groups and the outside world.

Ethnicity and the Nigerian Civil War: A Case Study

The events that led to the coup of January 15, 1966 and the civil war from 1967 to 1970 had its seeds sown in the past. The historical background of events that led to the coup and the civil war included (1) the political competition with other ethnic groups, socioeconomic, and insecurity of the Igbo ethnic group; (2) threats by various ethnic groups to secede; (3) the politicization of the army and militarization of politics; and (4) the increased importance of oil (the oil factor). These events built on one another and led to the conflict, alienation, and hostility that ended in the military coup of January 1966 and civil war in 1967. Ethnicity played a very crucial role in the dynamics of these events.

The Igbo and Yoruba had always been in political competition starting with their activities in the Lagos based Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) in the 1930s and early 1940s.⁴¹ In 1964, Chief Akintola, the Premier of the then Western Nigeria has aligned his political party Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) with the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC). The alignment of NNDP with the NPC weakened the power-base of the NCNC in the NPC-NCNC coalition government. Chief Akintola complained of job discrimination at the federal level and marginalization of Yoruba by accusing the Igbo of tribalism in the administration of the Nigerian Railway Corporation because all the top management and administrative positions were held only by the Igbo people. As Chief Akintola put it:

Notwithstanding our wealth and high social advancement, Western Nigeria has become a mere appendage in the community of the Federal Republic of Nigeria mainly because its people are disunited and disorganized, and as a result they have been superseded by relatives, tribesmen and clansmen of eastern NCNC chairman, who shout the slogan of one Nigeria more than anyone else.⁴²

Similarly, during the 1965 University of Lagos crisis, over the appointment of a vice-chancellor, Chief Akintola and his party took issue with the leadership of the University to illustrate Yoruba marginalization in appointments to posts in higher institutions located in the Yoruba ethnic homeland. Chief Akintola supported the replacement of the vice-chancellor, Professor Eni Njoku, an Igbo, with Professor Biobaku, a Yoruba (who had been offered a similar position in an African University), because the vice-chancellors for the two federal Universities (Ibadan and Lagos) were Igbos, whereas the

two Universities were located in Yoruba states. The resulting ethnic conflict within the institution generated much insecurity and alienation among the Igbo faculty and administrative staff. Consequently, the Igbos fled from Lagos to the University of Nigeria, Nsukka in Igboland. There, Professor Njoku was appointed vice-chancellor of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka a post he held until the outbreak of the civil war in 1967.⁴³

Another source of ethnic conflict between the Igbo and Hausa-Fulani was the cavalier manner in which the Igbo-led NCNC objected to the 1963 Census figures released by the chief census officer but accepted by the federal government. By 1963 the NCNC/NPC federal coalition had weakened and was breaking apart. The split in the AG with the break-away Yoruba faction led by Akintola's NNDP had provided the NPC with an opportunity to dump the NCNC. The NPC was then in a position to rule the country alone without the support of NCNC. Its position was enhanced by alignment with a much weaker Yoruba faction led by Akintola NNDP than with the Igbo-led NCNC. Looking toward the 1964 federal elections, each of the two major political parties, the NPC and NCNC, sought ways to undermine the power and influence of the other to win the elections and take control of the federal government.

The census crisis of 1963 was a political issue. The census result was not only supposed to provide a guide for revenue allocation and for defining political-electoral constituencies. It was also the first census conducted in an independent Nigeria. The controversy surrounding it illustrated the level of distrust that had grown among the various ethnic groups in Nigeria. Protesting that the results of the census were fraudulent, the NCNC Government of the Eastern Region rejected the figures and even challenged the legality of the federal government's action in accepting them. Nnoli opined that "to accept the results was to go against the objections of a major ethnic group."⁴⁴ Michael Okpara, leader of the NCNC and Premier of the Eastern Region, brought suit against the federal government to set aside the result of the census. The federal supreme court dismissed the suit without giving any reason for its decision. In his rejection of the census results, Michael Okpara made the Sardauna of Sokoto, the leader of the NPC and Premier of the Northern Region, a symbol of the threat of continued Northern domination of Nigeria by complaining about the "perpetual menacing threats of the Premier of Northern Region that his fore-bearers had always ruled Nigeria, and they would continue this rule forever."⁴⁵ Despite all its efforts, the NCNC did not get the support of two other Southern Premiers. Chief Akintola readily accepted the results, Chief Dennis Osadebey, Premier of the newly created Mid-West Region, decided to accept the results after initially rejecting them, "for the sake of national unity." However, the Mid-West's decision for accepting

the results was forced by the NPC's threat to withdraw federal aid on which the fledgling region depended. The census controversy not only exacerbated the alienation of the Igbo from the Nigerian society; but, it also convinced a large segment of the Nigerian population, that the quest by the Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups to dominate other ethnic groups was a reality of Nigerian socioeconomic and political life.

Although Igbo and Yoruba reactions to the 1963 census figures and prospects of continued NPC domination of the country explained AG/NCNC Alliance preparatory to the 1964 federal elections, the desire by Chief Akintola's NNDP to confine its activities to Western Nigeria, and reach an accommodation, and formed alliance with the NPC. "With the NNDP and leading Yoruba figures complaining of discrimination against the Yoruba and particularly in the federal government agencies whose chairmen were Igbos, and the 1964 election crisis further alienated the Igbo from the Nigerian State."⁴⁶

When Chief Akintola broke away from the AG and formed the United Peoples Party (UPP) and later the NNDP, the NPC quickly formed alliance with him. Thus, for the 1964 federal elections, the NPC and the NNDP formed an alliance of the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) against the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). It brought together the NCNC and AG along with the Northern Progressive Front, an alliance of the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC). During the federal elections of the 1964, the UPGA campaigned on a promise to restructure the federal system and create new regions (states) with a view to putting a stop to northern hegemony of Nigeria.⁴⁷

Again, the NNA and UPGA confronted each other at the December 1964 federal elections which were marred with violence (through the use of party thugs) and arrest of opposition candidates and members of the opposition parties. Shortly after the dissolution of the federal parliament on October 30, 1964, marking the beginning of electioneering campaigns, President Nnamdi Azikiwe warned "the nation of the consequences of not providing an atmosphere for free and fair elections."⁴⁸ Despite his warnings, violence, denial of opposition rights and violations of the electoral rules continued unabated. The ruling parties in the NNA used state institutions to turn the violence and hostility against the opposing UPGA led by NCNC and its allies with politicians been barred from campaigning, except in areas under their control while some were denied hotel accommodation in Kaduna, the northern regional capital. Consequently, the NCNC threatened to boycott the election.

Toward the end of electioneering campaigns President Azikiwe appealed to the politicians for calm and to desist from using their political power to

perpetuate their stay in office. He predicted the break-up of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and said, "If this our embryo republic must disintegrate, then in the name of God, let the operation be a short and painless one."⁴⁹ The election was marred by fraud and electoral malpractices. Nevertheless, the results were accepted by the NPC led alliance (NNA), while the NCNC led alliance (UPGA) rejected them. The president refused to call on Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa to form the government based on the results and offered to resign his position, thus, precipitating a constitutional crisis. The crisis was resolved following the intervention of the chief justices of Nigeria, and Eastern Nigeria, Sir Adetokunbo Ademola and Sir Louis Mbanafu. Undoubtedly, President Azikiwe's *volte-face* in reappointing Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as the prime minister shocked the NCNC, and AG leaders in both Western and Eastern Nigeria, particularly Igbo leaders who felt betrayed by the decision. They had hoped that the outcome of the October 1965 parliamentary elections in Western Nigeria would prove to the world that the federal elections of 1964 were rigged by the NNA. They were proved wrong because the NNDP was determined to remain in power at all cost despite poor popular support in the region. As a result of the blatant falsification of election results, anarchy was let loose in Western Nigeria. With the NNDP remaining in power in the West and the NNA in control of the federal government, according to Nnoli,

The Eastern Region was finally convinced that the arrogance, political imprudence and political greed of the Hausa-Fulani could not be overcome within the context of a united federation. The Igbo began to consider breaking up the country into North and South. However, the military coup in January of 1966 postponed any further consideration of this line of action.⁵⁰

The Igbo threat of secession in 1964 following the outcome of the federal elections was not the first threat of secession in Nigeria. The first threat of secession took place in 1914 when the Northern and Southern Protectorates were amalgamated by the British. The amalgamation was very unpopular in the North, particularly among the emirate aristocracy. The Northerners feared that the presence of Southern workers in the North would eventually have some influence on the emirate system. Hence the northern leaders opposed amalgamation but the British Colonial Office wanted amalgamation so that the British Treasury would not have to provide funds for colonial administration. This explained why amalgamation was done only for economic reasons.

Again in 1953 the North threatened secession over the AG Motion tabled by Chief Anthony Enahoro on March 31, 1953 that "The House

of Representatives accepts as a primary objective the attainment of self-government for Nigeria in 1956.”⁵¹ The Northern leaders were not only concerned that independence would result in Southerners domination. They were also afraid that the backwardness of the North in education, trained manpower, and socioeconomic attainments necessary for modern government, and social organization would lead to southern domination of Nigeria, and the demise of the emirate system, the source of power and influence of the Hausa-Fulani in the north. As a consequence, efforts were made by the British to accommodate northern fears, and these led to the adoption of a federal system under the 1954 constitution.

However, between 1953 and 1954, the Yoruba leaders of the AG threatened to pull the Western Region out of the Nigerian Federation over the issue of the status of the Lagos, which was to be made the capital territory (Federal Capital). Lagos before October 1954 was an integral part of the Western Region. Although it is predominantly Yoruba, it was a significant meeting place for all ethnic groups from the East, North, and West. Other ethnic groups from the East and the North felt that Lagos as the federal capital should not be subject to the control of any regional government nor any ethnic group to protect the interests of all residents regardless of the state of origin. That political considerations played important role in the dispute over Lagos. Until he unseated Eyo Ita as the leader of Government Business in Eastern Nigeria, Nnamdi Azikiwe the NCNC leader had his political base in Lagos. Although the AG remained the ruling political party in the Western Region, which then included Lagos, and given the animosity between the two political parties, it was understandable that the NCNC supported carving out Lagos from Western region, and making it the Federal Capital. It was only the threat of use of force by the Colonial Office that forced the capitulation of Yoruba over the issue. And at the 1957 Constitutional Conference, the AG leaders accepted the creation of Lagos as the Federal Capital but ensured that the federal government did not extend its boundary.⁵²

In early 1966 minority ethnic groups in the Eastern Region (Ijaw, Efik, and Ibibio) which before Nigerian independence demanded a Calabar-Ogoja-River State to be carved out of the region declared a Delta People's Republic. This was led by Isaac Boro, Sam Owonaro, and Nottingham Dick, using Ijaw militant youths known as Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS) as the vehicle for self-determination.⁵³ Though the move was suppressed by the military regime in early 1966, the protracted crisis in Nigeria following the July 1966 coup saw the creation of South-Eastern and Rivers States in May 1967; when General Gowon “proclaimed a state of emergency in the Federation and announced the division of the country into twelve states.”⁵⁴

At one time or another each ethnic group in Nigeria had threatened to secede. However, it was not until the Igbo dominated Eastern Region under the leadership of Colonel Chukwuemeka Ojukwu seceded in 1967 that the threat of secession was carried out, and the consequence of it was a civil war that lasted more than two years, from June 6, 1967 to January 12, 1970. Each threat created the impression that secession was a legitimate option for ethnic groups or regions that were alienated from the Federation of Nigeria. This impression encouraged ethnic groups in the country to consider the possibility and practicality of secession whenever they felt seriously frustrated by the situations in the country. However, since no one ethnic group actually seceded, it was not certain how the rest of the country would react when faced with an actual attempt to secede. It was the height of naivety for Igbo leaders to assume that the Yoruba would follow them without a preknowledge of their plan for secession. Thus, the Igbo did not get the support of the Yoruba and minority ethnic groups in the country when Colonel Ojukwu declared a Republic of Biafra on May 30, 1967.

Economic factor contributed to the East's decision to secede from the federation. The East threatened to secede at a time when petroleum resource accounted for the highest foreign exchange for the country. Commercial production of oil began in 1956 and by 1964 had become the most important revenue earner for Nigeria. The federal government collected the rent and royalties accruing from the oil industry. Only part of the revenue was returned to the region on the basis of the principle of derivation and allocation from the Distributable Pool Account. Obviously, secession was attractive to the Igbo leadership because it raised the prospect of controlling and utilizing the entire oil revenue in the Eastern Region. Unfortunately most of the oil from the East was derived from the Niger Delta region, and not in the Igbo heart land.⁵⁵

One of the remote causes of the ethnic conflict in Nigeria and the civil war can be traced to a colonial policy that linked ethnicity with the composition of the armed forces. This linkage was achieved through the concept of *warrior tribes*, whom colonial anthropologists and apologists believed had developed a martial prowess above other ethnic groups. There was also the perception of how dependable various ethnic groups were with respect to the colonial project in Nigeria.⁵⁶ The martial tribes that were deemed dependable became recruiting resources for the military by the British colonial authority. The less dependable were excluded. With this policy, the British colonial authority in Nigeria was able to apply the divide and rule policy in both creating and consolidating the Nigerian Army. This policy led to the domination of rank and file in the Nigerian army by members of politically diverse and demographically small ethnic groups, especially

from Benue, Nassarawa, and Plateau States of the Middle Belt in Northern Nigeria. Thus, the British colonial authority injected ethnicity into the Nigerian Army.⁵⁷ This was the beginning of ethnic consideration in the composition of the Nigerian Army and use of ethnicity within the army for political purposes.

Consequently, at the time of independence in 1960 Northern soldiers made up the rank and file of the Nigerian Army while British officers dominated the officer corps, and only 17 percent of the officer corps were Nigerians. The situation was compounded by the attitudes of some Nigerians toward the army. Soldiering was the last choice for Nigerians (especially southerners-Igbo and Yoruba) who had any ability or academic qualifications. Only those who were unable and incapable of obtaining alternative employment joined the army from the South. This attitude continued until the beginning of the civil war in 1967.

After independence, a program of indigenization (Nigerianization) of the armed forces was introduced with politicians already steeped in ethnic politics. The NPC/NCNC federal government conscious of the army's critical role in the political process as a final weapon of coercion, and this was reflected through the efforts of various political leaders to encourage members of their respective ethnic groups to join the army, and their desire to maintain communication with those already in the military. It was a small wonder that Chief Obafemi Awolowo was accused at the 1962 treasonable felony trial along with top AG leaders of seeking to infiltrate the army and influence army personnel to overthrow the federal government.

Indeed, a quota system for recruitment into the armed forces was introduced in 1962 with 50, 25, and 25 percent allotted to the North, East, and West respectively. Whereas two-thirds of all commissioned officers by 1962 were from the East, by contrast, of the 163 commissioned between 1963 and 1964 and were Second Lieutenants by 1965, 25, 19, 42, and 14 percent were from the East, West, North, and Midwest. Thus, by 1966, the rank and file of the Nigerian Army was dominated by men from the former Adamawa and Benue Provinces in the North, namely, Benue, Nassarawa, and Plateau States. While the quota system enabled people from the other parts of the Middle Belt and Dry North to dominate command structure of the officer corps.

Much argument has been made about the ethnic or nationalistic motives of the leaders of the January 15, 1966, coup d'état. According to Nnoli,

It is true that their (coup plotters) motives cannot be ascertained solely from what they indicate them to be. There is no way of determining whether their words correspond to their motives. Therefore, as in all cases of social analysis, one must look beyond the words to the objective facts

of the situation. When this is done the coup presents itself as ethnic in character.⁵⁸

In any event, the pattern of the killing during the coup gave the impression that it had an ethnic character. Twenty-seven people were known to have died in the coup of January 15, 1966. While the Premiers of Eastern and Mid-Western Nigeria, who were Igbo-speaking survived the January coup, the casualties of the coup from the Western and Northern Nigeria, and non-Mid-West Igbo included the Prime Minister Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa Sir Ahmadu Bello, Chief Samuel Akintola, and Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh (Itsekiri). In addition, four out of five Northern Officers, two out of five Western Officers, and one out of four Mid-Western Officers of the ranks of lieutenant colonel and above were killed. The only Igbo officer killed can be explained by his refusal to surrender the keys to the Armory. Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon survived the coup because he was out of the country at the time, while two, three, and seven colonels from the West, Mid-West, and East respectively survived the coup. Six of the seven majors and nineteen out of the other twenty-three officers who participated actively in plotting and executing the coup were Igbos. Thus, created the unfortunate impression that the January 15, 1966, coup had an ethnic character and that it was ethnically motivated.⁵⁹ Although the coup leaders failed to take over the reins of government (because of seniority), their action served as a prelude to military incursion in governance. Ethnic politics had given rise not only to the ethnicization of the military, the militarization of ethnicity but also to militarization of politics.

Military intervention in politics was welcomed heartily by the people of Western, Eastern, and Mid-Western Nigeria as well as Lagos. For them, it was a relief. But for the Northern oligarchy which had suffered heavy casualties, there was some disquiet and feeling that the regime should be given time to correct the problems that immediately led to intervention. Unfortunately, the head of the Federal Military Government (FMG) and supreme commander, Major-General John T.U. Aguyi Ironsi just pressed on doggedly with major issues in a simplistic manner. As Major-General James Oluleye put it:

Major-General Aguyi Ironsi did not prepare himself fully for a political leadership role which was thrust on him by the Council of Ministers before midnight on January 16, 1966 and was handicapped professionally. With him being disadvantaged militarily and politically, he walked into the ambush laid by the Igbo hawks who saw the situation and his appointment as the best and unique opportunity for balkanization or Ibonization of the country.⁶⁰

Within a period of four and a half months, the Ironsi regime promulgated thirty-three Decrees, all aimed at curing the political problems of the country. Although his objectives were laudable, what led to his undoing was the Unification Decree No. 34 of May 24, 1966, abolishing the Federation, and *ipso facto*, the regions and creating groups of provinces without creating new centers of power. Because authority in the military was hierarchical, there was certainly no need for the decree centralizing all programs and activities of the FMG which were seen by the Northern oligarchy and intelligentsia as an important prelude to the Ibonization of Nigeria. The Decree was untimely; discontent was brewing within the army whose rank and file was dominated by the Northerners, particularly after announcing some promotions within the army, though with some justifications, favoring the Igbos. According to Major-General Oluleye, then the second-in-command of the fifth Battalion in Kano, five days after the Unification Decree was promulgated:

A carefully orchestrated political violence erupted in Kano and spread to Katsina, Funtua, Sokoto, Maiduguri and other places in a sporadic manner. The 5th Battalion became extremely stretched in curbing the disturbances. Every Igbo person paraded himself as Ironsi. Unwittingly, the Igbos displayed the photograph of Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, in a prone position with his head under the jungle boot of Major Nzeogwu. It was displayed in homes and shops of the Igbos. Where people did not notice the photograph; they would invite their attention to it. To the Northerners they usually said, you see your papa under the foot of Major Nzeogwu. The intensity of the operations against the Igbos in the North was thus precipitated and accentuated by the Igbo themselves. The Northerners planned dutifully as the Igbos continued to behave unchecked. The result was catastrophic. Most of the Supreme Commander's advisers, official and unofficial, were Igbonization-oriented and consequently their pieces of advice even through commissions, were directed towards the selected aim which was far from being in the national interest.⁶¹

Meanwhile, in the military barracks resentment against the coup and the ascendancy of the Igbos and Southerners in the military and political schemes could not be contained. It was widely believed that General Ironsi knew about the January 15, 1966 coup. The rapid promotion of the best qualified replacements for those northern officers killed and arrested shifted the balance among commanders and high-level staff further in favor of Igbo officers. Thus confirming suspicions of Igbo plan of another coup for August 3, 1966:

During the first month after the January 15 coup, Igbo officers held every post of any importance in the army except Chief of Army Staff...and commander

of the 1st Brigade. Even when Ironsi compensated soon thereafter by appointing Northerners to two battalion command positions, Igboes were overwhelmingly dominant in the command structure.⁶²

Law and order had not been completely restored in the army after the January coup, and according to Luckham, by July 1966, "Northern soldiers were already in a semi-mutinous state."⁶³ However, their senior officers were reluctant to lead them in a revolt, until they became convinced that Major-General Ironsi was directing a plan of Igbo domination of the country that they put together their plan for his overthrow that was carried out on July 29, 1966. In the process of this counter coup 27 Igbo officers, 12 non-Igbo officers from East and West regions, 154 men of other ranks from the East, and 17 from the West and Midwest regions were killed while many others were injured. Among those killed was head of state, Major-General Aguyi Ironsi, and his host, the military governor of the Western Region, Lt. Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi.⁶⁴ Whereas the July 29, 1966, Northern coup (counter coup) was planned to disarm all Igbo officers and men across the country, it failed in the Eastern Region. This was especially significant because the military governor of Eastern Nigeria, Lt. Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, emerged as the leader and was to declare the region's secession from the Federation of Nigeria as a sovereign independent state and proclaimed it as the Republic of Biafra on May 30, 1967. Consequently, on July 7, 1967, civil war broke out between the Igbo (Biafran) and the federal government troops.⁶⁵ The war lasted for thirty months, from July 7, 1967 until January 12, 1970, with casualties standing at about a million as shown in table 5.1. The Nigerian crises as shown above pale in significance when compared with the tragedies in Bosnia, Rwanda, or Sudan even the frustrations are nonetheless deep, and enduring, and the threat of political cataclysm hangs over the country.

Ethnic Conflicts in Africa: An Overview

One of the major causes of ethnic conflict is the deliberate manipulation of negative perceptions by leaders to mobilize group support for their own political, economic, and social objectives. These explained partly the descent into the Nigerian civil war. However, many ethnic conflicts are essentially created by leaders for purposes that are not primarily in the interest of the ethnic group. Ethnic conflict can be initiated by a small group of leaders because of prejudices and fears that are part of building

an ethnic identity. Leaders count on the emotional intensity and loyalty of the members of an ethnic group. They know that distrust can be used to initiate fears. Such fears usually override logical thinking. Consequently, despite misgivings that individuals may have about engaging in violence against another group, their fears, sense of loyalty, and emotional commitment to their own ethnic group influence them to follow their leaders. The most obvious examples are the Nigerian civil war and the conflict in Rwanda that claimed 800,000 Tutsi lives and some moderate Hutus by the Hutus in 1994.⁶⁶ The Tutsis were massacred because Hutu political leaders made a deliberate choice to incite fear and hatred among the Hutus to keep themselves in power. Therefore, soldiers, police, local administrators, and even priests methodically encouraged the killings by spreading fear and rumors about the Tutsis' ambition to dominate the country.

Competition among groups for scarce economic resources is another major cause of violent ethnic conflict. Growing economic disparities may increase the fears of ethnic groups that are disadvantaged or denied economic opportunities. Modernization creates insecurity and increased confidence. Even groups that prosper from economic development sometimes feel insecure because the same forces of modernization that made their wealth possible also can make them more vulnerable. Any significant change could alter their status. Ethnic leaders often use economic crises to ignite conflict in order to strengthen their own position, both within the group and against other groups.

Modernization is another cause of ethnic conflict. Groups that participate in the development of the country acquire new values, access to modern ways of life, and they are often less tolerant of traditional cultures. Modernization helps to destroy traditional customs and boundaries that are essential to ethnic solidarity and sense of identity.⁶⁷ Therefore, modernization creates new identities and rearranges the boundaries. These changes threaten too many groups. Ethnic conflict sometimes erupts from this sense of fear and uncertainty of these rearrangements.

Closely related to modernization is the inability of political institutions in African countries to effectively manage differences that ultimately result in violence. Political leaders often respond to demands for political participation and economic opportunities by marginalized ethnic groups with excessive force, indifference, or ineffective policies. Afraid that strong ethnic identities could undermine their power or stability, many leaders attempt to eliminate these differences, often with brute force. This approach often leads to ethnic conflicts. We have the Blacks Africans in the Southern Sudan, suppressed by the Arab North because of their sense of nationalism and identity. The result is the civil war that lasted between 1983 and 2004 in Sudan, between the Arab dominated Sudanese Government and black Africans in Southern Sudan.⁶⁸

Another cause of ethnic conflicts is transition to democracy. Changes create anxieties and threaten ethnic identities. Democratic transitions represent a major change in the status quo. Although equality is widely viewed as a positive democratic value, some groups lose their privileges and advantages in a system of government that is based on the rule of law and impartiality. Many ethnic leaders are often unwilling to respect the emphasis on individual, as opposed to group, which is an essential part of democratic society. Many ethnic groups are reluctant to compromise and to respect different viewpoints, beliefs, and cultural practices.

The proliferation of weapons in African countries is one of the major causes of ethnic conflict. The availability of weapons increases the chances for conflicts among groups that can escalate into a major violence. Conflicts in Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan are fueled by the willingness of these countries as well as private groups and individuals supplying weapons to combatant groups. Many of these weapons were obtained during the Cold War, and following the end of the Cold War that witnessed intensification of ethnic conflicts. For instance, Southern, and Central Africa, and particularly the Great Lakes Region where many Cold War conflicts were waged, continued to be plagued by widespread warfare. The massacre in Rwanda in 1994 was caused by ancient rivalries between the Hutu and Tutsi, but the immediate cause was facilitated by the Hutus' access to weapons, supplied by France and other Western European countries. Similarly, the killings in Sudan continue because of political and ethnic rivalries between the Arab-led Islamic government in Khartoum and black Africans in the Southern Sudan. This war was intensified by the militia backed by the Sudanese Government and known as *Janjaweed* who have access to weapons supplied by Arab and Western European countries.⁶⁹

Ethnic conflicts are extremely costly. More often than not, the countries that can least afford to bear the costs are those that suffer most. Their ancient hatreds, poverty, and low level of political development create situations that are conducive to ethnic conflicts. Not only do the poor get poorer, they are also the most vulnerable to physical danger and psychological distress. Throughout the world ethnic wars have led to loss of millions of lives. While the exact number of lives lost to ethnic wars would never be known, in Africa alone millions have lost their lives to ethnic conflicts. For example, the Angolan civil war that lasted for 27 years (1975–2002) led to loss of more than 600,000 lives, while the Sudanese civil war, one of the longest civil wars in Africa, claimed 2,000,000 lives between 1983 and 2004.⁷⁰ In the Democratic Republic of Congo that has experienced two wars since independence (1960–1965, and 1997–2004), the numbers of people killed stood at 1,500,000 (1960–1965), and 2,500,000 (1997–2004), as shown in table 5.1 that follows.⁷¹

Table 5.1 Major ethnic conflicts in Africa, 1967–2007

Country	Estimated Deaths & Years	Description of the Conflicts
Angola	600,000 (1975–2002)	Civil war between the MPLA Government and UNITA rebels escalated after the independence from Portugal in 1975
Burundi	250,000 (1993–1999)	Tutsis and Hutus have been fighting since the Tutsis assassinated the first democratically elected president, a Hutu
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	2,500,000 (1997–2004) 1,500,000 (1960–1965)	Rebellion to oust Mobutu Sese Seko and a subsequent struggle for control of the country and civil war
Liberia	150,000 (1989–2003)	Rebellion to oust President Samuel Doe, and a subsequent struggle for control of the country, and the civil war under Charles Taylor
Nigeria	1,000,000 (1967–1970)	The civil war between the Igbo (Biafran) and the Federal Government of Nigeria
Rwanda	800,000 (1994)	Hutu troops massacred Tutsis and moderate Hutu
Sierra Leone	150,000 (1991–2001)	Rebel and forces loyal to the previous military regime overthrow the newly elected civilian government
Sudan	2,000,000 (1983–2005)	Rebels from the Christian and Animist in the South, and the Darfur Region of the Western Sudan are fighting the Arab, Muslim controlled government in Khartoum

Sources: Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila, A People's History* New York: Zed Books, 2002; *West Africa*, Variety of issues (1966–2003), *Time Magazine*, many issues (1980–2004), *The Washington Post*, many issues (1975–2007).

Resolving Ethnic Conflicts

Conditions in Africa that ignite ethnic conflicts also make finding peaceful solutions to ethnic wars extremely difficult. Most conflicts occur in poor societies and in countries without strong democratic institutions. Whenever ethnic groups disagree in democratic societies, they have the opportunity to compete for power and punish governments that mistreat them or failed to deliver their electoral promises. Also people have

access to law courts in democratic societies. For example, in the United States, African Americans and the Jews formed an Alliance of Civil Right Organization in the 1950s and 1960s, fought for their civil rights and against discriminatory laws. Similarly, in South Africa, after the end of the racist regime, liberal whites joined blacks, Asian, and colored peoples because of the country's limited and young democratic system. Since the establishment of African majority rule in 1994, South Africa's democratic institutions have diminished ethnic violence and brought different ethnic groups together.⁷²

Economic development can help in resolving ethnic conflicts. Poor societies often breed violent ethnic conflicts because those who are poor lack basic necessities of life. However, as countries develop economically and jobs are available during the period of economic booms, most groups are able to meet their basic needs and are encouraged to work within the various institutions to achieve their goals. During the periods of economic booms, government also will have more resources to allocate to ethnic groups with grievances. Nevertheless, if ethnic groups do not benefit from the booming economy and do not believe that the government is concerned about them, economic disparities may also ignite ethnic conflicts.

Some ethnic conflicts can be resolved if the ethnic group is large enough with many of its members living in separate parts of the country. In cases where one ethnic group dominates the population, such as in Eritrea, and in India, a solution to ethnic conflicts is to allow ethnic group to form its own country. By drawing new boundaries, each ethnic group can become a new nation as was the case of India and Pakistan in 1947.⁷³ India is predominantly Hindu, and Pakistan is overwhelmingly Muslim.

In many cases international organizations, especially the United Nations, and African Union can help resolve ethnic conflicts. Since its establishment in 1945, the United Nations has played a major role in encouraging ethnic groups to negotiate an end to hostilities. Many times, the United Nations has intervened militarily to end ethnic conflicts or to prevent violence from escalating. Pressures from the United Nations and willingness for solution from the parties involved in conflicts can prevent ethnic violence. Nongovernmental Organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, Amnesty International, International Crisis Group, and various Human Rights Groups can help end ethnic conflicts by drawing international attention to them and by serving as mediators and neutral third parties negotiators. Regional military forces can also help resolve ethnic conflicts. For example, as the ethnic conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone spilled over across national boundaries and threatened the political and economic stability of the West African subregion, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), led by Nigeria decided to intervene

militarily. Consequently, the ECOWAS states led by Nigeria spearheaded Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Observer Group (ECOMOG) forces to restore order in Liberia and Sierra Leone.⁷⁴

Another common solution to ethnic conflict is power-sharing arrangements. Essentially, power-sharing arrangement is to divide political powers among the different ethnic groups. This arrangement needs periodic adjustments to reflect changing demographics of the various groups so as to avoid disintegration of the groups. The final point for ethnic conflict resolution is federalism. The federal system solution to ethnic conflicts is the sharing of power between the central government and the states or provinces. Examples of federal systems are South Africa and India. The federal systems in these countries allow regional or provincial governments to have autonomy and flexibility to address problems that could escalate into ethnic conflicts.

Peace Building

Armed conflicts ravaging the African continent have continued to stunt economic development, political and social stability. Armed conflicts and other forms of strife prevalent in Africa inflicted extensive suffering on millions of people, destroyed essential infrastructures and ecosystems, sparking off emigration and displacement of millions of peoples. In recent years, the international community has come to recognize that conflict resolution calls for a comprehensive approach in which parties emerging from conflicts require assistance, not only in negotiating peace agreements, but also in building, consolidating, and sustaining peace. Too many countries lapsed into violence when efforts to consolidate peace or create stability were weak, or not sustained. A few encouraging examples in Africa are Mozambique, Angola, and Rwanda that have gradually consolidated peace and maintained stability after many years of civil wars.

State reconstruction after conflicts in Africa must be undertaken to enhance the ability of the people to govern themselves and allocate their resources efficiently and equitably and to discourage external actors from meddling in their affairs. Since a country's institutions have significant impacts on the way in which conflicts are resolved, they play a crucial role in the effective management of ethnic conflicts. Destructive ethnic mobilization is likely to be minimized if the country's institutions provide all ethnic groups with fair and predictable rules for competition for scarce resources and the benefits of economic growth, as well as structures for the peaceful resolution of conflict. Hence, one way to secure peace and

stability in a society is to provide all the diverse groups with institutions that enhance their ability to live together peacefully and in harmony.

The United Nations has established a peace-building commission. This commission is meant to fill an institutional gap by helping to mobilize efforts to consolidate, create stability, and sustain peace after civil conflict. In addition, the commission can mobilize efforts in bringing actors at the end of civil conflict to the table in an effort to improve international coherence and to ensure that attention does not diminish once the media spotlight turns its focus on other crises.

For peace to prevail in Africa, it is expedient to promote humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, ensure security and security-sector reform. The African political leadership (government) must promote good governance, accountability, and transparency. In the broadest sense, they must demonstrate to their people that peace brings real dividends, improvements in their standard of living, in their sense of opportunity, and in the way their societies function.

Conclusion

Collapse of the state in Somalia, virtual implosion of state in Liberia, horrific genocide in Rwanda, endemic conflict in Burundi, a seemingly never ending civil wars in the Democratic of Republic of Congo and Sudan, shaky democratic regime in Nigeria, and the impending civil war in Cote D'Ivoire and Sudan all appear to point to a massive failure to cope with ethnicity. Whether the record of accommodation would have been better had the economic record been one of progressive growth and more widely diffused prosperity is hard to tell. It is certainly true that ethnicity often overcomes class issues and that economic immoderation exacerbates ethnic conflict. Conflicts, in any case, tend to be easier to manage in circumstances of rising economic growth. What has been implicit in this chapter has been the massive failure of the nation-state in Africa to find solution to their ethnic conflicts. Despite the heady optimism of the 1960s, nowhere have hothouse methods of ethnic conflicts resolution actually succeeded. Somewhat like an opportunistic virus, ethnicity has found niches in this stubborn reality of Africa.

Perhaps radical solutions are needed to solve ethnic conflicts in Africa. According to Wole Soyinka,

We should sit down with square-rule and compass and redesign the boundaries of African nations. If we thought we could get away without this

redefinition of boundaries back when the Organization of African Unity was formed in 1963, surely the instance of Rwanda let us know in a very brutal way that we cannot evade this historical challenge any longer.⁷⁵

Perhaps a start has been made: Eritrea's independence and Ethiopia's acceptance of a kind of ethno-culturally based regionalism are significant breakthrough. Sudan's "Clash of incompatible cultures which historical mischance has placed under the same flag seems un-amenable to resolution by any means other than an arbitrated partition."⁷⁶ Likewise, it appears difficult, as Soyinka implies, to envisage circumstance under which Burundi and Rwanda can be knitted together as peaceful, let alone democratic states.

If radical solutions, even surgery, may have to be contemplated in some of the more desperate cases of intractable ethnic conflicts, more moderate measures that also make states more democratic may suffice elsewhere. The underlying sources of Botswana's and Mauritius's political stability appear to be their inclusiveness. South Africa's Government of National Unity from 1994 to 1999 has at least succeeded and lowered the stakes of a racial political conflict with highly beneficial consequences for the political stability of that country. Power sharing arrangements in Africa will encourage stability and lower the stakes in ethnic conflicts. In one of his lectures in 1995, Chief Emeka Anyaoku, the former secretary-general of the Commonwealth, has expressed the same thoughts eloquently that

There was a time when some of us were idealistic enough to think it possible to wish away essential differences between the components ethnic groups of our country (Nigeria), and mould a truly united Nigeria out of it without taking account of its plurality. But experience in this and in many other countries shows that this is neither possible nor indeed desirable. It shows further that for national unity to become truly nurtured beyond the limits of rhetoric and realized in a way that generates genuine patriotism among the citizens, there has to be a minimum of openness and accountability in the governance system. And an accountable government should mean a democratic government freely and fairly elected by the voters. It should also mean a democratic government that recognizes the importance of reaching out wherever possible for consensus among the significant component units of a pluralistic society.⁷⁷

African Governments need committed and dedicated leaders with sense of mission and focus to work on minimizing ethnic conflicts in the continent. The ECOWAS initiative of forming ECOMOG in West Africa, which has helped, resolved the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone should be an incentive for the African Union to emulate and initiate a "Common

Defense System with an African High Command to ensure the stability and security of Africa,"⁷⁸ which President Kwame Nkrumah proposed in 1963 when the OAU was formed. The new approach of sending troops to the Darfur Region of the Western Sudan and Somalia by the African Union is an initiative that should and must be encouraged and supported. All what the African Union needs from the outside powers, especially, the United States and the European Union is logistics support and equipments for them to mount effective and sustained intervention to solve Sudanese and Somalia ethnic conflicts.

The twenty-first-century African leaders should wake up and realize that no outside powers are going to fight African wars for the Africans any more. African problems must be confronted and addressed by the African themselves. African leaderships and their governments should stop the attitudes of self enslavement to the West. Will Africa ever survive on its own? What is the meaning of African independence, if we cannot do things on our own for ourselves. The survival of Africans is in the hands of Africans themselves. Enough is enough and African leaders need to break their cycle of dependency on the West. African leaderships and their governments should be committed and determined to confront and address African crises/problems with African solutions. With determined, visionary, and focused leaders, Africa can succeed and solve its ethnic conflicts.

This page intentionally left blank

Chapter 6

Peace, Security, and Human Survival in Africa

When is war not a war? Apparently when it is waged by the stronger against the weaker as a pre-emptive strike. When is terrorism not terrorism? Apparently when it is committed by a more powerful government against those at home and abroad who are weaker than itself and whom it regards as a potential threat or even as insufficiently supportive of its own objectives.

—Julius K. Nyerere¹

Introduction

Writing about peace, security, and human survival is a very broad subject that involves such subjects as arms control and disarmament, promoting economic welfare of international community, social and human rights and justice, finding solution to food crisis, hunger and population problems, HIV/AIDS, refugees and disaster relief worldwide can be mind-boggling.² Thus, I examine peace, security, and the strategic importance of Africa regarding the survival of the African peoples in the new international system, and Africa's search for peace and security in the twenty-first century.³

Since the beginning of time man has always sought peace. Peace and security are scarce and sensitive commodities in international politics. Africa is the second largest continent in size in the world next to Asia.⁴ Although it is the most central of all the continents in geographical location, politically, economically, and militarily, it is the most marginal continent.⁵

Physically, it is divided almost in half by the equator and the only continent traversed by the tropics of Cancer and Capricorn. Economically, it is very strategically placed in relations to the oil routes and some critical as well as essential minerals of the world.⁶ Paradoxically, its political leverage in world affairs is insignificant or at best, modest (if at all it has any). What then are implications of Africa being physically central and strategically located, and politically peripheral to world peace and security?

The Strategic Importance of Africa in Global Economy and Politics

Physically on the map of the world, as noted earlier, Africa is not only firmly central and strategically located. It is also the only continent that is cut almost into two halves by the equator and is traversed by the Tropics of Cancer and Capricorn. Africa is bounded by the two busiest Oceans in maritime and trade activities, the Atlantic Ocean to the South and West, and the Indian Ocean to the East.⁷ To the North of Africa lays the biggest and busiest land-bound waterway in the World, the Mediterranean Sea.

In addition, Africa's centrality has other dimensions. Africa has one of the oldest commercial routes to the Far East, dating back to the fifteenth century when Vasco da Gama, the Portuguese's explorer landed in Mozambique in 1482 in his efforts to find a sea route to India and the Far East.⁸ Circumventing the African continent by way of the Cape sea route was part of this process of facilitating Europe's maritime trade and communication with the countries in Asia, South-East Asia, and the Pacific.

Second, the Ocean route around the African continent remains very important and essential for Euro-Asian communications and commerce from the days of the spice trade in the fifteenth century to the period of Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century, and to date. The Cape route along the South African Coast has served the cause of rubber trade from Malaya, Jute from India, wood and, meat from Australia and New Zealand, and precious metals and spices from the Far East. These same routes have served textiles and industrial equipments trade from Europe to the Asian and Pacific countries.

Third, strategically Africa is the gateway to Eastern and Western Europe. Africa's sea route is the lifeline for the oil trade with Europe and North America. The sea-lanes around the Northeast coast of Africa (especially the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea) made it economically cheaper to transport petroleum and other products from the Middle East and the Gulf States Region to Europe and North America. Starting from the 1970s,

the Indian Ocean carried 40 percent of British's trade and approximately 25 percent of Japanese's trade. Since the 1960s and the beginning of the twenty-first century, virtually most of the exported petroleum products (oil) from the Middle East to Europe and to North America needed the two basic and vital African routes either passing through the Suez Canal in the Northeast or the Cape sea route in the South.

Economically and strategically, Africa is very important in terms of supply of many strategic minerals to the outside world, particularly Europe and North America. While Africa produces and has nine of the most highly sought after minerals and agricultural products and these include gold, diamond, uranium, oil, cobalt, zinc, copper, chrome, platinum, exotic woods, cocoa, rubber, and coffee. South Africa is the world's largest producer of gold. Globally, South Africa is one of the world's leading mining countries with many quantities and a broad range of mineral reserves. It has the world's largest reserves of platinum, manganese, chrome, and gold.⁹ In addition, Africa has the best diamond and the largest reserves of this strategic mineral in the world.¹⁰

To demonstrate the strategic importance of Africa's natural resources to the global community, it should be noted that the uranium used for the Atomic Bomb developed by the United States, under the Manhattan Project, and deployed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end the Second World War in 1945, was obtained from Africa, specifically, from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This evidence was confirmed in Albert Einstein's letter of August 2, 1939, to President Franklin Roosevelt that states, "The United States has only very poor ores of uranium in moderate quantities. There is some good ore in Canada and the Czechoslovakia, while the most important source of uranium is the Belgium Congo,"¹¹ (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). In addition, DRC is the World largest producer of cobalt. Cobalt is very essential and important mineral that is used chiefly for magnetic alloys. Of all the Africa's strategic minerals, the most exploited by Western Europe and North America is uranium, which has acquired prominence in the world community, particularly in this age of nuclear proliferation. Uranium has been mostly exploited in Namibia, South Africa, Congo, Niger Republic, and Republic of Chad.

For a long time, uranium in South Africa was extracted mostly as a byproduct from the country's gold mines, with the bulk of production mined by Anglo-American Corporation, Gold Fields, and General Mining Corporation. The first ore company to concentrate production on uranium, Beisa Mine in the Central Free State Province (formerly Central Orange Province) was commissioned in 1981. With uranium output of 1,093 tons in 1999,¹² South Africa is the third largest uranium producer in Africa, and one of the world's leading producers. Namibia is Africa's largest

uranium producer with 6,689 tons in 1999, and the world's fourth largest producer. Rossing Uranium, a Namibia based subsidiary of the Rio Tinto Group, which has headquarters in London and Melbourne, Australia, said, "Namibia will be able to supply a growing global demand for nuclear fuel as well as potential nuclear plants in Namibia."¹³ While Niger Republic with its controversial uranium issue over the alleged Iraqi production of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is Africa's second leading producer of uranium, and it is one of the world's leading producers.¹⁴ The major customers for the Namibian, Niger, and South African uranium are the European countries and the United States. Africa's iron ore reserves are twice those of the United States, and its reserves of chrome are the most important and the largest outside Russia. United States imports 98 percent of its manganese needs with Africa accounting for 50 percent.

Diamond trade has been a major source of conflict in some African countries, most notably Angola, DRC, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, as rebel groups fought for control of diamonds and found willing international buyers to finance their activities. Sierra Leone diamonds financed the rebel movements of Foday Sankoh in Sierra Leone, and Charles Taylor in Liberia in the 1990s. According to John Hirsch, "Successive mining ministers in Sierra Leone, agreed to provide mining concessions to various foreign entrepreneurs for large bribes, or joined in the mining and smuggling themselves, either openly or as silent partners."¹⁵ A recent estimate showed that Sierra Leone in the mid-1990s produced \$300 million to \$450 million worth of diamonds annually, almost all of which was smuggled through Liberia and the Cote d'Ivoire.¹⁶ Nearly half of the world's diamonds come from West, Central, and Southern Africa.

In Southern Africa, investors from Britain, the United States, and especially De Beers Corporation, play dominant role in Africa's diamond industry. Botswana is the world's leading producer of gem quality diamonds, producing some 30.4 million carats in 2003 compared to 28.4 million carats in 2002, with the diamond industry accounting for 83 percent of Botswana's export earnings. Indeed, four of the seven largest diamond producing countries in the world (Botswana, Canada, Namibia, Russia, Angola, Australia, and South Africa), are in Africa.¹⁷

Cecil Rhodes set up a company named De Beers in South Africa in 1888. The De Beers was the name of the Boer (white) farmer where the first diamond was found in 1867 in South Africa.¹⁸ The farmer De Beers was actually, illegally occupying Griqualand/African land where the first diamond was found. By 1893, Rhodes began excluding everybody else from the diamond selling business. However, he gave the contract to ten Jewish firms in London to sell African gems (diamond). Rhodes gave them boost and an advantage which, they maintain up to the present day. In

1947 the World Diamond Congress was formed by the firms, but it has no single African Representative on its governing body.¹⁹ Cecil Rhodes, a British colonizer, and imperialist made so much fortune from gold and diamond in Southern Africa in the nineteenth century with his British South African Company (BSAC). With the wealth he acquired from diamond and gold in Southern Africa, he endowed Annual Rhodes scholarships in 1902 for Commonwealth and United States students to study at Oxford University.²⁰

Diamond production in Botswana is dominated by Debswana, a joint venture company owned by De Beers Investments Corporation, and the government of Botswana with three operational mines in Lethlakane, Orapa, and Jwaneng. All diamonds produced are sorted and valued by Botswana Diamond Valuing Company, which is a subsidiary of the Debswana Diamond Company.²¹ Botswana is a participant in the Kimberley Process, the association of diamond producing and importing countries. Commercial diamond firms, pan-industry associations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), have implemented a certification system for the international trade in rough diamonds, designed to prevent so-called *blood* or *conflict* diamonds from being shipped through legitimate trading channels.²²

Oil and Africa's Growing Importance in the Global Economy

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack has brought about a major post-Cold War shift in U. S. policy toward Africa. Since the September 11 event, officials of the Pentagon and the State Department have identified some African countries as a significant potential threat to U.S. national security. Although United States has classified Somalia as a haven for al Qaeda terrorist group,²³ and drug trade, which was well articulated by the *Washington Post*, that "Narcotic drug trade rules in Somalia, a nation without a government, educated women play dominant role as sellers of widely used narcotic plant."²⁴ The U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa barely a month after September 11, 2001 observed that the policy of putting Africa on the back burner could no longer continue. Thus, later in 2002 policymakers at a Conference at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. confirmed that the African continent must be seen as strategically important to United States interests, largely because of terrorism and oil.²⁵

Interest in Africa's oil has increased significantly, partly due to the political uncertainties surrounding oil supply from the Middle East. Out of the top ten sources of oil for the United States as of 2006, three of them are African countries, Nigeria, Angola and Algeria (table 6.1). Had Nigeria joined the Arab oil embargo against the United States in 1973, the consequences would have been far more severe. For instance, Nigeria is the sixth world's oil producer and provides 12 percent of United States oil as of 2007.²⁶ Nigeria's low sulfur oil, sweet crude is much sought after by refineries in the United States, which purchases approximately 40 percent of its production.²⁷ However, according to the Energy Information Administration, an agency of the American government under the Department of Energy, Nigeria has moved up the ladder as the third largest exporter of crude oil to the United States. Nigeria overtook Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, to get to the third position in energy supply, and exported 1,290,000 barrels of oil to the United States in March 2007. To demonstrate the strategic importance of Nigeria to the United States, the American assistant secretary of state for Africa, Jendayi Frazer, said, "Nigeria remains a strategic country to U.S. security, trade and energy needs, because Nigeria accounts for 12 percent of U.S. oil imports as of March 2007, it passed Saudi Arabia and Venezuela to become the third largest exporter of crude oil to the United States."²⁸ As of 2006, Nigeria produces 2.5 million barrels of oil per day. It is estimated that Nigeria will be producing 4 million barrels per day by 2010.²⁹ It is also home to the world's seventh largest supply of Natural gas.³⁰ Although the United States has stationed its nuclear submarines in

Table 6.1 The top ten U.S. sources of oil as of 2005

Country	Numbers of Barrels per day (in thousands)
Canada	2,106
Mexico	1,591
Saudi Arabia	1,585
Venezuela	1,584
Nigeria	1,114
Iraq	522
Russia	476
Angola	470
Algeria	427
Britain	366

Sources: U.S. Energy Information Administration (Washington, D.C., 2005).

the Indian Ocean covering many of the Eastern European cities and the Gulf States region, the British loss of its traditional military bases in places such as Libya, Suez Canal, Yemen, Singapore, and Gibraltar, has invariably also increased the strategic functional alternative provided by Britain and the United States in the Indian Ocean. In reality, this has helped to consolidate Africa's strategic relevance for international peace and security.

The Middle East is the major source of oil supply for Europe and North America, but the war in Iraq, and Arab-Israel (the Israel-Palestine) conflicts are threatening continuous oil supply to the United States and Europe. Consequently, the United States and the European countries are intensifying interest in African oil, especially in Sudan, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, and the West coast of Africa stretching from Angola in the Southwest to Cameroon and Senegal in West Africa. Already as a strategy to protect the United States and Western European-based multinational oil corporations prospecting for oil in Africa, particularly in the Southwest and the West coast of the continent, U.S. Naval ships are patrolling these coasts regularly.

The U.S. Navy has installed a radar system in Sao Tome and Principe to guarantee maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, a key West African supplier to the U.S. oil market.³¹ It has been estimated that imports of African oil reached 921 million barrels or 18.7 percent of the U.S. total in 2005, surpassing imports from the Middle East, which were 839 million barrels, or 17 percent. Imports from Africa have increased by 51 percent since 2000 at the same time supplies from the Middle East fell from more than 900 million barrels to 839 million or from 22 percent to 17 percent of total U.S. imports.³² Former assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Charles Snyder has noted,

It used to be kind of a cruel joke twenty years ago when some of us tried to pretend Africa might rise to the level of a strategic interest, but thanks to the oil deposits that we are finding everyday in and near Africa. I can say with a straight face 30 percent of our oil will come from there, and I promise you it is a strategic interest.³³

However, "most, if not all, of Africa's oil-producing nations have been beset at different times by insecurity, corruption or all-out civil war,"³⁴ said John Prendergast, Senior Adviser at the International Crisis Group in Washington, D.C., an organization that is working to prevent conflicts around the world. Most important, the continuing strife in Sudan's western region of Darfur threatens large scale investment in Darfur. Adding to the supply uncertainties, the United States faces new competition for oil from an energy-hungry China. In January 2006, China's state-run CNOOC

Oil firm paid \$2.3 billion for 45 percent stake in Nigeria's offshore oil.³⁵ In addition to investments in oil and agriculture, China secured \$311 million contract with Nigerian Government in 2004 to build and launch a communications satellite known as NIGCOMSAT-1. Thus, on May 14, 2007, the Chinese manufactured communications satellite was launched into orbit on behalf of Nigeria. The satellite will provide communications services over Africa and parts of the Middle East and Southern Europe. A Chinese state-owned Aerospace Company, Great Wall Industry Corporation, will monitor the satellite from a ground station in northwestern China. It will also train Nigerian engineers to operate a tracking station and manage the satellite from a control station in Nigeria.³⁶

As of 2006, China gets more than 6 percent of its oil from Sudan. Indeed, the Chinese ambassador to the United States has acknowledged Africa's increasing importance as a supplier of natural resources for China's rapidly expanding economy. "Already, Africa supplies a third of the oil fueling China's economic boom."³⁷ Since the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the twenty-first century, China is aggressively investing in the African economy. China is intensifying its investments not only in oil in Sudan, Nigeria, and Angola, but also in copper in Zambia, coal in South Africa, timber in Liberia and the Republic of Congo, and agricultural industries in Nigeria, Cameroon, Ghana, Tanzania, and Mozambique.

The forum on China-African Cooperation held in Beijing in November 2006 was attended by forty-eight African heads of state and government.³⁸ The forum was given wide global prominence as a pointer to several of the Sino-African dynamic. The summit approved a three-year action plan to create a "new strategic partnership" between China and Africa based on equality and mutual benefit. The plan included a doubling of aid to Africa from 2006 levels by 2009, a \$5 billion China-Africa Development Fund, debt cancellations, a further opening of the Chinese markets to exports from Africa by increasing from 190 to 400 products. Also increasing the number of products receiving zero-tariff treatment, and pledged to build 30 hospitals, 30 malaria treatment centers, and 100 rural schools in African countries.³⁹

During his visit to Africa in January 2007, Chinese President Hu Jintao offered \$3 billion in credit to African countries along with additional aid and interest-free loans. "He emphasized that the money comes with none of the political conditions attached to aid from Western governments."⁴⁰ Chinese trade with Africa valued at \$3 billion in 1995 has grown to \$55 billion in 2007. Chinese trade with Africa has increased fivefold since 2001, and represents more trade than Africa does with the European Union. It has been predicted that its trade with Africa will increase to \$100 billion by 2010.⁴¹

Paul Sankey, a research analyst at Deutsche Bank has noted that "U.S. foreign policy is strictly oriented to maintaining the flow of oil in

a free-market manner they will look anywhere where they can get oil."⁴² According to current estimate by 2015, Africa will be supplying United States 25 percent of its oil needs. Many African countries are now oil producers (table 6.2). Africa has the best light crude Petroleum, especially, Nigeria with Bonny light crude and sulfur free that is highly prized in the Global oil market because it is easily refined into gasoline.⁴³ More than 100,000 jobs in the United States, notably, in Texas, Louisiana, and California are linked to African oil investments.⁴⁴

One of the hottest foreign policy issues since 2000 in the United States is energy independence, largely because the United States has been unable to find alternative sources of energy. The world is reaching oil peak as the situation concerning its price has shown since October 2005, when the price reached \$70 per barrel, and is destined to skyrocket as the supplies fail to meet increase demand.⁴⁵ Indeed, as of October 2007 crude oil prices have risen above \$90 per barrel as a result of renewed threat by Ijaw militants who continue to attack oil production facilities in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. In addition, the Iran-U.S. crisis over Iranian nuclear development program sent fresh fears of supply crunch to the international oil market.⁴⁶ Thus, as of June 2008 crude oil prices shot up to \$140 per barrel at the New York Mercantile Exchange.⁴⁷ As far as the crude oil is concerned, there is possibility that the price may continue to rise because of the unstable global economy, but the price will continue to fluctuate.

In addition, after newspaper reports that militants continued attacking pipelines in Nigeria losing 500,000 barrels a day of production. The Bush administration's tightened U.S. financial sanctions on Iran over alleged support for terrorism and issued new warnings about Tehran's nuclear program. Tension between Turkey and Kurds in northern Iraq, and fresh doubts about OPEC output levels also helped drive the price of oil up.⁴⁸

Thus, anxiety about political violence and tension around the world had once again driven up the political premium for oil. The new U.S. strategy based on the conclusions of May 2001 report of the President's National Energy Policy Development Group chaired by Vice President Richard Cheney, and known as Cheney Report, specifically focused efforts to promote greater diversity in oil supplies. The United States under the Bush Administration focused its attention on six African countries: Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Republic of Congo, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea.⁴⁹

According to the International Energy Agency, as of 2008, Americans consume 20.7 million barrels of oil a day, a quarter of the world total production of 84 million barrels a day. China is the second world consumer of oil at 7.9 million barrels per day, and it consumes 9 percent of world oil

Table 6.2 African oil production by country, 1993–2003 (thousand barrels per day)

Year	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Algeria	1,329	1,324	1,327	1,386	1,421	1,461	1,515	1,576	1,562	1,681	1,857
Angola	504	557	633	716	741	731	745	746	742	905	885
Benin	3	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	n/a	n/a
Cameroon	130	115	106	110	124	105	95	88	80	72	68
Chad	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	40
Congo-Brazzaville	185	185	180	200	225	264	293	275	271	259	243
Congo (DRC)	25	25	28	30	28	26	24	25	24	23	22
Egypt	941	921	924	894	873	857	827	781	758	753	750
Equatorial-Guinea	5	5	7	17	60	83	100	113	181	237	249
Gabón	305	337	356	365	364	337	340	327	301	295	240
Ghana	—	6	6	7	5	5	6	6	6	6	6
Ivory Coast	—	—	6	16	14	10	10	5	7	10	20
Libya	1,402	1,413	1,439	1,452	1,489	1,480	1,425	1,475	1,425	1,376	1,488
Morocco	^	^	^	^	^	^	3	^	^	^	^
Nigeria	1,985	1,988	1,998	2,138	2,302	2,163	2,228	2,104	2,199	2,013	2,185
Senegal	^	^	^	^	^	^	^	^	N/A	N/A	N/A
South Africa	8	9	9	8	15	15	32	32	23	20	16
Sudan	2	2	2	5	9	12	63	174	211	233	255
Tunisia	99	93	90	89	81	83	84	78	71	73	66

Note: N/A- Not available

^, less than 0.5

Sources: *BP Annual Statistical Review*, 2000–2003, and *Oil and Gas Journal*, 1993–2003.

output and its demand could double by the year 2020 as predicted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.⁵⁰ Oil markets do undergo seismic shifts and as Daniel Yergin put it,

Until 1971 the United States was the world's largest oil producer. Supplies were plentiful; Americans controlled their own oil prices. With surplus production capacity, the Texas Railroad Commission which despite its name regulated the state's oil, limited output to stabilize prices while maintaining a security reserve for times of crisis. In 1974 the Commission allowed all-out production at 100 percent of capacity to meet rising demand.⁵¹

Consequently, America's oil surplus has vanished. Worldwide, prices have risen and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries has not only become more powerful, but also taken over control of world oil production and established its own price at the open market.

Despite all its centrality, physically, and strategically, Africa is peripheral in influence and power within the international system. What are the causes of this marginality? And can the marginality be transcended? Undoubtedly, Africa's weakness and dependency had created crisis of confidence, conflicts, and political instability that have created insecurity and unstable conditions. Political institutions in Africa are fragile and often collapse under the weight of local rivalries. Obviously, this situation does not enhance Africa's leverage in the international system.

United States' Africa Policy after September 11, 2001

The Iraqi invasion by the United States was the first military conflict under President George W. Bush's new preemptive war doctrine. As part of his post-September 11, 2001 foreign policy doctrine, President Bush proclaimed the United States' right to wage preemptive wars against rogue states that threaten the U.S. security. *Preemption* means "striking in advance of hostile action to prevent its occurrence and to avoid suffering injury."⁵² Crucial here is the availability of reliable intelligence about a strike or strikes planned against a nation-state. If such evidence exists, preemptive military actions can be justified. But the bar of proof is high to justify all-out preemptive action. Neil Livingstone has noted before September 11, 2001 that

In fact, a nation carrying out a preemptive attack appear to the rest of the world as an aggressor rather than a potential victim, and in order to win

acceptance of its action, the nation engaged in the preemptive attack will have to make a strong and persuasive public case to justify its action. This, however, can be exceedingly difficult and in some instances impossible.⁵³

However, after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States has pursued a more aggressive foreign policy toward Africa under the context that Africa is now a national security issue. Intending to stabilize the continent in order to have access to Africa's natural resources to the benefit of U.S. interests, this policy is characterized by increased military cooperation between the Pentagon, State Department, and host African governments, as well as a more robust NATO/U.S. military presence throughout the continent. The fact on the ground demonstrates that U.S. policy goals are more focused on securing access to African resources especially, oil, through the militarization of individual African state's armed forces. These concrete transactions that make up the militarization efforts are providing intelligence, logistics, equipment, and counterterrorism training to host governments. In return the U.S. interests are favored above more domestically based economic, political, and social priorities. As a result, the African leaders with a well-armed military are able to dominate their political rivals with the blessing of the United States under the disguise of War on Terror.⁵⁴

Could the elevation by the United States raising of Africa as a priority after September 11, 2001, and the shift of focus by international institutions such as NATO toward Africa, bring a change of fortune to a very troubled continent? Although it is not easy to provide a quick answer to such question, what we have been witnessing appears to be the same policies of militarization and exploitation long familiar to the continent, especially since the Berlin Conference of the partition of Africa of 1884–1885.

U.S. Military Interests and Operations in Africa

The case for terrorism was made by Paul Wolfowitz,⁵⁵ the former Deputy Secretary of Defense (appointed World Bank President in 2005 by President George W. Bush), when he addressed military officers and government officials from forty-two African countries at the Annual Senior Leader Summit in Washington, D.C. on February 9, 2004. He confirmed Africa's growing importance, and stressed that it is imperative to build institutions, including military institutions, which in his worldview would play a vital role. Paul Wolfowitz told the Summit audience that he

Emphatically disagreed with people who apply historical and cultural determinism to the future of countries and I believe that strengthening

institutions in Africa has got to be the key to moving forward, because African states must participate effectively in defeating the scourge of global terrorism.⁵⁶

U.S. military spending in Africa between September 11, 2001 and 2004 doubled the amount expended between 1997 and 2001. The total amount spent or allocated for arms, training, and regional peacekeeping operations focusing primarily on training and arming Sub-Saharan African military between 2001 and 2005 stood at \$597 million, whereas for 1997 to 2001, the figure stood at \$296 million.⁵⁷ There are U.S. military presence and training of national police forces in counterterrorism tactics and cooperative agreement with Angola, Botswana, and South Africa. The United States also had military presence in the Gulf of Guinea and along the South-West African coast. Besides, the United States concerns about oil security, and the expanded level of funding can be explained by concerns that terrorist activities in African Nations threaten stability and security elsewhere in the world.

Beginning from 2004, United States started holding a joint military exercise with Nigeria and Algeria as part of efforts to consolidate its presence in the West and North Africa regions. In addition, to deploying soldiers and committing millions of dollars more into its antiterrorism campaign in Africa, particularly in oil-rich nations where radical Islam has a large following United States is intensifying its military involvement there. Apart from proposing spending \$100 million a year over five years (2005–2010) to boost security in both countries described as some of world's least policed areas;⁵⁸ a huge military surveillance base at Tamanrasset in the Southern Part of Algeria and training Algerian military to engage in counterterrorism maneuvers has been built with a view to monitoring any al Qaeda cells in North, East, and West Africa. In addition, the threats of Osama bin Laden's call to his followers to make Nigeria a global priority for his war against the West in Africa. Consequently, United States Armed Forces European Command (EUCOM) extended its counterterror operations into West and Central Africa.⁵⁹ A military agreement was signed with the government of Equatorial Guinea, covering supply of United States police vehicles, with U.S. security advisers becoming a visible presence in Malabo, the capital of Equatorial Guinea. In addition, the United States has military bases in Uganda to monitor the situations in Sudan and northern Uganda, and in Djibouti, since December 2001 with 1,600 U.S. troops to monitor and police the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea area, and the East Coast of Africa.⁶⁰

In addition, 1,700 U.S. military and civilian personnel are based in Ethiopia. United States is getting more involved in Africa militarily since September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.

Africa Command Center (AFRICOM)

President George W. Bush approved a Pentagon plan in January 2007 to set up Africa Command Center, to be known as AFRICOM. According to the plan, "the Command Center completed and in service since the end of September 2008."⁶¹ The U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates revealed the new plans as he addressed the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on the defense spending. President Bush proposed in his 2008 budget submitted to the Congress that "The main purposes of the Africa Command Center would be to fight the war on terror, cooperation, provide humanitarian aid, building partnership capability, oversee security, defense support to non-military missions, and if directed, military training operations designed to help local governments."⁶²

The United States had reportedly intended to build AFRICOM in Algeria but it was turned down, thus, it had to relocate it to Stuttgart, Germany for the time being. African countries hold that United States has harbored with ulterior motives. Mohamed Bedjaoui, the Algerian minister of state and foreign affairs, "questioned that why no one had ever proposed for any anti-terror cooperation with Algeria in the 1990s when terrorist violence went on rampant and wrought great havoc?"⁶³ Africans are suspicious of the U.S. intentions. Majority of Africans believe that the aim of the United States for the AFRICOM is to protect its potential oil interests in Africa. Second reason is that United States is worried about increased economic and diplomatic competition from China in Africa.

AFRICOM is an example of U.S. military expansion in the name of the war on terrorism, when it is in fact designed to secure Africa's resources and ensure American interests on the continent. AFRICOM represents a policy of U.S. military-driven expansionism that will only enhance political instability, conflict, and the deterioration of state security in Africa. This is a project that most African countries have rejected to be located on their soil. African leaders are opposed to a U.S. permanent command on African soil. In September 2007, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states defense ministers have decided that no member states would host AFRICOM. Nigeria and Ghana have joined in opposing AFRICOM in Africa. Ghanaian President John Kufuor told President Bush during his visit to Ghana in March 2008 that "you are not going to build any bases in Ghana."⁶⁴ Most of Africans have concluded that AFRICOM was primarily an extension of U.S. counterterrorism policy, intended to keep an eye on Africa's large Muslim population.

To show the unpopularity of AFRICOM in Africa and outside Africa, even the United States-funded aid groups sharply objected to working alongside troops, and the Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates has expressed his feelings on this project by speaking out that "I think in some respects we probably did not do as good a job as we should have when we rolled out AFRICOM. I was not there when the command was conceived by my predecessor Donald H. Rumsfeld, and approved by President Bush."⁶⁵ The only African country that has welcomed AFRICOM is Liberia, and this is no surprise because Liberia is seen as American *step-child*⁶⁶ in Africa, been the staunch American friend with strongest possible cultural, historical, and financial ties to the United States on African continent. The ruling establishment in Liberia consisted almost entirely of "Americo-Liberians," the descendants of freed American slaves who settled in the country in 1822.

AFRICOM is a deadly project for any African country that wants peace and stability to accept. Accepting this project would be a recipe to intensify anti-Americanism and for al Qaeda to make that African country a target of terrorist attack. AFRICOM would destabilize an already fragile continent, which would be forced to engage with U.S. interests on military terms. What African countries need is development of their own institutions for security, political, and economic independence; massive infusion of foreign direct investment, fair equitable trade, access to American markets, and for the United States to decrease/or total removal of agricultural subsidies, debt relief, and improved Official Development Assistance tailored toward the development, and democratic aspirations of African countries, and not militarization of the continent.

Barack Obama's Foreign Policy Approach

The new U.S. President Barack Obama has outlined a pragmatic, coalition-based approach to foreign policy, while speaking of America's moral obligation in the face of humanitarian catastrophes of the sorts that are plentiful in Africa. With the United States fighting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; America does not have capacity to pacify African militarily with the war in Darfur region of West Sudan, conflicts in the DRC and Somalia. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates has suggested that "the United States will not provide much needed helicopters to a struggling United Nations-African Union peacekeeping mission in Darfur because U.S. forces are stretched too thin in Iraq and Afghanistan."⁶⁷

Depedency, Imperialism, and Problems of Underdevelopment

That the legacy of Africa's domination, economic exploitations, and humiliation for many centuries by the Europeans conditioning the attitudes of outsiders toward Africans, as well as the level of Africa's political decisions is not in doubt. Outsiders, especially the Western European powers do not take Africa's influence seriously. On the other hand, Africans themselves have not acquired enough or much self confidence in global economy and diplomacy, to be able to demonstrate their efforts and contributions toward global peace and security. According to Ali Mazrui "The crisis of acculturation, creating an African leadership with imitative of the West, groping for new ideologies and new sense of direction, basically dependent in outlook—this cult of acculturation has also undermined Africa's capacity to innovate."⁶⁸

Africa's experience has shown that its fragmentation and marginalization have contributed to its economic underdevelopment, political instability and insecurity. These conditions have detracted from Africa's impact on contemporary world history. To be sure, the place of Africa in World politics can be attributed to economic underdevelopment, political instability, technological underdevelopment, and military weakness.

1. Economic underdevelopment
2. Political instability
3. Technology underdevelopment and
4. Military weakness

First, while Africa's strategic natural resources/minerals help to oil the wheels of Western (international) capitalism, the continent is worse off. By exploiting the natural resources of Africa the *periphery* (underdeveloped) of the world economy, and by repatriating all the profits amassed from them to the industrialized countries, which form the *core/center* (developed countries) of the global economy. For years, the industrialized countries and their multinational corporations have lent credence to what is increasingly being labeled here as the *Matthew effect* in international political economy. Thus, *Matthew effect* in the Bible can also sometimes help us understand some basic argument in economics and politics and we can conveniently utilize a biblical analysis here. According to the Gospel of St. Matthew, Chapter 13, verse 12, Jesus Christ said that "For whosoever has, to him more will be given, and he will have more abundance: but whosoever does not have, even what he has will be taken away from him."⁶⁹ Therefore, since direct foreign investments made by the foreign-based multinational

corporations in Africa are very often more than offset by excessive rates of capital repatriation to the industrial centers; they hinder economic growth, and therefore, direct foreign investments remove from Africa (the periphery) even that *which it has*.

Specifically, the core-periphery (developed-underdeveloped) relationship is exploitative, at least in so far as all profits earned in the periphery are remitted to the core rather than being reinvested locally. Such economic dependency exacerbates the level of underdevelopment of the periphery. In addition, the external orientation of the peripheral economies, encouraged by direct foreign investment, generates internal distortions and contradictions, which retard growth, in particular, the development of new class relations and an acceleration of social inequality in the periphery. In essence, growth is usually slower in the periphery than it would otherwise have been, and this creates insecurity.⁷⁰

Because of Africa's dependency and fragmentation, the continent has been divided into a multiplicity of territorial boundaries, a wealth of ethnic and linguistic divisions, a diversity of competing ideological and political traditions and its three major religious traditions of Islam, Christianity, and African traditional religion.⁷¹ This basic fragmentation of the continent is part of its general weakness in international Affairs.

Nevertheless, there is one advantage in the fragmentation of Africa, which produces 54 different member countries of the United Nations, and its agencies. Voting as a group, the African Union or African group in the U.N. has increased Africa's leverage within the U.N. system. Africa's role and its peace efforts in the U.N. are well known and here its role is felt in the U.N. for its constant campaign for peace, security, and human rights for the global community. It is true that Africa's voting power is only a modest form of power in a world dominated by the industrial powers, with their military and economic might. Nevertheless, African ambassadors at the U.N. and Specialized Agencies are lobbied during consideration of resolutions before the U.N., General Assembly, U.N. Specialized Agencies, and other international organizations.⁷²

Another critical problem facing Africa is its burden of underdevelopment. Africa has abundant mineral resources and great agricultural potential; unfortunately, it has some of the lowest standards of living in the world because food production is declining and industry has come to a complete halt. One study has estimated that the DRC in the heart of the continent have enough arable land to feed the entire continent of Africa, and enough hydropower to provide for Africa's energy needs provided there is peace, security, and stability in that country.⁷³ DRC, which is the size of Western Europe, has known little but corrupt governance and conflicts (civil wars) since independence in 1960. It is one of the world's poorest nations despite

its vast mineral wealth.⁷⁴ Joseph Kabila assumed the presidency following the assassination of his father Laurent Kabila by a bodyguard in 2001.

Africa's second weakness is political instability. Political instability is by no means unique to Africa or the developing and advanced industrialized countries.⁷⁵ The level of political instability in Africa is somewhat staggering, with the situation aggravated by rampant corruption, lack of commitments, and patriotism and crisis of moral decay arising out of the bubbling of the cultural melting pot.⁷⁶ While what constitutes corruption is sometimes a function of competing moral values within the society, political corruption and abuse of public office is a common phenomenon within the African ruling (elites) class. This has weakened Africa's image in relation to peace and its security in the global system.

Third, while natural resources are there in abundance in Africa, the major problem is technological inadequacy. Compared with many Asians and the Latin American countries, African countries have not yet established any industrial base, for any manufacturing processes largely because of technological underdevelopment. While multinational corporations operating in Africa have been among the major purveyors of Western technology into the continent, the level of transfer has been modest compared with the comparative technological sophistication in such countries as India, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, South Korea, Malaysia, or Taiwan.

The fourth Africa's weakness is military capability. Africa is militarily weak. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin once argued that "imperialism was the monopoly stage of capitalism."⁷⁷ It is at least as arguable that imperialism was the monopoly stage of warfare. Implicit in concepts like Pax Britannica was the assumption that Western powers have special privileges for being powerful militarily while proceeding to disarm the Africans from waging ethnic conflicts whereas Western powers were civilized enough to initiate the two world wars. President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya once complained after the Second World war that:

The European prides himself on having done a great service to the Africans by stopping the *tribal warfare* and says that the Africans ought to thank the strong power that has liberated them from their *constant fear* of being attacked by the neighboring warlike tribes. But consider the difference between the methods and motive employed in the so-called savage tribal warfares and those employed in the modern warfare waged by the *tribes of Europe*, and in which the Africans who have no part in the quarrels are forced to defend the so-called democracy.⁷⁸

The history of Africa's military weakness and insecurity has continued to haunt African leaders and thinkers. It was a small wonder that former President Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea once queried whether it

was because of the “inferiority of Africa’s means of self-defense that it was subjected to foreign domination.”⁷⁹ Whereas Africa’s military weakness served as a prelude to colonization, peace, security, and survival of Africa are very vital in the new scheme of international order. Therefore, because of its economic potential Africa should not be ignored in the new global equation of the twenty-first century.

Africa in Search of Peace and Security, and Non-Alignment Movement

The search for peace, security, and survival in the international system has led the African countries to subscribe to adopt a policy of Non-Alignment in the East-West Cold War led by the former Soviet Union and the United States between 1945 and 1990. All African states are members of the Non-Aligned Movement. What is meant by the term “Non-Aligned”? Prime Minister Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru of India and first leader of the Non-Aligned Movement has defined the movement “as not entering into military alliances with any country, and in particular with any country of either the Eastern or the Western Bloc.”⁸⁰ Broadly speaking, “Non-Aligned means not tying your-self with military blocs of nations, or with a nation. It also means trying to view things as far as possible, not from the military point of view, but independently, and trying to maintain friendly relations with all countries regardless.”⁸¹

One of the most significant experiences that conditioned the thinking of African countries with regard to world affairs and put them on the road to Non-Alignment was the constant use of their material resources in the wars waged by their former imperial European rulers to serve European interests. This naturally caused considerable resentment by the Africans. It was felt that such wars had nothing to do with the interests, and security of the African countries. And yet, almost the entire cost of many of such wars and a good proportion of some others came from the continent. Thus, the feeling is that it was not in the interests of the African countries to be involved in such power struggle (power politics) and that African countries should have a say in International Affairs, particularly with a view to contributing toward the cause of world peace, freedom, and human survival, hence the policy of Non-Alignment.⁸²

Non-Alignment was adopted as an instrument of foreign policy of African states after their independence in the 1960s, in order to give a fuller meaning and content to their newly achieved political independence. They were not only content with just formal transfer of political power, they

wanted to go beyond and shape their destiny autonomously. Moreover, they want to shape their destiny in a manner that not only protected and promoted their national interests, but would promote accelerated socio-economic development of their weak and underdeveloped societies. Because global peace was seen as a prerequisite for the achievement of these objectives, bloc politics, and power politics of the mid-twentieth century was opposed and discouraged.

At the Cairo Preparatory Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in June 1961, five criteria of non-alignment were laid down as follows:

1. An independent policy by member nations based on peaceful coexistence and non-alignment,
2. Support for movements for national independence,
3. Non-Aligned countries cannot become members of multilateral military alliances,
4. Not to concede military base to foreign powers, and
5. Not to become members of bilateral or regional defense arrangements made in the context of great power conflicts.⁸³

Obviously these criteria were not absolute. If only because it was stated that military alliances and foreign military bases should be avoided only if they aggravated tension in international relations and opened up possibilities of conflicts and war.

Africa's effort for global peace saw the holding of the First Conference of Independent African States held in Accra, Ghana, in April 1958.⁸⁴ At that conference African leaders appealed to the Great Powers to discontinue the production of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, and to "suspend all such tests, not only in the interests of world peace and human survival but as a symbol of their avowed devotion to the rights of mankind."⁸⁵ In his Opening Speech to the conference, the former Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah said,

We the delegates of this conference, in promoting our foreign relations, must endeavor to seek the friendship of all and the enmity of none. We stand for international peace, and security in conformity with the United Nations Charter. This will enable us to assert our own African Personality and to develop according to our ways of life, our customs, traditions and cultures.⁸⁶

African leaders reaffirmed the view that the reduction of conventional armament was essential in the interests of international peace, security, and human survival: "The Conference went on to condemn the policy

of using the sale of arms by the Great Powers as a means of exerting pressure on governments and interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.”⁸⁷ The Accra Conference was followed by a “*Ban the Bomb*” International Conference in Accra, at the beginning of 1960s, which considered an international march toward the Sahara Desert in protest against French nuclear tests in 1960, before the Algerian independence in 1962. President Nkrumah regarded Africa as a continent under the threat of *two swords*, first, racism and apartheid in Southern Africa, and second, the nuclear threat symbolized by the French nuclear tests in the Sahara Desert in 1960 in North Africa.⁸⁸ As a consequence, French assets in Ghana were frozen as part of the strategy against the nuclear desecration of African soil. In September 1970, the Third Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries in Lusaka, Zambia urged its members to rededicate themselves to the following basic aims of Non-Alignment:

The pursuit of world peace and peaceful co-existence by strengthening the role of Non-Aligned countries within the United Nations. So that it will be a more effective obstacle against all forms of aggressive action and the threat or use of force against the freedom, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of any country, the fight against colonialism and racialism which are negation of human equality and dignity.⁸⁹

The conference further emphasized the following:

1. The settlement of disputes by peaceful means;
2. The ending of the arms race followed by universal disarmament;
3. Opposition to Great Powers military bases and foreign troops on the soil of other nations in the context of Great Power conflicts and colonial and racist suppression;
4. The Universality, and the strengthening of the efficacy of the U.N.; and
5. The struggle for economic and mutual cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, “peace, security and human survival.”⁹⁰

Peace, security, including stability and development cannot be separated particularly when dealing with African problems. Therefore, peace, security, including stability and development of every African country is inseparably linked with those of other African countries. Consequently, instability in one African country affects and reduces the stability of all other African countries. A good example is the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region of

Africa. The war in the DRC has boomeranged throughout the entire Central Africa region, and spillover to East, Southern Africa, and North Africa and even beyond. One way or other we have seen the domino effect of this Central African war felt all over the entire continent of Africa.⁹¹

The erosion of peace, security, and stability in Africa, is one of the major causes of its continuing crises, and one of the principal impediments to the creation of sound economy and effective intra, and inter-African cooperation which is very essential for peace, security, and development of Africa. The interdependence of African nations and the link between peace, security, stability, and development demand a common African agenda. This should be based on a unity of purpose, and a collective political consensus derived from a firm conviction that Africa cannot make any significant progress on any front without collectively creating a lasting solution to its problems of lack of security and stability. To prevent war, and guarantee peace, security, and stability, the crisis of African leadership, corruptions, greed, nepotism, ethnicity, and distrust must be addressed, and seriously confronted.

Terrorism and Globalization

We cannot talk about peace and security in Africa or in the world without reference to the new phenomena facing the world since the beginning of the twenty-first century. World security has dramatically changed as a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. On the morning of September 11, 2001, two passenger planes hijacked by militants Arabs plunged into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, leading to their collapse, with almost 3,000 deaths. The third plane destroyed a section of the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., while the fourth plane slated for the White House went down into a field in Pennsylvania.⁹² For days, the whole world was at a stand still and in shock. The shock of these attacks was too grave for most people to take. Terrorism from abroad had reached the shores of the United States in a very deadly fashion for the first time, and destroyed the myth, and the notion that the United States is immune to terrorist attack from abroad.⁹³

For many years before September 11, 2001 attacks, the al Qaeda terrorist organizations had thousands of its members operating in several countries around the world, including the United States. With the September 11, 2001 attacks, the traditional belief of United States' insularity behind the great oceans, along with the relative few terrorist actions in the United

States before 2001 have created a false sense of security. Thus, since September 11, 2001, isolationism has retreated and the U.S. Government, supported by public opinion and the Congress, has pursued a highly international agenda to fight terrorism.

Terrorism has been a global issue for a long time. The threats of nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks by terrorists are threatening. The War on Terrorism declared by President George W. Bush elicited a positive global reaction. The fight against terrorism must include not only military and intelligence global cooperation, but also a rethinking of policies and actions of the Great Powers, and to the developing nations of the world (the have-nots) in this global age. When the question about terrorism is posed, issues of poverty, lack of economic opportunities, ignorance, injustice, education, and despair come to the fore and must be addressed seriously and urgently by the industrialized nations of the world with the United States taking a leading role.

While African countries have been plagued by instability since the colonial period, but the situation became worse in the postindependence era.⁹⁴ The struggle for liberation and self-determination in the Southern African subcontinent from the 1950s lasted until 1994 with the enthronement of majority rule in South Africa.⁹⁵ There had been civil wars in Nigeria, Chad, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote D'Ivoire, DRC, Sudan and the genocide in the Darfur Region of Western Sudan. Also there was war between Ethiopia and Somalia, and Ethiopia and Eritrea.⁹⁶ Besides, a series of military coups in many African countries in the 1960s, through the 1980s as well as overt and covert operations by foreign intelligence agencies in the African continent have destabilized a number of states leading to assassinations of their leaders.⁹⁷ These assassinations encouraged, and financed by outside forces particularly the Western powers, have affected and are still affecting the peace and security of Africa.

AIDS and Africa's Security

Access to healthcare and education are critical to Africa's development. Without them economic activity, development, and trade of virtually any kind are impossible. The ravages of HIV/AIDS are destroying a whole generation and sending Africa's development backward while malaria and tuberculosis are equally devastating. The twenty-first century saw Africa facing a debilitating challenge from HIV/AIDS pandemic,⁹⁸ seriously ravaging the continent. The HIV/AIDS issue is not a challenge to Africa alone but to the whole global community, because this disease has become a threat to

international security. Throughout the developing world, AIDS is severely undermining economic developmental efforts and human security, especially for Botswana, Malawi, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, India, Cambodia, China, Russia, Thailand, Brazil, and Haiti. Because of poverty, few Africans can afford to buy drugs needed to treat the dreaded diseases while cultural values, inadequate medical resources, and low levels of education contribute to the rapid spread of AIDS in developing countries in general and in Africa in particular. According to available statistics, of the 34 million people with AIDS worldwide in 1999, Africa recorded 24 million. Of the 16 million people who died from AIDS in 1999, some 13.7 million of them were Africans with more than 5,000 people dying daily. More people in Africa would have died from AIDS by 2007 than during the two world wars combined or from the bubonic plague, which claimed 20 million lives in Europe in the fourteenth century.⁹⁹ Africa's life expectancy because of AIDS is expected to drop from sixty years to forty-five years by 2010, if the HIV/AIDS cure is not found.

Most of the recent studies on AIDS that were conducted by ORC Macro, a research corporation based in Calverton, Maryland, U.S., and funded by the United States Agency for International Development, other international donors and various national governments had raised questions about monitoring by the United Nations AIDS (UNAIDS) Agency. It has been shown that for years UNAIDS Agency overestimated the extent of HIV/AIDS in East and West Africa, and by a smaller margin, in Southern Africa. The new studies "suggests that, in Botswana 34.9 percent of adults 15 to 49 years old are infected with HIV virus,"¹⁰⁰ while the overall infection rate of this deadly disease for people in Ghana aged 15 to 49 is 2.2 percent and in Rwanda, it is 3 percent. "The proportion of people infected in South Africa is 16.2 percent. The latest studies by the independent researchers and World Bank officials showed that the disease is still devastating Southern African countries according to the available data. It is in that region alone—in countries including South Africa, Botswana, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe that an AIDS Belt exists."¹⁰¹ David Wilson, a senior AIDS analyst for the World Bank added that "what we know now more than ever is that Southern Africa is the absolute epicenter of AIDS."¹⁰²

Undoubtedly, AIDS is one of the most serious threats to Africa's security and human survival. It reduces valuable human resources, increases health and welfare costs, diverts resources away from productive investments, destroys communities, and exacerbates Africa's economic and social marginalization and development. Africa is not alone with the challenge of this deadly disease. Asian countries, from 2006 AIDS report face a growing rate of many of the economic and security problems confronting Africa. Specifically, while Uganda's railroad company loses 15 percent of

its workforce annually to AIDS, Barclay's Bank of Zambia has lost almost 25 percent of its senior managers to AIDS. A 40 percent of Uganda's military forces are infected with AIDS.¹⁰³ In South Africa, 600 people with AIDS die daily as of 2004. In 2004, analysts said, "about 5 million people in South Africa are infected with HIV, the virus that causes AIDS."¹⁰⁴ "South Africa has an estimated 5.4 million people with HIV, more than any country except India."¹⁰⁵ There is yet no cure for this deadly disease that claimed the life of Makgatho Mandela, 54-year-old son of President Nelson Mandela, in January 2005.¹⁰⁶ Also, former president of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda was reported to have lost both his son and daughter-in-law to AIDS, leaving his grandchildren as orphans.¹⁰⁷ Had the children of these former African leaders infected with illnesses such as malaria or tuberculosis, there is possibility they would have been cured, because unlike HIV/AIDS there are medications to cure malaria and tuberculosis.

Classrooms in Malawi are deserted because a third of the teachers have AIDS. Many farmers in the rural areas are too sick of the disease to grow crops to feed their families and many family members are too busy caring for those infected with AIDS to cultivate the land.¹⁰⁸ Most skilled urban dwellers are not spared leaving behind a generation of orphans and puncturing hopes of development progress.

Fighting Africa's Killer Diseases

Africa by 2004 recorded 14 million AIDS related orphans with an estimated 20–30 percent of African armed forces infected with HIV/AIDS. The 2006 UNAIDS Annual Report said that "Seven African countries are experiencing a decline in the prevalence of HIV infection among young, urban adults, finally reaping the benefit of AIDS prevention and treatment."¹⁰⁹ However, the same report pointed out that, out of an estimated 39.5 millions living with HIV Worldwide, 24.7 millions are in Africa South of Sahara.¹¹⁰ The AIDS pandemic has undermined not only the health and wealth of nations, but their stability and social cohesion as well. Globally, it is estimated that there could be 100 million AIDS patients by 2010. Together, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria jeopardize efforts to attain the Millennium Development Goals in Africa.¹¹¹ At the U.N.' Millennium Summit in September 2000, representatives of the 192 U.N. member states committed themselves to reach 8 Millennium Development Goals (MDG) of significant 50 percent poverty reduction by 2015.¹¹²

Recognizing this challenge, the leaders of the G8 member-countries agreed at their Okinawa Summit in 2000 to aggressive new targets to

mitigate the impact of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. As a consequence, the U.N. Secretary General, Kofi Annan, advocated the creation of a *Global Fund* to fight AIDS at the First Summit of African Heads of State and Government on HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and other infectious diseases held in Abuja, Nigeria, in April 2001. This was supported by the African leaders. Therefore, the U.N. General Assembly Special Session on AIDS in June 2001 agreed to create and support a Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. The G8 countries pledged to finance it with an initial capital of \$1.5 billion at their meeting in Genoa, Italy in July 2001,¹¹³ but more funds is needed to fight these diseases globally. A transitional working group was convened by the U.N. later that year to develop the framework for the fund, which was constituted formally in January 2002 with the first meeting of its board of directors. A secretariat was thereafter established under the UN World Health Organization, while the executive director and a permanent operational team assumed duties in July 2002.¹¹⁴

The resources leveraged by the Global Fund should be additional resources. They complement and add value to well-established country-level development processes, including sectorwide approaches and poverty reduction strategies in partnership between governments and their development partners, and pledges from new donors and sectors not traditionally associated with health funding. The Global Fund will generate such additional funds by aggressively pursuing new donors and proving its value as a funding mechanism by assuring a return on donors' investments, linking funding of interventions to measurable disease mitigation outcomes.

The Global Fund by design is a partnership of governments, the private sector, and civil society. It is founded on the premise that fighting the three epidemics of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria effectively cannot be accomplished by traditional approaches. Such approaches which are exclusively government-driven, without input from the private corporations, NGOs, and faith-based organizations. These organizations have enormous influence in societies and also have vested interest in reversing the impact of these diseases. This public-private partnership nature of the Global Fund is reflected in the composition of the fund's board of directors consisting of representatives of governments, business sector and foundations constituency, NGOs from the North and the South, and communities afflicted by the three killer diseases.

Conclusion

With all their problems, Africans want peace, security, stability, and not only in Africa, but among the global communities as a whole. Why should

Africans not want peace, security, and survival in the world? In the first place, none of the African countries is a nuclear power or possesses nuclear weapons. Only the former white minority ruled South African government had nuclear weapons in the 1980s, and Libya embarked on the nuclear project in the 1990s. However, both countries had dismantled their deadly weapons programs.¹¹⁵

Peace, security, and human survival depend not only on weapons or military balance, but most important on international cooperation to ensure a sustainable peaceful environment, sustainable development, and prosperity based on equitably shared resources. Much of the insecurity in the world is connected with the divisions between the rich and the poor, the haves and have-not countries, grave injustices, mass starvation, hunger, ethnic conflicts, and HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa and in other developing countries. Yet, the funds which could help put an end to poverty and hunger are preempted by military uses by the big powers. The threat of nuclear weapons and the proliferation of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons around the world are threatening the peace and security of humanity. The big powers are increasing their military budgets, and spending on other peaceful purposes that can make the world more safe is being cut or neglected. There are not enough funds for research on HIV/AIDS. To make matter worse, the \$15 billion that the Bush Administration promised in 2002, to fight HIV/AIDS for a five year period (2002–2007) in Africa and the Caribbean, most of it has not been disbursed, and \$300 million of this fund was moved to the Bush's Faith-based Program in the United States. However, in February 2008, the U.S. Congress and President George Bush agreed to spend \$50 billion over five years period (2008–2013), for prevention of infection, treat people already infected from the HIV, and care for children orphaned by the AIDS epidemic.¹¹⁶ According to the U.N., the Global Fund needs at least \$10 billion per year to fight HIV/AIDS alone.¹¹⁷

However, nearly \$4 billion was committed in 2005 to replenish the Global Fund for AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. A special Session of the U.N. in June 2006 agreed that all those countries that put together credible, sustainable AIDS plans should get the funding they need to implement them. The session set a funding target of \$20 billion to \$23 billion a year for HIV-AIDS work by 2010.¹¹⁸ This funding represents what UNAIDS says is needed to provide AIDS drugs for the 5 million people in developing countries (most of these 5 million AIDS cases are in Africa), who do not have access to them as of 2006, as well as effective prevention and care measures, such as access to condoms and help to orphans. However, the U.N. started to revise its estimates in light of the new independent studies from its 2004 Report, reducing the number of infections in Africa by 4.4 million, back to the total of 25 million, 4 years earlier. It also gradually

decreased the overall infection rate for working age adults in Sub-Saharan Africa, from 9 percent in 2002 report to 7.2 percent in its report, released in November 2005.¹¹⁹

The world needs to, and should be looking for evidence of interventions that have worked, such as the rigorous enforcement of condom use at brothels in Thailand and aggressive public campaigns that have urged Ugandans to limit their sexual partners to one.¹²⁰ Other programs deemed successful such as circumcision¹²¹ should be encouraged by all African countries and should be funded by national governments and international donors. If the world military expenditures can be controlled and some of the savings diverted to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria cure and research and development, the world's security and human survival can be increased. Thus, the millions of mankind currently excluded from a decent life can have a bright future; peace and security will be promoted not only in Africa but worldwide.

Chapter 7

From Organization of African Unity to African Union

Unite we must. Without necessarily sacrificing our sovereignties, big or small, we can here and now forge a political union based on Defense, Foreign Affairs and Diplomacy, and a Common citizenship, an African Currency, an African Monetary Zone and an African Central Bank. We must unite in order to achieve the full liberation of our continent. We need a Common Defense System with an African High Command to ensure the stability and security of Africa.

—Kwame Nkrumah¹

Introduction

In reflecting on the economic and sociopolitical issues confronting Africa over the past five decades, it is apparent the Organization of African Unity (OAU) now African Union (AU) has played a significant role in addressing these concerns. Following the end of the Second World War and the creation of the United Nations Organization, many African nations began to revolt against (colonial) European government, demanding independence. The concept of creating a cohesive body that would integrate the continent despite differences in colonial rule emerged. Consequently, the creation of the OAU started in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This study examines the relative effectiveness and weaknesses of the OAU since its inception, and its transformation to AU in 2002.

The Evolution of the OAU

The Berlin Conference of November 1884—February 1885,² was attended by Great Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, Holland, Belgium, and Italy, with the United States as an observer. These countries not only paved the way for but also a symbolical manifestation of the European interest to “divide and conquer.” According to Alex Thomson, “Africa was a stateless continent, in which lineage and kinship dominated pre-colonial social relationships. This is the idea of the extended family.”³ While European colonization of Africa led to the imposition of European customs, traditions, and more importantly languages on African peoples. European colonization of Africa can best be explained by the need to gain access to African agricultural resources and raw materials, such as gold, diamonds, cotton, tobacco, and so on as well, as free and cheap labor. Alex Thomson has also noted that

France favored North, West and Central Africa, Britain claimed great chunks of West, East, Central and Southern Africa; Portugal took the territories of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau; King Leopoldville of Belgium was awarded the Congo; Italy established control in Libya, Eritrea and part of Somalia; Spain did likewise... the Western Sahara and Spanish Guinea, while Germany gained areas in Namibia (former South West Africa), and the east of the continent Tanzania (former Tanganyika), as well as the Cameroon and Togoland.⁴

Thus, if the borders of African States had reflected their natural, social and economic divisions, rather than these having been arbitrarily imposed overnight by European Powers, these and other anomalies would not have become a reality in present day Africa. As Lord Salisbury, then British prime minister, observed at the 1890 Anglo-French Conference: “We have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man’s foot ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by small impediment that we never knew exactly where the mountains and rivers and lakes were.”⁵

Ethiopia and Liberia were the only two countries that escaped colonial rule. Control and domination over other African territories continued until early 1950s when African Nationalist Leaders regarded as the first generation of the post-Second World War African leaders began to seek colonial freedom. The defeat of Germany during the two world wars (1913–1919 and 1939–1945) inspired these first generation of the post-Second World War African leaders to demand independence from their colonial rulers. However, United States and some of its allies supported to a certain degree the rights to self-determination regardless of color or race.

Kwame Nkrumah and Founding of OAU

One of the most radical, progressive, and instrumental leader of the first generation of the post-Second World War of African nationalists was Kwame Nkrumah. He was often acknowledged as the Father of African Nationalism as his Pan-African ideology reflected the concept of “Africa for the Africans.”⁶ His paradigm of Pan-Africanism was influenced by his childhood in Africa and developmental years he spent in the United States during the Great Depression and Harlem Renaissance Era. As a student, Nkrumah was influenced by the philosophy of Pan-Africanism and Back to Africa Movement enunciated by Marcus Garvey, Leader of the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA).⁷ He was also influenced by W.E.B. Dubois a prominent African American and leader of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP),⁸ and the intellectual-activist George Padmore, who advocated the idea of “unity amongst all African Peoples.”⁹ David Birmingham pointed out that “Padmore’s chief contribution to Nkrumah’s maturation was not a belief in armed violence, but an idealized commitment to African unity as the only way out of poverty of colonial fragmentation.”¹⁰

Pan-Africanism and Non-Aligned Movement were precursor movements that put Africa in a position to sit at negotiation tables, at least at the United Nations (U.N.) forums. Before leading Africa’s decolonization struggle, Nkrumah did not only attend the Pan-African Congress, held in Manchester, England in 1945, but he was also one of the organizers.¹¹ As the organizing secretary he drafted its resolution titled: “Declaration to the Colonial Peoples of the World.”¹² The conference whose aim was to inspire African leaders to regain control of their countries and develop a commitment toward liberating the African continent from the control of colonialism was attended by participants from Africa, Caribbean Islands, and European countries delegates, including Jomo Kenyatta, who later became the first president of Kenya. After the conference, Nkrumah returned in 1947 to his country, Ghana (then Gold Coast), determined to decolonize the Gold Coast and eradicate European domination from his country and Africa as a whole. His dream of obtaining Ghana’s independence from Britain became a reality on March 6, 1957 as Ghana became the first black Africa country to become independent. This was not only significant accomplishment for Ghana, but also for the entire continent as Nkrumah’s leadership and courage represented a symbol of self-determination and encouraged all African peoples to assert the principle of self-determination. Following Ghana’s independence, Nkrumah continued to pursue his quest in uniting the entire African continent as he organized

the All African Peoples' Conference in December 1958.¹³ *The raison d'être* for this conference was to develop strategies for dismantling colonialism in Africa. Indeed, the All African Peoples' Conference encouraged individual nationalist leaders to demand for freedom. For the first time, the Africans could see what independence meant for Africa. They could dream of liberation as a proximate reality and could feel the pulse of a whole continent. Within few years of the conference, African nationalists such as Patrice Lumumba of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Mboya of Kenya, and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia had become African Leaders in their respective countries.¹⁴

One of the most controversial figures who attended the 1958 All African Peoples' Conference was Patrice Lumumba. The young radical nationalist leader from the former Belgian Congo shared similar ideological beliefs with Nkrumah. Both were perceived as threats to the West due to their assertiveness, association with the then former Soviet Union and outspoken attacks against neo-colonialism in Africa. To an extent, many Europeans perceived Lumumba as a greater threat than Nkrumah. The Congolese leader was open and outspoken with his attack against Belgian government and accused them of genocide during colonial rule.¹⁵ The Congo serving as the second largest country in the continent and located in the heart of Central Africa was seen as a threat to the West if the Communist ideology continued to spread at the height of the Cold War in Africa. Unlike many African countries that adopted an approach of non-alignment, Lumumba was unrepentant about his communist ideology and friendship with the former Soviet Union. As a result, this created a division among two main groups of independent African nations, namely, the Casablanca and Monrovia Groups. The Casablanca Group, which consisted primarily of Anglophone countries, with the exception of Guinea, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria then fighting the French for independence were perceived as the radical group because of Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure's influence, who supported Patrice Lumumba. Moreover, the Casablanca Group supported Morocco's claim of part of Mauritania, Algeria's war of liberation against the French and promoted the idea of a Union of Africa States, which was Nkrumah's vision for Africa.¹⁶

In contrast, the Monrovia Group that consisted of both Anglophone and Francophone countries was more conservative, prefer maintaining close ties to France, United States and other Western powers, and not unnaturally, opposed to Lumumba. Furthermore, the group sought unity of aspirations and action based on African social solidarity and political identity, urging cooperation only in the economic, cultural, scientific, and technical fields, but opposed to political union, united defense, and foreign policy.¹⁷ However, a communiqué issued in May 1962, after consultations between

presidents Sekou Toure of Guinea and Leopold Senghor of Senegal at Labe, Guinea, announced the decision of the two leaders to increase their joint efforts to bring together the Monrovia and Casablanca Groups.¹⁸ Finally, in June 1962, in an effort to resolve the impasse, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia invited the two groups to Ethiopia with the intent of uniting them. Sekou Toure, president of Guinea served as the representative of the Casablanca Group, while President Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal represented the Monrovia Group. The June 1962 meeting between the emperor, and the representatives of the Casablanca and Monrovia Groups, was followed by the May 1963 Continental (Pan-African) Conference of all African Nations. Thus, for the sake of uniting Africa as a collective body within a structural framework, a continental organization known as the OAU was born in May 1963.¹⁹ At its establishment, thirty-two African countries that were independent at the time were founding members,²⁰ including twenty observer delegates from nonindependent African states.

On May 22, 1963, the leaders of the independent African countries assembled in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia where they agreed on a compromised formula and established the OAU, with much pomp and pageantry. At the launching of OAU, Emperor Haile Selassie's welcome address struck the keynotes of compromise and unity that guided the proceedings, thus:

It was the duty and privilege of the delegates to rouse the slumbering Giant of Africa, not to the nationalism of Europe of the nineteenth century, not to regional consciousness, but to the vision of a single African brotherhood bending its united efforts towards the achievement of a greater and nobler goal. While we agree that the ultimate destiny of this continent lies in political union, we must at the same time recognize that the obstacles to be overcome in its achievement are at once numerous and formidable.²¹

When the OAU was established in 1963, the Pan-Africanist idea of continental unity was popular and was a period of momentous changes in international relations. The end of the European colonial era and the rise of the Non-Aligned Movement occurred against a backdrop of a Cold War between the United States and the former Soviet Union. Conceived as a harmonizing center of nations, the U.N. had become an ideological battleground between the East and West with the emergence of blocs in which the developing world began to play a significant role. Two basic points must be made regarding the U.N. and OAU as international organizations. First, the U.N. is a microcosm of the world's state system, reflecting the interests of world governments. Governments, not people, are represented at the U.N. The same is true of the OAU. It represents African governments, not peoples. Second, the modern African state system was shaped by colonial

history. What became national boundaries of Africa today were decided and fixed by European Powers at the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 for the partition of Africa, a partition which cut-across ethnic lines.²² This was a partition that was done for the economic interests of the European Powers, without a single African participating in the conference.

At the Second OAU Summit in Cairo in 1964, African leaders accepted the European created boundaries over the objection of the Pan-Africanist faction led by President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. Nkrumah advocated for a *Union of African States* that would transcend the colonial and precolonial legacy and transform the fragmented state system. Nkrumah contended that the postcolonial state system would be politically divisive and economically wasteful, a contention that proved to be prophetic. The tension between the Pan-Africanist idea and the fragmented state system is implicit in the compromise solution embedded in Article II of the OAU Charter, which advocates “the promotion of solidarity and cooperation among African States as well as for the defense of their sovereignty and territorial integrity.”²³

Structure, Accomplishments, and Problems of the OAU

As an international organization, the OAU is composed of four main institutions/or organs namely, (1) the assembly of heads of state and government, (2) the council of ministers, (3) the general secretariat and (4) the commission on arbitration, conciliation and mediation. The Charter per se consists of a Preamble Protocol and thirty-two articles. The main objectives of the OAU are to recognize the sovereignty of its member states and promote unity and solidarity throughout Africa. On the fundamental aspects of the Charter of the OAU, Gino Naldi noted that

The most significant tenets are its commitment to the inalienable right of all people to self-determination and to freedom, equality, justice, dignity, the desire and need to promote greater understanding among their people... Respect for the hard-won independence as well as... the need to resist neo-colonialism in all its forms is stressed.²⁴

In essence, the identity of the OAU reflects Nkrumah's and Lumumba's sentiments against neocolonialism while the OAU is regarded as a regional organization within the U.N. system. There are many similarities and differences between the U.N. and OAU, the only major difference being the

absence of central decision-making machinery such as the security council. Both bodies have specialized agencies designed to help the four organs in meeting the objectives of the organizations and with respect to the OAU we have the committees on (1) economic and social issues; (2) education and cultural affairs; (3) health, sanitation, and nutrition; (4) research, scientific, and technical commission; (5) conflict resolutions and management (Defense Commission); and African Liberation Coordination Committee.²⁵

The OAU is clearly a creature of compromise between a hitherto ideologically and geographically divided continent. While this was no mean achievement, it tended to be all things to all governments, and its resolutions, by and large, have been ineffectual. Specifically, controversial issues have been postponed continually for fear of a split and consequently, the body had failed to exert moral authority to censure erring heads of state and government, including those engaged in grave violation of human rights such as former presidents Idi Amin of Uganda, Mengistu of Ethiopia, Samuel Doe of Liberia, and Emperor Bokasa of the Central African Republic.²⁶

In evaluating the accomplishments of the OAU as a body, it is clear that the organization played a significant role in resolving conflicts between members-states.²⁷ The organization can boast of some successful mediation of conflicts between members-states. The first has to do with the 1964 territorial dispute between Algeria and Morocco. It was followed by similar efforts in the Congo (now Democratic Republic of Congo) in the mid-1960s, and Nigerian civil war, 1967–1970. In an effort to reach a peaceful agreement, the OAU applied with consistency such fundamental principles of the Charter as the recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the member states.²⁸ The border dispute between Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya from 1968 to 1970 was successfully resolved by the Commission on Arbitration, Conciliation, and Mediation.

The African Liberation Coordination Committee

The African Liberation Coordination Committee as a specialized agency was set up to provide moral and financial support to white-dominated Southern African countries. Specifically, the committee was formed to address the one issue on which there was perhaps the highest consensus about which Africans are very emotional, namely, the liberation of the African continent from colonialism and racism. Based in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania because of proximity to the freedom fighters and the center of

the struggles, the Liberation Coordination Committee which had its own executive secretary was charged with the responsibility of implementing a coherent African policy toward the liberation struggles in Zimbabwe (former Rhodesia), Namibia, the former Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, and Cape Verde Island, and the white minority-ruled South Africa.²⁹ The Liberation Committee set up a Liberation Fund to receive contributions and donations from African, and extra-African States for distribution among liberation groups recognized by the OAU. It not only mediated in conflicts and raise morale among freedom fighters; it also provided a forum to keep the issue of African liberation on the world's agenda. However, with the end of apartheid in South Africa, after an all-race democratic election of 1994, the Liberation Committee which was an initiative of Nkrumah's vision of the decolonization of Africa, and which played a vital role was closed down in 1995.³⁰ During its early years, the Liberation Committee supported such liberation movements as the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde (African Independence Party of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde) (PAIGC), and Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRILEMO) that were fighting to gain independence from Portugal.³¹ Moreover, it fostered endeavors toward dismantling white rule in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. In an effort to elevate its position against imperialism and apartheid, and influence the U.N. to impose sanctions against South Africa, the OAU refused to admit white-ruled South Africa as a member-state until the institution of apartheid was officially dismantled in 1994:

Regarding Southern Africa and the decolonization of the former Portuguese territories, the OAU's role was admirable as well. The establishment of the Liberation Committee and the channeling of financial, material and military aid to the liberation fighters of those territories, as well as the diplomatic campaigns conducted in support of their respective causes have been among the organization's best achievements.³²

The Western Sahara and the OAU

Throughout the second decade of the OAU (1973–1983), the increase in membership strengthened its role in the international community, and being a larger body, it enhanced its position to resolve conflicts vis-à-vis the U.N. system. As its memberships increased, the OAU was confronted with

a crisis involving Morocco. The conflict with Morocco and its refusal to recognize the right of the peoples of Western Sahara to self-determination has been a sensitive issue since the OAU's inception. In an effort to remain consistent with the principles of its Charter, the Political Committee held a meeting in Addis Ababa in 1976, acknowledging Western Saharan's demand for independence "The OAU had not been pursuing an original line of action since the UN General Assembly had already recommended the decolonization of the Western Sahara; and the OAU merely limited itself at first to endorsing the UN resolutions... This was the position it maintained until 1979."³³ Between 1976 and 1983, the conflict continued to increase as the fundamental principles of the OAU Charter were challenged over Western Sahara. Consistent with the principle of opposing any form of neocolonialism, the majority of the OAU members (twenty-six) recognized the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and called for its admission into the organization.³⁴ The secretary-general, acting under Article 28 of the OAU Charter, which provides that "admission shall be decided by a simple majority of the member states,"³⁵ formally communicated the decision of the majority of the member states to the SADR as required by the Charter. Many considered this gesture as a major pitfall and challenge to the OAU, partly, because it led to Morocco's withdrawal from the organization, and partly, because of the danger of the conflict splitting the continent as a whole. Yet, it is also important to assess the consequences for the OAU had it not formally recognized SADR. Naldi has noted that "The Western Sahara dispute, the only significant neo-colonial struggle remaining in Africa, posed the OAU, and thus Africa in general, a crisis... The OAU proved to be a prisoner of its own weaknesses."³⁶ While Naldi posits an insightful critique of the OAU's performance in handling the conflict, he fails to recognize the significant consequences the organization would have endured, in terms of its integrity being questioned among member states and the international community. The OAU was presented with a limited number of options in taking a stance on the dispute. Consequently, the degree of reputation costs would jeopardize the OAU's ability to reach mutual cooperation with other international bodies in the future. In other words, one can suggest that the conflict over Western Sahara reflects the strength of its leadership and principles, rather than a pitfall and major flaw, if only because the Moroccan claims over Western Saharan remains to be resolved.³⁷

The OAU was unable to resolve more complex interstate and intrastate conflicts such as neither the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict, nor the challenges posed by the developments in Eritrea and Southern Sudan. Occasionally, it met challenges head-on, as it did for example, in the Chadian dispute by seating the Habre delegation to the exclusion of the Goukouni delegation

in 1987. While the divisive question of the Western Sahara ended in the admission into the OAU in 1984 of the SADR as a member state, a decision which led to the withdrawal of Morocco's membership from the organization. Thus, underscoring the risks, which have caused the OAU to postpone the resolution of contentious issues for fear of a split.

Despite the challenging economic, social, and political problems inherited from colonialism, the OAU was much more effective in the area of African liberation. Much of this success can be attributed to Salim Ahmed Salim, who as secretary-general of the organization served from 1989 to 2001. Under Salim's leadership, the OAU made significant progress. For instance, the creation of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution as a Specialized Committee, enable the OAU to address interstate and intrastate disputes on a more efficient and timely level. Furthermore, it allowed the OAU to take a proactive approach to resolving conflicts, rather than traditionally relying on ad hoc arrangements to deal with disputes among member-state.³⁸ The mechanism reflects a return to the fundamental principles on which the organization was established.³⁹ Since 1992, the mechanism has played a significant role in mediating to a limited degree the conflicts that have developed in Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. According to Naldi, "The creation of this Mechanism is undoubtedly significant... It is especially interesting to note that the Mechanism is preparing the ground for peace-keeping forces."⁴⁰

Some bold resolutions and Plans of Action have been adopted by the OAU. The Lagos Plan of Action of April 1980⁴¹ enunciated in cooperation with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in working out Africa's alternative strategies for economic development was one of such measures taken to accelerate economic development.⁴² While the UNECA has served as Africa's Think Tank, the use of the ECOWAS in the resolution of the Liberian civil war in 1997 was another example of how regional and subregional organizations might be used for economic and political objectives. The adoption of the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights has the potential of advancing the cause of human rights in Africa.⁴³

The OAU braised the trail in the area of economic change with the adoption of the Abuja Treaty in 1991. The treaty designed to establish an African Economic Community (AEC) is aimed at integrating economic activity, primarily trade, between different zones and states in Africa. The objectives of the treaty endorsed initially by fifty-one heads of state and government are "to increase economic self-reliance, promote an indigenous and self-sustained development, and raise the standard of living of African

peoples and to promote economic development on the continent.”⁴⁴ The treaties establishing the European Union and the AEC cannot but broaden trade and expand economies within a structural framework. The only difference being the mechanism to be used by the OAU to implement the Abuja Treaty particularly their strategy with respect to a common currency. Unlike the European Community which had developed the idea of the Euro as a means of fully integrating European economies, the OAU has not addressed the issue of a common currency. Nevertheless, the OAU has made a bold step in addressing the economic challenges facing the African continent by establishing an AEC.

The Case for Reparation

One of the most important contributions of the OAU in the 1990s, that has had an impact on Africans in the Diaspora is the declaration endorsing the demand for reparations from Europeans for enslavement of Africans. The struggle to obtain reparations for Africans in the continent and in the Diaspora has been controversial for the past century, and it has continued to create a division as it was demonstrated at the August 2001 World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, and Related Tolerance held in Durban, South Africa, sponsored by the U.N. The U.N. General Assembly designated the high commissioner for human rights as the secretary-general of the conference. Commissioner Robinson in addressing the issue of slavery “supported a call by African countries for the United States and Europe’s former colonial powers to issue an apology for slavery, and colonialism.”⁴⁵ A call opposed by former colonial powers, as noted by Dennis Barnes, “The United States and the United Kingdom objected to making any such apology out of fear that they would then be forced to pay exorbitant reparations to victim’s families.”⁴⁶ The United States and United Kingdom not only opposed the notion of slavery as a human rights violation; they viewed slave trade as a legal operation at the time in which it occurred. United States maintained that “it would accept the term of human rights violations if it also applied to the trafficking of humans from East and Central Africa by Arab traders.”⁴⁷ Contrary to the arguments made by Western European countries, and the United States, many African leaders stated that they “believe that countries which once perpetuated the slave trade should assume their mortal, economic, political and legal responsibilities in paying compensation.”⁴⁸ In his book, *The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks*, Randall Robinson not only emphasized the unresolved issue of

reparations but also recalled the declaration for reparation made by the First OAU-sponsored Pan-African Conference on Reparations in Abuja, Nigeria in April 1993:

Recalling the establishment of the Organization of African Unity of machinery for apprising the issue of reparations in relation to the damage done to Africa and to the Diaspora by enslavement, colonialism and neo-colonialism...calls upon the international community to recognize that there is a unique and unprecedented moral debt owed to the African peoples which has yet to be paid-the debt of compensation to the Africans, as the most humiliated and exploited people of the last four centuries of modern history.⁴⁹

The declaration for reparation represents a manifestation of Nkrumah's Pan-African ideology and also serves as a catalyst in elevating the issue of racial discrimination and the legacies of slavery and colonialism to an international level. In essence, the proactive approach of the African leaders with respect to resolving the issue of reparations, served as a precursor to the United Nation's interest in developing a global conference to address the concern.

The Roles of Mandela, Mbeki, Obasanjo, and Ghaddafi in Reorganizing the OAU

The idea of an AU served as the core or center of attempts made by South Africa's ruling African National Congress (ANC) to improve Africa's image to attract direct foreign investments and to make the new South Africa not only an important global trading nation, but also an economic power in Africa. Understanding the formation of the AU therefore, requires some background knowledge of the development of the policy of the ANC led by Nelson Mandela toward Africa.

The legendary African statesman, President Mandela, assumed office clearly aware not only that the end of the Cold War and the spread of neoliberal ideas had rendered unattractive the radical populist and socialist ideology of the ANC. He was also aware that the leadership role South Africa was expected to play in Africa's concerted response to the challenges of globalization meant that a new image had to be created. Therefore, his first major attempt to carve out a worldview for South Africa was to move the ANC away from its traditional populist and socialist ideas through a series of inhouse party discussions.⁵⁰

Although the ANC was undergoing internal reorientation through public speeches and policy documents, President Mandela signaled that the foreign policy of the new South Africa would be guided by liberal internationalism. Specifically, he made public in 1996 that his government policies would be informed by Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), a neoliberal strategy designed to make South Africa a destination for direct foreign investments and a competitive global trading nation.⁵¹ However, since South Africa is located in a continent whose international image as a protector of human rights, including property rights leaves much to be desired. The immediate challenge faced by the ANC in its attempt to pursue these twin objectives was devising appropriate means to improve Africa's image. Not surprisingly, South Africa's first major foreign policy document showed that foreign policy perspectives in a Democratic South Africa indicated that human rights and the promotion of democracy would be at the core of its foreign policy. Alfred Nzo, as the first foreign minister of the new South Africa, said, "Human rights are the cornerstone of our government policy and we shall not hesitate to carry the message to the far corners of the world. We have suffered too much, ourselves not to do so."⁵² However, the neoliberal position of the South African government, created division within the ANC, and undermined Mandela's efforts to chart a coherent foreign policy. Thus, three broad cleavages with respect to South Africa's worldview could be discerned at the time Thabo Mbeki took power in 1999. First are the populist remnants of the ANC, who wanted South Africa to maintain its ties even with rogue states. Second are the liberal internationalists, who believed in the reinvention of South Africa as a global trading state with strong regional and continental interests; and third are the pragmatists, who held the view that foreign policy should be driven by national interests rather than ethical values or ideological principles.⁵³ The inability of President Mandela to assert his view over and above these three groups prompted some analysts to suggest that the new South Africa has "no foreign policy at all under him."⁵⁴

Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance and Reorganization of OAU

Upon assuming office, Thabo Mbeki gave priority to the development of a coherent foreign policy that revolved around the liberal internationalism initiated by his predecessor. His prioritization of foreign policy at the beginning of his administration was intended to cow the opposition to

the liberal doctrine within the ANC. And also to signal to the business community that he was committed to the idea of making South Africa a destination for direct investments and international commerce. Consistent with the ANC'S efforts to reshape Africa's image, President Mbeki made the promotion of democracy a key aspect of South Africa's foreign policy goals in Africa. This explains why he frequently attacked one-party states and personal rule in the continent. While he also encouraged African peoples to govern themselves by resisting all forms of tyranny.⁵⁵

Mbeki's vigorous defense of liberal norms and his open condemnation of undemocratic governments in Africa angered some African leaders, many of whom had supported the ANC and given it sanctuary during the liberation struggle. The anger that President Mbeki's stand generated, and the resulting accusation that South Africa was "little more than the West's lackey on the Southern tip of Africa, compelled his government to adopt a new approach to the promotion of neo-liberalism in Africa."⁵⁶ Mbeki's new strategy entailed placing the neoliberal message within a broader transformationalist agenda. Instead of open condemnation of illiberal governments in Africa, President Mbeki called for the reconstruction of African identity. Thus, he not only decided to conclude the work of the earlier Pan-Africanist movements but also to reinvent African states to play their effective and rightful role on the global stage. Thabo Mbeki cleverly reintroduced *African Renaissance*⁵⁷ (emphasize is mine) to serve as the conceptual framework for the new approach. According to the South African government, African Renaissance is a "holistic vision... aimed at promoting peace, prosperity, democracy, sustainable development, progressive leadership and good governance."⁵⁸

It was within this context that President Mbeki decided and demanded the reorganization of the OAU, which had been referred to in the international media as a *Dictators' club*, on his first appearance as South Africa's president at the OAU Summit held in Algiers, Algeria in July 1999. President Mbeki felt that the image of OAU was not reflective of the democratic wave in Africa and he believed that the organization could be strengthened "so that in its work, it focuses on the strategic objective of the realization of the African Renaissance."⁵⁹ With the support of President Obasanjo of Nigeria, Mbeki managed to influence the African Heads of State and Government (AHSG) to take a number of important pro-democracy decisions. First was to reorient the OAU toward the promotion of "strong and democratic institutions." Second was to "exclude from the OAU member-states who's Governments came to power through unconstitutional means, particularly through military coup."⁶⁰ And the third was to assist military regimes that may exist on the African continent to move toward a democratic system of government.

Olusegun Obasanjo's African Vision and Reorganization of OAU

President Olusegun Obasanjo's support for Thabo Mbeki was based on the understanding that it would make the latter receptive to his own OAU reform agenda. The reform package of Obasanjo provides guidelines for the conduct of governance in Africa and to reposition the OAU at the center of Africa's developmental issues.⁶¹ The essential elements of President Obasanjo's reform package are well articulated in the Memorandum of Understanding on the "Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA)," adopted at the OAU Summit in Durban, South Africa in July 2002.⁶² With the acceptance and adoption of the Obasanjo reform package, a new innovation and institutional approach to prevent and manage conflicts in Africa has been incorporated into the AU.

After some years of retirement from the army, through many years of private discussions and public speeches, General Obasanjo in 1989 launched the Africa Leadership Forum (ALF)⁶³ as a vehicle to confront the African crises. The ALF organized several conferences, seminars, and workshops drawing on the civil society, and state sectors in various locations, in and outside Africa, including Obasanjo's Farm in Otta, Abeokuta, Nigeria. The genesis of General Obasanjo's Reform Plan can be traced back to the early 1990s, when he organized nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to develop what Francis Deng and William Zartman called "A strategic vision for Africa. This idea came from an expert consultative meeting the ALF in collaboration with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), held in Paris in 1990 to explore the implications of the end of the Cold War for Africa."⁶⁴ Among other things, the conference suggested that it might be useful for Africa to develop an institutional mechanism similar to that of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to deal with the post-Cold War challenges, and not surprisingly, ALF took up this initiative.

The Kampala Document: Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa

The meeting held in Paris in April 1990, concluded that Africa would remain in its multileveled crisis until a comprehensive solution producing

stable conditions for development is found from within (Africa). A broad conference to examine such solutions for development was recommended, and the director of the ALF, Felix Mosha, toured the African continent, after the Paris Meeting contacting leading Africans, public and private individuals about the feasibility of the project.⁶⁵ Between November 1990 and May 1991, four preparatory conferences were held to shape the ideas behind the conference and to mobilize support. The first two conferences held in Addis Ababa worked on the procedures and the contents of the project. General Obasanjo invited the secretary-general of the OAU and executive secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa to join in convening some thirty politicians and scholars who spoke of a triad of security, pluralism, and economic cooperation; each encompassing a number of basic principles. A Steering Committee composing approximately half of the conference participants met again in February 1991 and restructured the principles into four goals: security, stability, development, and cooperation. The committee envisaged a final document to be signed by African member states of the OAU which would then adopt its principles through national legislation.

Preparations also emphasized contacts with relevant sectors in and outside Africa. A third meeting held in Cologne, Germany in March 1991, brought the leaders of the ALF and the leaders of the movement who produced the Helsinki Document for Europe and North America in 1975 and created the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).⁶⁶ It was recognized that the European Movement started as a private initiative that took time to develop, that the African Movement needed to rest on its own African roots, and that Africa might need to make use of, or supplement its existing organization, the OAU. The fourth meeting sought to develop those roots by bringing together African NGOs in Ota, Nigeria in April 1991, where it was recommended that NGOs be included in all aspects of the evolving process.⁶⁷

The principal and final conference was convened in Kampala, Uganda on May 19 and 20, 1991, by the ALF jointly with the ECA and OAU and brought together 500 participants, including eight Heads of State and Government (three being former heads of state and government), diplomats, scholars, business executives, and representatives of students' and women's organizations. Deng and Zartman have pointed out that "Diplomatic gloves were off, people spoke frankly, and not all supported the general idea. After initial speeches, participants broke up into working groups on each of the four issue areas and emerged with new drafts, which were then adopted with consensus and enthusiasm by those assembled."⁶⁸ The result of this process was a statement of principles known as the

Kampala Document. The key principles are the following:

1. Every African state is sovereign. Every African state respects the rights inherent in the territorial integrity and political independence of all other African states.
2. The security, stability, and development of every African are inseparably linked with those of other African countries. Consequently, instability in one African country impinges on the stability of all other African countries.
3. The erosion of security and stability in Africa is one of the major causes of its continuing crises and one of the principal impediments to the creation of a sound economy and effective intra and inter African cooperation
4. The interdependence of African states and the link between their security, stability, and development demand a common African agenda based on a unity of purpose and a collective political consensus derived from a firm conviction that Africa cannot make any significant progress on any front without creating collectively a lasting solution to its problems of security and stability.
5. A conference on security, stability, development and cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) should be launched to provide a comprehensive framework for Africa's security and stability and measures for accelerated continental economic integration for socio-economic transformation. CSSDCA shall encompass four major areas henceforth called *calabashes*: security, stability, development, and cooperation.
6. A new order embodied in the framework of CSSDCA must be created in Africa through a declaration of binding principles and a commitment to ideological independence, which will guide the conduct of governance in individual African states as well as the imperative of intra-African relations. The implementation of the new order should seek an active partnership and positive involvement of the rest of the world.
7. The fulfillment in good faith of all the CSSDCA principles must be adhered to by all participating states within the context of any other obligations each participating member may have under international law.⁶⁹

To emphasize that the CSSDCA was an African initiative, the committee decided to use a uniquely African word—*calabash*,⁷⁰ because calabash is tight and does not leak, according to General Obasanjo. Therefore, in

specific terms, the Kampala Document provided benchmarks for judging the behavior of African leaders in the following four major areas otherwise called four *calabashes*: security, stability, development, and cooperation. "These were principles meant to redefine security and sovereignty, and to demand certain standards of behavior... from every government in Africa in the interests of common humanity."⁷¹

On security, the Obasanjo reform package aimed at influencing African leaders to treat security as a human security issue and an interdependent phenomenon. As a human security issue, it proposed that African leaders should redefine their states' security as a multidimensional phenomenon going beyond military considerations to include economic, political, and social aspects of the individual, the family, and the society. The document noted, "The concept of security must embrace all aspects of society..., and that the security of a nation must be based on the security of the life of individual citizens to live in peace, and to satisfy basic needs."⁷² As an interdependent phenomenon, the reform package urged African leaders to see the security of their states "as inseparably linked to other African countries."⁷³ This implies that the maintenance of security anywhere in Africa is a collective responsibility of all African states, and that sovereignty no longer offers the protection behind which African leaders can hide to violate the fundamental rights of their citizens.

On stability, the reform plan suggested that the criteria for judging the stability of African states should be grounded in liberal principles, such as respect for the rule of law, human rights, good governance, and the participation of African citizens in public affairs. On cooperation and development, the reform plan did not contain anything distinctly different from previous proposals submitted to the OAU. The majority of issues discussed under the cooperation and development aspects essentially reiterated the traditional rhetorical Pan-African ideals, such as African solution for African problems and the importance of integration for Africa's development, among others.

However, the emphasis placed by the reforms on the effective participation of civil society in cooperation and development programs brings to Pan-Africanism an essential missing link. Indeed, the guidelines urged African leaders not only to involve regional and grassroots civil society organizations in continental decision-making process, but also to allow NGOs to act as the main engines for dealing with security, stability, development, and cooperation issues. In addition, they established a clear relationship between development and cooperation and also declared that the "security, stability and development of every African country is inseparably linked to that of other African states."⁷⁴ This meant not only that successful management of security, stability, and development requires a

continental approach, but also that every African must be his or her brothers' or sisters' keeper.

As a matter of fact, the reform document suggested that African leaders should develop "a common African agenda based on a unity of purpose to confront Africa's security, stability, and developmental challenges."⁷⁵ Since the OAU did not have the institutional mechanism necessary to provide the common Africa agenda, it was imperative to demand a restructuring of the Pan-African organization. Therefore, Obasanjo with his Reform Plan wanted to reposition the OAU so that it would become the central institution for dealing with Africa's security, stability, and development challenges. Clearly, the Obasanjo reforms manifested themselves in the institutional design and legal underpinnings of the AU. For instance, the package on peace and security and its protocol, as well as Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of African Union⁷⁶ that gives the AU the right to intervene in domestic affairs on humanitarian grounds, draw heavily on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). In addition, the normative values of the CSSDCA inform much of the principles of the African Union Constitutive Act. In addition, Article 22 of the Cooperation on Africa, which provides for an Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), an advisory organ composed of 150 civil society organizations selected from different social and professional groups of the member states of the AU, draws on the civil society dimension of the CSSDCA.

The CSSDCA was intended to be adopted by the AHSG during the OAU Summit in Abuja, Nigeria in June 1991. However, due primarily to opposition from the *old guards*, Libya's Muammar Ghaddafi, Sudan's Omar Hassan el-Bashir, and Kenya's Daniel Arap Moi, the OAU Summit was not able to adopt the Kampala Document (CSSDCA).

Subsequent efforts by General Obasanjo to persuade African leaders to adopt the document not only failed, but Obasanjo's imprisonment in 1995 also led to the disappearance of the document from the agenda of the OAU all together. According to General Obasanjo, his attempt failed because "it threatened the status quo and especially the power positions of a few African governments whose domestic hold on unscrupulous power rendered them vulnerable and insecure."⁷⁷ Therefore, the election of General Obasanjo as Nigeria's elected civilian president in 1999 provided him with the opportunity to revive the CSSDCA process from where he left it in 1995. The need to do so and the urgency for Obasanjo to develop a new foreign policy toward Africa were quickened by domestic political pressures. President Obasanjo⁷⁸ came to power at a time when domestic opposition to Nigeria's peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone was at its peak. In particular, the revelation during the presidential election

campaign that Nigeria was spending \$1 million daily on the peace mission of the Economic Community of the West Africa States Monitoring Observer Group (ECOMOG) in Sierra Leone provoked so much public displeasure that a drastic reduction in Nigeria's involvement in Sierra Leone had become imperative for the Obasanjo Government.⁷⁹ Indeed, the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) was not simply aware that many voters favored the complete withdrawal of Nigerian troops from Sierra Leone. Its leaders also knew that Obasanjo as their presidential candidate had suggested, in the heat of the campaign, that it was "unacceptable for Nigeria to waste money in Sierra Leone when those funds could be used to develop Nigeria."⁸⁰ Therefore, after he was elected president, his immediate concern was finding a way to reduce Nigeria's peacekeeping burden in Sierra Leone. One Nigerian observer has pointed out that "any decision to the contrary would have generated unfavorable public reaction."⁸¹

However, since the supposedly internationalist and Pan-Africanist Obasanjo was not prepared to abandon Nigeria's leading role in West Africa and at the continental level, it became imperative to seek external support.⁸² Senior policy makers within the Obasanjo administration also recognized that a long-term policy was needed to prevent the recurrence of such a high burden of peacekeeping on Nigeria. In response, the Obasanjo administration created a Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa within the presidency to help the government deal with foreign policy challenges.⁸³ This ministry, whose work is supported by an Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution, was mandated to develop a policy that would help institutionalize the ideas of the CSSDCA within the OAU. From the viewpoint of the Obasanjo administration, the integration of the CSSDCA into the OAU would enable the continental organization to take center stage in the resolution and management of domestic conflicts in the continent.⁸⁴

According to the Obasanjo administration, such involvement of the OAU was necessary so that the cost of future African peacekeeping missions could also be borne by other relatively well-endowed African countries, besides Nigeria. This explains why the Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa, unlike the Federal Ministry of National Planning, which traditionally handles "Nigeria's multilateral international relations in the West Africa sub-region, is primarily in charge of continental integration and cooperation issues."⁸⁵ It was against this background that President Obasanjo went to the OAU Summit in Algiers in July 1999, seeking not only to set "in motion the process of relaunching the CSSDCA; but also to persuade his Head of States colleagues to make the OAU the primary institution for resolving conflicts in Africa."⁸⁶

Muammar Ghaddafi's Proposals for Reorganization of OAU

Cognizant of the fact that the two most powerful African leaders, presidents Obasanjo of Nigeria and Mbeki of South Africa, were teaming up to reorganize the OAU for the advancement of their own interests, the Libyan leader Muammar Ghaddafi intervened during the discussion on the item on collective security and conflicts on the African continent. "He invited African leaders to convene an Extraordinary Summit in Sirte, Libya from September 6 to 9, 1999 in order to discuss ways and means of making the OAU effective."⁸⁷ Without any hesitation, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government accepted Ghaddafi's invitation. Given Ghaddafi's longstanding opposition to most of the issues on which presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki sought to refocus the attention of the OAU, why did the two leaders agree to this Extraordinary Summit? This question needs an answer because, as the chief executive of the two most dominant African countries, either of them could have influenced the Assembly of Heads of State and Government to turn down Ghaddafi's invitation, but they did not. Both presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki welcomed Ghaddafi's decision to host the summit because they saw his offer as a good opportunity to reorganize the OAU to reflect their foreign policy goals without having to meet the huge cost involved in hosting an Extraordinary Summit by the OAU Secretariat. For President Mbeki, the summit was a good opportunity to strengthen the OAU to pursue the goal of the African Renaissance, which he initiated.⁸⁸ While Obasanjo saw the summit as a good place to persuade African leaders to accept his reforms agenda to further Nigeria's historical role "as a big brother and giant of Africa, providing security and attempting to spread prosperity as a public good of a benevolent hegemony."⁸⁹

It should be made clear here that Ghaddafi also had his own reasons for convening the Extraordinary Summit of September 1999. Apart from the obvious fact that he wanted to take the credit for relaunching of continental integration initiatives in Africa, his decision to host the summit was also influenced by much broader strategic and geopolitical imperatives. The Libyan leader wanted to use the platform of the summit to cement his full return to the geopolitics of black Africa, as well as to demonstrate his renewed commitment to the Pan-Africanism Project.⁹⁰ It was within this context that Ghaddafi's announcement to the media, after the Algeria OAU Summit that he had invited African leaders for an Extraordinary Summit in his home, in Sirte, Libya to create what he called a *United*

States of Africa.⁹¹ Since Ghaddafi had not, until this moment mentioned anything about the United states of Africa project, and most important to the extent that his invitation did not create any impression that the Extraordinary Summit had been planned before the Algiers Summit, many observers and African leaders interpreted the media announcement as the usual Ghaddafi public display of his power.

It therefore came as a surprise to African leaders attending the Sirte Summit when Ghaddafi opened the summit with an announcement of a United States of Africa Plan. Equally shocking was his insistence that the plan, which entailed the creation of a continental presidency with a five-year term of office, a single military force, and a common African currency, be approved "then and there."⁹² Before the Sirte Summit, the executive council of the OAU had discussed two other proposals and made recommendations on them for the consideration of the assembly. The first was a proposal supported by South Africa, asking the summit to mandate the council of ministers to study and make recommendations on the best ways to overhaul the OAU. The second was a proposal from Nigeria requesting the OAU Summit to recognize the CSSDCA as part of the official work of the OAU and to convene a Ministerial Summit to look at ways of integrating it into the OAU.

Ghaddafi's United States of Africa Proposal meant that African leaders had three competing proposals and interests to consider. To accommodate the three rival demands and interests, the African Summit in Sirte, Libya decided to replace the OAU altogether.⁹³ The council of ministers of the OAU was accordingly asked "to take the necessary measures to prepare the constitutive legal text for a new continental organization for Africa and submit its report to the Thirty-Sixth Ordinary Session of our Assembly in Lome, Togo in June 2000."⁹⁴ In addition, the summit agreed with President Obasanjo's proposals, "to convene an African Ministerial Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, as soon as possible in order to integrate the CSSDCA into the institutional structure of the new organization."⁹⁵

A majority of African leaders adopted this position because they saw it as the best possible way and opportunity of avoiding a division among them. However, Ghaddafi and his supporters presented the Sirte decision to the media as a victory for them. In actual fact, a careful reading of the Sirte Declaration shows that the position adopted by the summit favored Nigeria and South Africa tactically more than Libya or any other countries. As subsequent events showed, the victory declared by Ghaddafi and his sympathizers was somewhat premature. Although many of the leaders who spoke during the Sirte Summit cautiously welcomed Ghaddafi's Proposals, it was clear from their speeches that most of them saw it as too radical

and excessively ambitious. It therefore did not take too long for those who disagreed with the whole idea to voice their opposition publicly. South Africa, for instance, had a firm hand in the drafting of the Constitutive Act of the AU, and indicated that "it will not be part of any United States of Africa, and consequently opposed the inclusion of Ghaddafi's Plan in the recommendation of the Council of Ministers."⁹⁶ Not surprisingly, the constitutive legal text which was approved at the Lome Summit in June 2000 contained none of the ideas of the *United States of Africa*, as proposed by Muammar Ghaddafi. South Africa's dominance in the drafting of the Constitutive Act shed light on the AU's strong focus on the advancement of human rights, democracy, and good governance as well as of African Renaissance.

Though loosely based on the European Union (EU), the AU model adopted in Durban in July 2002 had Nigeria and South Africa's footprints all over it. Many of Africa's big men were not impressed. In fact, they resented the manner in which Nigeria and South Africa had usurped control of the organization. Muammar Ghaddafi, former Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi, and Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe were the chief opponents of AU. For Ghaddafi Arab leaders in Africa had fallen out with him in 1998, when they refused to endorse an OAU resolution rejecting UN sanctions against Libya for refusing to hand over the two Libyans suspects in the 1988 bombing of Pan-AM 103 aircraft over Lockerbie, Scotland.⁹⁷

Ghaddafi Reinventing Himself

Having failed to unite the Arab World behind him, Ghaddafi turned to Africa as his new support base.⁹⁸ Inaction by the continent's major players, such as Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt left Muammar Ghaddafi with a free hand to try to dominate the politics of AU. Ghaddafi has never hesitated to use his country's vast oil and gas riches to promote his foreign policy objectives in Africa and the Arab World. His most willing supporters have been countries that benefited from Libya bilateral assistance. For example, at the Sirte Summit in 1999, he paid the arrears of the membership fees of Cape Verde, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, and Niger to enable them to meet OAU requirements for participation in the pre-AU proceedings and voting.⁹⁹

Although Ghaddafi had been at the forefront of the formation of the AU, presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki soon eclipsed him. In his reinvention

of himself as a man of peace, Ghaddafi has emerged as presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki's rival in Africa, and internationally, in both the economic and political spheres. Western leaders, previously the Libya's harshest critics, not only accepted to work with Ghaddafi since he had handed over to the British government, the two suspects in the 1988 bombing of a Pan-AM 103 aircraft over Lockerbie, Scotland; but were also charmed by the oil and gas largesse that Ghaddafi had offered them. European leaders and especially, their oil and gas (multinational corporations) business executives are now frequent visitors to Ghaddafi and "sipping tea with him in the former pariah's desert tent, surrounded by throngs of Ghaddafi's trademark women guards."¹⁰⁰ For example, in May 2004, Ghaddafi was enthusiastically received by the president of the European Commission, Romani Prodi in Brussels, when he proclaimed that Libya would be the new bridge between Europe and Africa.¹⁰¹ As part of the Western leaders' dramatic diplomatic moves to Muammar Ghaddafi, the French president, Jacques Chirac, visited Libya in November 2004 after Libya agreed in January 2004 to pay compensation over the downing in 1989 of a French airliner over Niger even though Libya, which signed a compensation agreement for victims of the 1988 Pan-AM 103 airliner bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland, never publicly admitted responsibility for either incident.

In March 2006, Libya and France signed a cooperation agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy,¹⁰² the first deal of its kind since Libya abandoned its efforts in December 2003 to build weapons of mass destruction. As Maatuk, the Libyan minister of public Works puts it, "This accord represents a qualitative leap in relations between the two countries and proves that Libya has transformed its weapons of mass destruction into constructive weapons. We are telling the World that we are moving towards the development of Libyan nuclear technology for peaceful purposes."¹⁰³ In addition, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced on May 15, 2006 that the United States was restoring full diplomatic relations with Libya. Condoleezza Rice said that

United States would reopen its Embassy, shuttered after a mob set fire to it in 1979, and remove Libya from the list of state sponsors of terrorism within 45 days. Just as 2003 marked a turning point for the Libyan peoples, so too could 2006 mark turning points for the peoples of Iran and North Korea, and calling Libya an *important model* for resolving the disputes with Tehran and Pyongyang.¹⁰⁴

In any event, Ghaddafi had convinced many African leaders that he genuinely had the continent's best interests at heart. For instance, former Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda warmly acknowledged this, and the

former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Anna told the African Summit in Lusaka in 2001 that "I would like to pay tribute to leader Ghaddafi for spearheading this development of formation of the African Union."¹⁰⁵ It should be noted that Libya was one of the supporters of a controversial Resolution by African foreign ministers on the eve of the AU's Lusaka Summit of 2001 that expressed support for President Mugabe's controversial land policies, without a whimper about the ZANU-PF inspired violence Zimbabwe. Both presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki had to work hard to block that resolution, and finally got it watered down to a fairly innocuous statement supporting continued talks on the issue between Britain and Zimbabwe.¹⁰⁶

The ultimate battle for control of the AU pitted Africa's old guard, personified by Colonel Ghaddafi, against the young Turks, led by presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki. While the old guards were still bitter against colonialism and the need for Africa to carve out a future independent of the West, the young Turks maintained that the development discourse had undergone a fundamental shift, and that Africa needed to be integrated into the global economic system and engage the west more directly. But Colonel Ghaddafi wanted a new organization to be called the United States of Africa, headquartered in Tripoli, Libya. He offered a plush palace in the Libyan capital for this purpose, and even hinted that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, South Africa's Foreign Minister could be the AU's first foreign minister, with himself as the leader of the new organization. Unfortunately, Ghaddafi's efforts failed dismally.

The Young Turks saw the new organization as something more like the EU, with member-states retaining their own identities, and the AU working closely with the West. The battle for the leadership of AU extended to which countries would have seats in the proposed Peace and Security Council, modeled on the United Nations' Security Council. This would be one of the AU's most powerful organs, with the authority to intervene in the affairs of member-states and deploy a combined African military force to troubled spots or on peacekeeping missions. Ghaddafi saw the main purpose of the force as protecting the continent from external aggression, but President Mbeki's allies won the day.

Muammar Ghaddafi and the old guards were vehemently opposed to the inclusion of a prescription for good governance in the AU Charter. However, last minute intervention by South Africa ensure that the draft Charter made good governance a culture of human rights prerequisites for accrual of benefit from the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development.¹⁰⁷ South Africa also proposed that the AU would have to act when human rights were trampled. The proposed Charter made provisions for the AU to "intervene in a member-state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely, war crimes, genocide

and crimes against humanity. Any member state failing to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union may be subjected to sanctions.”¹⁰⁸

The total rejection of the United States of Africa Proposal and the strong emphasis placed by the Constitutive Legal text on liberal norms were a big blow to the plan by the Libyan leader. Ghaddafi’s disappointment with the whole process was evident in his pronouncements. In response to a question posed by a journalist trying to solicit his opinion on the assembly’s approval of the Constitutive Act during the Lome Summit in June 2000, Ghaddafi remarked: “It’s a victory for Africa. I am proud because I still have a grand ambition for the African continent and I have fixed a date with the Heads of State in Sirte in March 2001.”¹⁰⁹ Ghaddafi’s dissatisfaction with the turn of events explains why he came to the inaugural ceremony of the AU in Durban in 2002, “With a range of proposed amendments to the Constitutive Act. His proposed amendments included a single army for Africa, an AU Chairman with presidential status and greater powers of intervention in member states.”¹¹⁰ However, the chairperson of the summit, who incidentally happened to be President Mbeki, exploited Rule Eight of the new rules of procedure of the AHSG.¹¹¹ South Africa invoked Rule Eight, stipulating that items proposed by a member-state must be presented sixty days before a meeting and supporting documents and draft decisions sent to the chairperson of the commission thirty days ahead of the session to prevent Libya from tabling the proposal.

Therefore, the launching of the AU went ahead on July 9, 2002 without consideration of Libya’s proposal. Immediately after the inaugural ceremony, Ghaddafi tabled a motion requesting the AHSG to convene another Extraordinary Summit as soon as possible to amend the Constitutive Act. The assembly accepted Libya’s invitation, and referred the proposal for the consideration of the executive council, pursuant to the rules of procedure of the AHSG. While the assembly’s acceptance of Libya’s invitation seems to indicate Ghaddafi’s influence over the African leaders, the support for the Extraordinary Summit from the great majority of them had nothing to do with Ghaddafi’s proposal. There were certainly few African leaders who genuinely felt that Libya had a case, and there were those who caved in to Libya’s request to keep “a potential troublesome member (state) as Ghaddafi within the African Union.”¹¹²

Gender (Women) Equality in the AU

However, an important and much overlooked factor in convening the Durban 2002 Summit was the pressure brought to bear on African leaders

by women's rights activists. Before the Durban Summit, representatives of civil society working on gender and development had mounted a spirited campaign aimed at increasing the participation of women in the AU.¹¹³ Having successfully lobbied the council of ministers in February 2001 to agree to promote their participation, the women's groups appeared at the Durban Summit in July 2002 demanding further reforms.¹¹⁴ Central to the demands of the women groups was a request for the AHSG to amend the Constitutive Act (CA) so that the promotion of gender equality could be added to the objectives of the AU. The women groups also wanted the AHSG to remove all the gender-insensitive phrases in the Constitutive Legal Text. All the diplomats accredited to the AU indicated that many of the leaders, such as Presidents Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, John Kufuor of Ghana, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, and Obasanjo of Nigeria, who considered themselves progressive, became embarrassed when their attention was drawn to some of the gender-insensitive phrases in the Constitutive Act.¹¹⁵ In fact, diplomatic sources indicated that, had it not been for the concerns of the women's groups, South Africa would have objected to the Extraordinary Summit. Thus, just like many other AU members, South Africa's support for convening the Extraordinary Summit was primarily motivated by the issues that the women groups raised.¹¹⁶ The influence of the women groups in part explains why South Africa enthusiastically supported an amendment to the Constitutive Act that replaced the phrase *founding fathers* with *founders*, and in part account for South Africa's support for the inclusion of a clause in the Constitutive Act that make effective participation of women in decision making one of the central objectives of the AU.¹¹⁷ Thus, the ten members of the peace and security council of the AU is made up of five men and five women, while the sixteen member commissioners are composed of nine men and seven women. One of the most important achievements of the women groups is that the new Pan-African Parliament created by AU at its first sitting, made history by electing a woman; Tanzania's Gertude Ibengwe Mongella as the president.¹¹⁸ As with the AHSG, only a handful of executive members, composed primarily of the same people who had rejected similar ideas during the drafting of the Constitutive Act, were interested in Libya's proposal. Many of them did not even find it appealing enough to require a full Ministerial Summit. The executive council therefore, decided to refer Libya's amendment proposal to an ad hoc ministerial committee. While this committee was considering a date for its meetings, the executive council further agreed to convene an Extraordinary Ministerial Summit in Tripoli in December 2002 in response to Libya's invitation. It is interesting to note that Libya's proposal, the basis for requesting the Extraordinary Summit was not put on the agenda of the executive council meeting in Tripoli. However, it decided

to consider the report of the Ad Hoc Committee before the meeting of the AHSG in February 2003 in Addis Ababa. The Ad Hoc Committee, whose work was dominated by South Africa and Nigeria, held its meetings in Sun City, South Africa in January 2003. As expected, it rejected almost all the ideas contained in Libya's proposal for amendment, while those elements that were accepted were revised extensively. The report submitted for the consideration of the executive council and subsequently approval of the AHSG as the amendment to the Constitutive Act had little in common with the original proposal. In fact, with the exception of two clauses that drew their insights from Libya's proposal, the amendment that was adopted by African leaders at the Extraordinary Summit in Addis Ababa on February 3, 2003 conceded little to Ghaddafi's United States of Africa Plan. The two clauses that can be credited to Colonel Ghaddafi is that one concerning the extension of grounds for intervention to include serious threats to legitimate order to restore peace and stability, and that concerning preventing members of the union from renouncing their membership. Nigeria also got what it wanted, because the amendment contained a clause that made the Peace and Security Council an organ of the AU.¹¹⁹

Undoubtedly, the ideas and interests of presidents Obasanjo of Nigeria and Mbeki of South Africa, and to a limited extent, Colonel Ghaddafi of Libya are driving force that led to the reorganization of the OAU to AU. These competing sets of interests and ideas present enormous challenges and great opportunities for the development of a new, better, and effective continental organization. One obvious problem that is likely to emerge in the near future is that the conflicting nature of the three positions; particularly, the contradictions inherent in Ghaddafi's aspirations for the creation of the United States of Africa (Continental African government),¹²⁰ on the one hand, presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki's neoliberal integration agenda, and on the other, will make agreement at the assembly of heads of state and government level difficult. However, the conflicting interests appear to provide a good recipe for a stalemate. Thus, as the experience of the EU suggests the success of the EU is largely attributed to the effective exploitation of a similar rivalry between leaders of Germany, France, and Britain, the EU officials, and others. The competing interests could be used to make the AU function effectively. This is because the conflicting interests will provide a leeway for the AU bureaucrats to exercise the decisive entrepreneurial leadership.

More precisely, the different interests at stake have opened up the space for the AU commissioners to advance independent proposals to ensure that the outcomes of agreements reached by the African leaders reflect the general welfare of Africans, rather than the parochial interests of ruling elites that used to dominate OAU. They have also created room for

the commissioners to develop proposals that draw the attention of African leaders to common problems and their solutions, set the agenda of the AU to mediate compromises, and to ensure that the interests of African leaders converge. Since civil society groups have become a central force in African politics, the commissioners can mobilize civil society and domestic interest groups to support specific proposals that would serve the interests of the African masses. They can also draw on the support of these groups to influence African leaders to be receptive to their proposals. It is in this respect that the election of the historian and former Malian president, Alpha Oumar Konare as chairperson of the AU commissioners is very significant. Being a former president and an academic, Konare is well placed to chart an independent development path for the AU. He not only has the political clout, but has strategic position as an interlocutor between the AU bureaucrats, African consultants, think-tanks in Africa, and civil society groups; on the one hand, and ruling elites on the other should provide him with superior inhouse knowledge that he can easily exploit to initiate negotiations and ensure that the interests of the politicians converge.

In essence, the early development of the AU will depend, to a large extent on two key conditions. First, the success of the AU will center on how effectively the commissioners, especially the chairperson, will be able to use their privileged positions and access to information and ideas to reach agreements among African leaders. Second, the development of the AU will also depend on the kind of working relations established by the commissioners between the institutional structure of the continental organization and regional civil society organizations as well as grassroots civil society groups. This working relationship will determine the AU's success because, in addition to the broad civil society support that the commissioners will need to ensure that the politicians agree on issues that advance the general interests of Africans. However, the assistance of grassroots organizations will be required to implement the agreements reached. Thus, one hopes that the working relationship established by the commissioners of the AU between African politicians and civil society groups that worked in trade policy advocacy in July 2003 for the World Trade Organization in Cancun, Mexico will be extended to other issue areas.

Another reason why the competing interests should make one guardedly hopeful is because they are, perhaps, the only way to solve the perennial lack of genuine political will on the part of African leaders to implement international agreements. The competing interests are making the leaders of Nigeria, South Africa, and Libya demonstrates commitment to the entire AU process. With the leaders of Algeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Senegal gradually pushing for similarly preeminent roles in continental Africa, one would expect the AU Summits to be more than mere

talking shop before the transformation from OAU to AU. As shown by all the summits held, between 2002 and 2008 by the AU, unlike the OAU, the leading African states are demonstrating some credible commitment to the work of the AU, particularly the unanimous position rejecting Sudan's taking over the chairmanship of the AU in 2006.¹²¹

One way to sustain this commitment and avoid unnecessary rivalry among African leaders is to rotate the three-year-term seats in the peace and security council among the relatively powerful countries in each of the five subregions of Africa¹²² in exchange for a leading role and bigger burden sharing of AU activities in their subregions. Thus, instead of giving a permanent seat status to Nigeria or South Africa, Libya, Egypt, or Kenya, as a proposal submitted by Libya at the Durban Summit suggests, the AU can identify countries that are willing to play lead roles, including willingness to bear the larger share of the costs, and then rotate the three-year-term seats among them. However, to avoid accusations that the bigger African nations are monopolizing the AU for their hegemonic interests, it will be a good idea for the organization to locate the headquarters of the majority of its institutions in the smaller member states.

Conclusion

The failure of the OAU to apply a vigorous political will in search of lasting solution to some of African problems must be viewed in a larger historical perspective. To begin with, there is fragmented postcolonial state system. There is the troubled and declining economy and distorted state. There is much political unrest, instability, civil wars, famine, military coups, all of which have undermined Africa's confidence and dampened the earlier enthusiasm of the 1960s. In each state, perceived national or domestic needs have dictated harmful and failed policy options, including costly militarization in the continent. Such conditions do not foster bold and encouraging moves in the settlement of disputes, but instead induce caution and inaction. However, the gap between promise and performance is too wide for comfort. And in view of prevailing international economic and legal order that does not favor developing nations, especially Africa, the Pan-Africanist aspiration of political unity, economic prosperity, and social progress remains a distance dream at best. In that context, it can be fairly said that the resolutions and plans of action may be difficult to accomplish on a short term but possible on a long term.

The OAU has played a useful role in Africa's liberation, particularly in the liberation of Southern African states, and in the settlement of some of

the continental conflicts, but the failures far outweigh the successes. The OAU was a financially weak organization whose member states could not be compelled to pay dues. There was no enforcement machinery to give its resolutions a binding force and effect. However, making dues payment compulsory and creating enforcement machineries have been entertained as alternatives, only to be abandoned because of the fear they might split or drive out member-states. Thus, this remains as an unresolved dilemma.

This chapter has examined how attempts by African leaders to accommodate the interests of the three countries, Libya, Nigeria, and South Africa at an Extraordinary OAU Summit held in Sirte, Libya in September 1999 led to the reorganization of the OAU to the AU. However, presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki were more successful than Colonel Ghaddafi at influencing African leaders to accept their proposals. While Ghaddafi reinvented himself, he has managed to influence them to adopt some of his proposals, thus, the entire AU is a composite of foreign policy interests and preferences of South Africa and Nigeria.

With the transition of the OAU to the AU, many African leaders now recognize that this continental organization can be a useful tool for the pursuit of their national interests, and indeed, the development of their countries as well. Unlike the annual OAU Summits, which many leaders saw as social events for lofty but inconsequential debates, the discussions at the AU Annual Summits of 2002 to 2008 were conducted in a business-like fashion. Whether this seriousness will continue and be directed toward effective continental institution building will depend on the leadership qualities of the AU commissioners, and the new generation of African leaders.

African leaders should focus immediate attention on creating the necessary infrastructural backbone for the continent. Much needs to be done in providing electricity, roads, rail, and sea and air transportation on a continental basis. The AU should first create and strengthen all the necessary subregional institutions for continental integration. This will serve as the foundation for the administrative and political superstructure we all dream about and hope for the United States of Africa. And beyond this, the challenge of good governance in the various African countries would have to be addressed seriously, as a precondition for ensuring a sense of ownership of our continental agenda among all Africans.

Perhaps, the current winds of democratic change, which has transformed the OAU to the AU, and the formation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as an economic arm of the AU (see the next chapter for details on NEPAD); with its peer review mechanism encouraging change and good development. African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was instituted in 2003 by the AU to deepen the rule of law and other

attributes of good governance through National Governing Councils that independently monitor and access the activities of their political leaders. APRM is critical to the quest of Africa to make a difference in the twenty-first century. As of April 2007, Only Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda have gone through the entire cycle of implementation of APRM, while twenty-six out of fifty-four countries of the AU have signed up to the process. In addition, the African Charter of Democracy, Elections, and Good Governance are a good initiative. These new initiatives by a new generation of African leaders will help foster a proper and better reappraisal, and reorientation of policy and action to reflect the popular will in the twenty-first-century Africa. The central drama of Africa in the twenty-first century will be seen in the response to these new challenges and opportunities, and this is a critical mission that the AU has a historical responsibility. Therefore, given the necessary political will and sacrifices on the part of new African leaders, the AU's future is promising.

Chapter 8

New Partnership for Africa's Development: Politics of Dependence

Africa will have to rely upon Africa: African Governments will have to formulate, and carry out policies of maximum national and collective self-reliance. If they do they will develop; if they don't Africa will be doomed.

—Julius K. Nyerere¹

Our dream of Africa's rebirth as we enter the new millennium depends as much as anything on each country and each regional grouping on the continent committing itself to the principles of democracy, respect for human rights and the basic tenets of good governance. Among SADC's basic principles are respect for the sovereignty of member states and non-interference in one another's internal affairs. This is the basis of good governance on the inter-state level. But these considerations cannot blunt or totally override our common concern for democracy, human rights and good governance in all our constituent states. Can we continue to give comfort to member states whose actions go so diametrically against the values and principles we hold so dear and for which we struggled so long and so hard?

—Nelson Mandela²

Introduction

From the earlier statements, what conclusions can we draw from our study of African problems in terms of formulas that are as clear as possible and easy to apply? That the idea of an "African Renaissance" has found a place of pride in African political discourse since the colonial days is not in

dispute. Cheikh Anta Diop of Senegal first used it within the context of the African struggle against colonial rule, intending to capture the dreams and aspirations of the people of Africa in their quest for self-determination.³ With the end of apartheid system in 1994, a new South Africa emerged as a power in shaping African continental politics.

According to William Mervin Gumedé,

From the moment he became the ANC President, and thus Mandela's heir apparent, Mbeki pondered the question which those in his inner circle claim cost him many a sleepless night. How was he to stamp his own image on the country's highest office when the larger-than-life Mandela vacated it? The answer, say members of his inner circle, came to him early one morning in the cabin of an aircraft ferrying him to Europe. He would follow his natural calling to lead an economic, spiritual, social, cultural and political renewal of the entire African continent.⁴

Consequently, Thabo Mbeki resurrected the term "African Renaissance" as his country aspires to take a leading role in the economic and political transformation of the continent. Thus, Mbeki by 2001 was ready to translate his vision into a policy framework, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Inspired to change his country, the continent, and indeed, the world, into a caring society and fortified with a new ideology; South Africa joined Nigeria to end crippling wars that give Africa a bad name. Meanwhile, vast amounts of time and money were spent on efforts to broker peace in Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Sudan.⁵

Background to NEPAD

African Renaissance Plan sponsored by President Mbeki of South Africa, the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Program, also known as Millennium Action Plan (MAP) cosponsored by presidents Obasanjo of Nigeria, Mbeki of South Africa, and Algeria's President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was launched in February 2001. The plan's central objective is that Africa's development that depends on its full involvement in the global economy, requires a mixture of reform in Africa and assistance from other countries. The plan envisaged establishing peace and democratic governance; respect for human rights; combating diseases; providing health care and education for African peoples; and encouraging trade and investments rather than asking for aid.⁶ A similar plan was conceived and launched by President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal in January 2001, and known as

OMEGA Plan. The plan aims at enabling Africa to take full advantage of globalization through long-term financing of priority projects in the areas of infrastructure, education, health, and agriculture at the subregional and continental levels.⁷

At the end of the Cold War, it had become clear that the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) and other such programs had failed to deal effectively with African problems. As the twenty-first century approached, the continent remained pervaded by chaos, ethnic violence, civil wars, poor economic performance, rampant corruption, and public apathy with self-centered leaders ruling most of the countries in Africa. Therefore, the need for new thinking with new strategies to address the problems of underdevelopment in the continent cannot be said to be overemphasized. As a consequence of policy advice by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and at the request of African ministers of finance following November 2000, meeting in Addis Ababa; the two plans, the Millennium Action Plan for African Recovery and OMEGA Plan were merged, named, and endorsed as the New African Initiative (NAI), at the July 2001, African Summit in Lusaka, Zambia. During the implementation discussions in Abuja, Nigeria, in October 2001, African leaders agreed to change the name of the combined program to NEPAD.⁸ The NEPAD not only commits African leaders to eradicate poverty but also calls for a new partnership between Africa and donor countries and organizations, and grouped within the Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA). Each of Africa's five subregions is expected to identify projects in the eight priority sectors of the NEPAD, namely good governance, infrastructure, education, health care, agriculture, new information/communication technologies, energy, and market access.⁹ Thus, NEPAD is aimed at creating a better climate for Africa in the global economy. At the G8 Summit in July 2001 in Genoa, Italy, Presidents Obasanjo, Mbeki, Wade, and Bouteflika presented their strategy for African renewal to the G8 leaders. It was agreed at the Genoa Summit that the G8 should come up with an African Action Plan (AAP) as a response: "The New Partnership for Africa's Development is a call for a new relationship of partnership between Africa and the international community, especially the highly industrialized countries, to overcome the development chasm that has widened over centuries of unequal relations."¹⁰

Most Africans consider themselves to be marginalized from the affairs of their countries, the continent, and the world. To succeed, an African Renaissance must end the economic discrimination faced by the continent and blunt the anger that peoples of Africa, feel toward an international system that reinforces what has justifiably been referred to as global apartheid.¹¹ Thus, success will depend not in rhetorical flourishes, but in

putting bread on the tables of ordinary Africans, giving them a say in how their countries are run, and making their leaders accountable.

Unfortunately, the biggest beneficiaries so far have been those who were already well off, and with respect to a new South Africa:

South Africa's white businesses are riding the crest of the African Renaissance wave and the government's outreach to developing countries, and especially to African countries. New Partnership for Africa's Development has been seized on just as eagerly, giving rise to an entire cottage industry of conferences, dinners, workshops, and consultancies, and white South African accents can now be heard throughout the *black* Africa, as business has conquered the continent.¹²

Although new investments have been welcomed, many Africans complain that white entrepreneurs have taken with them loathsome and uncaring labor practices and racist interpersonal skills. For instance, in Mozambique, one of the white South Africa's favorite getaways, the pristine shoreline is being systematically destroyed by columns of four-wheel drive vehicles, banned on South Africa's own beaches. More significant, in many cases, South Africa's black businesses are not different because they treat indigenes of other African countries with barely disguised disdain. Parastatals such as South African power utility, the Eskom, and the country's transport group, the Transnet have stormed ahead to capture the continent. Indeed, they have stakes in many African countries, including Nigeria. Between 1998 and 2000, South Africa's trade with the rest of the continent grew by 36 percent, with an estimated cumulative surplus of R60 billion (Rand-South African currency).¹³

South Africa's role as a continental economic power with Nigeria as its rival, was viewed with deep suspicion elsewhere on the continent. Concerns that the country instinctively sides with the West were reinforced when South Africa hosted the United Nations Conference on Racism in August 2001. For instance, many African leaders wanted reparations placed on the agenda of the conference, but when countries such as Denmark and Germany threatened to slash aid if this plan went ahead, President Mbeki found himself in a dilemma. In the end, his ally, President Obasanjo, managed a face-saving compromise that saw the issue of reparations watered down in the communique issued after the conference. When South Africa bid to host the 2004 Olympics, not a single first-round African vote was in its favor. Similarly, when South Africa won the bid to host the 2010 Football World Cup (FIFA), none of the African ballots played a role. With the fuzzy African Renaissance framework in place, the Mbeki supporters turned their attention to the need for fresh leaders and credible

economic policies.¹⁴ However, finding the new leaders presented the bigger problems, as there was never any doubt that Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) should serve as the economic model for the rest of the African continent. Consequently, Mbeki criss-crossed Africa to sound out leaders with the right democratic credentials to champion the plan, courting presidents Obasanjo, Wade, Bouteflika, Mkapa, Chissano, and Mogae. For Thabo Mbeki, "A global human society based on poverty for many and prosperity for a few, characterized by islands of wealth surrounded by a sea of poverty, is unsustainable."¹⁵ He puts a trusted and business-friendly Wiseman Nkuhlu in charge of assembling both the nuts and bolts of what would eventually become known as NEPAD. However, the entire concept was nearly aborted when President Wade of Senegal, with French backing, came up with a hastily conceived rival plan that would effectively divide Francophone Africa from the rest of Africa. France is known for being a spoiler just as the experience of independence of ECOWAS/CEAO demonstrated in the early 1970s.¹⁶ With the intervention of President Obasanjo, Mbeki persuaded President Wade that the two plans should be married, and warned him of the danger of falling into a Western trap of divide and rule.

NEPAD was touted as nothing less than the African equivalent of America's Marshall Plan that rebuilt Europe after the end of the Second World War. On the emergence of NEPAD, South Africa's finance minister, Trevor Manuel, has this much to say: "when the global economy is pregnant with favorable opportunities, its true purpose, however, is to serve as the centerpiece of the Mbeki government's initiatives to address what is wrong in the world."¹⁷

Opponents of NEPAD within the South African Government have argued that Mbeki would be better served, "by putting his energy into the domestic delivery as the best antidote to negative perceptions and Afro-pessimism. And there is a need for Africans to undertake an initiative to ensure better governance, end conflicts and embark on sustainable development."¹⁸ Joel Netshitenzhe, countered the opponents of NEPAD when he noted that

This is not merely a matter of African patriotism or some ephemeral love for the continent, but is impelled by profound South African self-interest. How so? South Africa shall never be an island in a sea of poverty. Furthermore, a growing aggregate demand in Africa is critical for South Africa's own industrial development. South Africa has its own medium and long term needs in respect of such resources as water and energy, and the potential presented by such marvels as the Congo River Basin not only present opportunities for South Africa, but will help create mutual dependency that is crucial for true integration.¹⁹

Few would disagree that only radical action could turn the African continent's fortunes. Africa has 12 percent of the world's population, more than 30 percent of the world's poorest people, and approximately 50 percent of the global number of people living with HIV/AIDS.²⁰ The continent exports 30 percent more in 2005 than it did in 1980, but receives 40 percent less income than it did in the same period. After more than two decades of the so-called Structure Adjustment Programs (SAP), unemployment rates were pegged at an average of 35 percent continent wide. The black Africa has a foreign debt of more than \$170 billion as of 2004, and pays creditors \$40 million a week to service debts accumulated as a result of the Cold War, apartheid policy, corruption, and mismanagement of the economy, and failed projects.²¹

NEPAD was not the first attempt to fashion an African wide development initiative. Since the 1960s, there have been efforts by domestic and external actors to transform the continent and improve the African peoples' ability to engage in sustainable development, such as East African Community (EAC), 1967, Mano River Union (MRU), 1973, Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), 1980, and others.²² Several earlier homegrown plans were quickly shot down by international financial institutions such as the World Bank because they did not fit into the ubiquitous Washington consensus paradigm.²³

Goals and Strategies of NEPAD

For instance, proponents of NEPAD have argued that there is a nexus between development, peace, security, democracy, and good governance. African leaders are expected to commit themselves to good governance, respect for human rights, democracy and sound economic policies, and must monitor one another through the peer review mechanism of NEPAD. NEPAD sees the state creating an environment conducive to direct foreign investments by protecting property rights, guaranteeing the rule of law, and providing social and economic infrastructure. However, NEPAD fails to recognize that the African state is traditionally weak due to the colonial legacy of fragmentation and the effects of economic globalization.²⁴ Mismanagement of the economy, corruption, and the failing state is at the heart of Africa's underdevelopment.

With few exceptions, African countries had no proper state to speak of at independence. All of them had to start from the scratch to foster the rule of law and create one regime where none existed, and "building a modern nation state is much more urgent."²⁵ Also, many African countries do not

have properly elected and constituted national legislatures. Indeed, many are ruled by one-party system, military regimes, and monarchies. This is a crucial issue, since NEPAD's decision-making structures must comprise representatives from national parliaments. The entire plan is based on the concept of good governance in Africa in exchange for direct foreign investments from the industrialized North. As Mahmood Mamdani has observed that "South Africa's paltry post apartheid foreign development investment (FDI) should be a warning to the naïve."²⁶

Nonetheless, NEPAD has a number of admirable goals that essentially reflect those of the United Nations Millennium Development Program (UNMDP).²⁷ For instance, an annual African growth rate of 7 percent for 15 years; cutting poverty in half by 2025; reduction of infant mortality rates by 66 percent; a 25 percent reduction in maternal mortality rates; and schooling for every eligible child. To attain these goals, NEPAD has two broad approaches. First, it will focus on specific economic projects, such as building a hydroelectric dam at Inga on the Congo River, and the introduction of new farming techniques, especially mechanized system. A continental electricity grid is envisaged by 2010, mass production of generic anti-AIDS drugs is to be launched in South Africa, and cyberspace (dot-com force) of specialists teaching computer skills created.²⁸ African leaders are to embark on concerted efforts to identify the continent's comparative advantages and aggressively market them. Second, NEPAD is to focus on longer-term political changes designed to entrench the rule of law, good governance, and business codes among participating countries.

NEPAD plan is vague on details and there is much confusion over its policy prescriptions. Its architects say vagueness is essential to secure the widest possible backing for the plan, which is still being discussed at the level of heads of state and government.²⁹ First, where will the money to execute the plan come from? The hope is that the envisaged 7 percent growth rate would be achieved on the back of increased exports and by securing an additional \$64 billion in indirect foreign investments each year.³⁰ The fundamental difference between NEPAD and earlier African development plans, such as the LPA of 1980, is the strong focus on democracy and good governance, and the call for a new international partnership between Africa and the industrialized North. NEPAD "breaks new ground in speaking to Western democracies in Western democratic language."³¹ Proponents of the plan argue that in the prevailing global climate, NEPAD represents the only pragmatic option for getting anything at all from the rich countries, and that a more radical set of proposals would have been a nonstarter. Ultimately, the proponents of NEPAD would like to see a free trade zone running the full breadth and length of Africa, from Dakar

to Nairobi and from the Cape to Cairo, linking the economies of the West to the East and the North to South of the continent. The European Union (EU) has signed free trade agreements individually with Southern African Development Community (SADC). In addition, with the encouragement of the United States, Egypt, and the North Africa Consultative Community (Maghreb), and some countries in black Africa that adhered to its conditions of good governance, including Nigeria and South Africa, have not only joined EU's conditions of good governance but also joined a selective trade pact, called the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).³² The act specifically stipulates that "before any African country can benefit from AGOA, it must comply with International Monetary Fund rules, requiring reorganization of domestic economic and social policies including, cuts in domestic spending, and corporate tax rates, and broad privatization through divestiture."³³ The act specifically requires African countries to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), and comply with its trade liberalization rules. This pact is heavily weighted in favor of the United States, and many African businesses have collapsed against this unfair trade competition.

Globalization and Critique of NEPAD

Globalization is a new form of imperialism-*neocolonialism*. Like imperialism or colonialism, it is marked by domination, exploitation, and destruction of the weak, the poor, if possible. It is economic order that subordinates political and social systems to conform to the logic of global markets and capital, grafted on local labor. It is a system that polarizes societies externally and internally into beneficiaries and victims.³⁴ While globalization is characterized by "cross-national flows of goods, investment, production and technology," these flows are asymmetrical, favoring the developed dominant industrialized states.³⁵ It is a deepening form of dependency rather than interdependence that best explains the effect of globalization on Africa. Globalization is a neocolonial ideological rationalization for ruthless capitalism exported to Africa and other developing nations without being subject to the constraints of national systemic modifiers with the capacity to discipline capital for the benefit of the national public interest. However, globalization can offer a great opportunity, but only if African governments manage it carefully and with greater concern for empowering the poor.

Critics of NEPAD complain that NEPAD is a facsimile of Western, especially Washington consensus on governance and fiscal management and is likely to further subjugate the continent within the global

system, enslaving Africa's economies and leading to further marginalization of African peoples. As George Monbiot, a columnist with the London *Guardian* observed, "African countries can demand a change of government, but they cannot demand a change in policy. Democracy in Africa is meaningless until its leaders are prepared to challenge the external control of their economies."³⁶ While its supporters claim that NEPAD is the first comprehensive development plan for Africans to come out of poverty, critics counter that NEPAD is designed to please foreign donors and investors rather than the continent's own governments and citizens. For example, on January 9, 2002, representatives of some 200 social movements, organizations, and institutions meeting in Bamako, Mali, issued "The Bamako Declaration," rejecting what they believe was NEPAD's obsession with neoliberalism and its willingness to integrate Africa into what is essentially an unjust global trade system.³⁷ Again in March 2002, the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference (SACBC) condemned NEPAD, calling it "an ambiguous plan and some of its proposals dubious. The bishops averred that NEPAD may not achieve its purpose because of lack of consultation with those the plan will affect."³⁸

The former British prime minister, Tony Blair, endorsed NEPAD, and he remarked; "This is the best chance in a generation for us (the West) to make the partnership between the West and Africa works."³⁹ These were sentiments endorsed by Thabo Mbeki when he addressed the United Nations General Assembly in September 2002, emphasizing that the partnership had to be based on an equal footing: "We seek to ensure that we move away from the donor-recipient relationship with the developed world to a new partnership based on mutual respect as well as shared responsibility and accountability."⁴⁰ But can African nations do without foreign aid, especially aid from the West? African leaders, led by presidents Obasanjo, Mbeki, Wade, and Bouteflika, presented NEPAD for Western financial support at the G8 Summit in Genoa, Italy in July 2001. They requested for \$64 billion aid in terms of direct foreign investments in Africa for a period of five years. But partnership in a context of disproportionate power relations amounts to little more than domination. Very instructive, a British Foreign Office briefing proclaimed, "They have defined a new paradigm for the development relationship, we are dancing to their tune, but at least it is our own dance."⁴¹ This is another strategy of encouraging dependency of Africa on the West.

One of the strongest critics of NEPAD was the Gambia President Yahya Jammeh who was very skeptical about the project and pointed out that

Africa's socio-economic development must come from us (Africans). NEPAD will never work. You come up with a programme and depend on

nothing but begging. I, Yahya Jammeh, will not kneel down before any man and beg. I will only kneel before God. If NEPAD is an African project, why take it to the Westerners to approve it? Was it necessary to take it to the G8 summit? That is why I am skeptical about it. Did G8 bring their agenda to Africa for us to approve it? If the problem is an African one, what I believe is that before talking to the G8—the very People who are responsible for the problems we have today—we should have brought it to Africa, and each country should have gathered its intellectuals and allowed them to debate it, as we did with the African Union Project. We need the input of the masses. They are the ones who can make it happen and the ones to pay the taxes and who will do the work in order to translate it to reality. But some said no and packed it up, took it to the G8—the grandfathers.⁴²

However, Jammeh stressed that “he had nothing against the West; all he wanted was for Africans to be treated with respect because the West was developed through African blood, sweat, tears, and African resources.”⁴³

Other critics have argued that NEPAD has given a lifeline to global financial institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and WTO, which face a huge credibility problem. International financial and currency volatility, such as the Asian crash of 1998, no longer affects only rich countries.⁴⁴ The civil society groups in developed countries have stepped up pressure on their governments to pursue more equitable policies.⁴⁵ Although trade liberalization is a key aspect of NEPAD, it is difficult to imagine how this will benefit Africa. Developing countries are subject to tariff barriers that are four times higher than those faced by rich countries. Global financial structures effectively give the rich countries complete economic control over the poor countries. The richer the nation, the more IMF votes it has. The World Bank is run by *donor nations*, with all the important decisions being taken in Washington. Inevitably, they all come down to the reduction of a state’s role to care for its own citizens. The consequences for democracy are devastating if not managed carefully. Presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki and the new African leaders saw NEPAD as crucial to African renaissance and fully supported its good governance foundations. The old guards led by Muammar Ghaddafi, Daniel Arap Moi, and Robert Mugabe, on the other hand, viewed talk of good governance with contempt, and dismissed NEPAD as a ploy by Western imperialists to again hold Africa hostage. Specifically, Ghaddafi labeled NEPAD as “a creation of colonial capitalists and racists.”⁴⁶ NEPAD’s proponents consciously tried to avoid the politically charged language of historical justice and reparations, while nevertheless, accepting that colonialism and the Cold War have contributed to Africa’s problems. The continent’s foreign debt burden, much of it arguably illegitimate owed to the Western creditors by African dictators and authoritarian regimes who were Western cronies,

represents one of the single largest obstacles to development. Indeed, the current international debt relief framework, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, has failed to resolve Africa's debt crisis.⁴⁷

African Union and NEPAD

With the end of the Cold War, African dictators could no longer be propped up by rich Western powers prepared to turn a blind eye as long as their allegiance lay with the West. Even the most brazen African tyrants had to take note that democratization and good governance is the ticket to foreign aid. With this came a growing realization that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was not up to the challenge of the twenty-first century. The OAU Charter placed undue emphasis on the principles of sovereign equality of member-states and noninterference in the internal affairs of the member-states. It was ill-equipped to deal with the proliferation of coups and authoritarian rule on the continent between 1963 and 1990.⁴⁸ Hence, a new organization or radical reform was needed to deal with unforeseen problems. With the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994, the OAU had been stripped of its very *raison d'être*, the liberation of Africa. African leaders decided to reorganize the organization, and this process began with a review of some elements of the 1991, Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community.⁴⁹ Thus, at the Extraordinary OAU Summit in Sirte, Libya, in 1999, the Abuja Treaty was revised, placing strong emphasis on popular participation and human security as opposed to the security of states. The changes were adopted at the OAU summit in Togo in 2000, and consequently, the African Union (AU) was launched in Durban, South Africa on July 9, 2002.⁵⁰

South Africa entered the debate quite late, having been excluded from OAU membership until apartheid system was dismantled with multiracial elections in 1994. The new South Africa under African majority rule was initially quite skeptical about attempts to reform the organization. In the immediate post-1994 period the South African foreign policy, moralists favored doing away with the OAU altogether. However, when it appeared that control over the OAU by the Libyan leader Muammar Ghaddafi could result in negative spillover for Nigeria and South Africa, presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki began to show interests in reorganizing the OAU. Their chief concern was that Ghaddafi's image in the West as a tyrant would damage presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki's efforts to market NEPAD.⁵¹

At the formal launching of the African Union in Durban on July 9, 2002, Nigeria, South Africa, and their allies lost the fight over whether NEPAD should be placed under the control of the organization, and by implication,

are subject to veto by its opponents. Most important, the yardstick for good governance, and peer review system of NEPAD, was placed under the AU's direct control. This was a major setback for Nigeria and South Africa. NEPAD will be absorbed into the African Union's proposed Council on Security, Stability, Development, and Coordination. Proponents of NEPAD hoped to locate its secretariat within the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, and thus put it at arm's length from the African Union. But it was not situated within the organization, and thus, it remains to be seen how independently NEPAD will be able to operate effectively in these circumstances.⁵² Muammar Ghaddafi and his allies lobbied successfully for NEPAD's Steering Committee membership to be increased from fifteen to twenty heads of state.⁵³ Nigeria and South Africa had hoped that only leaders with sound democratic credentials would serve on the committee. They finally agreed to a compromise that would allow Ghaddafi and other members of the old guard into the NEPAD Club in exchange for Durban, South Africa, rather than Tripoli, being the venue for the formal launching of the African Union on July 9, 2002. Nigeria and South Africa were determined that the African Union be launched anywhere but Tripoli in order to protect the credibility of the organization.

Presidents Mugabe, Arap Moi, as well as Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi emphatically stated that they will not tolerate examination of fellow Africans as part of a peer review process of NEPAD. Thus, the foreign ministers of member-states of the African Union were treading cautiously on Zimbabwe. This presents a dilemma, for if the African Union is to gain credibility it seeks, it cannot afford to vacillate on the subject of Africa's remaining strongmen. Thus, the new breeds of African leaders face the task of succeeding where President Kwame Nkrumah failed in 1960s, particularly to persuade a majority of African governments to incrementally transfer real power, economic, and foreign policies to the Pan-African Parliament created under the African Union and submit to the judicial rulings of a continental court. Only then will they be able to talk about real progress.⁵⁴

Toward Regional Economic Integration

The mainstay of NEPAD's plan to hold African countries and their leaders accountable to good governance rests on the Peer Review Mechanism, whereby heads of state and government will agree to an external assessment of how well they are fulfilling their obligations. The purpose is to encourage the adoption of policies, standards, and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development, and accelerated

regional and continental economic integration.⁵⁵ Participation “has to be voluntary, you are not going to be able to get people to live up to specific commitments on the basis of compulsion.”⁵⁶ Whether or not the system has any teeth will be determined by what measures are taken against errant countries (e.g., Libya, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe). Herein lies the problem. Will Africa have the political will to act against its own when agreement cannot even be reached over how the peer review system should be applied in practice? The old guard favors encouragement rather than public criticism to bring about behavior change. For instance, with Ghaddafi insisting that Africa has its own style of governance, democracy, and political culture, which need to be preserved, and pointed out that “We do not want imposed conditions.”⁵⁷ Proponents of NEPAD have advocated use of the carrot rather than the stick, with countries ranked as good performers reaping the rewards of aid, trade, and investment.⁵⁸ The question here is, would this inspire the bad apples among the African leaders to mend their ways? What Africa needs are not only increased interstate trade but also increased economic and technical cooperation among the member-states to achieve collective self-reliance in the field of agriculture. To combat hunger, and poverty in Africa, the new development strategy must be agriculture and rural based. NEPAD recognized this by emphasizing that “agriculture will provide the engine for growth in Africa,”⁵⁹ especially in food production, which is very vital to reduce importation of foreign foods dependency, food which can be easily grown and produce in Africa. It is very ridiculous for Africa to receive \$18.6 billion in foreign aid and spend almost the same amount on food imports. What Africa need is trade and direct foreign investments and not aid. Africa is the only part of the world where food production has decreased in recent years. At the same time, political upheaval and conflict there are seen as providing fertile ground for extremists. Widespread famine in Africa has spurred high-profile relief efforts over the years, from United Nations programs to celebrity fundraising concerts such as “Live Aid in the 1980s, and Live 8 Concert in 2005.”⁶⁰

African continent was more than self-sufficient in food production in the 1960s. Regrettably, Africa is now a massive food importer. The UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) pointed out that “African in less than 40 years went from being a net exporter of basic food staples to relying on imports and food aid.”⁶¹ From 1966 to 1970, net exports averaged 1.3 million tons of food a year. By the late 1970s, Africa imported 4.4 million tons of staple foods a year, a figure that had risen to 10 million tons by the mid-1980s. Since independence, agricultural output per capita remained stagnant, and in many places declined. It seems that if the situation continues as it is now African farmers will only be able to properly

feed their families and societies when the goods from the developed countries, especially food products stop flooding our markets.

Commenting on the poverty situation in Africa, President Obasanjo lamented that

Poverty remains a major challenge, and most countries on the continent have not benefited fully from the opportunities of globalization. Africa's efforts to achieve economic growth have been hindered by conflicts, insufficient investment, limited trade, debilitating debt burden, and lately the impact of HIV/AIDS. Africa lacks basic infrastructure in many sectors, including transport, compared to the industrialized world. The gap in infrastructure constitutes a serious handicap to economic growth and poverty reduction on the continent of Africa. Improved infrastructure could and would transform the continent into investors' haven.⁶²

All Africa needs is to find indigenous solution to its problems. Africa must take care of its domestic problems before it can face the outside world. Each African country must engage in institutional reforms and build workable and effective institutions at the outset. African countries must enunciate a viable integration policy that can help them (1) compete more gainfully in the global economy; (2) persuade, and if necessary, force a restructuring of the international trading system to minimize many of the disadvantages suffered by African traders; and (3) deal more effectively and seriously with the international financial system.

Regional economic integration is the *watch word* for twenty-first-century global economy. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in its multifaceted operations in Africa has served as an Economic Think Tank for the continent. The African Union, various opinion makers, and many social scientists working in Africa have been emphasizing regional economic integration as a viable way to improve economic conditions in the continent and enhance Africa's ability to participate more gainfully in the new global economy.⁶³ To build a viable African Economic Community, we have to start to build the regional groupings (Regional Economic Community) and strengthening the existing ones and that is what the ECOWAS and SADC efforts are all about and should be. The EAC, the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC) and the Maghreb (North African Consultative Committee/NACC) must be promoted and strengthened. If we can strengthen the regional economic communities, and make them function effectively and efficiently for the economic and mutual benefit of the African peoples, African economic integration can be achieved before advancing to the political union goal.

The emergence of powerful economic blocs such as the EU, North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), and Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) have made regional integration in Africa imperative. For instance, because the EU, NAFTA, and the APEC are protectionists, this certainly poses potential danger for Africa, given the fact that most African countries are at present engaged in a significant amount of trade with these three blocs. Also given the relative economic strength of these three economic blocs, EU, NAFTA, and APEC, they are most likely to dominate global political and economic affairs for many years to come in the twenty-first century. The ability of African countries to participate in and benefit from a global economy dominated by these three blocs will largely depend on the level of the continent's success at regional integration. Strong and viable regional integration schemes will significantly strengthen the ability of the continent to negotiate with EU, NAFTA, and APEC, and other such economic communities for the benefits of global trade in general and African in particular. Only collective action will improve Africa's bargaining power and allow the continent to extract more benefits from global trade. This approach is very essential for Africa in today's international trade.

Regional economic cooperation/integration will increase the size of domestic markets and enhance the ability of local manufacturers to benefit from economies of scale. In addition, regional integration will also increase the area within which emerging domestic industries can provide assistance. They need to grow, mature, and become globally competitive in terms of both price and output. Finally, regional economic integration will enhance the ability of African economies to cope with the challenges and opportunities of globalization. For instance, regional integration could make it easier and more efficient for African countries to avail themselves of technological innovations in information processing and communication technologies such as Internet and cellular/mobile phone.

NEPAD and Civil Society

Despite claims that NEPAD is indigenous to Africa, civil society groups and some governments have questioned where they fit into the new partnership. Secretary-General of the Congress of South Africa Trade Union (COSATU) Zwelinzima Vavi summed up popular anger when he argued that many African statesmen with questionable democratic credentials were spearheading the NEPAD plan.⁶⁴ Also, many leading African intellectuals

have commented: "In spite of recognition of the central role of the African peoples in the plan, the African peoples have not played any part in the concept."⁶⁵ To this, Thabo Mbeki invited critics to "join the structures of NEPAD and try to influence it to adopt some of their policy positions."⁶⁶

The architects of NEPAD did not consult the African people during its formulation and have made no genuine and serious efforts to do so as they prepare to begin implementation. Just like many previous development programs in the continent, NEPAD is elite-driven and characterized by noninvolvement of civil society. As pointed out by John Mbaku, "after the Presidents of Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal and Algeria had discussed NEPAD among themselves in Abuja, they first consulted policy makers in the developed Western industrial countries and representatives of the international financial community before making any contact with the African Peoples whose lives would be directly affected by NEPAD."⁶⁷ The civil society in Africa got most of the information about NEPAD from the foreign press and not from the architects of the initiative.

Representatives of many historically marginalized and deprived groups consider NEPAD as yet another external imposition (which is only different from the Structural Adjustment Programs in that it claims to safeguard services, especially to the poor) designed to generate benefits primarily for foreign capital, the metropolitan economies and a few privileged indigenous elites.⁶⁸

In April 2002, African intellectuals at a conference in Accra, Ghana, endorsed a resolution complaining that "the people had not played any part in drafting the NEPAD Document. They claimed NEPAD was drawn up to please foreign donors. They also complained that NEPAD does not deal sufficiently with the unequal global trade rules or global financial architecture, which is heavily stacked against Africa."⁶⁹ NEPAD needs African intellectuals and should be given opportunities to debate it.

The fundamental flaw is that NEPAD was formulated in typical Mbeki policy making style: "small groups of like-minded experts sweat it out in seclusion, shielded from elected representatives and institutions. Bilateral meetings or one-on-one meetings are then held with interest groups to get them on board."⁷⁰ Without African grassroots support, NEPAD is doomed to sink beneath the quicksand of a credibility gap. GEAR is a stark lesson in this respect. What NEPAD architects omitted is rather instructive. The plan makes little reference to human rights, and where it does, this is largely rhetorical. Nor does it say much about the crippling HIV/AIDS pandemic sweeping the continent and threatening to lay waste already frail economies and fragile societies.

Conclusion

African countries experienced increased political instability as a result of implementing World Bank-IMF inspired SAPs in the 1980s and 1990s. Governments were severely weakened in their ability to satisfy basic needs of their citizens. Therefore, their legitimacy was diminished. These anti-state policies are leaving a legacy of de-industrialization and re-colonization of Africa. The economies of the African countries are increasingly controlled by conditionalities established by such global financial institutions as the IMF and World Bank that in turn are controlled by the Group of G8 Industrialized Countries. Under these circumstances, foreign policies formulated by African countries are likely to be *dominated* by external states. This appears to be the case even with the NEPAD policy. Thus, President Obasanjo has warned that "Africa must ensure that NEPAD is not turned against us as a tool for a new conditionality,"⁷¹ because the subordination of African countries to the forces of globalization will continue to foment conflict.

NEPAD, nevertheless, has been effective in some areas. For the first time, all Africa's ills are not laid at the doorstep of the West, and there is acknowledgment that the continent's own shortcomings have contributed to its precarious position. Moreover, the plan has caught the attention of ordinary citizens, even if only to wonder what the fuss is all about, to an extent that no previous continental proposals have done. NEPAD also placed Africa at the forefront of international debate, albeit fleetingly, until antiterrorism noise drowned out just about everything else. However, NEPAD needs the input of the African masses.

At the G8 Summit in July 2001 in Genoa, Italy, presidents Obasanjo, Mbeki, Wade, and Bouteflika presented the NEPAD plan for African renewal to the G8 leaders, also agreed that the G8 leaders should come up with an AAP. However, African leaders were disappointed by the outcome of G8 Summit held in Alberta, Canada, in June 2002 because the United States, the world's leading economic power put the Africa program far down on its agenda. Although there was fairly widespread support for Zimbabwe's suspension from the Commonwealth, Britain's threat to cut NEPAD's funding if South Africa did not act against President Mugabe provoked accusations that colonial attitudes would poison the new partnership. Former Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien warned that "NEPAD would risk losing 9.5 billion Canadian dollars if it did not include a political peer review."⁷² However, NEPAD's biggest danger is that it could collapse due to lack of funds. Unless it secures direct foreign investments and fair trade policy from the West, it could become just another

pointless product of vanity. While the G8 countries have lauded the plan, they have been in no hurry to provide Africa with the resources (money) needed. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair has sought to undermine NEPAD by setting up his own internal commission on Africa.⁷³

Ultimately, the solution to Africa's deep-seated but not insurmountable problems lies in the development of the continent's natural resources by its own people. Africa has proved immensely rich in oil, with new reserves being discovered almost every year in South-West Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, and North Africa. It also has an abundance of minerals and precious metals, which outsiders are all too eager to exploit. The World Bank and the developed countries would like nothing better than gaining control of the war-torn Democratic Republic of Congo's vast mining operations.⁷⁴ African leaders should not allow this to happen. Until Africans themselves develop and reap the rewards of these munificent riches, and routinely apply good political, and better and efficient economic management, the future of the continent will never be secure.

NEPAD is a call for a new relationship of partnership between Africa and the international community, especially the highly industrialized countries, to overcome the development chasm that has widened over centuries of unequal relations. African leaders should now wake up and realize that only an African initiative with genuine commitment and ready to police themselves can ensure stability, good governance, accountability, and authentic sustainable development. If it works, NEPAD presents a profound new opportunity to turn a page in African Union history. Implementing its principles is not just the right thing to do. It is a good investment for Africa. It is meant to be a partnership between Africa and the dominant industrial powers in the global economy. However, the West appears to have a different view of NEPAD, mostly to use it to perpetuate Africa's dependence on them, which is causing serious concern among Africans who know that the leaders of the developed countries are only on the lookout for their countries' interests.

Chapter 9

Pan-Africanism and Unity: A Wake-up Call to Africans

We have to prove that greatness is not to be measured in stockpiles of atom bombs. I believed strongly and sincerely that with the deep-rooted wisdom and dignity, the innate respect for human lives, and the intense humanity that is our heritage, the African race, united under one federal government, will emerge not as just another world bloc to flaunt its wealth and strength, but as a Great Power whose greatness is indestructible because it is built not on fear, envy and suspicion, nor won at the expense of others, but founded on hope, trust, and friendship and directed to the good of all mankind.

—Kwame Nkrumah¹

A united and developed Africa, wedded to the basic values of the respect for life that constitutes the undercurrent of its traditional civilizations, will impress humanity with the joy and significance of life. An Africa united and prosperous, an Africa united and powerful, will be a balancing factor in a world of solidarity, dialogue and peace.

—Edem Kodjo²

Meaningful democracy cannot flourish as long as external forces maintain the balance of power in the continent. African leaders should now realize that only an African initiative with genuine commitment and the political will to police themselves can ensure stability, good governance, accountability, transparency, and authentic economic development. If this is achieved it will represent a profound new opportunity to turn a leaf in African history.

According to Cheikh Anta Diop, "The time has come to draw practical conclusions from years of studying African problems, to sum them up in formulas that are as clear as possible and easy to apply."³ In order for African Union to truly accomplish its objectives in the twenty-first century, it must look back to the past to forge ahead to the future, politically, economically, socially, and culturally. It is the right of all peoples to pursue their own destiny. Economic prosperity will develop in embracing the traditional beliefs of unity, collectivism, self-reliance, and self-determination. Former president Julius Nyerere of Tanzania said, "Without unity, there is no future for Africa."⁴ There is nothing wrong with establishing an African Union. What is wrong is for African leaders to enter into a union reluctantly and unprepared. The African Union should and must not be like its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity, described as a *club of dictators*. Thus, to avoid the mistakes of the past, African leaders must not only address the matter of their arrears of contributions amounting to a massive \$106 million (as of July 2007) but also be prepared to put the needed resources into the new organization to make it function properly as expected of an international organization.

President Kwame Nkrumah's dream of a *United States of Africa* when the OAU was formed has become a reality in Africa today. With many conflicts and civil wars in Africa, Africa needs a peacekeeping force of its own as advocated by Nkrumah in 1963 when he proposed that "we need a Common Defense System with an African High Command to ensure the stability and security of Africa."⁵ In the same manner, the first chairperson of the African Union Commission, Alpha Oumar Konare, has advocated that

There are few individual national solutions to problems plaguing the continent today, such as diseases, environmental degradation and peace and security. Foreign Nations are taking advantage of Africa's lack of harmonization to turn its people into consumers rather than producers, and to dump medicines and other products not wanted by the developed world. In working with international institutions like the United Nations, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund, there was no option, but for Africa nations to join forces and put aside questions of national sovereignty. The African Union is a union of all of Africa from north to South, from east to west. While Europe sought to build a federation of nation states in the form of the European Union, African States would have to reconstitute themselves into a Pan-African unit. It is imperative for the continent to move ahead with creating a common economic market, foreign policy and defense strategy. An African court of justice is urgently needed to promote the fight against *impunity*. If we do not do that, what would prevent people from taking us before non-African courts? We will be completely humiliated. Similarly, a central bank is needed to handle the continent's debts,

create coherence between national macro-economic policies, and provide financing guarantees. A common health policy also has to be developed, among others to deal with the spread of AIDS.⁶

Alpha Konare added that the necessary resources should be made available for these endeavors to ensure they are effective and legitimate.

Decolonizing African Mentality

Alpha Oumar Konare's exhortation is a warning to all Africans and their leaders in particular to wake up to the need, challenges, and opportunities of the twenty-first century and run an effective, efficient, accountable, and transparent African Union. Africa does not need a half-hearted and half-measured organization any more. Transforming the Organization of African Unity into an effective African Union requires mental decolonization, self-reliance, and self-transformation, and Africans must break from dependence and mental trap and develop the ability and new strategies to solve their own problems.

During the 1990s, the number of people in extreme poverty in Africa increased from 242 million to 300 million.⁷ This represents one-third of the continent's population. Privatization of public enterprises and trade liberalization policies, it has been argued by some social scientists that it would alleviate poverty. However, privatization is accompanied by deregulation and downsizing. Thus, when the government sells off public assets to private corporations, usually foreign firms, presumably through local fronts, less profitable jobs are always eliminated. Also, within the context of globalization, manufacturing will expand primarily where labor is cheap and unorganized. Obviously, privatization and globalization are not conducive to poverty alleviation.

Trade liberalization opened the markets of African countries to generally unregulated, anarchic capitalism. Also, African governments were compelled by the global financial institutions to abolish subsidies. However, developed, dominant states retained protectionist policies, especially in the area of agriculture. Farmers from the developed states are subsidized at "a rate of about \$250 billion a year."⁸ For example, the U.S. government has paid at least \$1.3 billion in subsidies for rice and other crops between 2000 and 2005 to individual Americans who claimed to be farmers but do no farming at all (ghost farmers). These subsidies were paid under a federal agricultural program approved by the U.S. Congress: As *The Washington Post*⁹ rightly pointed out, "In 2005 alone, when pretax farm profits were

at a near record \$72 billion, the federal government handed out more than \$25 billion in aid subsidies to farmers, almost 50 percent more than the amount it pays to families receiving welfare.”¹⁰ These subsidies not only undermine the prices that African agricultural products can command on the world market but also assist in perpetuating poverty in the continent.

The call for the international community, especially the Western powers, is to assist African countries with a massive infusion of foreign direct investments, fair equitable trade, access to Western markets, decreased agricultural subsidies, debt relief, and improved official development assistance. The new reforms in the Bretton Woods Institutions should go far enough to ensure more voting rights and greater representation for Africa in the World Bank and IMF.

To make Official Development Assistance more in tune with African development strategies, the African Union should introduce an Official Development Assistance Policy to avoid situations where a substantial part of the grant granted to African countries gets used to pay experts from the donor countries. The consultancy practice of donor countries has been an issue of concern among African countries and other developing countries, many of whom are indebted to financial institutions such as International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and others for funds that were largely expended on foreign consultants attached to projects for which they provided financing to the African countries. African countries should make it clear that such practice would no longer be acceptable, and African countries should begin to insist that foreign assistance can no longer be at the whims and caprices of the donors, while emphasizing the need for more direct foreign investments and trade, and less aid. Africa's encounter with the major powers, especially with the Europeans, has not been a simple matter. Most analysts attribute Africa's underdevelopment or non-development to colonialism, neocolonialism, and globalization. Kwame Nkrumah put it succinctly: “To those who study facts fairly, it must surely be clear that the European occupation of Africa was carried out for the benefit of Europeans. Concerns for the welfare of the African peoples hardly entered in the matter.”¹¹ Therefore, Africa's salvation does not and must not lie in just blindly copying foreign systems but in returning to its roots and heritage and building upon them. Chancellor Williams has advised: “When if ever, black people actually organize as a race in their various population centers, they will find that the basic and guiding ideology they now seek and so much need is embedded in their own traditional philosophy and constitutional system simply waiting to be extracted and set forth.”¹² Robert Guest has admonished:

When Japan's ruler decided in the nineteenth century that they had to modernize to avoid being colonized they sent their brightest officials to

Germany, Britain and America to find out how industrial societies worked. They copied the ideas that seemed most useful, rejected the western habits that seemed unhelpful or distasteful, and within a few decades Japan advanced enough to win a war with Russia, the first non-white nation to defeat a European power in modern time. Japan's example should be important for Africa, because it shows that modernization need not mean westernization. Developing countries need to learn from developed ones, but they do not have to abandon their culture and traditions in the process. Africans face the same challenges now that Japan faced in the nineteenth century; How to harness other people's ideas and technology to help them build the kind of society that they, the Africans want.¹³

Are Africans mentally trapped? Africans, whether, politicians, intellectuals, business professionals, men and women, young and old, must wake up and decolonize mentally. This will be the first and most important step toward Africa's full emancipation. To deny the possibility of self-transformation of the continent is to give credence to the widely held racist Western belief that Africans are an inferior race with very little appreciation of the values of democracy and progress. African countries must do away with overdependence on foreign aid from the West, which was supposed to lift Africa from underdevelopment and undemocratic rule but, in fact, has done more to keep Africa down and disempowered its peoples. This has severely altered the African psyche, with greater impact than a century of missionary miseducation of the African peoples.

The tragedy of Africa is that it is a continent with great economic potential but is mired in abject poverty. Most ironic is the fact that the resources and the blueprint that Africa desperately needs to launch itself into global economy already exist in Africa. The real problem has been uncommitted, unpatriotic, corrupt, and visionless leadership and a *zombie* follower-ship. *Zombie* denotes people whom Nigerian popular musician late Fela Anikulapo Kuti¹⁴ called mindless followers and people without personal initiatives, the kind of mindlessness that is associated with the regimentation in the military. This is a generation of people without vision and personal initiatives and who look to wrong places for Africa's salvation. African leaders should define Africa's interests and work to bring to fruition those interests. All the grand past initiatives and plans crafted to resuscitate Africa's economic development came to ignominious grief. From all indications, it seems that NEPAD may suffer the same fate, if no precaution is taken by the leadership.

In the twenty-first century, the global economy and politics are shifting, displaying their contradictory tendencies and posing great challenges to the African continent. Globalization of the world economy has left most of Africa marginalized. Africans have been casualties of international

capitalism rather than genuine partners. Africa has been ill-prepared to adjust itself simultaneously to complex global dynamics, new challenges, and the management of internal and external threats in the age of global terrorism.¹⁵ Africa appears to be traveling in reverse toward anarchy and self-destruction. Even the spread of democracy, which for so long has eluded Africans, has become a negative force when introduced into an environment of abject poverty, high illiteracy, weak state, and disorganized civil society institutions. The IMF– and the World Bank–imposed austerity measures have exacted more sacrifices from the very poor the institutions set out to assist. Many African countries are still immersed in bloody civil conflicts and debt crisis, with seemingly no way out. Moreover, the global economic boom of the last decade of the twentieth century has completely bypassed Africa, while Africa has the lowest human development index of any region in the world. This is in stark contrast to what has been obtained in the industrialized countries, which have benefited enormously from globalization.

All the projections concerning Africa look bleak and hopeless. The cover page of *The Economist* reads “The Hopeless Continent,”¹⁶ and most United Nations reports on Africa paint pictures of hopelessness, and yet these reports are not far from the truth. After five decades of independence, most African countries are still underdeveloped and the people continue to suffer from poverty and material deprivation. According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Africa, especially south of the Sahara, still remains the poorest part of the world with most of its citizens unable to meet their daily basic needs. According to the 2003 UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI), thirty (88 percent) of the thirty-eight poorest and less developed countries in the world are located in Africa.

All the portrayal of hopelessness and despair need not become self-fulfilling prophecy if the African leaders take serious actions instead of continuously begging the international community, especially the West, to come to their rescue. External assistance can become a catalyst for change only when such assistance is received to complement Africa’s own plan for transformation. Such a strategy is an absolute necessity, particularly when weighed against Africa’s past history. Caring about Africa is an obligation and a responsibility that Africans cannot escape from, regardless where Africans choose to reside. Africa’s survival is in the hands of Africans as no foreign powers will serve or promote Africa’s interests. Therefore, Africans must seek by all means the interests of Africa. Former president Julius Nyerere of Tanzania warned that “Africa will have to rely upon Africa; African Governments will have to formulate, and carry out policies of maximum national and collective self-reliance. If they do they will develop; if they don’t Africa will be doomed.”¹⁷

African leaders should not be influenced by the world governed by a shadowy *corporatocracy* that, with an invisible empire of wealth and greed, deploys a combination of bribes, assassins, and seductive women to enslave African leaders and their citizens. The invisible empire, and its economic hit men¹⁸ and consultants who are out cajoling unsuspecting developing countries, especially the African countries, into borrowing too much money at the risk of filing for bankruptcy and sacrificing national sovereignty, must be discouraged. The loans are used to finance lucrative contracts for the benefit of Western European and U.S.-based multinational corporations whose activities would not help African countries or alleviate the poverty of their peoples.

The activities of the Western powers and their multinational corporations continue to impoverish the already underdeveloped Africa while developing the already developed Western countries. African leadership must take zero-tolerance action against corruption because of the grievous harm that it has done to Africa over the years. Greed and corruption are some of the reasons why the perpetual collapse of infrastructure and institutions continue in the continent. These are some of the causes of the endemic poverty, underdevelopment, and cyclical failure of democracy in Africa.

African states should and need to reduce their dependence on their former colonial overlords to earn some respect and human dignity, fight against corruption, economic waste, and mismanagement of our natural resources. Respect for Africa comes through deeds and actions. There must be a commitment to social justice, innovation, hard work, and merit based on performance, and to protecting our sovereignty, creating African unity, and promoting and defending African values, good governance, and respect for human rights and the rule of law. With the acceptance and adoption of the principles enunciated in the Kampala Declaration Document of 1991,¹⁹ a new innovation institutional approach to prevent and manage conflict in Africa has been incorporated into the Africa Union and should be effectively implemented.

A Wake-Up Call to Africans

African states need to develop innovative home-grown strategies to cope with the new security challenges of the twenty-first century. The goal is not just simply to find *African solutions to African problems*, however desirable that may be. Rather than prospect for obtaining international support, solving many of Africa's problems will be greatly enhanced when Africans

themselves make serious and sustained efforts to address these difficulties. Africa's case for international collaboration and assistance becomes both credible and achievable if Africans are spearheading such efforts. In any case, given the multiplicity of the challenges of peace and security in the new millennium, it is only through genuine international collaboration that African security mechanism can become much stronger.

Nevertheless, the African Union should recommit and rededicate itself to the NEPAD to eradicate poverty while each of Africa's five regions—East, West, North, South and Central—should identify priority projects in the eight major sectors of the NEPAD programs, namely, good and democratic governance, infrastructure, education, health care, agriculture, new information/communication technologies, energy, and free and open market access. The member states of African Union should implement these projects and enforce NEPAD's peer review mechanism of member states.²⁰

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of modern Turkey has warned: "To the youth I bequeath the future and the nation's evolution."²¹ He who is asleep God cannot help. Africa must help itself and mobilize its forces to fight inaction and laziness in economic, political, social, and cultural fields; work, exertion, and effort are the tools that forge great nations. However, to develop them, organization, planning, methodology, and rigor must take precedence over improvisation, slackness, and hopelessness. African leadership should be assertive, serious and be responsible in their approach. Serious work must be done to formulate new orientations because time is running out.²² A Yoruba proverb says "*Bi a nti dagba si nse ni amagbon si*" (As we are growing older, we should be getting wiser). After 50 years of independence, African leaders should be getting better and wiser and be able to manage their own affairs and resources for the benefit of the African peoples. Africa needs a change and it needs it fast. The continent needs to start taking control of its resources, building its institutions and its capacity for a sustainable development.

Africa must take all measures necessary to put the African Union on a firm solid and sustainable foundation. African leaders should not forget the lessons of history to awaken them to the fact that in the present state of the world, the economic development of Africa can be ensured only within the framework of a community that emanates from the political will that transcends the boundaries inherited from the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference on the partition of Africa. African governments have to grapple squarely with their history and should translate their Pan-African projects into action. Africa's predicament can be resolved only through the revival and implementation of Kwame Nkrumah's original Pan-African projects, as updated by Edem Kodjo's impassioned plea—a great message of hope in

the future of African continent advocated by African Union Commission chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare:

The Arab African countries would have to be part of the envisaged *United States of Africa*. The African Union is a union of all of Africa from north to south, from east to west. It is not a league of black states. It would be unacceptable for Arab states in North Africa to become part of Europe or the Middle East. The nation-state had shown its limitations in Africa. While Europe sought to build a federation of nation states in the form of the European Union, African states would have to reconstitute themselves into a Pan-African unit.²³

Conclusion: Breaking Africa Dependency

Kwame Nkrumah's original Pan-Africanism projects, Edem Kodjo's proposals for a rationalized Pan-Africanism and unity for survival, and Alpha Konare's advocacy of a Pan-African union are solidly based on both history and present realities. There must be an African Renaissance anchored on a serious and thoroughly overhauled African Union and directed toward self-reliant and people-centered development. And this should reconnect the African societies at all levels for the realization of continental political, economic, geo-strategic, and cultural unity.²⁴ African leaders have a duty to confront much poverty in the continent with bold action. In addition, African leaders should challenge the external control of their economies and develop their homegrown strategies. One of the challenges of the twenty-first century is for the African leadership to be held responsible and accountable for their actions, and for Africa to be integrated more fully to take advantage of the global economy so that the opportunities of globalization do not bypass the continent. African leaders should fight for African industrial products to be given access to Western markets and must be assertive when dealing with the major powers. They should also put pressures on the West to eliminate trade subsidies that are damaging African products in the global markets. Events in Nigeria and South Africa have implications for the economic strength and political stability of Africa. Therefore, Nigeria and South Africa, the two giants and hope of Africa, should be in the forefront of these challenges. One African leader after another has let African peoples down in the struggle to improve their material well-being. Thus, African leaders should be held accountable for their actions. African leaders are responsible for most of the problems in Africa.

The situation in Zimbabwe under President Robert Mugabe, between 2000 and 2008, is a typical example of the failure of African leaders.

Zimbabwe between 1980 and 2000 was the breadbasket of southern African states, but since 2006 it has become dependent on foreign aid, charity donations from the West, and UN Food Program support to feed almost one-third of its population. This is the consequence of greed, corruption, and leadership failure that has led to political violence and economic collapse of the country.²⁵ Therefore, the African political class including their leaders that had ravaged our economy must be brought to account. The ordinary man must be secured from hunger, thirst, and being shelterless. They should be provided with adequate infrastructure and security so that they can live their lives in peace and with hope for tomorrow. It is only when these things are done that we can begin to hope that at last Africa will be getting on in the world and facing its challenges. As Chinua Achebe, writes in his book *Things Fall Apart*, "When a man says yes his *Chi* (personal god) also says yes."²⁶ How many more African men, women, and children must die of disease, HIV/AIDS, hunger, malnutrition, and war before we finally wake up to the fact that the severity of the African crisis calls for urgent and drastic solutions? The United States of Africa is an idea that is possible if we can integrate, strengthen, and sustain the existing regional groupings—ECOWAS, SADC, EAC, UDEAC, and the Maghreb (NACC)—into a viable, effective, and efficient African Economic Community, they themselves will be the building block of a United States of Africa.

Africa can develop and prosper without culturally Westernizing. In this twenty-first century, Africa should look more closely at countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and others in Asia—the *Asian Tigers*. These countries were colonized by the same colonial powers that colonized African countries and had the same per capita income as Nigeria and Ghana in 1960. These countries have since left African countries far behind in per capita income, industrial growth, and economic development. To what extent are the economic achievements of the Asian Tigers due to their cultural factors? Can foreign cultures be studied for lessons that are relevant for Africa?

Africans have been studying Western culture and practicing the Western systems for decades in the hope of stimulating its development. However, what are the results—dependency, poverty, miseries, mismanagement, and corruption? We need a new approach and look to the Eastern World, and not just the Asian Tigers but China and India as well. It is time that Africa diversified the cultural models it has adopted for developmental lessons. Such diversification will help reduce our dependency upon the West and in other (many) areas of endeavor as well. One strategy in our fight against that dependency should be horizontal integration. This horizontal integration should involve not only national integration within each

country, but also the regional integration and cooperation that I have suggested and elaborated upon in the previous chapter. Most important, we should look inward. In this case Pan-Africanism then becomes an instrument of horizontal integration, because Pan-Africanism is partly rooted in African cultural and racial identification.

Africa will remain in its multilevel crisis until a comprehensive solution producing stable conditions for development is found from within. Therefore, a new order embodied in the framework of security, stability, development, and cooperation must be created in Africa through a declaration of binding principles and a commitment to ideological independence that will guide the conduct of governance in individual African countries as well as the imperative of intra-African and inter-African relations.

We should understand that African leadership cannot claim legitimacy without courageously confronting the plight of the African peoples and their urgent quest for the universal ideals of human dignity. Africa is a continent endowed with abundant natural and human resources. There is no reason or any justification whatsoever for the peoples of Africa to be the leading recipients of external humanitarian assistance that sustain life only at a minimum level of survival. Africans are fleeing by the millions within their countries as internally displaced persons or crossing international borders as refugees. Most of them are destitute, depending only on international charity. National sovereignty can be meaningful only if it discharges a certain level of responsibility in providing adequate protection and assistance to citizens and all those under state jurisdiction. Failure to do so exposes a country to international scrutiny and possible intervention on humanitarian grounds.

While there have been severe constraints and setbacks, Africa's quest for human dignity is an imperative that might be impeded but can no longer be reversed. Therefore, Africa's quest for human dignity has become an urgent imperative and it is time to hold the African leaders accountable for their dismal record and to work on the prospects for forging a better future for the peoples of Africa. Africa's role models need to be the ones after whom emerging African leaders style their leadership. Leadership is responsibility. Africa must rise in this century to claim its rightful place in world affairs. The struggle will be waged by Africans in the continent and Africans in the Diaspora.

Africa today is faced with a stark choice, either unite or perish. But this is not a simple choice. It involves the mobilization of the peoples of the continent, sustained political will, complex decisions, and the pooling of sovereignties by the nations. Yet the debate on why and how the African continent should unite in terms of political stability, economic integration, cooperative peace, security, and development is more urgent today than at

any other time in postcolonial history of Africa. However, African leaders should take serious leading roles in strengthening their cooperation with the rest of the developing nations in order to enhance the bargaining power of the African states as well as expand political, economic, and cultural relations as well as trade and investment among themselves and the developing world, particularly the South-South regions. Until these challenges with the opportunities presented are achieved, African efforts for unity, development, and progress will remain a dream. The twenty-first century should not mimic the twentieth century. I contend that this is our moment and we must seize it. United we stand, divided we fall. Africa is our home, and it's our future. Without unity of purpose the future of Africa is at stake. The challenge and responsibility, therefore, is on the emerging African leaders to begin to change Africa into a decent continent, and to organize and implement the efforts to establish order and stability.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. Kwame Nkrumah, *Towards Colonial Freedom: Africa in the Struggle against World Imperialism*, London: Heinemann, 1962. Kwame Nkrumah was the first president of Republic of Ghana, 1957–1966.
2. J.M. Roberts, *History of the World*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 425. For further details see Leonard Thompson, *A History of South Africa*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990, pp. 31–32.
3. Douglas Farah, “Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade,” *The Washington Post*, November 2, 2001.
4. Ibid.
5. <http://www.africapolicy.org/african-initiatives/aafall.htm>. Accessed on July 25, 2004.
6. G. Feldman, “U.S.-African Trade Profile.” Also available online at: <http://www.agoa.gov/Resources/TRDPROFL.01.pdf>. Accessed on July 25, 2004.
7. Ibid.
8. Salih Booker, “Africa: Thinking Regionally, Update.” Also available online at: <http://www.africapolicy.org/docs98/reg9803.htm>. Accessed on July 25, 2004.
9. For full details on Nigeria’s contributions toward eradication of the white minority rule in Southern Africa and the eradication of apartheid system in South Africa see, Olayiwola Abegunrin, *Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966–1999*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003, pp. 79–93.
10. See Olayiwola Abegunrin, *Nigeria and the Struggle for the Liberation of Zimbabwe: A Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making of an Emerging Nation*. Stockholm, Sweden: Bethany Books, 1992, p. 141.

1 NIGERIA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH AFRICA

1. “Mr. Prime Minister: A Selection of Speeches Made by the Right Honorable, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa,” *Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Nigeria*, Lagos: National Press Limited, 1964, p. 97.

2. Leonard Thompson, *A History of South Africa*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990, pp. 187–242.
3. For full details see Robert Harvey, *The Fall of Apartheid: The Inside Story from Smuts to Mbeki*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.
4. Ibid.
5. For full details on the fall of apartheid see the following books: Allister Sparks, *Tomorrow Is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa's Road to Change*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995, Harvey, and Heather Deegan, *The Politics of the New South Africa: Apartheid and After*, New York: Longman, 2001.
6. Michael Crowder, *A History of Nigeria*, New York: Praeger, 1962, p. 213. Also see Olayiwola Abegunrin, "Nigerian Federalism, Resource Control and Restructuring: The Imperative of Sovereign National Conference," in Segun Gbadegesin, ed., *The Imperative of Cultural Democracy in Nigeria: Reflections from the Yoruba Diaspora*, Mitcheville, MD: Pinnacle, 2006, pp. 88–98.
7. Brian Lapping, *Apartheid: A History*, revised edition, New York: George Braziller, 1989, pp. 1–3.
8. Alan Burns, *History of Nigeria*, seventh edition, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958, p. 126.
9. Crowder, pp. 169–176.
10. Kehinde Faluyi, "Nigeria in the Nineteenth Century," in Akinjide Osuntokun and Ayodele Olukoj, eds., *Nigerian Peoples and Cultures*, Ibadan: Davidson Press, 1997, pp. 171–172.
11. *The News*, Lagos, February 26, 2001, p. 22.
12. Burns, p. 210.
13. Crowder, p. 213.
14. See Omo Omoruyi, *The Tale of June 12: The Betrayal of the Democratic Rights of Nigerians (1993)*, London: Press Alliance Network Limited, 1999. Also see Eghosa E. Osaghae, *Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998.
15. Thompson, *A History of South Africa*, p. 32.
16. Ibid., p. 33.
17. Ibid., p. 36.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p. 115.
20. Leonard Thompson, "The Subjection of the African Chiefdoms: Great Britain and the Afrikaner Republic," and "The Compromised of Union," in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson, eds. *The Oxford History of South Africa*, 2 volumes, New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 245–364.
21. For details of the origins of apartheid see Charles T. Loram, *Education of the South African Native*. London: Longman, Green and Company, 1917. Also see Muriel Horrell, *African Education: Some Origins and Development until 1953*. Johannesburg: South Africa Institute of Race Relations, 1953.
22. Ibid. In addition see Lapping, p. 128.
23. Lapping, p. 105.
24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.
26. Ibid. pp. 133–134.
27. Richard Gibson, *African Liberation Movement: Contemporary Struggle against White Minority Rule*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 24.
28. The Pass is a document that includes information on ethnic origin, age, birth-place, employment, etc. that must be carried at all times by each black person in South Africa under apartheid rule. For details on Pass see G.M. Carter and P. O'Meara, eds., *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1979, p. 102.
29. Lapping, pp. 137–138.
30. R.A. Akindele, ed., *The Organization of African Unity, 1963–1988*, Ibadan: Vantage, 1988, p. 131.
31. Federation of Nigeria, *Parliamentary Debates: House of Representatives, March–May Session, 1960*, Lagos: Government Printer, 1960, p. 152.
32. United Nations, *General Assembly Official Records, Eighteenth Session, Records of 1221st Meeting and Resolutions*, New York: United Nations, September 30, 1963, p. 12.
33. United Nations Document A/SPC/L.71 and Corr. 1 and add. 1–4 L/Rev.1.
34. Jaja Wachuku's Address to the House of Representatives Debates, November 1961, Lagos: Government Printer, 1961, p. 14.
35. Olayiwola Abegunrin, *Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966–1999*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003, p. 33.
36. Okon Akiba, *Nigerian Foreign Policy towards Africa: Continuity and Change*, New York: Peter Lang, 1998, p. 14.
37. Statement by the Ministry of External Affairs on the 7th Anniversary of African Liberation Day, May 25, 1970, Lagos: Ministry of External Affairs, 1970, p. 6.
38. "Okoi Arikpo's Speech at the Council of Ministers' Meeting," *Nigeria: Bulletin on Foreign Affairs*, volume 2, no. 1, July 1971, pp. 39–42.
39. Organization of African Unity, *The Principles of the OAU Charter: The Lusaka Manifesto, Dialogue and Future Strategy*, Addis Ababa: OAU, 1971, p. 153.
40. Joy Ogwu, *Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Future*, Lagos: Nigeria Institute of International Affairs, 1986, p. 66.
41. Akiba, p. 139.
42. Ibid. pp. 139–140.
43. Ibid., p. 138.
44. Joseph Garba, *Diplomatic Soldiering: Nigerian Foreign Policy 1975–1979*, Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1987, p. 93.
45. Olajide Aluko, *Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981, pp. 24, 33–34.
46. Akiba, p. 147.
47. Abegunrin, p. 93.
48. Olayiwola Abegunrin and H.E. Newsum, *United States Foreign Policy towards Southern Africa: Andrew Young and Beyond*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987, p. 77.

49. Abegunrin, *Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966–1999*, p. 91.
50. Ibid.
51. Akiba, p. 147.
52. Ibid. See also Adeoye A. Akinsanya, “Multinational Corporations in South Africa: Armed Conflict and Majority Rule in Southern Africa,” *International Review of Politics and Development*, volume 3, June 2005, 14–51.
53. The Lusaka Manifesto: The Future of Southern Africa. Fifth Summit of East and Central African States held in Lusaka, Zambia, April 14–16, 1969. See Kenneth W. Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa: The Limit of Independence*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973, pp. 315–323.
54. Olajide Aluko, “Nigeria, Namibia and Southern Africa,” in Olajide Aluko and Timothy Shaw, eds., *Southern Africa in the 1980s*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985, p. 53.
55. Ibid.
56. Adekunle Ajala, “Nigeria and the Conflict in Southern Africa,” in Gabriel O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele, eds., *Economic Development and Foreign Policy in Nigeria*, Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1988, p. 203.
57. “Nigerians Support for Liberation of the Continent,” *Nigerian Review*, volume 8, 1977, pp. 1–2.
58. On June 16, 1976, thousands of black students revolted against a second-class rate education system that required them to take classes in Afrikaans, the language of the Dutch descendants (white minority), who were the main architects of apartheid policy. See John Kane-Berman. *Soweto: Black Revolt, White Reaction*. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1978.
59. Thabo Mbeki was a guest of Nigerian Government where he lived from 1977 to 1984 before he moved to Lusaka, Zambia. He was living at the 1,001 Apartment in Ikoyi, Lagos, Nigeria, 1977–1984.
60. Olajide Aluko, “Nigerian Foreign Policy in the Year 2000,” in Timothy Shaw and Olajide Aluko, eds., *Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Perceptions and Projections*. London: Macmillan Press, 1983, pp. 195–196.
61. The original members of the Frontline States are as follows: Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and later joined by Zimbabwe in 1980. The Frontline States objective was to bring about independence under African majority rule in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa. Gilbert M. Khadiagala, *Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security, 1975–1993*, Athens: Ohio State University, 1994.
62. Ibrahim A. Gambari, *Theory and Reality in Foreign Policy Making: Nigeria in the Second Republic*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1989, p. 118.
63. Lapping, pp. 137–139.
64. For details on Nigeria’s contributions to (ANC and PAC) South African Liberation Movements see Olajide Aluko, “Nigeria, the United States and Southern Africa,” *African Affairs*, volume 78, no. 310, January 1979. Also

- see Abegunrin, *Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966–1999*, p. 81.
65. *West Africa*, London, September 6, 1976, p. 1305.
 66. *Ibid.*
 67. Robert Schrire, *South Africa: Time Running Out, Adopt or Die: The End of White Politics in South Africa*, New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1991, pp. 126–131.
 68. Anthony Sampson, *Mandela: The Authorized Biography*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999, p. xxii.
 69. Abegunrin, *Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966–1999*, pp. 151–152.
 70. “Nigeria Foaming with Blood,” *The Economist*, London, November 18–24, 1995, pp. 17–18.
 71. Abegunrin, *Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966–1999*, p. 155.
 72. *Ibid.*, pp. 159–164.
 73. See *The Guardian*, Lagos, September 25, 2000, p. 2.
 74. Tunji Olagunju, “Exporting Nigeria–South Africa Bilateral Relations,” Lecture Delivered to Trainee Diplomats at the South African Foreign Service Institute, Pretoria, September 18, 2000.
 75. “After Apartheid: South Africa’s Defining Decade, Government Faulted as AIDS Claims Much of a Generation,” *The Washington Post*, Washington, DC, April 1, 2004, pp. 24–25.
 76. See Bade Onimode, “Global Challenges facing South Africa and Nigeria towards the 21st Century,” Paper Presented at Nigeria–South Africa Dialogue held at Rosebank Hotel, Johannesburg, August 26–27, 1999.
 77. *Ibid.*
 78. *Ibid.* See the next chapter for discussion on restructuring of the United Nations.
 79. “In Sudan, A Big Sheik Roams Free: Militia Leader Describes Campaign against Africans as Self-Defense,” *The Washington Post*, Washington, DC, July 18, 2004, pp. 1 and 21. Also see “Take Action: No More Quiet Diplomacy on Darfur,” *The Washington Post*, Washington, DC, July 28, 2004, p. 18.
 80. Ogwu, p. 93. Also see chapter 5 in this book on conflicts resolution in Africa.
 81. “The G8 Disappointment for Third World,” *West Africa*, London, July 31–August 7, 2000, pp. 18–19. Also see Our Common Interests, Report of the *Commission for Africa*, chaired by Tony Blair, British Prime Minister, London, British Information Service, 2005.
 82. John Mukum Mbaku, “NEPAD and Prospects for Development in Africa,” *International Studies*, volume 41, no. 4 (2004), pp. 5–6.
 83. Guy Martin, *Africa in World Politics: A Pan-African Perspective*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2002, p. 166.
 84. *Daily Champion*, Lagos, March 3, 1996.
 85. See Ogwu, p. 65.
 86. See *The Comet*, Lagos, March 12, 2001.

2 NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA IN THE GLOBAL FORUM

1. Chief Obafemi Awolowo's closing address to the 5th Session of the Organization of African Unity, held in Rabat, Morocco, *Proceedings of OAU Annual Summit*, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1968.
2. "Nigeria Loses Clout to South Africa," *The Guardian*, Lagos, August 12, 1994.
3. "Mandela Speaks for Africa," *West Africa*, London, February 10–16, 2003, p. 6.
4. Eghosa E. Osaghae, *Nigeria since Independence: Crippled Giant*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998, p. 303.
5. "Mandela Attacks Abacha," *Nigerian Times*, New York, December 1995, p. 3.
6. "Unfinished Work: Mandela Has Remade South Africa; but Much Is Left to Be Done," *The Washington Post*, May 30, 1999.
7. Olayiwola Abegunrin, "A Survey of Nigerian Foreign Policy: 1960 to 1998," in Bamidele A. Ojo, ed., *Problems and Prospects of Sustaining Democracy in Nigeria: Voices of A Generation*, Huntington, NY: Nova Science, 2001, pp. 120–123.
8. Anthony Sampson, *Mandela: The Authorized Biography*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999, p. xxii.
9. *The Washington Post*, June 13, 1988, p. A23.
10. "Machete's Diary," *West Africa*, London, September 2, 1985, pp. 1793–1794.
11. See Olayiwola Abegunrin, *Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966–1999*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003, pp. 61–96.
12. *Ibid*, p. 189.
13. See the *United Nations General Assembly Records, 1993–1994*. New York: United Nations, 1994.
14. Ibrahim A. Gambari, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations, "Trends in Africa's Foreign Policy: Perspective from the United Nations." Paper Presented at "African Foreign Policy Decision-Making Conference," School of Advanced International Studies of John Hopkins University. Washington, DC, April 4, 1998, p. 5.
15. The likely new UN Permanent members are India representing the Southeast Asia, Brazil representing the Latin America, Japan representing the Far East and the Pacific Region, Germany for Central Europe, and Nigeria or South Africa representing Africa.
16. Abegunrin, *Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966–1999*, p. 92.
17. Ali A. Mazrui, "The Path to Nigeria's Greatness: Between Exceptionalism and Typicality." *The Guardian*, Lagos, November 1, 2004.
18. R.A. Akindele, "Reorganization and Reform of the U.N.: The Problems of the Veto Power, Expansion of Membership of the Security Council and Nigeria's Quest for a Permanent Seat on the Council," in R.A. Akindele and Bassey E. Ate, eds., *Selected Readings On Nigeria's Foreign Policy and International Relations*, Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 2000, pp. 94–99.

19. "South Africa's Mbeki: Out of Mandela's Shadow," *The Washington Post*, June 6, 1999, p. 22. See also Jack E. Spence. *After Mandela: The 1999 South Africa Elections*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999.
20. Richard Morin, "South Africa's Defining Decade: Despite Deep Woes, Democracy Instills Hope," *The Washington Post*, March 31, 2004.
21. Olayiwola Abegunrin, "Chief M.K.O. Abiola's Presidential Ambitions and Yoruba Democratic Rights," in Toyin Falola and Ann Genova, eds., *Yoruba Identity and Power Politics*, Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2006, pp. 334–352.
22. "Africa's Uneasy Rivalry," *New Africa*, London, August 2000, p. 23.
23. "Africa and Security Council Seat." *This Day*, Lagos, April 19, 2006. Available at www.thisdayonline.com/nview. Accessed on April 19, 2006.
24. Ibid.
25. Bade Onimode, "Global Challenges Facing South Africa and Nigeria towards the 21st Century," Paper Presented at Nigeria-South Africa Dialogue held at Rose bank Hotel, Johannesburg, August 26–27, 1999.
26. Joy Ogwu, "South Africa and Nigeria's Relations with the World," Paper Presented at the Nigeria–South Africa Dialogue held at Rose bank Hotel, August 26–27, 1999.
27. *Daily Times*, Lagos, June 30, 1996.
28. "China Backs Nigeria for U.N. Security Council," *The Guardian*, Lagos, November 1, 2004.
29. Ibid.
30. Laolu Akande, "Nigeria's Bid for UN Seat on Course, Says Envoy," *Guardian Newspapers*, New York, July 23, 2007.
31. "Nigeria to Deploy Fresh Battalions in Sierra Leone," *The Guardian*, Lagos, August 9, 2000. See also "U.S. and Nigeria Join Forces," *West Africa*, London, pp. 16–18. See also Susan E. Rice and Gayle E. Smith, "The Darfur Catastrophe," *The Washington Post*, May 30, 2004.
32. Morocco voluntarily withdrew from the African Union over the organization's recognition of the Western Sahara as an independent sovereign state in 1984.
33. "Obasanjo, Annan Fault Principle of Non-Interference." *The Guardian*, Lagos, April 5, 2000, p. 5.
34. Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted in Lome, Togo, July 11, 2000. See Appendix 2, Article 4 (h).
35. Originated in President James Monroe's message to the U.S. Congress on December 2, 1823. It was intended as a warning to European states not to intervene in the New World (in the Americas), and it has become the conceptual basis of U.S. policy in Central and Latin America. Similarly if all African states are united they can demand that no foreign powers should intervene in the African affairs.
36. On Foreign Powers mediation of African conflicts see the following; "African Leaders Urge U.N. to Deplore Force in Congo (Former Zaire now DRC)," *The Washington Post*, November 6, 1996. "France to Send Force to Congo to Try to Quell Surge of Violence," *The Washington Post*, May 29, 2003. "Democratic

- Republic of Congo: Journey through the Rubble,” *West Africa*, London, April 14–20, 2003, pp. 7–12. Also see “Upheavals Undermine Hope for West Africa Stability,” *The Washington Post*, September 17, 2000, and “Annan Requests U.S. Peacekeepers in Liberia,” *The Washington Post*, July 2, 2003.
37. “Nigeria, South Africa Permanent Members of World Bank, International Monetary Fund: Ministers.” *Newsgroups: AFP*, September 26, 2003, p. 18.
 38. Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, London: Panaf Books, 1963, pp. 150–172, and pp. 216–222.
 39. Cover Story, “Togo’s Gnassingbe Fails to Win Obasanjo’s Sympathy,” *Vanguard*, Lagos, February 18, 2005. Also available on www.vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/cover/f218022005.htm. Accessed February 19, 2005.
 40. *Ibid.*
 41. For full details on the origins of ECOMOG, see Margaret Vogt, ed., *Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peacekeeping*, Lagos: Gambumo Publishers, 1992. Also see Adekeye Adebajo, *Liberia’s Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002.
 42. Ibrahim A. Gambari, *Trends in Africa’s Foreign Policy: Perspective from the United Nations*. A Paper Presented at “African Foreign Policy Decision-Making Conference,” School of Advanced International Studies of John Hopkins University, Washington, DC, April 4, 1998, p. 7. One of the first two Nigerian journalists to die in the Liberian Civil War, Tayo Awotunsin, a reporter for *The Nigerian Punch*, was one of author’s students in 1982 at the Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo, Ile-Ife, Nigeria.
 43. *Ibid.*
 44. *The Washington Post*, June 19, 2004
 45. Ali A. Mazrui, “Pan-Africanism: From Poetry to Power,” *ISSUE: A Journal of Opinion*, volume 23, no. 1, 1995, p. 36.
 46. Ibrahim A. Gambari, *Trends in Africa’s Foreign Policy: Perspective from the United Nations*, p. 7.
 47. Kofi Annan, “What I Have Learned,” *The Washington Post*, December 11, 2006.
 48. R. A. Akindele and Bassey E. Ate, eds., *Selected Readings On Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and International Relations*, Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 2000, p. 99.
 49. Out of 192 United Nations members in the General Assembly, 53 of them are African countries.

3 POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA: NEW CHALLENGES AND DILEMMAS

1. Nelson Mandela, *I Am Prepared to Die*. Mandela’s speech during his trial before he was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1963, London: International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1979, p. 48.

2. Brian Lapping, *Apartheid: A History*, New York: George Braziller, 1989, for details see Chapters 13 and 14.
3. Asmal, Kader, and Louise Asmal and Ronald S. Roberts, *Reconciliation through Truth: A Reckoning of Apartheid's Criminal Governance*, New York: George Braziller, 1989.
4. Heather Deegan, "Excerpts from President Mandela's Address to the Nation at his Inauguration on May 10, 1994," *The Politics of the New South Africa: Apartheid and After*, New York: Longman, 2001, p. 113.
5. For details on the African and Southern African Crises, see the following Ali A. Mazrui, *The African Condition: A Political Diagnosis*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1980, Edem Kodjo, *Africa Tomorrow*, New York: Continuum, 1987, G.M. Carter and P. O'Meara, eds., *Southern Africa: The Crisis Continued*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1979.
6. "In South Africa, Clinton Confronts a Complex Success Story," *The Washington Post*, March 26, 1998, p. A30. Also see "Clinton Sees Example in South African Success," *The Washington Post*, March 27, 1998, p. A27.
7. Kenneth W. Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa: The Limit of Independence*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. Also see The Commonwealth Report, *Mission to South Africa: The Findings of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group on Southern Africa*, London: Penguin Books, 1986.
8. "From Miracle to Reality: South Africa's Five years Democracy Faces Stiff Challenges," *The Washington Post*, April 28, 1999, pp. 17 and 22.
9. Lennart Peterson, *Post Apartheid Southern Africa: Economic Challenges and Policies for the Future*. New York: Routledge, 1998, pp. 27–32.
10. Dr. Nkosazana Zuma was the Minister of Health under President Mandela Government, 1994–1999, but later Minister of Foreign Affairs after the June 1999 election. She was a controversial but very effective and efficient Health Minister, challenging pharmaceutical giants and declaring war on smoking virtually everywhere but in homes. See "Activist Health Minister Draws foes in South Africa: Tobacco, AIDS, Patent Policies Criticized," *The Washington Post*, December 11, 1998, p. A18.
11. "South Africa: The Economic Challenges," *Africa Today*, London, May 1999, p. 9.
12. "Joblessness the Thread that Could Unravel South Africa's Economy," *The Washington Post*, March 30, 1996, p. 31.
13. *Africa Today*, London, May 1999, pp. 9–10.
14. Anton Roodt, "The South African Economy," *Corporate Africa*, London, issue 25, volume 1, summer 2002, p. 41.
15. *Ibid*, p. 42.
16. David Mermelstein, ed., *The Anti-Apartheid Reader: The Struggle against White Racist Rule in South Africa*, New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1987, pp. 189–290.
17. Roodt, p. 42.
18. *Ibid*.
19. "New South African President Promises More Reforms," *The Washington Post*, June 26, 1999.

20. For details see Allister Sparks, *Beyond the Miracle: Inside the New South Africa*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2003.
21. "Unfinished Work: Mandela Has Remade South Africa But Much is left to be Done," *The Washington Post*, May 30, 1999, p. A18.
22. "South Africa's Mbeki: Out of Mandela's Shadow," *The Washington Post*, June 6, 1999, pp. B1 and 5.
23. Peterson, pp. 30–32.
24. "Black Getting Poorer: Staying Poor in South Africa, Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies," Chronic Poverty Research Center, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa, *West Africa*, London, May 26, 2003, p. 24.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, eds., *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War*, Harare: Publishing House for Southern African Research and Documentation Center, 1986. Also see Joseph Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front: South Africa's War against Its Neighbours*, London: CIIR and James Currey, 1986.
29. Laurie Nathan, *The Changing of the Guard: Armed Forces and Defense Policy in a Democratic South Africa*, Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1994, p. 48.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid, pp. 47–56.
33. Gilbert M. Khadiagala, *Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security 1975–1993*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1994, p. 18.
34. Nathan, p. 15.
35. Olayiwola Abegunrin, *Economic Dependence and Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: SADCC and South Africa in Confrontation*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990, pp. 1–32. This organization's name was changed to Southern African Development Community (SADC) at the Heads of State and Government Summit Meeting held in Windhoek, Namibia, August 17, 1992, and South Africa joined as a formal member in 1994.
36. "In a Big Man's Shadow: Malawi still Search for Democracy Five Years after Despot's Departure," *The Washington Post*, June 6, 1999, p. 5.
37. Denis Venter, "South African Foreign Policy Decision-Making in the African Context," in Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons, eds., *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001, pp. 162–176.
38. Democratic Republic of Congo has not seen peace since its independence in 1960.
39. Trekkers or Trekerboers (Afrikaners), these are white settlers/farmers mostly Dutch and Germans who migrated to South Africa between 1652 and 1795 and settled in the Cape then known as Cape Colony. See Leonard Thompson, *A History of South Africa*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990, pp. 33–57.

40. Abegunrin, *Economic Dependence and Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa*, pp. 239–241.
41. “Drug Trade Moves in on South Africa: Traffickers Prey on Fragile New Democracy,” *The Washington Post*, September 1, 1996
42. Amon J. Nsekela, ed. *Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation*, London: Rex Collings, 1981, see Chapters 1 and 2. For more details on SADC see the next chapter in this book.
43. Robert D.A. Henderson, “The Southern African Custom Union: The Politics of Dependence,” in Ralph Onwuka and Amadu Sesay, eds., *The Future of Regionalism in Africa*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985, pp. 225–253.
44. “Joblessness the Thread That Could Unravel South Africa’s Economy,” *The Washington Post*, July 14, 1996.
45. Olayiwola Abegunrin, *Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966–1999*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003, pp. 80–93.
46. Mermelstein, pp. 189–290.
47. “South Africa Needs Helping Hand Before It Can Lend One,” *The Washington Post*, September 2, 1994. Also see F.W. De Klerk, “My Ordeal at the Hands of Mandela,” *New Africa*, June 1999, p. 34.
48. “Mandela Attacks Abacha,” *Nigerian Times International*, volume 4, no. 9, December 3–5, 1995, p. 3.
49. For details on New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), see chapter 8 in this book.
50. Nelson Mandela, “South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs*, volume 72, no. 5, spring 1993, pp. 159–178.
51. Fred Ahwireng-Obeng and Patrick J. McGowan, “Partner or Hegemon? South Africa in Africa,” in Jim Broderick, Gary Burford, and Gordon Freer, eds., *South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Dilemmas of A New Democracy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, pp. 55–77.
52. Nathan, pp. 48–55.
53. “Angola’s Peace Withers again under Fire,” *The Washington Post*. January 24, 1994.
54. In addition to arrest of Mark Thatcher, twenty white South Africans on trial in Malabo, forty-nine former white South African soldiers were captured in Zimbabwe attempting to fly to Equatorial Guinea with intention to overthrow the government of that country. See Equatorial Guinea Affairs: Mark Thatcher Denies Coup Charges,” *Guardian*, London, August 25, 2004. Also available at www.guardian.co.uk/southafrica/story. Accessed on April 28, 2006.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Anthony Barnett and Martin Bright, “U.S., U.K. Knew of African Oil Coup Plot, Kept Silent: Regime Change in Oil Rich State Would Suit Their Strategic and Commercial Interests” *Guardian Newspapers Limited*, London, November 29, 2004. Available at <http://rense.com/general60/USUKknewofafrican.htm>. Accessed on November 30, 2004.
58. Ibid.

59. Craig Timberg, "African Coup Plot Leaves Kin Bereft: 65 Jailed for Role Were Poor Ex-Soldiers," *The Washington Post*, September 25, 2004, p. 13.
60. "Small Arms Proliferation: The Legal Side of a Dirty Business," *The Washington Post*, January 24, 1999.
61. *Africa Today*, London, August 2002, p. 10.
62. Milan Vesely, "South African Breweries Now No. 2 in the World," *African Business*, London, July/August, 2002, p. 37.
63. See Jerome A. Singh, "Why AIDS in South Africa Threatens Stability and Economic Growth in Other Parts of Africa," *The Lancet*, volume 364, No. 9449, 2004, p. 1920.
64. Kevin Sullivan, "Call of Cell phones Rings True for African Economies," *The Washington Post Foreign Service*, July 9, 2006.
65. Rachel L. Swarns, "Awe and Unease as South Africa Stretches Out," *New York Times*, February 17, 2002.
66. South African business enterprises are spread all over Africa, even far beyond Southern Africa, banking and brewing in West Africa, and banking and transportation in Central and East Africa. See "South Africans Look North, Invest in Neighbors," *The Washington Post*, November 6, 1997.
67. "Illicit Gun Trade Fanning Flames of Conflict," *The Washington Post*, January 24, 1999.
68. Peterson, p. 32.
69. "Spread of AIDS in South Africa Could Lower Life Expectancy," *The Washington Post*, December 2, 1998, p. A35. Also see "Ignorance Feeds Deadly South Africa AIDS Epidemic," *The Washington Post*, February 16, 1999.
70. "Global Trade Wave Leaves Africa Dry," *The Washington Post*, December 1, 1996. For Black South Africans in Business see, Mpho Lakaje, "Presidential Business: South Africa's Businessmen Are at the Frontline of the Battle for the Country's Presidency," *BBC Focus on Africa*, London, July–September, 2007, pp. 46–48.
71. Desmond Tutu, *The Rainbow People of God: The Making of A Peaceful Revolution*, New York: Double Day, 1994. See Chapters 1–3. Also see "Mandela Bridging White-Black Divide," *The Washington Post*, July 21, 1995.
72. "South African Blacks Lag in Job Market Despite Gain in Political Power," *The Washington Post*, July 14, 1996.
73. See Ali A. Mazrui, *A Tale of Two Africas: Nigeria and South Africa as Contrasting Visions*, London: Adonis and Abbey, 2006, pp. 290–295.

4 SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY AND THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA

1. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Declaration and Treaty was signed in Windhoek, Namibia, on August 17, 1994, by all the fourteen SADC member states, which include nine original founding member states namely, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland,

- Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and five new members, Namibia, Mauritius, South Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Seychelles. See "In Memoriam: Opening Statement of the April 1, 1980, Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) Summit," by the Chairman, His Excellency Sir Seretse Khama, President of the Republic of Botswana, *SADEX*, volume 2, no. 3, May–June, 1980, p. 20.
2. *SADC Today*, Gaborone, Botswana: SADC Secretariat, December 1997.
 3. Amon J. Nsekela, ed., *Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation*, London: Rex Collings, 1981.
 4. See Kenneth W. Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa: The Limit of Independence*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. Also see G.M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds., *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1979.
 5. Gilbert M. Khadiagala, *Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern Africa Security*, Athens: Ohio State University Press, 1994.
 6. *SADCC Blantyre 1981*, The Proceeding of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference held in Blantyre, Republic of Malawi, November 19–20, 1981, Zomba, Malawi: Government Printer, 1982.
 7. See Douglas G. Anglin, "Economic Liberation and Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: SADCC and PTA," *International Organization*, volume 37, no. 4, 1983, p. 685.
 8. Address by President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia to the Lusaka Economic Summit of Southern African Development Coordination Conference, held in Lusaka, Zambia on April 1, 1980, Lusaka: Government Printer, 1980, pp. 3–4.
 9. The nine original founding members of Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. See *SADC Handbook*, Gaborone, Botswana: SADC Secretariat, 1980.
 10. "Black Southern Africa: Realistic Route to Self-Reliance," *The Times*, London, August 9, 1982, p. 5.
 11. Olayiwola Abegunrin, "Southern African Development Coordination Conference: Politics of Dependence," in Ralph I. Onwuka and Amadu Sesay, eds., *The Future of Regionalism in Africa*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, p. 192.
 12. Address by President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, p. 4.
 13. *SADC Today*, Gaborone, Botswana: SADC Secretariat, September 1997.
 14. Lennart Peterson, ed., *Post Apartheid South Africa: Economic Challenges and Policies for the Future*. New York: Routledge, 1998, p. 1.
 15. The fourteen SADC member countries as of September 1997 are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. See *SADC Handbook*, Gaborone, Botswana: SADC Secretariat, 1997.
 16. *SADC Handbook*, Gaborone, Botswana: SADC Secretariat, 1996.
 17. The SADC Declaration and Treaty, signed in Windhoek, Namibia, August 17, 1992.

18. Scott Macleod, "South Africa Stands at A Crossroad," *Time Magazine*, volume 135, no. 6, February 5, 1990, pp. 26–33.
19. The second wave of democratization was the end of the military rules/regimes and the beginning of African leaders coming to power through democratic elections. Thus, democratic election has become model of democracy for African countries.
20. *SADC Handbook*, 1996.
21. Olayiwola Abegunrin, *Economic Dependence and Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: SADCC and South Africa in Confrontation*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990, pp. 21–23. Also see detailed Records of SADCC Summit Meeting held in Harare, Zimbabwe on July 20, 1981 in *SADEX*, Vol. 3, no. 5, September–October 1981, pp. 1–10.
22. "SADC Treaty," *SADC Handbook*, 1996.
23. *Ibid.*
24. Nsekela.
25. *SADC Handbook*, 1996.
26. Peterson, pp. 27–32.
27. See Joseph Hanlon, *Apartheid's Second Front: South's War against Its Neighbours*, London: CIIR and James Currey, 1986. Also see Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, eds., *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War*, Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House for Southern African Research and Documentation Center, 1986.
28. *United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network*, New York: UN, July 2000
29. "Rebel Leader Jonas Savimbi Killed by Angolan Army," *The Washington Post*, February 23, 2002.
30. Allister Sparks, *Tomorrow Is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa's Road to Change*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995. Also see Olayiwola Abegunrin, *Nigeria and the Struggle for the Liberation of Zimbabwe: A Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making of an Emerging Nation*. Stockholm, Sweden: Bethany Books, 1992, pp. 125–178.
31. Gavin Cawthra, *Brutal Force: The Apartheid War Machine*, London: International Defence and Aid Fund, 1986.
32. Robert Edgar, ed. *Sanctioning Apartheid*, Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1990. Also see *South Africa: The Sanctions Report*, Prepared for the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa. London: Penguin Books, 1989.
33. Robert D.A. Henderson, "The Southern African Customs Union: Politics of Dependence," in Ralph I. Onwuka and Amadu Sesay, eds., *The Future of Regionalism in Africa*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, pp. 225–227.
34. Olayiwola Abegunrin, "The Arabs and the Southern African Problem," *International Affairs*, London, volume 60, no. 1, winter 1983/1984, p. 99.
35. *Star*, Johannesburg, November 23, 1956.
36. In 1976, South American and U.S. officials met in Buenos Aires, Argentina to discuss SATO proposals. Shortly after this meeting, South African Navy officials visited Washington, DC, to discuss the results of the Buenos Aires

- meeting with the U.S. officials. See John Prados, "Sealanes, Western Strategy and Southern Africa," in Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned African Scholars (eds.) *U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa*, Boston, MA: West End Press, 1978, p. 79.
37. Abegunrin, *Economic Dependence and Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa*, pp. 23–24.
 38. Organization of African Unity, *The Kampala Document: Towards A Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa*, Ota, Ogun State: Africa Leadership Forum, 1991.
 39. Laurie Nathan, *The Changing of the Guard: Armed Forces and Defense Policy in A Democratic South Africa*. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1994, pp. 28–30.
 40. See Jakkie Cilliers, *Building Security in Southern Africa: An Update on the Evolving Architecture*, ISS Monograph Series, No. 43, Institute for Security Studies, Johannesburg: November 1999.
 41. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
 42. "Mozambique Floods Washed Away Hatred," *The Washington Post*, March 12, 2000.
 43. *Ibid.*
 44. Robert Rotberg and Greg Mills, eds., *War and Peace in Southern Africa*, Cambridge, MA: World Foundation, 1998, pp. 172–178.
 45. *Ibid.*, pp. 194–201.
 46. "South Africa: Economic Challenges," *Africa Today*, May 1999, p. 9.
 47. See Ali A. Mazrui, *A Tale of Two Africas: Nigeria and South Africa as Contrasting Visions*, London: Adonis and Abbey, 2006, p. 33. Also see "Southern Africa: Full Stream Ahead as Growth Spreads." *The Africa Report*, No. 2, March 2006, p. 134.
 48. For details on the economic origins of SADC see Nsekela.
 49. See the following: "Africa's Racial Land Divide: Zimbabwe Confronts White Grip on Fertile Farms," *The Washington Post*, February 21, 2000. Also see "A Brutal Legacy of Congo War," *The Washington Post*, October 25, 2003.

5 ETHNICITY AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

1. Adebayo Adedeji, Former Executive Secretary, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 1975–1991.
2. William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp. 217–227.
3. Okwudiba Nnoli, *Ethnicity and Development in Nigeria*, Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1995, p. 1.
4. James O'Connell, "Political Integration: The Nigerian Case," in Arthur Hazlewood, *African Integration and Disintegration*, London: Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 126–131.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 143.

6. Masipula Sithole, "Managing Ethnic Conflict in Zimbabwe: Ethnic Arithmetic or Ethnic Balance," Presented at the *CODESRIA Conference on Ethnic Conflicts in Africa*. Nairobi: November 1992.
7. Awlter O. Oyugi et al., *Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa*, Nairobi: Heinemann, 1988.
8. See I. Schapera, *A Handbook of Tswana Law*, London: Frank Cass, 1938.
9. M. G. Smith, "Pluralism in Pre-Colonial Africa Societies," in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, editors, *Pluralism in Africa*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1971, p. 28.
10. Klemens Von Metternich, Austrian Statesman, and Minister of Foreign Affairs 1809–1848, restored Austria as a leading European power. He hosted the Congress of Vienna of 1814–1815, and restored order in Europe after the fall of the French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte.
11. Massimo d'Azeglio, an Italian Statesman, novelist, and painter, he was governor of Milan, 1860–1863.
12. David Putman, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 18.
13. Obafemi Awolowo, *Path to Nigerian Freedom*, London: Faber and Faber, 1947, p. 48.
14. Rupert Emerson, "Nation Building in Africa," in Karl Deutsch and William J. Foltz, eds., *Nation Building*, New York: Alberton Press, 1963, p. 104.
15. For details on the Portuguese Policy in their colonies in Africa see Fola Soremekun, *ANGOLA: The Road to Independence*, Ile-Ife, Obafemi Awolowo University Press, 1983. Also see Luis Serapiao and Mohamed A. El-Khawas, *Mozambique in the Twentieth Century: From Colonialism to Independence*, Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1979.
16. Jean Francois Bayart, *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*, London: Longman, 1993, p. 51.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 12–13.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
20. Crawford Young, "The Dialectic of Politics of Cultural Pluralism: Concept and Reality," in Crawford Young, ed., *The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation-State at Bay?* Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993, pp. 23–24.
21. David Welsh, *The Roots of Segregation*, Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 94.
22. John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993, pp. 183–195.
23. David Welsh, "Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa," *International Affairs*, volume 72, no. 3, July 1996, pp. 481–482.
24. Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979, pp. 171–173.
25. Welsh, "Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa," p. 482.
26. John De St. Jorre, *The Brothers War: Biafra and Nigeria*, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1972.

27. Milton Viorst, "Sudan's Islamic Experiment," *Foreign Affairs*, volume 7, no. 3, May–June, 1995, p. 49.
28. See Julie Flint and Alex De Waal, *DARFUR: A Short History of a Long War*, London: ZED Books, 2005.
29. "More than Words for Darfur," *The Washington Post*, October 26, 2004.
30. Rene Lemarchand, "Burundi in Comparative Perspective: Dimensions of Ethnic Strife," in John McGarry and O'Leary, eds., *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, London: Routledge, 1993, pp. 155–156.
31. Ibid.
32. D.A. Low, *Baganda in Modern History*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1971, pp. 233–234.
33. These countries, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe achieved their independence through armed liberation struggles and guerrilla war. See Richard Gibson, *African Liberation Movement: Contemporary Struggle against White Minority Rule*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972, Ann Seidman, *The Roots of Crisis in Southern Africa*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1985, and Terence Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe*. London: James Currey, 1985.
34. Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*, Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1995.
35. E.S. Etieno Odhiambo, "Democracy and Ideology of Order in Kenya," in Awlter O. Oyugi, et al., *Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa*, p. 127.
36. Joshua Bernard Forest, "Ethnic-State Political Relations in Post-apartheid Namibia," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, volume 32, no. 3, 1994, pp. 301–302.
37. Jeremy Harding, *Small Wars, Small Mercies: Journeys in Africa's Disputed Nations*, London: Penguin Press, 1993, p. 253.
38. Welsh, "Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa," p. 485.
39. Eliphas Mukonoweshuru, "Containing Political Instability in a Poly-Ethnic Society: The Case of Mauritius," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, volume 14, no. 2, April 1991, p. 220.
40. Lekopanye Mooketsi, "Botswana: The Beleaguered President," *Southern Political and Economic Monthly*, volume 8, no. 7, April 1995, p. 19.
41. James S. Coleman, *NIGERIA: Background to Nationalism*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1958, pp. 227–229.
42. See the Western Nigerian Government's White Paper charging Igbo tribalism in the administration of the Nigerian Railway Corporation, *Daily Times*, Lagos, April 2, 1964.
43. Nnoli, p. 122.
44. Ibid.
45. See *Daily Times*, Lagos, March 4, 1964.
46. John P. Mackintosh, *Nigerian Government and Politics: Prelude to the Revolution*, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966, p. 547.
47. Abegunrin, *Federalism and Political Problems in Nigeria*, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, North Texas State University, Denton, Texas, 1975, p. 107. Also see *Daily Express*, November 11, 1964. Also see Adeoye A. Akinsanya, "The

- Inevitability of Political Instability in Nigeria,” in Adeoye A. Akinsanya and John A. Ayode eds., *Readings in Nigerian Government and Politics*, Ijebu-Ode: Gratia Associates International, 2005, pp. 20–85.
48. *Morning Post*, Lagos, October 1, 1964.
 49. *Daily Times*, Lagos, December 11, 1964.
 50. Nnoli, p. 123.
 51. Anthony Enahoro, *The Fugitive Offender: The Story of a Prisoner*, London: Cassell, 1965, p. 124.
 52. Obafemi Awolowo, *AWO: The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960, pp. 246–248.
 53. Isaac Boro, *The Twelve Day Revolution*, Benin City: Idodo Umeh, 1982.
 54. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, *Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook, 1966–1969*, volume 1, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 447.
 55. Nnoli, p. 125.
 56. Southerners were not submissive to the colonial authority/rulers as the northerners were before independence when Nigeria was under the British rule.
 57. J. Adekanye, “The Quota Recruitment Policy: Its Sources and Impact on the Nigerian Military,” in Peter Ekeh and Eghosa E. Osaghae, eds., *Federal Character and Federalism in Nigeria*, Ibadan: Heinemann, 1989, p. 235.
 58. Nnoli, p. 130.
 59. Ibid.
 60. James J. Oluleye, *Military Leadership in Nigeria, 1966–1979*, Ibadan: University Press Ltd, 1985, p. 32.
 61. Ibid., pp. 32–33.
 62. Robin Luckham, *The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960–1967*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971, pp. 56–57.
 63. Ibid.
 64. Nnoli, p. 133.
 65. Ibid., pp. 133–134.
 66. Richard J. Payne and Jamal R. Nassar, *Politics and Culture in the Developing World: The Impact of Globalization*, New York: Pearson-Longman, 2003, pp. 214–216.
 67. Robin Wright, “Ethnic Conflict: An Overview,” in Charles P. Cozic, ed., *National and Ethnic Conflict*, San Diego, CA: Green Haven Press, 1994, p. 158.
 68. Simon Robinson and James Nachtwey, “The Tragedy of Sudan.” *Time Magazine*, October 4, 2004, pp. 44–63.
 69. Ibid.
 70. Sudanese’ civil war that lasted for 21 years, between 1981 and 2005 was between the Arab-led Sudanese government in the north and the Black African Sudanese in the south. The peace agreement that settled the war was signed on January 9, 2005 in Kenya. The civil war going on in Darfur, the Western part of Sudan started early in 2003, when two rebel groups took up arms against the Arab-led Islamic government in Khartoum, citing discrimination against the Black Sudanese in the Darfur region. As of June 2006,

- at least 2,000,000 people—a third of Darfur's population have been driven from their homes, and approximately 250,000 have been killed. For full details on the north-south Sudanese' civil war, and the conflict between the Sudanese Western Region of Darfur, and the Arab-led Islamic government in Khartoum, see Alex De Waal editor, *Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa*, London: Hurst, 2004, and Julie Flint and Alex De Waal, *DARFUR: A Short History of a Long War*, London: Zed Books, 2005.
71. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo, from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History*, New York: Zed Books, 2005. Emily Wax, "In Congo, Peace Eludes Its U.N. Keepers: 17,000, Member Force Faulted for Not Protecting Civilians from Ongoing Hostilities," *The Washington Post Foreign Service*, March 28, 2005.
 72. Heather Deegan, *The Politics of the New South Africa: Apartheid and After*. New York: Longman, 2001, pp. 167–216.
 73. Payne and Nassar, pp. 296–333.
 74. Abegunrin, *Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966–1999*, 2003, pp. 135–137.
 75. Wole Soyinka, *The Economist*, September 10, 1995, p. 14.
 76. Viorst, p. 50.
 77. Emeka Anyaoku, *Round Table*, 334, 1995, p. 5.
 78. Kwame Nkrumah, "Addis Ababa Summit, 1963," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 1, September 1963, p. 47. For full details see Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, London: Heinemann, 1963.

6 PEACE, SECURITY, AND HUMAN SURVIVAL IN AFRICA

1. Julius K. Nyerere was president of Republic of Tanzania 1963–1985, "Foreword," in Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, eds., *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War*, Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986, p. vii.
2. See the Proceedings of Symposium on Global Security for the Twenty-First Century Held in Florence, Italy, December 1986. New York: United Nations, 1987. Also see Paul Hartling, "The UNHCR and the Refugee Crisis in Africa," *ISSUE: A Journal of Opinion*, Volume 12, nos. 1 & 2, 1985, p. 25.
3. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosenberg, "The Marginality of African States," in G.M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds., *African Independence: The First Twenty-Five Years*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1985, pp. 46–60.
4. Sanford J. Ungar, *Africa: The People and Politics of an Emerging Continent*, New York: Simon Schuster, 1985, pp. 10–20.
5. Ungar, p. 10.
6. Oye Ogunbadejo, *The International Politics of Africa's Strategic Minerals*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986, pp. 36–62.
7. James Duffy, *Portuguese Africa*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961, pp. 25–27.

8. Ibid, pp. 36–62.
9. Pusch Commey, “Mining: Dethroning King Monopoly,” *New African*, London, September 2002, pp. 50–51.
10. Martin Bailey, “Rossing Helps Profits but Fuel Protests,” *African Business*, London, July 1982, pp. 32–33. Also see Luyton Driman, “BBC Viewpoint: Is Africa Open for Business?” www.bbcnews.com Accessed June 5, 2006.
11. For full details of how the uranium was obtained by the United States from the Democratic Republic Congo (the former Belgian Congo) during the Second World War through the Belgian government, which was the former colonial power. See Donna Uthus Gregory, ed., *The Nuclear Predicament: A Sourcebook*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986, pp. 39–40.
12. World Energy Council Member Committees 2000/2001; *Uranium 1999: Resources, Production and Demand*, 2000, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and International Atomic Energy Agency Reports, 2001, pp. 10, 18, and 20.
13. Special Reports, “Namibia Set to Be Global Uranium Supplier,” *United Press International*, March 26, 2007.
14. Ibid. Also see U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on International Relations, “Africa and the War on Global Terrorism,” November 15, 2001.
15. John L. Hirsch, *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p. 25.
16. James Rupert, “Diamond Hunter Fuel Africa’s Brutal Wars,” *The Washington Post*, October 16, 1999. Also see Douglas Farah, “Liberia Reportedly Arming Guerrillas: Rebel Control of Sierra Leone Diamond-Mining Areas Crucial to Monrovia, Sources Say,” *The Washington Post*, June 18, 2000.
17. Diamonds Mining, *Mining Weekly*, Johannesburg, May 10, 2006. Also available on www.miningweekly.co.za/min/sector/diamonds. Accessed on May 24, 2006.
18. African Diamond, “Patterns of Inequality,” Jewish/European Business. <http://www.nefertamu.tripod.com>.
19. Ibid.
20. “Death of Mr. Rhodes,” *The Times*, London: March 27, 1902, p. 7. Also see Anthony Thomas, *Rhodes: The Race for Africa*, London, Bridge, 1997.
21. Botswana Mining, *Mining Journal*, London, May 2006.
22. De Beers, *Annual Review 2003*, De Beers, Johannesburg, 2003. www.diamondfields.com. Accessed on May 24, 2006.
23. John Prendergast, “Our Failure in Somalia: U.S. Counterterrorism Policy Is Empowering Islamist Militias,” *The Washington Post*, June 7, 2006. Also see Emily Wax, “Somalia Lawlessness Spills into the Sea: Modern Day Pirates Strikes for Ransom and Cargo,” *The Washington Post Foreign Service*, April 2, 2006.
24. Emily Wax, “Women of Somalia Are Drawn to Drug Trade,” *The Washington Post Foreign Service*, April 16, 2006.
25. Abegunrin, *Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966–1999*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003, p. 179. Also see Shai Oster, “Oil Fuels Unrest in Nigeria,” *The Wall Street Journal*, March 21, 2005, p. A15.

26. Laolu Akande, "Nigeria Is Third Largest Oil Exporter to United States," *The Guardian Lagos*, June 13, 2007.
27. Abegunrin, *Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military Rule*, p. 172.
28. Akande, *The Guardian*. Lagos, June 13, 2007.
29. Ibid. Also see Ike Okonta and Oronoto Douglas, *Where Vultures Feast: 40 Years of Shell in the Niger Delta*, San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books, 2001, pp. 72–75.
30. "Gas Flaring in Nigeria: A Human Rights, Environmental and Economic Monstrosity." *Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth Nigeria*. Amsterdam, June 2005, p. 4.
31. "U.S. Navy to Set up Sao Tome Radar for Gulf of Guinea Security," *REUTERS*, December 7, 2006.
32. "Blood and Oil," *New York Times Editorial*, April 16, 2006. Also see Rob Crilly, "Oil from Africa Comes with Political Instability," *USA TODAY*, May 1, 2006. Also available at www.USATODAY.com. Accessed on May 24, 2006.
33. Charles Snyder, Speech at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, April 13, 2004.
34. Rob Crilly, "Oil from Africa Comes with Political Instability," *USA TODAY*, May 1, 2006.
35. *Nigeria Today Online*, "China Seals \$2.3 billion Nigerian Oil Deal," January 10, 2006.
36. Emeka Anuforo, "Nigeria Launches Satellite," *The Guardian*, Lagos, May 13, 2007.
37. Mark Ashurst, "China's Ambitions in Africa," BBC News, November 25, 2006. Available on www.bbcnews.com. Accessed on November 27, 2006.
38. Edwin Madunagu, "China's Return to Africa," *The Guardian*, Lagos, December 14, 2006.
39. "China-Africa Relations: A Win Win Strategy," *African Business*, London, March 2007, p. 4.
40. Chris McGreal, "Hu Jintao Starts Africa Tour with Loans Promise," *Guardian News*, London, January 31, 2007.
41. Craig Timberg, "Hu Jintao Defends China's Role in Africa," *The Washington Post*, February 8, 2007.
42. Crilly, *USA TODAY*, May 1, 2006.
43. David Goldwyn and J. Stephen Morrison, "Promoting Transparency in the African Oil Sector: Report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies Task Force on Rising U.S. Energy Stake in Africa, CSIS, Washington, DC, March 2004. Also available at www.csis.org/africa/index.htm#oil. Accessed on April 13, 2006.
44. David Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991, pp. 567–572.
45. Paul Blustein and Craig Timberg, "High Oil Prices Met with Anger Worldwide: Both Rich and Poor Countries Make Moves to Appease Citizens," *The Washington Post*, October 3, 2005. Also see Mike Oduniyi, "Niger Delta Threat Raises Oil Prices to \$70 per Barrel," Available on www.allafrica.com. Accessed on April 13, 2006.

46. "Crude Oil Futures Climb above \$71 per Barrel," Available on www.allafrica.com. Accessed on April 19, 2006.
47. Simone Baribeau, "Stocks Nosedive as Oil Hits Record," *The Washington Post*, June 27, 2008. Also see Peter Fritsch and Kelly Evans, "How Economy Could Survive Oil at \$100 a Barrel," *The Wall Street Journal*, September 29–30, 2007, p. A1. Also see Matt Chambers, "Crude Oil Reaches Fresh High as Futures Rise 11% in a Week," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 17, 2007, p. C11. Steven Mufson, "Strike on Iran Would Roil Oil Markets, Experts Say," *The Washington Post*, October 26, 2007.
48. Ibid.
49. Daniel Volman, "The Bush Administration and African Oil: The Security Implications of the U.S. Energy Policy," *Review of African Political Economy*, Volume 30, no. 98, December 2003, pp. 573–584.
50. Steven Mufson, "Global Forces Converge to Drive Up Oil Prices," *The Washington Post*, July 27, 2008. Also by Steven Mufson, "Oil Prices Causes Global Shift in Wealth: Rise in Oil Price Transform Economies," *The Washington Post*, November 10, 2007.
51. Yergin, p. 567.
52. Paul Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001, p. 168.
53. See Neil C. Livingstone, "Proactive Responses to Terrorism: Reprisals, Preemption, and Retribution," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., *International Terrorism*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, p. 223.
54. Robert J. Samuelson, "A New Era for Oil," *The Washington Post*, March 30, 2005.
55. Paul Wolfowitz was the architect of Iraq war who was forced out from the World Bank presidency amid allegations that he improperly acted to benefit his girlfriend.
56. Paul Wolfowitz, "Remarks," Annual Senior Leader Seminar, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, February 9, 2004. www.dod.gov/speeches/2004/sp20040209-depsecdef0863.html. Accessed on May 24, 2006.
57. The programs and amounts being spent budgeted are as follows: (1) The Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) \$15 million for 2005, and \$53 million between 2002 and 2005; (2) The African Regional Peacekeeping (ARP), which trains, equips, and assists African soldiers in local peacekeeping efforts, \$45 million for 2005, and \$154 million for 2002–2005; (3) The International Military Education and Training (IMET), \$10.8 million, for 2005 and \$43.6 million from 2002 to the end of 2005. U.S. Department of Defense, and Department of State, Washington, DC, 2004.
58. Stephen Morrison, "Intelligence Report: U.S. to Spend \$500 Million to Secure Nigeria's Oil and Gas, and in Algeria too and to Combat Terror Spots in West Africa," CSIS, Washington, DC, May 2005.
59. See Sandra T. Barnes, "Global Flows: Terror, Oil, and Strategic Philanthropy," *African Studies Review*, Volume 48, no. 1, April 2005, pp. 3–15.
60. Emily Wax and Karen DeYoung, "U.S. Secretly Backing Warlords in Somalia," *The Washington Post*, May 17, 2006.

61. Theresa Whelan, "The Niger Delta: Future Reform and Strategies for External Support," A Presentation by Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary U.S. Department of Defense at *The Center for Strategic and International Studies African Program*, Washington, DC: March 14, 2007.
62. "U.S. to Get Africa Command Center," *BBC NEWS*, February 6, 2007.
63. "U.S. Embarrassment in Africa," *People's Daily Online*. Available on <http://english.people.com.cn>. Accessed on April 4, 2007.
64. See Karen DeYoung, "U.S. Africa Command Trims Its Aspirations: Nations Loath to Host Force; Aid Groups Resisted Military Plan to Take on Relief Work," *The Washington Post*, June 1, 2008.
65. Ibid.
66. See specifically chapter three in Sanford J. Ungar, *AFRICA: The People and Politics of an Emerging Continent*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986.
67. Stephanie McCrummen and Colum Lynch, "Sudan Leaders Uneasy about Obama," *The Washington Post*, December 9, 2008.
68. Ali A. Mazrui, *The African Condition*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 117.
69. See *The Holy Bible, King James Version*, St. Matthew, Chapter 13, verse 12.
70. See Adeoye A. Akinsanya, *Multinationals in a Changing Environment: A Study of Government-Business Relations in the Third World*, New York: Praeger, 1984.
71. Sulayman S. Nyang, *Islam, Christianity, and African Identity*, Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1984.
72. Thomas Hovet, Jr., *Africa in the United Nations*, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1963.
73. Stephen C. Smith, *Case Studies in Economic Development*, 2nd edition, New York: Addison-Wesley Longman, 1997, p. 13.
74. Emily Wax, "Land of Plenty, Lives of Desperation: Congo Is Transformed by Hunger after Years of Devastating War," *The Washington Post Foreign Service*, November 2, 2003. See also Alex Thomson, *An Introduction to African Politics*, New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2000, p. 212.
75. Young, *Ideology and Development in Africa*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982, pp. 253–267.
76. Ibid.
77. V.I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*. New York: International Publishers, 1939.
78. Jomo Kenyatta, *Facing Mount Kenya*, London: Heinemann Education Books, 1979, p. 212.
79. Conakry: Guinea National Broadcasting Service, quoted in Ali Mazrui, *The African Condition*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 122.
80. A. Appadorai, "Non-Alignment: Some Important Issues," *International Studies*, volume 20, nos. 1–2, January–June, 1981, pp. 3–4.
81. Ibid.
82. Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, New York: International Publishers, 1963, pp. 198–200. See also Adeoye Akinsanya, "Foreign Economic Control and Non-Alignment in Global Affairs," *Pakistan Horizon*, 45, April 1992, pp. 69–93.

83. K.P. Misra, "Towards Understanding Non-Alignment," *International Studies*, volume 20, nos. 1–2, January–June, 1981, p. 24.
84. Colin Legum, *Pan-Africanism*, London: Pall Mall Press, 1962, pp. 147–148.
85. Ibid.
86. Quoted in Teshome Adera, *National Leaders and African Unity*. Addis Ababa: Berhanena Selam Printing Press, 1963, p. 147.
87. Ibid.
88. Abegunrin, *Nigeria and the Struggle for the Liberation of Zimbabwe: A Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making of an Emerging Nation*. Stockholm, Sweden: Bethany Books, 1992, p. 33.
89. Misra, p. 24.
90. Ibid, pp. 24–25.
91. Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg, eds., *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003, pp. 213–215. Also see Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila*, New York: Zed Books, 2002, pp. 214–247.
92. Donald M. Snow, *National Security for a New Era: Globalization and Geopolitics*, New York: Longman, 2004, pp. 283–284.
93. Brigitte L. Nacos, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding Threats and Responses in the Post-9/11 World*. New York: Pearson-Longman, 2006.
94. See the following on the crises and the unstable situations in Africa since the 1960s. Helen Kitchen, ed., *Africa: From Mystery to Maze*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1976, Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar, eds., *African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985, and Kenneth W. Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa: The Limit of Independence*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972.
95. Andrew Reynolds, ed., *Election 1994 South Africa: The Campaigns, Results and Future Projects*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, Heather Deegan, *South Africa Reborn: Building a New Democracy*. London: UCL Press, 1999, Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, eds., *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War*, Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986.
96. See the following on wars and civil wars in Africa: John J. Stremlau, *The International Politics of Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977, Donald Rothchild, "Ethnic Insecurity, Peace Agreements, and State Building," in Richard Joseph, ed., *State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999, A.B. Assensoh and Yvette M. Alex-Assensoh, *African Military History and Politics: Coups and Ideological Incursions, 1900–Present*, New York: Palgrave, 2001, and James Nachtwey and Simon Robinson, "The Tragedy of Sudan," *Time Magazine*, New York, October 4, 2004, pp. 44–61, and Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, *Darfur: A Short History of a Long War*. London: Zed Books, 2005.
97. John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1978, pp. 105–160. Also see Ludo De Witte, *The Assassination of Lumumba*. London: Verso, 2001

98. Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, "Fighting Africa's Killer Diseases: AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, *West Africa*. London, June 23–29, 2003, pp. 7–11.
99. Jon Jeter, "A Continent Ravaged by AIDS," *The Washington Post*, December 20, 1999.
100. Craig Timberg, "How AIDS in Africa Was Overstated: Reliance on Data from Urban Prenatal Clinics Skewed Early Projections," *The Washington Post Foreign Service*, April 6, 2006. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/05/AR2006040502517_pf. Accessed on July 1, 2006. Also see the Editorial, "Assessing AIDS: In Some African Countries, the Toll Is Lower than What the U.N. Told Us," in *The Washington Post*, April 10, 2006.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
103. Uganda AIDS Commission, *HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report*, Kampala, 2001.
104. Richard Morin, "Impact from AIDS Poses Major Test of South African Democracy," *The Washington Post*, October 20, 2004.
105. See "From News Services," *The Washington Post*, November 14, 2006.
106. BBC, "Mandela's Eldest Son Dies of AIDS," available at <http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4151159.stm>. Accessed on December 19, 2005.
107. Ali A. Mazrui, *A Tale of Two Africas: Nigeria and South Africa as Contrasting Visions*, London: Adonis & Abbey, 2006, p. 292.
108. Jon Jeter, "A Continent Ravaged by AIDS," *The Washington Post*, December 20, 1999.
109. David Brown, "Programs Help Reduce HIV Rates in Parts of Africa, Reports Says Virus Resurges in Uganda and Thailand." Prevalence of HIV infection among the city dwellers of 15 to 24 years old has fallen by at least 25 percent in the following African countries: Zimbabwe, Malawi, Kenya, Botswana, Burundi, Rwanda, and Cote d'Ivoire. In Zimbabwe, Kenya, Botswana, and Tanzania, the rate fell a similar percentage among rural people. *The Washington Post*, November 22, 2006.
110. "The Global Reach of AIDS."
111. Moghalu, p. 7.
112. United Nations, *Human Development Report (HDR)*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
113. Moghalu, p. 7.
114. Ibid., pp. 7–8.
115. Adebayo Oyebade, "African Security and Nuclear Weapons: Past Fears and Future Relevance," in Adebayo Oyebade and Abiodun Alao, eds., *Africa after the Cold War: The Changing Perspectives on Security*, Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1998, pp. 106–108.
116. David Brown, "House Leaders Agree on More AIDS Funding," *The Washington Post*, February 28, 2008.
117. Moghalu, pp. 8–10.
118. "Turning Talk into Action: G8 Gleneagles One Year On," *Department for International Development*, London, June 26, 2006.

119. Timberg, "How AIDS in Africa Was Overstated," April 6, 2006.
120. The strategy known as ABC—Abstinence, Be faithful, Correct and consistent with Condoms. This was first used in Uganda for HIV/AIDS prevention. See Alan Green, "ABC Model," *The Guttmacher Report on Public Report*, Volume 5, no. 4. Kampala, October 2002. Also see David Brown, "World AIDS Program Garners Praise," *The Washington Post*, March 31, 2007.
121. See Craig Timberg, "Major Studies in Kenya, Uganda Show Circumcision Can Slow Spread of HIV in Africa," *The Washington Post*, December 14, 2006.

7 FROM ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY TO AFRICAN UNION

1. Kwame Nkrumah, "Addis Ababa Summit, 1963," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, September 1963.
2. Thomas Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa: White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent, from 1876 to 1912*. New York: Avon Books, 1991, pp. 239–223.
3. Alex Thomson, *An Introduction to African Politics*. New York: Routledge, 2000, p. 8.
4. *Ibid*, p. 10.
5. Henry S. Wilson, *The Imperial Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1870*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minneapolis Press, 1977, p. 95.
6. David Birmingham, *Kwame Nkrumah: Father of African Nationalism*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1998, p. 24.
7. Amy Jacques Garvey (editor), *The Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey*. Dover, MA: The Majority Press, 1986.
8. See Kwadwo Pobi-Asamani, *W.E.B. Dubois: His Contributions to Pan-Africanism*. San Bernadino, CA: The Borgo Press, 1994, and David Levering Lewis, *W.E.B. Dubois: The Biography of a Race 1868–1919*. New York: Henry Holt, 1993, pp.386–407.
9. George Padmore, *History of the Pan-African Congress: Colonial Coloured Unity, A Programme of Action*. London: Panaf, 1963.
10. Birmingham, p. 24.
11. Nkrumah and Padmore were organizing Secretaries of the Pan-African Congress of 1945. See Olisanwuche P. Osedebe, *Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement, 1776–1991*. Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1994, p. 138.
12. Kwame Nkrumah, *Towards Colonial Freedom*. London: Heimann Books, 1962, pp. 44–45.
13. See Esedebe, pp. 167–169.
14. Birmingham, pp. 99–100.
15. Ludo de Witte, *The Assassination of Lumumba*. New York: Verso Press, 2001, pp. xvi and 179.

16. Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*. London: Heinemann, 1964.
17. Gino Naldi, *The Organization of African Unity: An Analysis of Its Role*. New York: Mansell, 1999, p. 2.
18. Esedebe, p. 187.
19. Ibid., p. 192.
20. See the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.
21. "Text of Emperor Haile Selassie's Welcome Address," *Journal of African Studies*, volume 1, September 1963, pp. 281–291.
22. Pakenham, pp. 139–142.
23. For details see Article II of the Charter of the OAU.
24. Naldi, p. 33.
25. Vincent B. Khapoya, *The African Experience: An Introduction*, 2nd edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998, p. 289.
26. Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style*. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1977.
27. Joel Krieger, William A. Joseph, Miles Kahler, Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, Barbara B. Stallings, and Margaret Weir (eds.), *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 4.
28. See the Charter of the OAU.
29. Richard Gibson, *African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles against White Minority Rule*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972, pp. 7–9.
30. Khapoya, p. 289.
31. Gibson, pp. 164–165 and 219–221.
32. Naldi, p. 36.
33. William I. Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 4.
34. Naldi, p. 72.
35. See Article 28 of the Charter of the OAU.
36. Ibid.
37. Pablo San Martin, "Briefing: Western Sahara: Road to Perdition?" *African Affairs*, volume 103, no. 413, October 2004, pp. 651–663.
38. Ibid.
39. See the Organization of African Unity Charter and the Constitutive Act of the African Union.
40. Naldi, p. 33.
41. Abegunrin, *Economic Dependency and Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: SADCC and South Africa*. Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990, pp. 13–14.
42. Ralph Onwuka, 'Layi Abegunrin, and Dhajoo Ghista (eds.), *AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT: The OAU/ECA Lagos Plan of Action and Beyond*. Lawrenceville, VA: Brunswick, 1985.
43. Malcolm Evans and Rachel Murray (eds.), *The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights*, 2nd edition. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
44. Richard S. Mukisa and Bankole Thompson, "The Prerequisite for Economic Integration in Africa: An Analysis of the Abuja Treaty," *Africa Today*, 4th Quarter, 1995, p. 56.

45. *United Nations Wire Services*. New York: UN, August 2001.
46. Dennis Barnes, "The Frustrations Surrounding Reparations," *Howard University Magazine*, volume 10, no. 1, Fall 2001, pp. 16–21.
47. *Ibid.*
48. *Ibid.*
49. Randall Robinson, *The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks*. New York: Dutton Books, 2000, pp. 219–220.
50. African National Congress, *Developing a Strategic Perspective on South African Foreign Policy*. Umanyono, Johannesburg, 1997. Also see African National Congress, *Understanding Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR)*, Johannesburg, 1997. Available at <http://www.policy.org.za/pol/policy>. Accessed on October 22, 2004.
51. Peter Vale and Sipho Maseko, "South Africa and the African Renaissance," *International Affairs*, volume 74, 1998, pp. 271–287. Also see Peter J. Schraeder, "South Africa's Foreign Policy: From International Pariah to Leader of the African Renaissance," *The Round Table*, 359, 2001, pp. 229–243. For details on GEAR see chapter three in this book.
52. Christ Landsberg, "Promoting Diplomacy: The Mandela-Mbeki Doctrine," *Journal of Democracy*, volume 11, no. 3, 2000, p. 108.
53. Graham Evans, "South Africa's Foreign Policy after Mandela: Mbeki and His Concept of an African Renaissance," *The Round Table*, 352, 1999, pp. 261–268.
54. Marie Muller, "South Africa's Economic Diplomacy: Constructing a Better World for All," *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 13, 2002, p. 3.
55. Landsberg, p. 106.
56. *Ibid.*
57. For details on African Renaissance see Cheikh Anta Diop, *BLACK AFRICA: The Economic and Cultural Basis for a Federated State*, New Expanded Edition. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1987.
58. Department of Foreign Affairs of Republic of South Africa, *Foreign Policy of South Africa*, Pretoria, July 20, 2003.
59. Thabo Mbeki, "Speech Delivered on October 11, 1999 at the Launching of the African Renaissance Institute," Pretoria, 1999. Available at www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/speeches/1999. Accessed on October 22, 2004.
60. For details see AHG/Decl.xxxv. Also available at www.iss.co.za/af/Reg.Org/unity, and Union/pdfs.oau/org/9HoGAssembly1999.pdf. Accessed on October 22, 2004.
61. Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Nigeria's Foreign Policy*, Abuja, 2000. Also see Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa. *Functions of the Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa*, Abuja, 2002.
62. African Union, *Memorandum of Understanding on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa*, Presented and accepted in Durban, South Africa, July 2002.
63. Africa Leadership Forum is a Nongovernment Organization founded in 1980 by General Obasanjo after he retired from the military, and before he became Nigeria's civilian president in 1999. Olusegun Obasanjo and Felix

- G.N. Mosha (eds.), "Africa: Rise to Challenge," in *Conference Report on the Kampala Forum*, Otta, Abeokuta: Africa Leadership Forum, 1992, p. 260.
64. See Francis M. Deng and William Zartman, *A Strategic Vision for Africa: The Kampala Movement*. Washington, DC: Brookings Press, 2000, p. 107.
 65. Ibid., p. 5.
 66. Ibid.
 67. Ibid.
 68. Ibid.
 69. The Kampala Document, *Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa*. Kampala, Uganda, May 19–22, 1991. This conference was jointly organized by Africa Leadership Forum, with the Secretariats of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. This conference was made possible with full support and cooperation of President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda.
 70. To emphasize that the CSSDCA was an African initiative, the four principles were grouped under the terms of the goals of the process: security, stability, development, and cooperation with an African word—*calabashes*—because calabash is tight and does not leak. For full details on the basic principles of CSSDCA see Obasanjo and Mosha (eds.), *Africa: Rise to Challenge*. Otta, Abeokuta; Africa Leadership Forum, 1991.
 71. Ibid.
 72. African Heads of State and Government Declaration: AHSG/Decl.4 (XXXVI).
 73. African Union, *Memorandum of Understanding*, p. 2.
 74. AHSG/Decl.4 (XXXVI).
 75. African Union, *Memorandum of Understanding*, p. 27.
 76. See Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.
 77. Deng and Zartman, p. xv. Obasanjo was arrested and imprisoned by the military regime of General Sani Abacha, 1995–1998 for unsubstantiated coup plan.
 78. From here henceforth General Obasanjo will be referred to as President Obasanjo since he was democratically elected as a civilian president in May 1999.
 79. See Adekeye Adebajo, "Nigeria: Africa's New Gendarme," *Security Dialogue*, 31, 2000, p. 195.
 80. BBC News, February 27, 1999. Available on <http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2hi/africa/287236.stm>. Accessed on October 22, 2004.
 81. [Http://www.bbc.co.uk/2hi/africa/737701.stm](http://www.bbc.co.uk/2hi/africa/737701.stm). Accessed on October 22, 2004.
 82. Nigerian Federal Ministry of Co-operation and Integration in Africa. Also available on http://www.nopa.net/useful_Information/federal_cabinet.shtml. Accessed on October 22, 2004.
 83. Ibid.
 84. Thomas Kwasi Tieku, "Explaining the Clash and Accommodation of Interests of Major Actors in the Creation of African Union," *African Affairs*, volume 103, no. 411, April 2004, p. 259.

85. Ibid.
86. Ufot B. Inamete, *Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Nigeria*. Selinsgrove, NJ: Associated Press, 2002, p. 292.
87. Department of Foreign Affairs: Republic of South Africa, "Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa," Pretoria, 2002.
88. Mbeki, "Speech Delivered on October 11, 1999."
89. AHS/Decl.XXXV.
90. Khaled Dawoud, "Buying Power: Colonel Ghaddafi Used Champion Arab Nationalism Now He spends Libya's Money on Increasing His Influence in Africa," *BBC Focus on Africa*, London, October–December 2001, p. 16.
91. Asteris Huliaras, "Ghaddafi's Comeback: Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s," *African Affairs*, volume 100, no. 398, January 2001, p. 17. For the full details of the proposed "Union of African States" in the 1960s, see Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*.
92. Alex De Waal, "What Is New in the New Partnership for Africa's Development?" *International Affairs*, volume 78, no. 3, 2003, p. 46.
93. See the "Transitional Arrangement and Final Provisions," Article 33 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.
94. Nita Bhalla, "OAU Gives Way to African Union," *BBCNEWS*, May 25, 2001. Accessed August 19, 2004 on <http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa>.
95. Francis Kornegay, "Beyond the OAU: African Union or Afro-Jamhuriya?" http://www.igd.org.za/pub/g-dialogue/Special_feature/beyond.html. Accessed October 19, 2004.
96. William M. Gumede, *Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC*. Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2005, p. 209.
97. Ibid.
98. Howard Schneider, "Libya's Ghaddafi Say His Future Is African: Pan-Arab Unity Is No Longer the Goal," *The Washington Post*, October 4, 1998.
99. Khaled Dawoud, "Libya Buying Power," *BBC Focus on Africa*. London, December 2001, p. 16.
100. Ibid., p. 210.
101. Ibid.
102. NEWS, *The Arab World*. "Libya and France Sign Nuclear Deal," March 16, 2006. Available on <http://www.english.aljazeera.net>. Accessed on May 24, 2006.
103. Ibid.
104. Glenn Kessler, "U.S. Restores Full Diplomatic Ties with Libya," *The Washington Post*. May 16, 2006.
105. Gumede, p. 210.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. *The Dispatch*, Johannesburg, July 13, 2000. <http://www.dispatch.co.za/2000/07/13/foreign/OAU.HTM>. Accessed October 22, 2004.
109. See Baimu and Sturman, "Amendment to the African Union's Right to Intervene. For details see the Constitutive Act of the African Union.

110. Ibid.
111. For details, see the rules of procedure in the Constitutive Act of the African Union.
112. Gumede, p. 212.
113. Many African Women Organizations are on the forefront of this campaign were mostly from such organizations as African Women's Committee on Peace and Development (AWCPD), African Women's Development and Communication Network (FEMNET), African Center for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), The African Center for Democracy and Human Rights Studies (ACDHRS), The African Leadership Forum (ALF), Ajina Mama wa Afrika, Equality Now, the Federation of African Women in Education (FAWE), Femmes Africa Solidarite (FAS), The Forum for Community Development (FCD), and Women in Law and Development in Africa (WILDAF).
114. See detailed documents at CM/Dec.579 (LXIII). The Women demands were embodied in the declaration entitled, "Mainstreaming African Women's Vision and Executive Participation in the African Union," Durban, June 2002.
115. Thomas Kwasi Tiekou, "Explaining the Clash and Accommodation of Interests of Major Actors in the Creation of the African Union," *African Affairs*, volume 103, no. 411, April 2004, p. 264.
116. Ibid.
117. See Article 32, No. 4, "Amendment and Revision," in the Constitutive Act of African Union.
118. *New African*, London, May 2004, pp. 14 and 17.
119. Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 32, No. 4, "Amendment and Revision."
120. It is very interesting that Ghaddafi has picked up where President Kwame Nkrumah left off in the 1960s advocating for the "United States of Africa," see Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*.
121. The Member States of the African Union took a bold step in taking an unanimous position in rejecting Sudan from taking up the chairmanship of the organization in January 2006. The President of Republic of Congo, Dennis Sassou Nguesso was chosen as the chairman for 2006.
122. The five Subregions of Africa are West, East, North, South, and Central.

8 NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT: POLITICS OF DEPENDENCE

1. Julius K. Nyerere, former President of Tanzania, 1961–1985, Speech made at the Edinburgh University, Scotland, October 9, 1997.
2. Nelson M. Mandela, Address at the Official Opening of SADC Summit, 1997. Also available at www.polity.org.za.govdocs. Accessed on April 20, 2004.

3. Cheikh Anta Diop, *Black Africa: The Economic and Cultural Basis for a Federated State*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1987, p. 1.
4. William M. Gumedé, *Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC*. Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2005, p. 201.
5. Ibid.
6. John M. Mbaku, "NEPAD and Prospects for Development in Africa," *International Studies*, volume 41, no. 4, 2004, pp. 390–393.
7. Guy Martin, *Africa in World Politics: A Pan-African Perspective*, Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2002, p. 166.
8. Mbaku, p. 392.
9. Ibid., p. 391.
10. Abegunrin, "African Union and NEPAD," *West Africa*. London, September 2–8, 2002, p. 6.
11. Gumedé, p. 203.
12. Ibid. p. 204.
13. South Africa Institute of International Affairs Survey, December 2002.
14. Gumedé, p. 204.
15. Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, Ninth edition, Belmont, CA: Thomson/ Wadsworth, 2004, p. 188.
16. S.K.B. Asante, "ECOWAS/CEAO: Conflict and Cooperation in West Africa," in Ralph I. Onwuka and Amadu Sesay (eds.), *The Future of Regionalism in Africa*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985, p. 76.
17. Gumedé, p. 205.
18. COSATU News Conference Statement, April 25, 2002. Also available at www.cosatu.org.za. Accessed on May 24, 2006.
19. Gumedé, p. 205.
20. See Graig Timberg, "How AIDS in Africa Was Overstated: Reliance on Data from Urban Prenatal Clinics Skewed Early Projections." *The Washington Post Foreign Service*, April 6, 2006. Also see the Editorial, "Assessing AIDS: In Some African Countries, the Toll Is Lower than What the U.N. Told Us," in *The Washington Post*, April 10, 2006.
21. Gumedé, p. 205.
22. Ralph I. Onwuka, Layi Abegunrin, and Dhanjoo Ghista (eds.), *African Development: OAU/ECA Lagos Plan of Action and Beyond*, Lawrenceville, VA: Brunswick, 1985. Also see Ralph I. Onwuka and Amadu Sesay (eds.), *The Future of Regionalism in Africa*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985.
23. The World Bank. *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action*, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1981. Also see Olayiwola Abegunrin, *Economic Dependence and Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: SADCC and South Africa*, pp. 11–12.
24. South Africa Council of Churches, *Un-blurring the Vision: An Assessment of NEPAD by South African Council of Churches*, June 6, 2002. Also available at www.africaaction.org/docs02/nepad206.htm. Accessed on April 24, 2006.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Edwin Madunagu, "Millennium Goals: Fake and Real," *The Guardian*, Lagos, April 20, 2006.

28. Gumede, p. 207.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid. p. 208.
31. "Africa's Development Plan Must Succeed," *BBCNEWS*, March 25, 2002. Also available at www.bbc.com. Accessed on May 24, 2006.
32. U.S. House of Representatives H.R. # 1432 of 1999. Available at "AGOA News," www.AGOA.info. Accessed on May 24, 2006.
33. Abegunrin, "The Military and Nigerian Political Economy in the Global System," in Kwadwo Konadu-Agyemang and Kwamina Panford (eds.), *Africa's Development in the Twenty-First Century: Pertinent Socio-Economic and Development Issues*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006, p. 245.
34. Samir Amin, "Capitalism, Imperialism, Globalization," in Ronald H. Chilcote (ed.), *The Political Economy of Imperialism*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000, pp. 157–197.
35. James Petras, "Globalization: A Critical Analysis," in Ronald H. Chilcote (ed.), op. cit., pp. 181–213.
36. Gumede, p. 206.
37. Mbaku, p. 394.
38. *Johannesburg Mail*, March 8, 2002.
39. Gumede, p. 206.
40. Thabo Mbeki, *We Are the Architects of Africa's Renewal*. Address to the U. N., September 16, 2002.
41. Gumede, p. 206.
42. Lokongo Bafalikike, "Jammeh: NEPAD Will Never Work," *NewAfrica* (London), September 2002, p. 18.
43. Ibid.
44. "NEPAD: Who are the Partners in the New Partnership?" *Action for Southern Africa*, volume 2, no. 3, April 2002.
45. www.Jubileusa.org. Accessed on April 24, 2006.
46. William Gumede, "Oil Diplomacy: Gaddafi and the African Union," *African Business*, November 2001.
47. Iraj Abedian, "Global Financial Regime Needs Overhaul," *Global Dialogue*, volume 7, no. 2, July 2002.
48. E. Maloka, "Holding Hands, Wielding a Stick," *Sunday Times*, London, July 7, 2002.
49. *Financial Mail*, Johannesburg, April 27, 2001.
50. See the previous chapter (chapter 7) for details on the Durban, South Africa launching of the African Union on July 9, 2002.
51. Gumede, p. 209.
52. Ibid., p. 211.
53. "Mbeki Poised to Prove His Worth to Africa," *The Star*, Johannesburg, July 8, 2002.
54. Gumede, p. 211.
55. The New Partnership for Africa's Development, 2001. Also Available at www.nepad.org
56. "African Union Launch May Mark Fresh Start for Africa," *Business Day*, Johannesburg, July 9, 2002.

57. Gumede, p. 212.
58. Ibid.
59. *Africa Recovery*, January 2004, p. 13.
60. Karen DeYoung, "Gates, Rockefeller Charities Join to Fight African Hunger," *The Washington Post*, September, 13, 2006.
61. Martin Plaut, "Africa's Hunger a Systemic Crisis," BBCNEWS, January 31, 2006. Also available at www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa. Accessed on May 24, 2006.
62. Olusegun Obasanjo, *THISDAY*, Lagos, March 11, 2003. Also available at <http://www.allafrica.com>.
63. See Guy Martin, *Africa in World Politics: A Pan-African Perspective*, chapter six on African Regional Cooperation and Integration, pp. 123–184.
64. *Financial Mail*, Johannesburg, April 27, 2001.
65. Ibid.
66. Gumede, p. 212.
67. Mbaku, p. 394.
68. Ibid.
69. George Ogola, "NEPAD: Hope for a New Africa," *News Africa*, London, July 29, 2002, p. 12.
70. Gumede, p. 212.
71. Ernest Harsch, "Africa Still Waiting for Genuine Partnership," *Africa Recovery*, volume 16, nos. 2–3, September 2002, p. 27.
72. *Associated Press*, November 20, 2002.
73. For details on this see Our Common Interest. *Report of the Commission for Africa*, Chaired by Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, London: British Information Service, 2005. Also available at www.commissionforafrica.org. Accessed on May 26, 2006.
74. "World Bank Wants Control" of Democratic Republic of Congo Mining." *The Guardian*, London, May 5, 2004.

9 PAN-AFRICANISM AND UNITY: A WAKE-UP CALL TO AFRICANS

1. Kwame Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology*. London: Heinemann, 1961, pp. xi–xiv.
2. Edem Kodjo, *Africa Tomorrow*. New York: Continuum, 1987, p. 287.
3. Cheika Anta Diop, *Black Africa: The Economic and Cultural Basis for a Federated State*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1987, p. 1.
4. Julius K. Nyerere, "Without Unity, There Is No Future for Africa," Speech delivered in Accra, Ghana on the Occasion of Ghana's 40th Independence Anniversary, March 6 1997.
5. Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*. London: Heinemann, 1963.
6. http://www.news24.com/news24/Africa/News/0,2-11-1447_1843773,00.htm1. Accessed on February 11, 2006.

7. *African Research Bulletin*, Volume 39, no. 7. July 16–August 15, 2002, p. 15287.
8. Richard Mshomba, "How Northern Subsidies Hurt Africa," *Africa Recovery*, 16, nos. 2–3. September 2002, p. 29.
9. Dan Morgan, Gilbert M. Gaul, and Sarah Cohen, "Harvesting Cash, Reaping Money for Nothing: Farm Program Pays \$1.3 Billion to People Who Do Not Farm," *Washington Post*, July 2, 2006.
10. "Payments Keep Coming, Even Without Crops," *The Washington Post*, July 2, 2006.
11. Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, p. 20.
12. Chancellor Williams, *The Destruction of Black Civilization*. Chicago: Third World Press, 1987, p. 161.
13. Robert Guest, *The Shackled Continent*. London: Macmillan Press, 2004, p. 23.
14. See Sola Olorunyomi, *AFROBEAT: Fela and the Imagined Continent*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2003, pp. 189–190.
15. See Brigitte L. Nacos, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding Threats and Responses in the Post-9/11 World*. New York: Longman, 2006.
16. "The Hopeless Africa," *The Economist*, London, May 13, 2000, pp. 17 and 22–24.
17. Julius K. Nyerere, former President of Tanzania, 1961–1985, Speech made at the Edinburgh University, Scotland, October 9, 1997.
18. See John Perkins, *Confessions of an Economic Hit Man*. San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler, 2004.
19. Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman, *A Strategic Vision for Africa: The Kampala Movement*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002.
20. "Abuja Conference on New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)," *NEPAD Summit*, Abuja, Nigeria: October 2001.
21. Kodjo, p. 287.
22. "Obasanjo: NEPAD Has Challenges," *Africa News*. London, July 7, 2004.
23. Speech of the chairperson of the African Union Commission. Available online at <http://www.news24.com/news24/Africa/News/0.2-11-1447>. Accessed on February 11, 2006.
24. Cheika Anta Diop, *Black Africa: The Economic and Cultural Basis for a Federated State*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1987.
25. See Farai Sevenzo, "Mugabe's Playground," *BBC Focus on Africa*, London, July–September, 2007, volume 18, no. 3, pp. 10–13; Baffour Ankomah, "Mugabe: Our Cause Is Africa's Cause," *New Africa*, London, May 2007, pp. 10–19; Shakeman Mugari and Craig Timberg, "Tales of Terror in Zimbabwe," *The Washington Post*, April 24, 2008; "Mr. Mugabe's Violence," Editorial Opinion in *The Washington Post*, April 30, 2008, and "Zimbabwe's Terror," Editorial Opinion in *The Washington Post*, May 7, 2008, Washington Post Foreign Service, "World Leaders Rebuke Zimbabwe," *The Washington Post*, June 24, 2008, and "An African Failure: The Continent's Leaders Respond Weakly to Robert Mugabe's Murderous Repression," *The Washington Post*, July 7, 2008.
26. Chinua Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*. Ibadan: Heinemann, 1959, p. 27.

This page intentionally left blank

Selected Bibliography

- Abegunrin, Olayiwola. "African Regional Organizations." In Joel Krieger (ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- . "Angola and the Soviet Union Since 1975." *Journal of African Studies* (UCLA), 14, no. 1 (Spring 1987), 25–30.
- . "The Arabs and the Southern African Problems." *International Affairs*, 60, no. 1 (Winter, 1983–1984), 97–105.
- . "Chief M.K.O. Abiola's Presidential Ambitions and Yoruba Democratic Rights." In Toyin Falola (ed.), *Yoruba Identity and Power Politics*. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2006.
- . *Economic Dependence and Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: SADCC and South Africa in Confrontation*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990.
- . "Federalism, Political Instability and Struggle for Democracy in Nigeria." In Bamidele Ojo (ed.), *Problems and Prospects of Sustaining Democracy in Nigeria: Voices of a Generation*. Huntington, NY: Nova Science, 2001.
- . "Liberation Struggle in South Africa." *Renaissance Universal Journal*, 4, no. 1–2 (1984).
- . "The Military, and Nigerian Political Economy in the Global System." In Kwadwo Konadu-Agyemang (ed.), *Africa's Development in the 21st Century: Some Pertinent Issues, Opportunities and Challenges*. New York: Ashgate International, 2006.
- . "Nigeria: Federalism, Resource Control and Restructuring." *Journal of Nigerian Affairs*, 10, no. 1 (March 2002), 11–21.
- . "Nigeria and the Politics of the U.S. on the Liberation of Zimbabwe." *Journal of African Studies of China*, Taiwan, Republic of China, no. 8 (January 1981), 166–231.
- . *Nigeria and the Struggle for the Liberation of Zimbabwe: A Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making of an Emerging Nation*. Stockholm, Sweden: Bethany Books, 1992.
- . "Nigeria's Foreign Policy: A Democratic Kickstart, 1998–1999." *Government and Politics Journal*, 11, no. 6 (March 2002).
- . *Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966–1999*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.
- . "Post Apartheid South Africa: An Analysis on Regional Perspectives." *Journal of the Third World Spectrum*, 6, no. 2 (Fall 1999), 19–41.

- Abegunrin, Olayiwola. "Prospects and Possibilities of SADCC as a Regional Organization." *Quarterly Journal of Administration* (OAU: Ile-Ife), 1–2 (October 1989–January 1990), 25–30.
- . "Restructuring Nigerian Federalism: The Imperative of a Sovereign National Conference." In Segun Gbadegesin (ed.), *The Imperative of Cultural Democracy in Nigeria: Reflections from the Yoruba Diaspora*. Mitchellville, MD: Pinnacle, 2006.
- . SADCC: Towards Integration of Southern Africa for Liberation." *A Current Bibliography on African Affairs*, 17, no. 4 (1984–1985), 93–107.
- . "The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Review Essays." *African Studies Review*, 45, no. 3 (December 2002), 31–34.
- . "Southern Development Coordination Conference: Politics of Dependence." In Ralph Onwuka and Amadu Sesay (eds.), *The Future of Regionalism in Africa*. New York: Macmillan, 1985.
- . "The Southern Nine." *A Current Bibliography on African Affairs*, 14, no. 4 (1981–1982), 331–334.
- . "Soviet and Chinese Military Involvement in Southern Africa." *A Current Bibliography on African Affairs*, 6, no. 3 (1983–1984), 52–83.
- . "The Soviet/Russian Involvement in Southern African Liberation Struggle, 1960–1990." In Maxim Matusevich (ed.), *Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa: Three Centuries of Encounters*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2006.
- . "The U.S. Policy of Containment: A Case Study of Cuban Missile Crisis." *Quarterly Journal of Administration (QJA)*, 6, nos. 1–2 (January 1982), 103–116.
- . "The West and South Africa." *Renaissance Universal Journal*, 4, no. 1 (1984).
- . "Western Options vis-à-vis South Africa." *Western Journal of Black Studies*, 6, no. 4 (Winter 1982), 231–240.
- . "Zimbabwe-U.S. Relations." *Encyclopedia of Global Perspectives on the United States*. Great Barrington, MA: Berkshire, 2006.
- . "Zimbabwe's Foreign Relations Since Its Independence." *Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives*. Stockholm, Sweden, 6 (December 1987), 93–107.
- Abegunrin, Olayiwola, and Olusoji Akomolafe (eds.). *Nigeria in Global Politics: Twentieth Century and beyond, Essays in Honor of Professor Olajide Aluko*. New York: Nova Science, 2006.
- Abegunrin, Olayiwola, and Franklin Vivekananda (eds.). *The Political Economy of South-South Cooperation: Towards a New International Economic Order*. Stockholm, Sweden: Bethany Books, 1998.
- Abegunrin, Olayiwola, and H.E. Newsum. *United States Foreign towards Southern Africa: Andrew Young and Beyond*. London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 1987.
- Abegunrin, Olayiwola, Ralph Onwuka, and Dhajoo N. Ghista (eds.). *Africa Development: The OAU/ECA Lagos Plan of Action and Beyond*. Lawrenceville, VA: Brunswick, 1985.
- Aborisade, Oladimeji and Robert J. Mundt. *Politics in Nigeria*, 2nd edition. New York: Longman, 2002.

- Achebe, Chinua. *Things Fall Apart*. Ibadan, Nigeria: Heinemann, 1959.
- Adebajo, Adekeye. *Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002.
- Adedeji, Adebayo (ed.). *Africa within the World: Beyond Dispossession and Dependence*. London: Zed Books, 1993.
- Adekunle, Abiodun A. (ed.). *The Nigeria—Biafra War Letters: A Soldier's Story, Volume I*. Atlanta, GA: Phoenix, 2004.
- Adeniji, Oluyemi. *Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy, Governance, and International Security*. Ibadan, Nigeria: Dokun, 2000.
- Akadiri, Oladele. *Diplomacy, World Peace and Security*. Akure, Nigeria: Ondo State Government Printing Press, 2003.
- Ake, Claude. *Democracy and Development in Africa*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001.
- Akiba, Okon. *Nigerian Foreign Policy towards Africa: Continuity and Change*. New York: Peter Lang, 1998.
- Akindele, Rafiu and Bassey E. Ate (eds.). *Selected Readings on Nigeria's Foreign Policy and International Relations*. Ibadan, Nigeria: Vantage, 2000.
- Akindele, Rafiu (ed.). *The Organization of African Unity, 1963–1988*. Ibadan, Nigeria: Vantage, 1988.
- Akinrinade, Sola and Amadu Sesay (eds.). *Africa in the Post Cold War International System*. Washington, DC: Pinter, 1998.
- Akinsanya, Adeoye A. "Multinational Corporations in South Africa, Armed Conflict and Majority Rule in South Africa." *International Review of Politics and Development*, 3 (June 2005), 14–51.
- . "Foreign Economic Control and Non-Alignment in Global Affairs." *Pakistan Horizon*, 45 (April 1992), 69–93.
- . *Multinationals in a Changing Environment: A Study of Government-Business Relations in the Third World*. New York: Praeger, 1984.
- Akinsanya, Adeoye A. and John A. Ayode (eds.). *Readings in Nigeria Government and Politics*. Ijebu-Ode: Gratia Association International, 2005.
- Akinsanya, Adeoye, A. and Gordon J. Idang (eds.). *Nigerian Government and Politics, 1979–1983*. Calabar, Cross River State: Wusen, 2002.
- Akinyemi, A. Bolaji. "Mohammed/Obasanjo Foreign Policy." In Oyeleye Oyediran (ed.), *Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule, 1966–1979*. Lagos: Macmillan Press, 1979.
- . *Foreign Policy and Federalism: The Nigerian Experience*. Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 1974.
- Alao, Abiodun. *The Burden of Collective Goodwill: The International Involvement in Liberian Civil War*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1996.
- . *Zimbabwe's Foreign Policy*. Master's Thesis, Department of International Relations. Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, 1985.
- Aluko, Olajide. *Africa and the Great Powers in the 1980s*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987.
- . *Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1982.
- (ed.). *Foreign Policies of African States*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977.

- Alao, Abiodun. *Ghana and Nigeria, 1957–1970: A Study in Inter-Africa Discord*. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1976.
- . “Nigeria, the United States and Southern Africa.” *African Affairs*, 78, no. 310 (January 1979).
- Anglin, Douglas. *Zambian Crisis Behavior: Confronting Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence*. Montreal: McGill University Press, 1996.
- Asante, S.K.B. *Pan-African Protes: West Africa and Italo-Ethiopian Crisis, 1934–1941*. London: Longman, 1977.
- Assensoh, A.B. and Yvette M. Alex-Assensoh. *African Military History and Politics: Coups and Ideological Incursions, 1900–Present*. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
- Awolowo, Obafemi. *Path to Nigeria Freedom*. London: Faber and Faber, 1947.
- Ayittey, George, B.N. *Africa Betrayed*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992.
- . *Africa in Chaos*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998.
- . *Africa Unchained: The Blue Print for Africa’s Future*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
- Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa. *Mr. Prime Minister: A Selection of Speeches Made by the Right Honorable, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa*. Lagos: National Press Limited, 1964.
- Barber, James and John Barratt. *South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security 1945–1988*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Baregu, Mwesiga and Christopher Landsberg (eds.). *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security. Challenges*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003.
- Basedau, Matthias and Andreas Mwhler (eds.). *Resource Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Hamburg: Institute of African Affairs, 2005.
- Birmingham, David. *Kwame Nkrumah Father of African Nationalism*. Athen, OH: Ohio University Press, 1998.
- Briand, Michael (ed.). *Dialogue in Williamsburg: The Turning Point for South Africa?* San Francisco, CA: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1989.
- Broderick, Jim, Gary Burford, and Gordon Freer (eds.). *South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Dilemmas of a New Democracy*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001.
- Burstein, Stanley. *Ancient African Civilizations: Kush and Axum*. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 1998.
- Calderisi, Robert. *The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn’t Working*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- Carter, G.M. and P. O’Meara (eds.). *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1979.
- Cervenka, Zdenek. *The Unfinished Quest for Unity in Africa and the OAU*. London: Julian Friedmann, 1984.
- Chazan, Naomi, Robert Mortimer, John Ravenhill, and Donald Rothchild. *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, 3rd edition*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999.
- Cheru, Fantu. *African Renaissance: Roadmaps to the Challenge of Globalization*. New York: Zed Books, 2002.
- Chiedu, Kingsley. “Fighting Africa’s Killer Diseases.” *West Africa*. London, June 2003.

- Christie, Kenneth. *The South African Truth Commission*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000.
- Clapham, Christopher. *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Collins, O. Robert (ed.). *Documents from the African Past*. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2001.
- Commission for Africa. *Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa*. London: British Press, 2005.
- Decalo, Samuel. *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977.
- Deegan, Heather. *The Politics of New South Africa: Apartheid and After*. New York: Longman, 2001.
- . *South Africa Reborn: Building A New Democracy*. London: UCL Press Limited, 1999.
- DeRoche, Andrew. *Black, White and Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953–1998*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2001.
- Diop, Cheika Anta. *Black Africa: The Economic and Cultural Basis for a Federated State*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1987.
- Dompere, Kofi Kissi. *African Union: Pan-African Analytical Foundations*. London: Adonis and Abbey, 2006.
- Eades, Lindsay Michie. *The End of Apartheid in South Africa*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999.
- Easterly, William. *The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good*. New York: Penguin Press, 2006.
- Edgar, Robert E. (ed.). *Sanctioning Apartheid*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1990.
- Eddie, Carlene J. *Politics in Africa*. Belmont CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2003.
- El-Ayouty Yassin and William Zartman (eds.). *The OAU after Twenty Years*. New York: Praeger, 1985.
- Ellis, Stephen. "Liberia 1989–1994: A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence." *African Affairs*, 94, no. 375, April 1995.
- Esedebe, Olisanwuche. *Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement, 1776–1991*. Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1994.
- Etuk, Emma S. *Listen Africans: Freedom Is under Fire*. Washington, DC: Emida International, 2002.
- Evans, Graham. "South Africa's Foreign Policy after Mandela: Mbeki and His Concept of an African Renaissance." *The Round Table*, 352, 1999.
- Evans, Malcolm and Rachel Murray (eds.). *The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights*, 2nd edition, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Fawole, Alade W. *Nigeria's External Relations and Foreign Policy under Military Rule (1996–1999)*. Ile-Ife: Obafemi Awolowo University Press, 2003.
- Francis, David J. *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006.
- Forest, Joshua Bernard. "Ethnic-State Political Relations in Post-apartheid Namibia." *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 32, no. 3, 1994.

- Gambari, Ibrahim A. *Theory and Reality in Foreign Policy Making: Nigeria after the Second Republic*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1989.
- Gault, Hunter Charlayne. *New News out of Africa: Uncovering Africa's Renaissance*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Gibson, Richard. *African Liberation Movement: Contemporary Struggle against White Minority Rule*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Grundy, Kenneth, W. *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa: The Limit of Independence*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1963.
- Gumede, William Mervin. *Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC*. Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2005.
- Guyer, I. Jane. *African Studies in the United States: A Perspective*. Brunswick, NJ: African Studies Association Press, 1996.
- Haarlov, Jens. *CDR Research Report No. 14, Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: Central Elements of the SADCC Venture*. Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research, 1988.
- Hanlon, Joseph. "African Debt Hoax." *Review of African Political Economy*, 25, no. 77 (September 1977).
- Harbeson, W. John, and Donald Rothchild (eds.). *Africa in World Politics: Post Cold War Challenges*, 3rd edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000.
- Harvey, Robert. *The Fall of Apartheid: The Inside Story from Smut to Mbeki*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.
- Hill, Robert A. *Pan-African Biography*. Los Angeles, CA: Crossroads Press, 1987.
- Hirsch, L. John. *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001.
- Hunter, Susan. *Black Death: AIDS in Africa*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
- Ihonvbere, Julius, O. and Timothy Shaw. *Illusion of Power: Nigeria in Transition*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1998.
- Johnson, Phyllis and David Martin. *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War*. Harare: Zimbabwe, 1986.
- Jorre, John de St. *The Brothers War: Biafra and Nigeria*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mufflin Company, 1972.
- Keller, J. Edmond, and Donald Rothchild (eds.). *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996.
- Keller, J. Edmond, Donald Rothchild, and Louis A. Picard (eds.). *South Africa in Southern Africa: Domestic Change and International Conflicts*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989.
- Khadiagala, M. Gilbert. *Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern Africa Security*. Athens, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1994.
- Khadiagala, M. Gilbert, and Terrence Lyons (eds.). *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001.
- Khapoya, Vincent B. *The African Experience: An Introduction*, 2nd edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998.
- King James. *The Holy Bible*. St. Matthew, Chapter 13, Verse 12.

- King, Mae, C. *Basic Currents of Nigerian Foreign Policy*. Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1996.
- Knott, David. "Interest Grows in Africa Oil and Gas Opportunities." *Oil and Gas Journal* no. 41 (May 1997).
- Kodjo, Edem. *Africa Tomorrow*. New York: Continuum, 1987.
- Konadu-Agyemang, Kwadwo and Kwamina Panford (eds.). *Africa's Development in the Twenty-First Century: Pertinent Socio-Economic and Development Issues*. Burlington, VA: Ashgate, 2006.
- Krafona, Kwesi. *The Pan-African Movement: Ghana's Contribution*. London: Afroworld, 1986.
- Lake, David, A. and Donald Rothchild (eds.). *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998.
- Landsberg, Christ. "Promoting Diplomacy: The Mandela-Mbeki Doctrine." *Journal of Democracy*, 11, no. 3 (2000).
- Langley, J. Ayodele. *Ideologies and Liberation in Black Africa, 1856–1970*. London: Rex Collings, 1979.
- . *Pan-Africanism and Nationalism in West Africa, 1900–1945: A Study in Ideology and Social Classes*. London: Oxford University Press, 1973.
- Lapping, Brian. *Apartheid: A History*. New York: George Braziller, 1989.
- Legum, Colin. *Africa Since Independence*. Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999.
- . *Pan-Africanism*. London: Pall Mall Press, 1962.
- Lemarchand, Rene. "Burundi in Comparative Perspective: Dimensions of Ethnic Strife." In John McGarry and O'Leary (eds.), *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*. London: Routledge, 1993.
- Lezhnev, Sasha. *Crafting Peace: Strategies to Deal with Warlords in Collapsing States*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005.
- Love, Janice. *Southern Africa in World Politics: Local Aspirations and Global Entanglements*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2005.
- Low, Eric P. *The Rise, Fall, and Legacy of Apartheid*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004.
- Mamdani, Mahmood. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.
- Mandela, Nelson. *Intensify the Struggle to Abolish Apartheid: Nelson Mandela Speeches*. New York: Pathfinder, 1990.
- . *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1994.
- . *Nelson Mandela: I Am Prepared to Die*. London: International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1984.
- . "South Africa's Future Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs*, 72, no. 5 (1993).
- Martin, Guy. *Africa in World Politics: A Pan-African Perspective*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2002.
- Mathurin, Owen Charles. *Henry Sylvester Williams and the Origins of the Pan-African Movement, 1869–1911*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976.
- Matusevich, Maxim. *No Easy Row for a Russian Hoe: Ideology and Pragmatism in Nigerian-Soviet Relations, 1960–1991*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2003.

- Mazrui A. Ali. *Africa's International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979.
- . *A Tale of Two Africas: Nigeria and South Africa as Contrasting Visions*. London: Adonis and Abbey, 2006.
- . *Towards A Pan-Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1971.
- Mazrui A. Ali, and Michael Tidy. *Nationalism and New States in Africa*. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1984.
- Mbeki, Thabo. "Speech Delivered at the Launching of the African Renaissance Institute." October 11, 1999, Pretoria, 1999.
- Meredith, Martin. *Diamonds, Gold and War: The British, The Boers and the Making of South Africa*. New York: Public Affairs, 2007.
- Mohamoud, Abdullah A. (ed.). *Shaping a New Africa*. Amsterdam: KIT, 2007.
- Morgan, Dan, Gilbert M. Gaul, and Sarah Cohen. "Farm Program Pays \$1.3 million Billion to People Who Do Not Farm: Reaping Money for Nothing." *Washington Post*, July 2, 2006.
- Mshomba, Richard E. *Africa in the Global Economy*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000.
- Nkrumah, Kwame. *Africa Must Unite*. London: Heinemann, 1964.
- . *I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology*. London: William Heinemann, 1961.
- . *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*. New York: International, 1965.
- . *Towards Colonial Freedom: African in the Struggle against World Imperialism*. London: Heinemann, 1962.
- Nnoli, Okwudiba. *Ethnicity and Development in Nigeria*. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1995.
- Nsekela, Amon, J. (ed.). *Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation*. London: Rex Collings, 1981.
- Ntalaja-Nzongola. Georges, *The Congo, from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History*. New York: ZED Books, 2005.
- Nyang, S. Sulayman. *Islam, Christianity and African Identity*. Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1984.
- Nyerere, K. Julius. *Man and Development*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974.
- . *Uhuru Na Ujamaa: Freedom and Socialism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Obasanjo, Olusegun. *Africa Embattled*. Ibadan, Nigeria: Fountain, 1988.
- O'Connell, James. "Political Integration: The Nigerian Case." In Arthur Hazlewood, *African Integration and Disintegration*. London: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Ogunbadejo, Oye. *International Politics of Africa's Strategic Minerals*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985.
- . "Soviet Policy in Africa." *African Affairs*, 79, no. 316 (July 1980).
- Ogwu, Joy. *Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Future*. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1986.

- . "South Africa and Nigeria's Relations with the World." Paper Presented at the Nigeria-South Africa Dialogue. Johannesburg, South Africa, August, 1999.
- Olorunyomi, Sola. *AFROBEAT: Fela and the Imagined Continent*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World.
- Oluleye, James E. *Military Leadership in Nigeria 1966–1979*. Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 1985.
- Onwuka, Ralph, I. and Olajide Aluko (eds.). *The Future of Africa and the New International Economic Order*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986.
- Onwuka, Ralph, I., and Amadu Sesay (eds.). *The Future of African Regionalism*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985.
- Osaghae, Eghosa E. *Nigeria since Independence: Crippled Giant*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998.
- Osia, Kunirum. *Israel, South Africa and Black Africa*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1982.
- Our Common Interest. *Report of the Commission for Africa*, Chaired by Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister. London, British Information Service, 2005.
- Oyebade, Adebayo and Abiodun Alao (eds.). *Africa after the Cold War: The Changing Perspectives on Security*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1998.
- Oyugi, Walter, O., Michael Chege, and Afrifa K. Gitonga. *Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa*. Nairobi: Heinemann, 1988.
- Paton, Alan. *Cry, The Beloved Country*. New York: Scribner, 1987.
- Payne J. Richard and Jamal R. Nassar. *Politics and Culture in the Developing World: The Impact of Globalization*. New York: Longman, 2003.
- Perkins, John. *Confessions of an Economic Hit Man*. San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler, 2004.
- Peterson, Lennart. *Post Apartheid Southern Africa: Economic Challenges and Policies for the Future*. New York: Routledge, 1998.
- Pobi-Asamani, Kwadwo, O. W.E.B. Dubois: *His Contributions to Pan-Africanism*. San Bernardino, CA: Borgo Press, 1994.
- Prendergast, John. "Our Future Failure in Somalia: U.S. Counterterrorism Policy Is Empowering Islamist Militias." *Washington Post*, June 7, 2006.
- Reno, William. *Warlord Politics and African States*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999.
- Report of an Independent Task Force. *More than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach toward Africa*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006.
- Reynolds, Andrew (ed.). *Election '94 South Africa: The Campaign, Results and Future Prospects*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995.
- Robinson, Simon, and James Nachtwey. "The Tragedy of Sudan." *Time Magazine*, October 4, 2004.
- Rodney, Walter. *How Europe Under Developed Africa*. Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1994.
- Rotberg, Robert and Greg Mills (eds.). *War and Peace in South Africa: Crime, Drugs, Armies and Trade*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998.
- Schraeder, Peter J. *African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation*, 2nd edition. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2004.

- Schrire, Robert. *Adapt or Die: The End of White Politics in South Africa*. New York: Ford Foundation, 1991.
- Seidman, Ann. *The Roots of Crisis in Southern Africa*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1985.
- Shaw, Timothy, M. and Olajide Aluko (eds.). *Africa Projected: From Recession to Renaissance by the Year 2000?* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985.
- (eds.). *Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Perceptions and Projections*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983.
- (eds.). *The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy: A Comparative Analysis*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984.
- Shepard, B. Robert. *Nigeria, Africa and the United States: From Kennedy to Reagan*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991.
- Singh, Jerome, A. "Why AIDS in South Africa Threatens Stability and Economic Growth in Other Parts of Africa." *Lancet*, 364, no. 9449 (2004).
- Snow Donald M. *National Security for a New Era: Globalization and Geopolitics*. New York: Longman, 2004.
- Soremekun, Fola. *Angola: The Road to Independence*. Ile-Ife: Obafemi Awolowo University Press, 1983.
- Soyinka, Wole. *The Economist*, September 1995.
- . *The Open Sore of a Continent: A Personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- . *You Must Set Forth at Dawn: A Memoir*. New York: Random House, 2006.
- Sparks, Allister. *Beyond the Miracle: Inside the New South Africa*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.
- . *The Mind of South Africa*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989.
- . *Tomorrow Is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa's Road to Change*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
- Spence, Jack, E. *After Mandela: The 1999 South African Elections*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999.
- Stockwell, John. *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1978.
- Stremlau, J. John. *A House No Longer Divided: Progress and Prospects for Democratic Peace in South Africa*. New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997.
- . *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977.
- Sullivan, Kevin. "In War-Torn Congo, Going Wireless to Reach Home: For Poor, Cell-phones Bridge Digital Divide." *Washington Post Foreign Service*, July 9, 2006.
- Swarns, Rachel L. "Awe and Unease as South Africa Stretches Out." *New York Times*, February 17, 2002.
- Taras, Raymond C. and Rajat Ganguly. *Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension*, 2nd edition. New York: Longman, 2002.
- Taylor, Ian. *NEPAD: Toward Africa's Development or Another False Start?* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005.

- Thomas, Caroline, and Peter Wilkin (eds.). *Globalization, Human Security and The African Experience*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999.
- Thompson, Leonard. *A History of South Africa*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990.
- Thompson B. Vincent. *Africa and Unity: The Evolution of Pan-Africanism*. London: Longman, 1969.
- Thomson, Alex. *An Introduction to African Politics*. New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2000.
- Tieku, Thomas Kwasi. "Explaining the Clash, and Accommodation of Interests of Major Actors in the Creation of African Union." *African Affairs*, April 2004, 103, no. 411.
- Timberg, Graig. "How AIDS in Africa Was Overstated: Reliance on Data from Urban Prenatal Clinics Skewed Early Projections." *Washington Post Foreign Service*, April 6, 2006.
- Tutu, Desmond. *The Rainbow People of God: The Making of a Peaceful Revolution*. New York: Double Day, 1994.
- UNAIDS. *AIDS Epidemic Update*, December 2002. Geneva, Switzerland: UNAIDS and WHO, 2002.
- Ungar, Sanford J. *AFRICA: The People and Politics of an Emerging Continent*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986.
- United Nations Development Program. *Human Development Report*, 2002. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- . *Human Development Report*, 2003. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- . *Human Development Report*, 2004. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Venter, Denis. "South African Foreign Policy Decision-making in the African Context." In Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons (eds.), *African Foreign Policies: Power and Process*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001.
- . "Wind of War Set to Blow across Angola." *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 10, no. 10, October 1998.
- Villa-Valencia, Charles and Wilhelm Verwoerd (eds.). *Looking Back Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa*. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2000.
- Vogt, Margaret A. (ed.). *Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peace Keeping*. Lagos: Gambumo, 1992.
- Wax, Emily. "French Peacekeepers Arrive in Congo: U.N.-Backed Mission Seeks to Quell Ethnic Fighting and Protect Civilians." *Washington Post Foreign Service*, June 7, 2003.
- . "Somalia Lawlessness Spills into the Sea: Modern-Day Pirates Strike for Ransom and Cargo." *Washington Post Foreign Service*, April 2, 2006.
- Welsh, David. *The Roots of Segregation*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1971.
- Whitaker, Jennifer Seymour. *How Can Africa Survive?* New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1988.
- Williams, Chancellor. *The Destruction of Black Civilization: Great Issues of a Race from 4500 B.C. to 2000 A.D.* Chicago, IL: Third World Press, 1987.

- Wiseman, John. "Leadership and Personal Danger in African Politics." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 31, no. 4, December 1993.
- Worger, H. William, Nancy L. Clark, and Edward A. Alpers. *Africa and the West: A Documentary History from the Slave Trade to Independence*. Phoenix, AZ: Oryx Press, 2001.
- Wright, Stephen (ed.). *African Foreign Policies*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999.
- Yergin, Daniel. *THE PRIZE: The Epic for Oil, Money and Power*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991.
- Young, Crawford. *Ideology and Development in Africa*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982.
- . *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979.

SOME USEFUL WEB SITES ON AFRICA

1. Africa News online at <http://www.africanews.org>. This is one top source for up-to-date information on all of Africa, news from more than 60 different sources. New stories and news are added daily on this Web site. Pick any country in Africa or topical news section or visit a region within the continent of Africa. It covers all aspects of Africa.
2. Africa Policy Information Center (now Africa Action), at <http://www.africa.policy.org>. Analyzes and publishes policy relevant information related to the U. S. policy in Africa, bringing to light perspectives from grassroots organizations and government entities.
3. www.allafricannews.com. Source of news from Africa.
4. www.africapolicy.org/docs98/reg9803.htm.
5. www.agoa.gov/Resources/TRDPROFL.01.pdf.
6. Report of the Commission for Africa. Available at www.commissionforafrica.org.
7. www.galleries.media24.com/News24.
8. Africa on Line at <http://www.news.africaonline.nu>.
9. Trans Africa Forum www.transafricaforum.org South Africa, Truth and Reconciliation Commission Web site at <http://www.truth.org.za>.

Index

- Abacha, Sani, 4, 21–22, 30–33, 62
 Abeokuta, 155
 Abubakar, Abdulsalami General, 21
 Abuja, 42, 152, 159, 175
 Abuja Treaty, 150–151, 183
 Accountability, 33, 109, 191
 Accra, 132–133, 188
 Accra Conference, 133
 Achebe, Chinua, 200
 Action Group (AG), 91, 95–98, 100
 Adamawa, 100
 Addis Ababa, 145, 149, 156, 168
 Adediji, Adebayo, 2, 83
 Ademola, Adetokunbo, 97
 Adeniji, Olu, 37
 Afghanistan, 1, 127
 Africa Leadership Forum, 155–156
 African Action Plan (AAP), 175, 189
 African Americans, 143
 African, Caribbean, and Pacific
 Cooperation, 31. *See also* ACP
 Africa Command Center (AFRICOM),
 xii, 126–127
 African Charter of Human and Peoples’
 Rights, 150
 African Development Bank (ADB), 23, 61
 African Economic Community,
 150–151, 183
 African Growth and Opportunity Act
 (AGOA), 180
 African Heads of State and Government
 (AHSG), 154, 159, 161, 166–168
 African High Command, 41, 111, 141.
 See also African Military High
 Command
 African Independence Party of Guinea
 Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), 148
 African Liberation Coordination
 Committee, 20, 147–148. *See also*
 African Freedom Fighters
 African National Congress (ANC), 11,
 18–20, 48–52, 54, 61–62, 72–75, 79,
 91–92, 152–154, 174
 African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM),
 171–172, 184
 African Renaissance, 62, 158, 161, 163,
 173–174, 175–176, 199
 African Union (AU), xiii, xvi, 25, 30, 3,
 34, 39–41, 43–44, 60, 62, 77, 83,
 141, 163, 165–172, 183–184,
 192–193, 198–199
 African Union Constitutive Act, xvi, 40,
 159, 166
 Afrikaans, 9, 58, 89–90
 Afrikaner, 8, 67, 90, 92
 Agbobu, Chris, 23
 Agwai, Martin, General, 35
 AIDS, 135–140, 179, 193
 Akintola, Samuel Oladoke, 94–96, 101
 Al Qaeda, 117, 125, 127, 134
 Alberta, 17, 189
 Algeria, 118, 122, 125–126, 144, 147, 154,
 174, 188
 Algerian War, 144
 Algiers, 154, 162
 All African Peoples’ Congress (AAPC), 144
 All African Plan, 175, 189
 Aluko, Olajide, xv, 19
 Amalgamation, 97
 Americo-Liberians, 127
 Amin, Idi, 147
 Anglin, Douglas, 70
 Anglo-American Corporation, 52,
 58–59, 115

- Anglo-Boer War, 9
 Anglo-French Conference, 142
 Anglophone Bloc, 40, 43, 144
 Angola, 9, 19–20, 40, 58, 63, 77, 84, 87,
 91, 105–106, 108, 116, 118, 121–122,
 125, 142, 148, 150, 174
 Angolan civil war, 40, 79, 105–106
 Annan, Kofi, 39, 44, 138, 165
 Antiterrorism, 187
 Anti-Apartheid Committee, 20, 35
 Anyaoku, Emeka, 110
 Apartheid, 10–17, 19–21, 29–31, 36, 45,
 47, 53–54, 60–63, 65, 71, 76–77, 79,
 84, 148. *See also* Post-apartheid era,
 and apartheid policy
 Apartheid Regime, 16, 19
 Apartheid System, 17, 183
 Arabs, 117, 135, 157–159
 Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 119
 Arab States, 199
 Arab Traders, 151
 Arab World, 163
 Argentina, 78, 130
 Arikpo, Okoi, 14
 Armed forces, 124–125, 136
 Arms control, 113
 Arusha, 107–108
 Asia, 1, 49–50, 79, 170–171, 200
 Asian countries, 114, 136
 Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation
 (APEC), 187
 Asian Tigers, 200
 Asians, 130, 182
 Association of Southern African States
 (ASAS), 62, 81, 92
 Assassination, 130
 Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal, 198
 Atlanta, Georgia, 62
 Atlantic Coast, 107,
 Atlantic Ocean, 171
 Atomic Bomb, 173
 Atrocities, 11
 Auckland, 30
 Australia, 116
 Austria, 87
 Authoritarianism, 45
 Autonomy, 67, 107
 Awolowo, Obafemi, 15, 29, 86, 100
 Azikiwe Nnamdi, 96–98
 Babangida, Ibrahim, 32, 36
 Bakgatla, 86
 Bakwana, 86
 Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa, 5, 12, 97, 101
 Balkans, 35
 Bamako, 181
 Bamako Declaration, 181
 Bamangwato, 86
 Bamelete, 86
 Bangguo, Wu, 38
 Bangwaketse, 86
 Bantu, 11, 14–15
 Bantustans, 14–15
 Barclay Bank, 137
 Barnes, Dennis, 151
 Barnett, Anthony, 94
 Barolong, 86
 Bashir-al, Omar Hassan, 159
 Batawana, 86
 Battlokwa, 86
 Batu Education Act, 1
 Bayei, 86
 Bedjaoui, Mohamed, 126
 Beijing, 120
 Beira, 70
 Beisa Mine, 173
 Belgians, 87, 90, 91
 Belgium, 108, 142
 Bello, Ahmadu Sardauna of Sokoto, 95,
 101–102
 Benguela, 70
 Benin Republic, 12, 182
 Benue, 150–151
 Berlin Conference, 124, 142, 198
 Biafra, 14, 92, 99, 103
 Biafran leader, 14
 Bible, 128
 Bin Laden, Osama, 1, 125
 Bi-National Commission Agreement,
 32, 38
 Biobaku, Saburi, 94
 Birmingham, David, 217
 Black Consciousness Movement in South
 Africa (BCMSA), 89
 Blair, Tony, 181, 190
 Blood Diamond, 117
 Blumeris, Arthur, 71
 Boers, 8–9, 89, 116
 Bokasa, Emperor, 147

- Bonny, 181
 Boro, Isaac, 98
 Bosnia, 103
 Botha, Pieter, W. 77–78
 Botswana, 59–60, 69, 71, 74, 77, 93,
 116–117, 125, 136
 Bouteflika, Abdelaziz, 25, 174, 177, 181, 189
 Brazil, 49, 117, 130, 136,
 Brenton Woods Institutions, 194. *See also*
 IMF and World Bank
 Bright, Martin, 63
 Britain, 17, 36, 77, 119, 142–143, 165, 168,
 189, 195. *See also* Great Britain
 British, 17, 64, 77, 87, 90, 97, 142, 181, 189
 British Colonial Office, 97
 British Crown, 7
 British Higher Commission, 7, 77
 British South African Company (BSAC),
 9, 117
 British Treasury, 146
 Brussels, 164
 Bubonic plague, 136
 Buganda, 90
 Buhari, Muhammadu General, 32
 Burundi, 90, 105–106, 109–110, 150, 174
 Bush Administration, 139
 Bush, George W. 123–124, 126, 135, 139

 Cairo, 39, 132, 146, 180
 Calabar, 98
 Calabash, 157–158
 California, 182
 Calverton, 136
 Cambodia, 136
 Cameroon, 65, 119–120, 122, 142, 150
 Canada, 17, 116, 189
 Cancun, 169
 Cape Coast, 7, 180
 Cape Colony, 9
 Cape of Good Hope, 1, 8,
 Cape Province, 88–89
 Cape Sea Route, 114–115
 Cape Settlement, 8
 Cape Town, 63, 70
 Cape Verde, 16
 Capital Intensive, 53
 Capitalism, 65, 128, 130, 193, 196
 Caribbean, 31, 139
 Caribbean Islands, 143
 Carter Center, 43
 Carter, Jimmy, 43
 Casablanca Group, 144–145
 CEAO, 177
 Center for Strategic and International
 Studies, 176, 184
 Central Africa, 83, 134, 147, 151, 163, 190
 Central African Customs and Economic
 Union (UDEAC), 186, 200
 Central bank, 192
 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
 Chad, 40, 115, 119, 121, 135, 163
 Chadian conflict 40, 149
 Chancellor, William, 194
 Cheney, Richard, 121
 Cheney Report, 121
 Chevron Corporation of Nigeria, 23
 China, 1, 36, 38, 119–121, 126, 136, 200
 China-Africa Development Fund, 120
 China-African Cooperation, 120
 Chinese National Oil Corporation
 (CNOOC), 119
 Chinese National Peoples' Congress, 38
 Chirac, Jacques, 164
 Chissano, 79, 177
 Chretien, Jean, 189
 Christianity, 78, 88, 90
 Chrome, 172
 Chronic Poverty Research Centre, 53
 Civil war, xi, 135
 Clinton administration, 47
 Clinton, William J., 46
 Cobalt, 172–173
 Cocoa, 6, 115
 Coffee, 172
 Cold war, xi, 36, 54, 73, 77, 79, 105, 117,
 119, 131, 144, 145, 155, 182–183
 Cologne, 156
 Colonial office, 10, 97
 Colonial rule, 7, 88, 98, 143–144
 Colonialism, 5, 25, 30, 37, 132, 147, 152,
 182, 194
 Colonization, 5, 142, 189
 Colored People, 134
 Common Defense System, 110–111, 192
 Commonwealth, 17, 21, 26, 33, 60, 77,
 110, 189

- Commonwealth games, 17
- Commonwealth Governments, 17, 21
- Commonwealth Heads of Government Summit, 21
- Commonwealth of Nations, 17, 21
- Communication, 36, 175, 187, 198
- Communication technologies, 175, 187, 198
- Communist Party, 67–68. *See also* Communist ideology 144
- Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 78, 155–156
- Conference on Security, Stability, development cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), 78, 155–157, 159–160, 162
- Conflict, 132,
- Conflict prevention, 41, 61
- Conflict resolution, 25, 41, 43, 106
- Congo, 5, 35, 50, 56, 105, 115, 119, 121–122, 142, 144, 177. *See also* Congo River Basin
- Congo River, 177, 179
- Congress of South Africa Trade Union (COSATU), 187
- Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), 78
- Constitutive Act of African Union, 159
- Copper, 172
- Corporatocracy, 197
- Corruption, 32, 36, 119, 130, 178–179, 196
- Coup d'état, 151
- Credibility, 182, 184, 188
- Crude oil, 26, 118
- Cultural values, 104, 136
- Currency, 49, 151, 188
- Customs Union, 60, 77
- Czechoslovakia, 173
- Cyber-space, 179
- Cyprus, 35
- Dakar, 179
- Dar-es-Salaam, 70–71
- Dar-es-Salaam Declaration, 71, 147
- Darfur, xvi, 1, 24, 35, 39, 90, 104, 106, 111, 119, 127, 135
- D'Azeglio, Massimo, 86
- De Beers, 116
- De Beers Corporation, 116–117
- Debswana, 116
- Debswana Diamond Company, 116
- Debt relief, 127
- Decolonization, 35, 147–148, 193
- De Klerk, F.W., 20, 61, 73
- Delta, 129
- Delta People's Republic, 97–99
- Democracy, 45, 84
- Democratic elections, 45–46, 79
- Democratic Republic of Congo, 24, 58, 65, 69, 72–73, 77, 81, 84, 89, 105–106, 109, 115–116, 122, 127, 129, 134, 135, 144, 147, 150, 174, 190
- Democratization, 45, 105–106, 183
- Deng, Francis, 155–156
- Denmark, 176
- Department of Defense, 117, 134
- Deutsche Bank, 120
- Developed countries, 24–25
- Developing countries, 24–25, 34, 175, 196
- Developing World Debts, 34
- Diamonds, 172, 117
- Dick, Nottingham, 98
- Dictators' Club, 154, 192
- Diop, Cheikh Anta, 174, 192, 200
- Diplomatic gloves, 156
- Direct foreign investment, xiii, 48, 50, 127–130, 129, 178–180, 189, 194
- Direct investment, xiii, 127
- Discrimination, 5, 9, 10, 52, 84, 94–95, 105
- Divestiture, 183
- Djibouti, 125
- Doe, Samuel, 106, 147
- Dot-com, 179
- Drugs, 59, 79–80, 83–84, 117, 136, 139. *See also* Drug traffickers, 79–80
- Dubai, 58
- Dubois, W.E.B., 143
- Durban, 70, 151, 155, 163, 167, 183
- Durban Summit, 167, 170
- Dutch East Indian Company, 8
- Dutch Reform Church, 15
- East Africa, 151, 190
- East African Economic Community (EAEC), 186, 200

- East-West, 196
 Eastern Cape Province, 133
 Eastern Region, 144–148
 Economic Commission for Africa (ECA),
 2, 156, 178
 Economic Community of West African
 States (ECOWAS), 3, 24, 31, 40–43,
 110, 150, 177, 186, 200
 Economic Community of West African
 States Monitoring Observer Group
 (ECOMOG), xi, 3, 41–43, 110, 160
 Economic cooperation, 29, 62, 70, 156,
 185–187
 Economic development, 48
 Economic globalization, 1, 114, 180
 Economic of scale, 76, 186–187
 Economic Think Tank, 150, 169, 186
 Economic transformation, 66–67
 Economic welfare, 113
 Ecosystem, 65, 108
 Edmonton, 23
 Efik, 98
 Egypt, 34, 37, 38–39, 122, 163, 170
 Einstein, Albert, 115
 Electricity Supply Commission of South
 Africa (ESCOM), 58
 Email, 64
 Emancipation, 195
 Emerging markets, 49
 Emerson, Rupert, 87
 Emir Sokoto, 9, 95, 101–102
 Emperor, Haile Selassie, 145
 Empowerment, 83
 Enahoro, Anthony, 97
 Energy Information Administration, 118
 England, 143
 Enslavement, 151–152
 Environmental degradation, 193.
 See also Environmental Protection
 Agency (EPA)
 Equatorial Guinea, 63, 119, 121–122,
 125, 163
 Erasmus, C.F., 78
 Eritrea, 92, 110, 135, 142, 149
 Ethiopia, 34, 110, 125, 135, 142, 141–142,
 147, 149–150, 163, 185
 Ethnic Conflicts, xii, 83, 86, 103–107,
 110, 139
 Ethnic groups, 85–86, 88, 93, 105
 Ethnicity, xii, 84–85, 87, 94
 Ethnocentrism, 84–85
 Euro-Asian, 114, 171
 Euro, 151
 Europe, xi, 1, 130–131, 192, 198, 200
 European Command (EUCOM), 125
 European Commission, 164
 European Community, 151
 European Economic Community (EEC),
 88. *See also* European Union
 European Union (EU), 31, 41, 60, 111,
 120, 163, 168, 180, 187, 192, 199
 Executive Outcomes, 63. *See also* Private
 armies
 Exploitation, xi, 124, 168
 Exports, 2, 177–179
 Extraordinary Summit of African Union
 of Head of State and Government,
 166–168
 Eyadema, Gnassingbe, 41

 Fajuyi, Adekunle, 103
 Famine, 177
 Far East, 6, 34, 114
 Federal Government, 12, 15–17, 21, 95, 99,
 103, 106, 108
 Federal Military Government, 18, 101–102
 Federal Republic of Nigeria, 148
 Federal Supreme Court, 95
 Federation of International Football
 Association (FIFA), 176
 Federation of Nigeria, 91, 148
 Financial Institutions, 23–24
 First generation, 143
 First World War, 142
 Food production, 2, 71, 185, 200
 Football, 176
 Ford-Kissinger, 78
 Foreign aid, 181, 183, 185, 195, 200
 Foreign Direct Investment, 179
 Foreign investment, 127–130, 189
 Fort Hare University College, 133
 Forum on China-African Cooperation, 180
 Founding fathers, 71–72, 167. *See also*
 Founders
 France, 17, 36, 142, 168, 177
 Francophone, 43, 144, 177

- Frazer, Jendayi, 118
 Free trade, 180
 Free Trade Agreement, 179–180
 Freedom, 45–46, 131–133, 142, 146–148
 Freetown, 7
 French nuclear test, 87, 133, 164, 177
 Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRILEMO), 148
 Front Line States, 4, 13, 20, 55–56, 70–71, 78
 Fulani. *See also* Hausa-Fulani
 Funtua, 102

 G8 Summit, 25, 175, 182, 189
 Gabon, 182–183
 Gaborone, 107–108, 112
 Gama, Vasco Da, 1, 114
 Gambari, Ibrahim Agboola, 19
 Gambia, 37, 163, 181
 Garba, Joseph, 16
 Garvey, Marcus, 143
 Gates, Robert, 126–127
 Gauteng Province, 115
 Gender equality, 166
 General Mining Corporation, 173
 Genoa, 137, 175, 182, 189
 Genocide, 90
 Georgia, 43
 Germany, 17, 34, 64, 126, 142, 156, 176, 195
 Ghaddafi, Muammar, 159, 161–166, 168, 171, 182–185
 Ghana, 65, 120, 122, 126, 132, 136, 143, 146, 167, 172, 188, 200
 Ghost farmers, 193
 Gibraltar, 119
 Gleneagles Agreement, 17, 25
 Gleneagles Summit of G8, 25
 Global, 42, 51, 72–73
 Global Challenges, 33
 Global Economy, 171, 176, 272
 Global ethnicity, x, 84–87
 Global Fund, 138–139
 Global System Mobile Communication (GSM), 23, 65
 Global terrorism, 135
 Global trade, 187
 Globalization, xi, 1, 23, 49–50, 114, 134, 175, 180, 187, 193–196, 199

 God, 46, 97, 182, 198
 Gold, 172
 Goldie, George, 7, 9
 Goukouni, Weddeye, 149
 Governance, xii, 25, 38–40, 51, 83, 173–175, 178–180, 197–198
 Government of National Unity, 48, 61, 72, 74, 109, 112, 165
 Gowon, Yakubu, 14, 98, 101
 Grassroots, 158, 169, 188
 Great Depression, 143
 Great Lakes, 2, 105, 134
 Great Trek, 58
 Great Wall Industry Corporation, 120
 Greed, 32, 97, 134, 196–197
 Griqualand, 116
 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 120, Group-77, 35
 Group of Eight (G8), 137–138, 182, 189–190
 Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), 48, 50, 153, 177, 188
 Guerrilla warfare, 93, 119,
 Guinea, 7, 63, 65, 130, 143–144
 Guinea Bissau, 142, 148
 Gulf of Guinea, 119, 125
 Gulf States, 114, 119
 Gumede, William Mervin, 174

 Habre, Hissene, 149
 Haiti, 136
 Harare, 34, 72
 Harare Summit, 34
 Harlem Renaissance Era, 143
 Harmonization, 192
 Hausa-Fulani, 85, 95, 98
 Health care, 48, 52, 174–175 198
 Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC), 183
 Hegemony, 54, 78, 96, 161
 Helsinki Document, 156
 Herero, 86
 Hindu, 161
 Hiroshima, 115
 HIV, 135–140
 HIV/AIDS, xii, 2, 23, 54, 66–67, 113, 135–140, 178, 186, 188, 193, 200.
 See also HIV infection
 Holland, 142

- Hopelessness, 194–197
 House of Representatives, 15, 97–98
 Hub, 70, 77
 Human Development, 194, 196
 Human Development Index (HDI), 196
 Human Dignity, 39, 46, 196
 Human resources, xii, 80, 137
 Human rights, 5, 39, 57, 84, 111, 113,
 129, 143–146, 160–161, 163, 174,
 179, 188
 Human security, 135–136, 158, 183
 Humanity, 13, 16, 40, 139, 158, 166, 191
 Hutu, 90, 104–106

 Ibadan, 94
 Ibibio, 98
 Identity, 84–87, 89, 93, 104, 147, 154
 Ideology, 88, 143–144, 152, 195
 Igbo, 86, 89, 94, 97, 99–100, 102–103, 106
 Ijaw, 86, 98
 Ikwerre, 86
 Imperialism, 25, 37, 130, 148, 180
 Independence, 4–5, 35, 63, 111, 127, 134,
 141, 148, 178, 196
 India, 1, 77–78, 130–131, 136,
 Indian Congress Party, 91
 Indian Ocean, 107, 172, 119
 Indian Ocean Island, 109
 Industrial Revolution, 171
 Industrialized countries, 25, 128–129,
 190, 196
 Inflation, 23, 47–48
 Information technology, 23, 51, 75
 Infrastructure, 174–176, 178, 185,
 198–199
 Insecurity, 56, 59, 61, 66–67, 80–81, 84,
 104, 119, 128–131, 139
 Institutional Reforms, 127
 Integration, xii, 72, 74, 87, 160–161,
 184–187, 200
 Integrity, xv, 147–148, 153, 157,
 Intelligence, 55, 64, 123, 136
 Interdependence, 54, 77, 134, 157, 180
 Inter-State Committee on Security and
 Defense, 56
 Inter-State Defense and Security
 Committee (ISDSC), 78
 International Atomic Energy Agency, 23
 International Committee of Red Cross, 161
 International Crisis Group, 161, 179
 International Energy Agency, 183
 International Financial Institutions (IFI),
 23–24, 33, 178
 International Labor Organization (ILO),
 17, 24
 International Law, 55, 157
 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 25,
 40, 65, 180, 182, 189, 194, 196
 International Relations, xi, xv, 36, 132,
 145, 160
 International trade, 117, 187
 Internet, 187
 Intervention, 30, 40, 42, 97, 101,
 165–168, 177
 Investment, 95–96, 114, 127, 190
 Iran, 121, 164
 Iraq, 1, 177, 190
 Ironsi, Aguiyi, J.T.U., 13, 101, 103
 Islam, 193
 Israel, 119
 Ita, Eyo, 98
 Italy, 138, 142, 175, 181, 189
 Ivory Coast, Cote d'Ivoire, 41–42, 60–61,
 109, 116, 135

 James Raid, 9
 Jammeh, Yahya, 181–182
 Janjaweed, 105
 Japan, 17, 34, 64, 68, 115, 195
 Java, 8
 Jebba, 7
 Jesus Christ, 128
 Jews, 107
 Jintao Hu, 120
 Johannesburg, 21

 Kabaka, 91
 Kabila, Joseph, 130
 Kabila, Laurent, 130
 Kaduna, 102
 Kalanga, 86
 Kampala, 155–158
 Kampala Document, 155–159, 197
 Kano, 102
 Karanga, 86
 Katanga, 92
 Katsina, 102
 Kaunda, Kenneth, 70–71, 137, 144, 164

- Kenya, 37, 65, 85–86, 88–89, 91, 130 144,
147, 169, 172
- Kenya African National Union
(KANU), 91
- Kenya Central Association, 88–89
- Kenyatta, Jomo, 88, 130, 143–144
- Khama, Seretse, 105
- Khartoum, 136, 158–159
- Khoi-Khoi, 8
- Kiambu, 86
- Kikuyu, 85, 88, 138
- Kikuyu Central Association, 88–89
- Kimberley, 176
- Ki-Moon, Ba, 35
- King Leopoldville, 142
- Kodjo, Edem, xiii, 191, 198–199
- Konare, Alpha Oumar, xiii, 169,
192–193, 199
- Korekore, 130
- Kufuor, John, 126, 167
- Kurds, 183
- Kuti, Fela Anikulapo, 195
- Labe, 145
- Lagos, 7, 16, 95, 98, 101
- Lagos colony, 7
- Lagos Plan of Action, 150, 178–179
- Lakes, 134, 142
- Landlocked countries. *See* Botswana,
Rwanda, Swaziland, Zambia,
Zimbabwe
- Language, 18, 84–86, 179
- Latin America, 24, 79
- Latin American countries, 194
- Leadership, xii, 15, 111, 21–22, 29–31,
41–42, 143–144, 152, 171, 194–197
- Lebanon, 35
- Lemarchand, Rene, 90
- Lenin, V.I., 130
- Lesotho, 58–60, 77, 163
- Liberation, 5–6, 12–13, 15–16, 18–21,
26, 61, 69–71, 77, 135, 147–148,
170, 183
- Liberalization, 54, 65, 183
- Liberia, 3, 24, 34–35, 39, 41–42, 63, 84,
105–106, 108–110, 116, 120, 127,
135, 147, 159
- Liberian civil war, 40, 42, 150
- Libya, xiii, 37, 61, 119, 122, 139, 142, 159,
161–171, 170–171, 183, 185
- Live Aid, 185
- Live 8 Concert, 185
- Lobito, 70
- Lockerbie, 163–164
- Logistics, 8, 38, 111, 124
- Lokoja, 9
- Lome, 162
- Lome Convention, 31
- Lome Summit, 163, 166
- London, 7, 17, 52, 91, 116, 181
- Louisiana, 121
- Low, D.A., 91
- Luanda, 107
- Lugard, Frederick, 8
- Lumumba, Patrice, 144, 146
- Lusaka, 18, 70–71, 133, 165, 175
- Lusaka Declaration, xii 71
- Lusaka Manifesto, 71
- Maamba Collieries, 58
- Maatuk, 164
- Macroeconomic policy, 47, 50
- Madagascar, 39, 65, 163
- Maiduguri, 102
- Majority Rule, 107,
- Malabo, 93–94, 187
- Malan, Daniel, 10, 77
- Malaria, 135, 138–140
- Malawi, 57, 59–60, 77, 136, 137, 163
- Malaya, 172
- Malaysia, 130, 200
- Mali, 65, 144, 163, 169, 181
- Mamdani, Mahmood, 179
- Manchester, 143
- Mandela, Makgatho, 137
- Mandela, Nelson, xii, 11, 20–21, 26,
30–32, 36, 45–48, 62, 67, 73, 84,
137, 152–153, 173–174
- Manhattan Project, 173
- Mann, Simon, 63 Mano River Union
(MRU), 178
- Manuel, Trevor, 49–50, 177
- Manyika, 86
- Maputo, 70, 76
- Marijuana, 79
- Market Access, 76, 175, 198

- Market economy, 51, 58
- Marshall Plan, 177
- Marxist Regime, 77, 116
- Maryland, xvi, 136
- Massai, 85
- Material resources. *See* Natural Resources
- Matthew Effect, 128
- Matthew, Gospel of St., 128
- Mauritania, 144
- Mauritius, 72, 77, 93, 110
- Mazrui, Ali, A. 41, 128
- Mbaku, John, 188
- Mbanafo, Louis, 97
- Mbeki, Thabo, 18, 22, 25, 30–31, 36, 48, 50–52, 62, 67, 76, 152–154, 161, 163–164, 165–168, 171, 174–177, 181, 183, 188–189
- Mboya, Tom, 144
- Mediation, 40, 147
- Mediterranean Sea, 171–172
- Melbourne, 116
- Mengistu, 147
- Metternich, Von Klemens, 86
- Mexico, 118, 130, 169
- Middle Belt, 9, 150
- Middle East, 1, 115, 118–119, 199
- Mid-West, 144, 151–152
- Militarization, 124, 126–127
- Military aid, 18–19, 124–125
- Military dictatorship, 38
- Military government, 14, 30
- Millennium Action Plan (MAP), 175
- Millennium Development Goals (MDG), 137
- Mineral resources, 38, 114–117
- Minerals, 38
- Mining, 115–117
- Minority, 5, 9, 11, 16
- Mixed marriage, 14
- Mkapa, 177
- Mobile phone, 187
- Mobile Telecommunication Network (MTN), 32
- Modernization, 87, 104, 163
- Mogae, 177
- Moi, Daniel Arap, 159, 163, 182, 184
- Mongella, Gertude Ibengwe, 167
- Monitoring, 124–125
- Monopoly, 130
- Monroe Doctrine, 40
- Monrovia Doctrine, 42
- Monrovia Group, 144–145
- Montreal, 17
- Morocco, 39, 122, 144, 147, 149–150
- Mosha, Felix, 156
- Moto, Severo, 63
- Mozambique, 3, 19–20, 56, 57–59, 65, 76–77, 79, 84, 87, 91–92, 108, 114, 120, 142, 148, 176
- Mpumalanga Province, 115
- Mugabe, Robert, 51, 70, 159, 163, 182, 184, 189, 200
- Multinational Corporations, 119, 128–130
- Munich, 17
- Museveni, Yoweri, 167,
- Muslims, 1, 126
- Mutesa, Edward, 91
- Nagasaki, 115
- Nairobi, 180
- Naldi, Gino, 146, 150
- Namibia, xvi, 19–20, 58, 60, 73, 77, 91, 93, 115–116, 142, 148
- Narcotic, 117
- Nassarawa, 100
- Nasser, Abdul, 78
- Natal, 11, 13, 88
- Natal Province, 133
- Nation building, 46–47, 86
- National Association for the Advanced Colored People (NAACP), 143
- National Committee against Apartheid (NACAP), 20
- National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), 91, 94–98, 100
- National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), 148
- National Party of South Africa NPSA), 13
- National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 63
- National interests, 124, 127, 131–133, 171
- National Liberation Movement, 77, 116
- National party, of South Africa, 89–90, 92, 138
- Nationalism, 88–89, 104, 145
- Natural gas, 118

- Natural resources, xiii, 25, 56, 75,
114–115, 124, 128, 130, 190,
198, 201
- Ndebele, 86
- Ndu, 86
- Nehru, Pundit Jawaharlal, 131
- Nene, George, 25
- Neocolonialism, 29, 37, 148, 180, 194
- Neoliberalism, 46, 51, 152–154, 168, 181
- Netherlands, 12
- Netshitenzhe, Joel, 177
- New African Initiative (NAI), 175
- New Partnership for Africa's Development
(NEPAD), xiii, 25, 62, 165, 171,
173–175, 177–185, 187–190,
195, 198
- New World Order, 37, 69, 39, 157. *See also*
New International System, 113
- New York City, 16, 121, 134
- New York Mercantile Exchange, 121
- New Zealand, 17, 21, 114
- Newly Independent States (NIS), 3, 31
- Ngala, 89
- Ngwaketse, 93
- Ngwato, 93
- NIGCOMSAT-1, 120
- Niger, 115–116, 163
- Niger Delta, 9, 98–99. *See also* Niger Delta
Region 99
- Niger Delta Territories, 7
- Niger Delta Volunteer Service, 98
- Nigeria, xi–xiii, 2–9, 11–27, 29–42, 44, 49,
60–62, 65, 84–87, 90–91, 94–103,
106, 109–110, 118, 120–122, 125,
135, 150, 152, 154–156, 159–161,
163, 168, 170–171, 174–176,
183–184, 188, 195, 199–200. *See* Big
brother, Pan-Nigeriana, 42
- Nigerian Army, 100
- Nigerian civil war, 40, 86, 94, 103, 147
- Nigerian Electric Power Authority
(NEPA), 23
- Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), 96–97
- Nigerian National Democratic Party
(NNDP), 94–97
- Nigerian Railway, 94
- Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM), 94
- Njoku, Eni, 94
- Nkrumah, Kwame, xiii, 1, 41, 111, 132,
141, 143–44, 146, 148, 184, 191–
192, 194, 198–199
- Nkuhlu, Wiseman, 177
- Nnoli, Okwudiba, 127, 143, 146, 151
- Non-Aligned Movement, 24, 26, 131–133,
143, 145
- Nongovernment Organization (NGO),
66–67, 98, 101, 161, 207, 237
- North, 135
- North Africa, 190, 199
- North Africa Consultative Community
(NACC/Maghreb), 186, 200
- North American Free Trade Area
(NAFTA), 187
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), 17, 78, 117, 124, 185–186
- North Korea, 164
- Northern Elements Progressive Union
(NEPU), 96. *See also* (NPF)
- Northern Progressive Front
- Northern People's Congress (NPC), 91,
94–97, 100
- Northern Protectorate, 7–8, 97
- Northern Region, 94–98. *See also*
Northern Nigeria, 85
- Nsukka, 95
- Nuclear Power, 139
- Nuclear Project, 139
- Nuclear weapons, 139
- Nyang, Sulayman, v, xv
- Nyerere, Julius, 92, 113, 173, 192, 196
- Nyeri, 86
- Nzeogwu, Kaduna, 102
- Nzo, Alfred, 153
- Nzongola-Ntalaja, 106
- Obama, Barack, 127
- Obasanjo, Olusegun, 16, 18, 21–22,
25, 33, 39, 41, 152, 154–163, 165,
167–168, 171, 174–177, 181–183,
186, 189
- Obasanjo (Military) Administration, 18
- Obiakor, Chikadibia, Lt-General, 36
- Obiang, Teodoro, 94
- Obote, Milton, 91
- Official Development Assistance (ODA),
127, 194

- Ogoja, 98. *See also* Ogoja-River State
- Ogoni activists, 21, 30–31. *See also* Ogoni Crisis, and Ogoni Leaders
- Ogoni Crisis, 21
- Ogoni leaders, 30
- Ogwu, Joy, 37–38
- Oil, 99, 115, 118–119, 190. *See also* oil production
- Ojukwu, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu, 14, 99, 103
- Okotie-Eboh, Festus, 100
- Okpara, Michael, 95
- Oluleye, James, 101–102
- Olympic Games, 17
- OMEGA, 175
- Onimade, Bade, 37–38
- Operation Rachel, 55, 80
- Orange Free State, 11, 13, 173
- ORC, Macro Corporation, 136
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 155
- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 155
- Organization of African Unity (OAU), xiii, xvi, 20, 25, 34, 39, 62, 92, 111, 141–143, 145–156, 158–163, 168, 170–171, 183, 192–193. *See also* OAU Charter
- Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee, 147–148
- Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 19, 121, 123
- Osadebey, Dennis, 95
- Osama Bin Laden, 2, 187
- Otta, 155–156
- Ovambo, 93
- Owonaro, Sam, 98
- Pacific, 31, 114
- Pacific Basin, 68
- Padmore, George, 143
- Pakistan, 161
- Palestine, 119
- Pan-African, 39, 60, 143–144, 145, 158, 160, 170
- Pan-African Organization, 159
- Pan-African Freedom Movement of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa, 106
- Pan-African Parliament, 167, 184
- Pan-African Projects, xiii, 198–199
- Pan-African Union, xiii, 199
- Pan-Africanism, xiii, 143, 158, 191, 199, 201
- Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), 11, 18–20
- PAN-AM-103, 163–164
- Parastatal, 176
- Paris, 155
- Parliament, 12–13, 167
- Partition, 110, 146, 198
- Patriotism, 110, 130, 177
- Pax Africana, 42
- Pax Britannica, 195
- Pax Nigeriana, 42
- Peace and Security Council, 165
- Peacekeeping Operations, 35, 42, 44
- Peer Review Mechanism (PRM), 172, 184
- Pennsylvania, 134
- Pentagon, 117, 124, 134
- Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), 160
- Piedmont, 87
- Plateau, 151
- Platinum, 115
- Policy makers, 46, 55, 60, 99, 188
- Political leaders, 27, 49, 84–85, 87, 109
- Political parties, 10, 94–96
- Political power, 3, 71, 76, 81, 90, 108
- Political stability, 41, 81, 110, 184
- Population, 8, 10–11, 26, 68
- Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), 63, 148
- Portugal, 116, 142, 148
- Portuguese, 9, 12, 87, 116, 127, 171, 146
- Poverty, 23, 25–26, 51–53, 192–193, 199
- Poverty Alleviation, 192
- Powell, Colin, 90
- Power Holding Company of Nigeria, 23
- Preemptive war doctrine, 123
- Prendergast, John, 119
- Pretoria, 32, 49, 63, 81, 93, 119
- Prodi, Romani, 164
- Propaganda war, 16–17
- Property rights, 153, 178
- Protectorate, 10
- Prussia, 87
- Pyongyang, 164

- Qualifications, 100
 Race, 84
 Racial issue, 12
 Racism, 12–13, 16–17, 26, 70, 132, 147
 Rainbow nation, 46, 68
 Rand, 49, 72
 Reconciliation, 110
 Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), 48, 53, 68, 75
 Recovery plan, 25, 50, 53
 Red Cross, 107
 Red Sea, 114, 125
 Refugee Crisis, xi
 Refugees, 61, 113, 201
 Regional cooperation, 184, 187
 Regional Economic Community, 186
 Regional integration, 184, 186–187
 Renaissance, 62, 92, 158
 Rhodes, Cecil, 9, 116. *See also* Rhodes scholarship, 117
 Rice, Condeleezza, 164
 Riebeek, Jan Van, 8–9
 Riggs Bank, 64
 Rio Tinto Group, 116
 River Limpopo, 70
 River State, 148
 Robben Island, 46
 Robinson, Randall, 151
 Robinson, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 151
 Roosevelt, Franklin, 115
 Rossing Uranium, 116
 Royal Niger, 9
 Royal Niger Company, 7, 9, 12
 Rozwi, 86
 Rule of law, 73, 107, 178
 Rumsfeld, Donald, 63–64, 127
 Russia, 37, 116, 136, 195
 Russia Federation, 37
 Rwanda, 3, 46, 90, 104, 106, 108–110, 135, 150, 172
 Sahara, 2, 198
 Sahara Desert, 198
 Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), 149–150
 Salam Sudan Foundation (SSF), xvi
 Salim Ahmed Salim, 150
 Salisbury, Lord, 142
 Sam, Owonaro, 148
 Sampson, Anthony, 46
 Sanctions, 21
 Sankoh, Foday, 116
 Sao Tome and Principe, 65, 148
 Saudi Arabia, 177–178
 Savimbi, Jonas, 77
 Scotland, 164
 Seatholo, Khorso, 18
 Second World War, 130, 142, 177
 Secret Intelligence Service (SIS MI6), 64
 Secretary of Defense. *See also* Robert Gates
 Seko, Mobutu Sese, 60, 90, 111, 159
 Self-transformation, 2, 25, 195
 Senegal, 36, 37, 182, 267, 177, 188
 Senghor, Leopold Sedar, 144
 September 11, 123–124, 134–135
 Seychelles, 69, 72, 77
 Shared heritage, xii, 6–9
 Sharpville massacre, 5, 11, 13, 15, 19
 Shona, 86, 93
 Sierra Leone, 3, 24, 35, 39–41, 63, 84, 105–106, 108–110, 116, 135, 159–160
 Sierra Leonean civil war, 35, 105–106
 Sierra Leone's Diamond, 117
 Sinai, 35
 Singapore, 119, 200
 Sirte, 160–162, 183. *See also* Sirte Declaration
 Slavery, 37, 111, 151–152
 Smith, Johann, 63
 Snyder, Charles, 179
 Sobekwu, Robert, 20
 Sokoto, 7, 95, 102
 Somalia, 24, 39, 46, 105, 111, 117, 127, 142, 149
 South Africa, xi–xiii, xvi, 1–6, 8–27, 29–40, 45–81, 84, 88, 91–92, 107, 114–117, 125, 134, 136–137, 139, 147–148, 151–155, 163, 165, 174, 176–177, 183–184, 188–189, 199–200
 South African Airlines, 51
 South African Breweries (SAB), 64
 South African Defense Force (SADF), 55, 63

- South African Electric Supply Commission (ESCOM), 23, 58
 South African Forest Corporation (SAFCOL), 51
 South African National Defense Force (SANDF), 55
 South African State Oil Corporation (SASOL), 23
 South African Youth Revolutionary Council (SAYRCO), 18
 South Asia, 126
 South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO), 78
 South Korea, 130, 200
 South West Africa, 142
 South West African Peoples' Organization (SWAPO), 19
 Southeastern Europe, 126
 Southern Africa, 9–10, 70–76, 79–85, 127, 88–89, 137, 142, 169, 180, 200
 Southern Africa Relief Fund (SARF), 18
 Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference (SACBC), 181
 Southern African Countries, 137
 Southern African Custom Union (SACU), 31, 60, 77
 Southern African Development Coordination Conference, xi–xii, 70–73
 Southern African Development Community (SADC), xi–xii, 3, 24, 40, 43, 57, 59–60, 69–81, 126, 173, 180, 200
 Southern Protectorate, 146
 Southern Sudan, 92, 149
 Soviet Union, 3, 37, 78, 144–145
 Soweto uprising, 18
 Soyinka, Wole, 109
 Spain, 63, 142
 Spanish Sahara, 142
 Special Committee, 63
 Special Committee on Peacekeeping, 63
 Spinola, Antonio, General, 77
 Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA), 25, 175
 Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), 23, 178, 188–189
 Stuttgart, 126
 Sub-Saharan Africa, 1, 140
 Sudan, xvi, 2, 24, 39–40, 90, 103, 105–106, 109–111, 119, 122, 127, 135, 159, 174, 185
 Sudanese Civil War, 158–159
 Suez Canal, 115, 119
 Sun City, 168
 Sustainable Development, xiii, 73, 139, 154, 178, 184
 Swaziland, 59–60, 77, 136
 Swiss, 51
 Taiwan, 130
 Tamanrasset, 187
 Tanzania, 35, 57–58, 61, 65, 69–70, 77, 92, 120, 142, 147, 167, 192, 196
 Taylor, Charles, 106, 116,
 Technology, 36
 Tehran, 121
 Telecommunications, 23, 51, 75
 Terror, 124
 Terrorism, 113, 134–135
 Terrorist organization, 134
 Texaco oil, 123
 Texas, 121
 Texas Rail Commission, 123
 Thailand, 136, 140
 Thatcher, Margaret, 63,
 Thatcher, Mark, 63
 Thomson, Alex, 142
 Togo, 3, 41–42, 142, 162, 183
 Togoland, 142
 Toit, Dirk Du, 23
 Toit, Nick du, 63
 Tonga, 130
 Toure, Sekou, 130, 144–145
 Trade, 95, 114
 Trade Liberalization, 193
 Trans Continental Belt, 70
 Transnet, 176
 Transparency, 33, 109, 191
 Transvaal, 11, 13
 Transvaal Province, 16
 Treaties, 7, 53, 74
 Tribes, 87, 130
 Tribalism, 87
 Tripoli, 165, 167, 184
 Tropic of Cancer, 170–171

- Tropic of Capricorn, 170–171
 Tswana, 86, 93
 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 54, 67
 Tuberculosis, 54, 136, 138–140
 Tunisia, 182
 Turkey, 121, 198
 Tutsi, 90, 104–106
 Tutu, Desmond, 30, 67
- Uganda, 65, 90, 125, 136–137, 140, 147, 167
 Union of African States, 146, 161–162, 168, 171
 United Arab Emirates, 58
 United African Company (UAC), 7
 Union Government, 9–10
 United Kingdom, 64, 151
 United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), 96
 United Nations (UN), 18–20, 26, 28, 33–35, 37, 47–48, 62–63, 89, 126, 163
 United Nations-African Union Peacekeeping Mission, 191
 United Nations AIDS (UNAIDS), 136–137, 139
 United Nations Committee against Apartheid, 20, 28, 50
 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 24
 United Nations Conference on Racism, 176
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 24
 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 196
 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 2, 150, 156, 175, 184, 186, 200
 United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Council (UNESCO), 159
 United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
 United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (UNFAO), 185
 United Nations Food Program (UNFP), 200
 United Nations General Assembly, 12–13, 16, 33–34, 44, 129, 138, 148, 152, 181
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 151
 United Nations Millennium Development Goal (UNMDG), 137, 179. *See also* United Nations Millennium Development Program (UNMDP)
 United Nations Organization (UNO), 24, 33–37, 41, 83, 107, 129, 132–133, 138–139, 141, 143, 145, 146, 148, 151–152, 163, 165, 185, 192, 196
 United Nations Peace-Keeping, 24, 34–35, 50. *See also* UN Peace Building Commission, 109
 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), xii, 24, 29, 35–37, 37–38, 43–44, 165
 United Nations System (UNS), 33, 193
 United Nations World Health Organization (WHO), 138
 United Peoples Party (UPP), 96
 United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), 96–97
 United States, xi, 1, 17, 36, 43, 64, 78, 107, 114–116, 120, 122–125, 126, 139, 143, 151, 180, 189, 197
 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 136
 United States Congress, 193
 United States of Africa, 161–163, 192, 199
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 26
 Universal Hero, 32, 46
 Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), 143
 Uranium, 115–116
 Uruguay, 78
- Vail, Leroy, 132
 Venezuela, 118
 Verwoerd, Hendrick, 77
 Voster, John, 77
 Vertical integration, 76
 Viva, Zwelinzima, 187
- Wachuku, Jaja, 18
 Wade, Abdoulaye, 25, 174, 177, 181, 189
 War on terror, 124, 134–135

- Washington, D.C., 118–119, 134. *See also*
 Washington Consensus, 178
- Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 116
- West Africa, xi, 3, 32, 41–43, 83, 119, 125,
 136, 142, 160, 190
- West African Frontier Force (WAFF), 7
- Western Cape, 53, 78
- Western Cape Province, 89
- Western Europe, 78, 87, 114, 129, 151. *See also* Western Europeans
- Western hemisphere, 35
- Western Powers, xi, 5, 24, 32, 117, 195, 194
- Western Region, 141–142, 144–148
- Western Saharan, 39, 142, 148–150
- Western Sudan, 24, 35, 127
- Westphal, Michel, 64
- White House, 134
- White Minority Regime, 81
- White Rule, 77
- Williams, Chancellor, 194
- Wilson, David, 136
- Witwatersrand, 70
- Wiwa, Ken Saro-Wiwa, 4, 21, 30
- Women's groups, 167
- Women organizations, 167
- World Bank, 24, 40, 124, 136, 178, 182,
 189–190, 192, 194, 196
- World Conference against Racism, 151
- World Diamond Congress, 117
- World Health Organization (WHO), 138
- World Trade Center, 134
- World Trade Organization (WTO), 24,
 169, 180, 182
- Worldview, 124, 152–153
- Worldwide, 140
- Yar'Adua, Shehu Musa, General, 21
- Yemen, 119
- Yergin, Daniel, 123
- Yoruba, 87, 94–96, 98, 198
- Young, Crawford, 88
- Yugoslavia, 46
- Young Turks, 165
- Zaire. *See also* Democratic Republic of
 Congo
- Zambia, 18, 58, 61, 65, 69–71, 77, 120,
 133, 136–137, 144, 164, 175
- Zartman, I. William, 155–156
- Zezuru, 86
- Zimbabwe, 19–20, 51, 54, 58–59, 69–72,
 77–78, 81, 84, 86, 91, 93, 136–137,
 148, 163, 165, 184–185, 189, 199–200
- Zimbabwean African National Union
 (ZANU-PF), 165
- Zinc, 115
- Zombie, 195
- Zuma, Nkosazana Dlamini, 48, 165